







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MEMOIRS
OF THE
KINGS OF SPAIN
OF THE
HOUSE OF BOURBON,

FROM
THE ACCESSION OF PHILIP THE FIFTH
TO
THE DEATH OF CHARLES THE THIRD:

1700....TO....1788.

DRAWN FROM ORIGINAL AND UNPUBLISHED DOCUMENTS.

BY
WILLIAM COXE, M.A. F.R.S. F.S.A.
ARCHDEACON OF WILTS, AND RECTOR OF BEMERTON.

IN THREE VOLUMES.

VOL. II.

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1813.

MEMOIRS
OF THE
KINGS OF SPAIN
OF THE
HOUSE OF BOURBON

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Peterboro'-court, Fleet-st.
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CONTENTS

OF

VOLUME II.

CHAPTER XIX.—1711.—Disastrous state of France—Defection of England from the Grand Alliance—Secret Negotiations between the British ministry and France—Situation of Spain—Declining health of the Queen—Internal feuds, and temporary misunderstanding between the courts of Versailles and Madrid—Memorial of Noailles on the situation of the Court and Country—His cabals against the Queen and Princess Orsini—His recal, and the disgrace of Aguilar—Mission and Instructions of the new envoy Bonnac—Opposition of Philip and his Ministers to the sacrifices required by Louis as the price of Peace—Successful interference of the Princess—Philip grants full powers to Louis, to continue the negotiation in his behalf—Departure of Charles from Catalonia—His election to the imperial throne—Breach between the courts of London and Vienna—Opening of the Congress of Utrecht—Advantages gained by Louis—Disgrace of Marlborough—Campaign of 1711 in Catalonia..... page 1.

CHAPTER XX.—1712—1714.—Deaths of the new Dauphin and his eldest Son, and hopes of Philip to be called to the French throne—Negotiations to prevent the union of the two Crowns—Correspondence of Louis and Philip—Philip agrees to renounce his pretensions to France—Progress of the arrangement between France and England—England separates from the Allies, and agrees to a suspension of arms—Success of the French in the Netherlands—Philip makes his public Renunciation—Establishment of the new french Colony of Louisiana—The Dutch compelled to accept the mediation of England—The Ministers of Philip admitted to the Congress—Conclusion of the Negotiations for Peace—Treaties of Utrecht, Rastadt, and Baden..... page 32.

CHAPTER XXI.—1712—1714.—Departure of the English troops from Catalonia—Afflicting case of the Catalans—Their spirited resolution—Treaty for the evacuation of Catalonia concluded by the Emperor—Negotiation between England and Spain relative to the Catalan constitution and privileges—Their cause abandoned by England—They reject the offer of the Castilian Government, and prepare for an obstinate defence—Military operations in Catalonia—March of the French army—Siege, defence and storm of Barcelona—The Catalan constitution abrogated—Surrender of Majorca—Letter from the Emperor to General Stanhope on the fate of the Catalans..... page 57.

CONTENTS.

- CHAPTER XXII.—1714.—**The Princess Orsini obstructs the conclusion of Peace, to extort the cession of her Sovereignty in the Netherlands—Death of Maria Louisa, Queen of Spain—Despondency of Philip, and influence of the Princess—Administration and financial regulations of Orri—Fruitless attempt to reform the Abuses of the Church—Disputes and reconciliation of the Princess with the Court of Versailles—Her negotiations and intrigues for the re-marriage of Philip—Choice of Elizabeth Farnese, Princess of Parma—Arrival of the new Queen in Spain—Disgrace and banishment of the Princess—Remarks on this singular event—Her subsequent adventures—Changes in the Spanish administration. *page 74.*
- CHAPTER XXIII.—1715—1716.—**Death of Louis the Fourteenth—Change of policy in the court of Madrid—Rivalry between Philip and the Regent Duke of Orleans, and his animosity against the Emperor—Character of the new queen Elizabeth Farnese—Rise, ascendancy, and designs of Alberoni. *page 98.*
- CHAPTER XXIV.—1716—1717.—**State of Europe—Political and commercial disputes between Spain and England, and views of Philip on the French throne—Alberoni promotes a breach with France and an union with England—Signature of a commercial Treaty—Declaration of Philip against the Pretender—Correspondence of Mr. Dodington, British Envoy, and his intercourse with Alberoni—Overtures to England for an Alliance against the Emperor—Declined—Treaties which led to the conclusion of the Triple Alliance. . . *page 113.*
- CHAPTER XXV.—1716—1717.—**Indignation of Philip at the treaties between England, the Emperor, and France—Artful conduct of Alberoni—His attempts to alarm or lure England into an alliance with Spain—Conferences of Alberoni with the British Envoy—Extracts from the correspondence of Mr. Dodington, relative to the situation and views of Alberoni. *page 127.*
- CHAPTER XXVI.—1717.—**Hesitation of the Dutch to join in the Triple Alliance—Proposals of reconciliation made to Spain and the Emperor—Conferences of the British Minister on the offer of Parma, Placentia, and Tuscany—Arrest of the Spanish Inquisitor General, by the Austrian Governor of Milan—Indignation of Philip—Fruitless attempts of Alberoni to prevent a Rupture—Letter to the Duke of Popoli—Obtains the sanction of the Council of State for the commencement of Hostilities. *page 153.*
- CHAPTER XXVII.—1717.—**Hostile preparations in the eastern ports of Spain—Promotion of Alberoni to the dignity of Cardinal—Departure of the Spanish Expedition against Sardinia—Attempts of Alberoni to amuse the courts of England and France—Invasion and Conquest of Sardinia—Justification of Spain—Alarms and preparations of England and France—Overtures of accommodation made to Spain—Preparations for a new Expedition—Mission of Mr. Stanhope to Madrid, to propose overtures of accommodation—England finally overcomes the lukewarmness of France and Holland—Conferences of the British ministers with Alberoni on the subject of the overtures—The Spanish court affects to accept the proffered terms—Illness and recovery of the King—Unpopularity of Alberoni—Anecdote relative to his ludicrous squabble with the duke of Escalona. *page 164.*

CONTENTS.

- CHAPTER XXVIII.—1717—1718.**—New efforts of France and England to promote an accommodation—Mission of the Marquis de Nancré to Madrid, and cabals of the Regent with the disaffected Spaniards—England equips an Armament to check the aggressions of Spain—Indignation of Philip—Reproachful Letters from Alberoni to Mr. Dodington—His intrigues in France and England—Negotiations with Victor Amadeus—Invasion of Sicily—Arrival of the British Armament on the Spanish Coasts, and new attempts for an accommodation—Conclusion of the Quadruple Alliance—Arrival of Earl Stanhope, and his Negotiations at Madrid—Destruction of the Spanish Fleet by Admiral Byng—Indignation of the Court—Fruitless offer of Gibraltar, as the recompense for the accession of Philip to the Quadruple Alliance—Departure of Earl Stanhope—Manifestos of Spain relative to the invasion of Sicily..... *page 186.*
- CHAPTER XXIX.—1718—1719.**—Remonstrances of the Spanish court against the conduct of England—Cabals of Alberoni with the different powers of Europe—Arrangements with Sweden and Russia for an invasion of England—Conspiracy against the Regent of France detected—Papers and Manifestos published on the occasion—France declares war—Philip heads the army—Unsuccessful campaign—Capture of the frontier Fortresses, and destruction of the Docks and Arsenals—Death of Charles the Twelfth, and neutrality of Sweden and Russia—Fruitless Expedition to Scotland in favour of the Pretender—Unsuccessful attempt on Brittany—Misfortunes of the Spanish arms in Sicily—Accession of the Dutch to the Quadruple Alliance—Ineffectual manœuvres of Alberoni to divide the Allies. *page 206.*
- CHAPTER XXX.—1719—1720.**—Decline of Alberoni's credit—Cabals and machinations to obtain his disgrace—Interference of the English and French cabinets—He loses the favour of the Queen—His dismissal and departure from Spain—Incidents of his Journey to the Genoese territories—Arrest and liberation—Persecutions against him—His Apologies, and the Replies—Evasion—Re-appearance and subsequent Adventures—Spirit of his Administration, and Improvements in Spain—His Person and Character—Close of his Life..... *page 228.*
- CHAPTER XXXI.—1720—1723.**—Philip reluctantly accedes to the Quadruple Alliance—Successful expedition against the Moors in Africa—Difficulties with regard to the fulfilment of the Quadruple Alliance—Alliance of Spain with England and France—Negotiations relative to the restoration of Gibraltar—Correspondence on that subject—Double marriages between the families of France and Spain—Increasing difficulties in the negotiation.....*page 252.*
- CHAPTER XXXII.—1721—1723.**—Reconciliation of Philip with the Regent Duke of Orleans—Double Marriages between the two Branches of the House of Bourbon—New difficulties in arranging the accommodation with the Emperor—Opening of the Congress of Cambray—Habits and monotonous life of Philip and his Queen—State of the Court and Administration after the removal of Alberoni—Temporary favour of Scotti, d'Aubenton, Tolosa, and Mirabal—Rise and Character of Grimaldo. *page 270.*
- CHAPTER XXXIII.—1724.**—Construction of the royal residence of St. Ildefonso—Abdication of Philip—Acts and formalities on the occasion—Conjectures relative to the causes of this extraordinary event. *page 283.*

CONTENTS.

CHAPTER XXXIV.—1724—1725.—Accession and Character of Louis—Account of his Queen—Their matrimonial infelicity—Her caprice and indiscretion—Temporary disgrace—Project for obtaining a Divorce—Embarrassments of the new Government—Characters and situation of his Ministers—Predominant influence of the Court of St. Ildefonso—Plans of the Queen Dowager for the establishment of her Son, Don Carlos—Incipient Schism between the two Courts—Attacks against the authority of Philip—Illness and Death of Louis—Philip resumes the Crown, in contradiction to his Vow, and in opposition to a part of the Ministry—Situation of the widowed Queen..... *page 292.*

CHAPTER XXXV.—1725.—Acknowledgment of Don Ferdinand as Prince of Asturias—Cabals on the expected changes in the government—Removal of the Junta—Disgrace of Mirabal and Lede—Diminution of the credit of Grimaldo, and rise of Orendayn—Change of policy in Spain—Overtures to the Emperor—Account of Ripperda—His plans of political œconomy—Negotiations at Vienna—Dismission of the infanta from France, and marriage of Louis the Fifteenth with Maria Letzinski—Indignation of the King and Queen—Their ineffectual overtures to England—Conclusion of an alliance with the court of Vienna... *page 316.*

CHAPTER XXXVI.—1726.—Substance of the three Treaties concluded by Ripperda at Vienna—His departure and arrival in Spain—His indiscreet and violent conversations—Honourable reception at Madrid—Entrusted with the sole administration of affairs. *page 336.*

CHAPTER XXXVII.—1726.—Administration of Ripperda—His ineffectual attempts to intimidate and afterwards to divide the maritime Powers and France—Difficulties of his situation—Failure of his promises to the imperial court—Disputes with Konigseg the imperial Ambassador—Attacks of his enemies—Loses the favour of the King and Queen—Disgrace—Takes refuge in the Hotel of the English Ambassador—Discloses the secrets of the Spanish Cabinet—Arrest and imprisonment in the Castle of Segovia—Subsequent adventures—Change of Administration..... *page 345.*

CHAPTER XXXVIII.—1726.—Preponderance of the German influence at Madrid—Disgrace of Grimaldo and Change of Ministry—Rise of Patino—Ineffectual attempts of the French Court to effect a Reconciliation—The Queen obtains the disgrace of the Confessor and the Sicilian Abbots—Philip resumes his designs on the French Succession—Instructions and Mission of the Abbot Montgon to Paris—Commencement of an intercourse between the two Bourbon Courts—Montgon returns to Madrid—Temporary Hostilities with England—Siege of Gibraltar—Signature of the Preliminaries by the Emperor—Delays of Spain—Effects of the Death of George the First—Restoration of the correspondence between France and Spain... *page 362.*

CHAPTER XXXIX.—1727—1728.—Cavils and delays of the Court of Madrid in regard to the execution of the Preliminaries—Hostile preparations of England—Mission of Mr. Keene and count Rottembourg, as English and French Plenipotentiaries to Madrid—Audiences of Rottembourg—Spirit and resentment of the Queen—She induces Rottembourg to accept a modification of the Preliminaries in favour of the Spanish demands—Acquiescence of the

CONTENTS.


English and Dutch Ministers—Effects of this supposed accommodation—England persists in rejecting the proposed modification of Spain—Extorts the concurrence of France—Remonstrances and threats of the Hanover Allies—Chicanery and obstinacy of the Queen—Motives which induced her to recede—Illness of the King—Act of the Pardo..... *page 388.*

CHAPTER XL.—1728—1731.—Tardy and inefficient Proceedings of the Congress of Soissons—Obstructions to the execution of the Preliminaries by Spain—Hypochondriac Malady of Philip, and power of the Queen—His ineffectual attempt to abdicate—Illness of Louis the Fifteenth, and new hopes of Philip to succeed to the French Crown—Secret Plans of the Courts of Madrid and Vienna—Double Marriage between the Families of Spain and Portugal—Establishment of the royal Residence at Seville—Increasing Malady of the King—Separation of the Courts of Spain and Austria—Treaties of Seville and Vienna—Disgrace of Montgon—Death of St. Philip..... *page 412.*

CHAPTER XLI.—1732—1736.—Continuance of Philip's Malady—Successful Expedition against Oran—Return of the Spanish Court to the Capital—Machinations of Spain against the Emperor—Negotiations with France—War of the Polish Succession—Campaigns in Italy and Germany—Conquest of Naples and Sicily—Don Carlos proclaimed King—Division in the Bourbon Alliance—Preliminaries of Vienna concluded between France and Austria—Indignation of the Spanish Court—Their reluctant accession to the Preliminaries—Dispute with the Pope—Temporary rupture with Portugal, and acquisition of the colony of Sacramento..... *page 432.*

CHAPTER XLII.—1736—1739.—Reluctance of Spain to accede to the definitive Treaty, and attempts to renew the War—Death, Character, and Administration of Patino—Account of his Successor, La Quadra, and the new Administration—Signature of the definitive Treaty..... *page 455.*

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CHAPTER XIX.

1711.

Disastrous state of France—Defection of England from the Grand Alliance—Secret negotiations between the British ministry and France—Situation of Spain—Declining health of the Queen—Internal feuds, and temporary misunderstanding between the courts of Versailles and Madrid—Memorial of Noailles on the situation of the court and country—His cabals against the Queen and Princess Orsini—His recal, and the disgrace of Aguilar—Mission and Instructions of the new envoy Bonnac.—Opposition of Philip and his Ministers to the sacrifices required by Louis as the price of Peace—Successful interference of the Princess—Philip grants full powers to Louis, to continue the negotiation in his behalf—Departure of Charles from Catalonia—His election to the imperial throne—Breach between the courts of London and Vienna—Opening of the Congress of Utrecht—Advantages gained by Louis—Disgrace of Marlborough—Campaign of 1711 in Catalonia.

NOTWITHSTANDING this favourable change of affairs, the crown of Philip still tottered on his head; for the fate of Spain, as well as the issue of the war, ultimately depended on the contest in the Netherlands.

In the preceding year, Douay, Bethune, St. Venant, and Aire, had been added to the conquests of the allies; the iron frontier of France was broken; and another campaign prosecuted with the same skill, and attended with the same success, would have reduced Louis to receive the terms of peace,

CHAP. XIX.
1711.

CHAP. XIX.
1711.

April 14.

dictated before the gates of his capital. Public distress increased with the public disasters, and all the energy of an absolute government scarcely sufficed to draw from an exhausted nation the means of prolonging a defensive and unfortunate contest. The death of the dauphin removed the principal adviser of the war in Spain; while the party of the new dauphin found in every quarter of the court and country, zealous advocates for that restoration of peace, which they considered as the only resource for averting impending ruin.

With regard to the allies, the preceding year had closed with the most flattering aspect. All attempts of France to introduce divisions in the confederacy, and negotiate a separate peace, were ineffectual; while, on the side of the emperor, the defeat of the rebels in Hungary, and the commencement of a negotiation with the Turks, for the termination of a contest which had hitherto weakened his efforts, enabled him to send considerable reinforcements to Spain, the Netherlands, and the Rhine. The time now seemed to be arrived, when retaliation was to be made on France, for the manifold evils she had inflicted on Europe, since the commencement of the thirty years war; when she was to be stripped of those acquisitions which she owed to force, intrigue, and usurpation, and a barrier established for the further security of the states of Europe against her power, injustice, and ambition. At this crisis, the House of Bourbon was again saved by those jealousies among its enemies, which had more contributed to its grandeur than even its own power and resources.

The duke of Savoy, dissatisfied with the emperor for withholding those territories which had been promised as the price of his services to the common cause, opened a secret negotiation with France, which, though discovered and frustrated,

did not fail to leave behind the seeds of suspicion and discord.*

CHAP. XIX.

1711.

But the chief cause which rendered vain all the sacrifices and exertions of the war, which prevented the deliverance of Europe from the scourge of french oppression, was the defection of England from those principles which the british government had been the first to lay down and assert.

This change originated principally in the character and views of queen Anne. Unlike William, she entertained neither personal nor political animosity against France; and she was alike incapable of comprehending the principles, or imbibing the spirit of his system of policy. She had accepted the throne as her right; but the death of her only son, the duke of Gloucester, awakening in her bosom the affections of a sister, she became anxious to restore her dethroned family in the person of her brother. Hitherto, the unexampled success which had crowned her arms, induced her to repress her private sentiments, and she had been borne away by the spirit of an exulting people, and the authority of her great and fortunate ministers, whom she respected, without regarding or approving.

At length, accident rather than design, called these latent inclinations into action. Her favourite, the duchess of Marlborough, had placed near her royal person a dependant relation, Mrs. Masham, with the design of relieving herself from the tedium of constant attendance, and, at the same time, of strengthening her interest. This lady, secretly attached also to the exiled family, and jealous of her patroness, profited by the moments of ill humour, which the overbearing temper of the duchess frequently excited in the breast of the queen. To hasten the downfall of the duchess, she fomented the dissatisfaction of her royal mistress, and became the agent of a private negotiation with Harley, the chief of the tories. As

* Memoires de Berwick, t. 2, p. 182.

CHAP. XIX.
1711.

the queen could not fulfil her designs in favour of her brother, during a war which humbled France, and strengthened the power of the whig ministry, her views were directed to the attainment of peace. In this object, her tory and jacobite advisers equally concurred; because, from party motives, they all had joined in reprobating the conduct of the war, and exciting the popular clamour for its termination.

Those domestic feuds, which are inseparable from a free government, aided the designs of the queen, and accelerated the downfall of the whigs. All the powers of the press, assisted by the talents of the ablest writers, had been effectually employed to misrepresent their conduct, and vilify their characters. Success had gradually lost its power to dazzle. The danger which had awakened the public alarm, was scarcely removed before it was considered as imaginary, and the people began to clamour for the termination of a contest, which they were taught to believe was prolonged merely to gratify personal avarice and private ambition. Of this revolution in the public sentiment, the tories profited with consummate address; they formed an union with the jacobites, and opened secret negotiations with France, and with the exiled family.*

May, 1710. The design being thus far matured, the first blow was struck by the disgrace of the duchess of Marlborough, whose place was filled by Mrs. Masham. The whigs, unaware of their danger, or despising the intrigues of so inconsiderable an agent as a bed-chamber woman, hastened the crisis by their overweening confidence. Instead of catching the alarm on the removal of lord Sunderland, the son in law of Marlborough, from the office of secretary of state; instead of disconcerting their opponents by decision and unanimity, they temporised, and suffered the strength of their party to be gradually under-

June.

* Memoires de Berwick, t. 2. — Macpherson's Papers, vol. 2, passim.

mined by the successive dismissal of their chiefs. In August, the disgrace of Godolphin, the great minister of finance, announced their approaching downfall; and was followed by the voluntary resignation of others. Finally, before the close of the year, an administration of tories was formed under the direction of Harley, and the stability of the party secured by the election of a new parliament, in which the influence of government, their own personal exertions, and the co-operation of the jacobites, gave them an entire ascendancy.

CHAP. XIX.
1711.

In the midst of their success, they could not yet venture openly to attack the well-founded authority of Marlborough. They, therefore, suffered him to retain the command of the army, till, by working on the passions of the people, and abridging the means of success, they had prepared the way for his downfall. The change of measures created a new burst of popularity in their favour, and the services of Harley were soon afterwards rewarded with the earldoms of Oxford and Mortimer, and the high office of lord treasurer. The post of principal secretary of state, with the chief direction of foreign affairs,* was intrusted to his colleague, Henry St. John, better known by the title of Bolingbroke, who, to an inveterate antipathy to the very name of Austria, united a blind partiality to France.

May 24,
1711.

This political revolution occasioned an unfeigned triumph at Paris and Madrid. The fall of the whigs was proclaimed as the salvation of the two monarchies, and Torci justly remarked, "what we have lost in the Netherlands, we shall now gain in London."†

* As Lord Dartmouth, the Secretary for the Southern Department, was unacquainted with french, the transactions with France, which belonged to his department, were transferred to Bolingbroke.

† Torci, t. 3, p. 16 and seq.

CHAP. XIX.
1711.

The new ministers, secure of the parliament, hastened to dissolve the grand alliance, and hurried into a negotiation with France. They, indeed, scarcely waited till they were perfectly established in power, before they listened to overtures, which were conveyed through the channel of marshal Tallard, then a prisoner in England. After his return to France, the communication was kept up by a catholic priest of the name of Gualtier, originally a french spy, and now brought into notice by the earl of Jersey, a zealous adherent of the Stuarts, to whose lady he was chaplain.

These communications were graciously received by Louis; and as early as April 1711, Gualtier was sent to Paris, charged with directions from the new ministers. They represented, in humble terms, that peace was no less expedient for England than for France. They hinted at the necessity of preserving appearances with the allies, and requested the king to propose a renewal of the conferences to the dutch. With a servility ill becoming the ministers of a nation so recently the arbitress of Europe, they declared that such orders should be given to the english plenipotentiaries as should prevent Holland from again obstructing the conclusion of peace, by the renewal of those haughty demands which had insulted the honour, and wounded the feelings of the french monarch. No specific engagement was demanded, but merely a general acknowledgment that their overtures were favourably received.*

Louis, indeed, cordially received these overtures, as the prelude to a far more honourable accommodation than his misfortunes had permitted him to expect since the battle of Blenheim. Under the pretext of consulting his own dignity, though, in reality, to make an invidious distinction between

* Torci, t. 3, p. 31—36.

the two maritime powers, he declined opening any direct negotiation with the States, and announced his desire to employ the mediation of England. He expressed these sentiments in a memorial, containing the conditions which he proposed to concede, as the basis of a general accommodation. He offered security to the English for their commerce in Spain, the Indies and the Mediterranean, a barrier in the Netherlands, and the restoration of the commercial advantages formerly enjoyed by Holland. He declared his resolution to give reasonable satisfaction to all the other members of the grand alliance; and as the favourable situation of Philip afforded new expedients to settle the dispute relative to Spain, he stated that means should be taken to obviate the difficulties, and to secure the present situation, commerce and interests of the belligerent powers. Finally, conferences were to be immediately opened for the conclusion of a general peace, and Aix la Chapelle or Liege proposed as the place of meeting.*

April 22.

The british ministry accepted these vague conditions, and meanly approved the mark of contempt shewn towards Holland, as just and delicate. They did not, however, wait for the opening of general conferences; but selfishly grasping at the offer of commercial advantages, required such explanations as led to a private and separate negotiation. By the agency of Gualtier, they continued these clandestine transactions with the utmost activity; while they amused the states with professions of cordiality and confidence. They at length so far matured their arrangements, that Prior, the confidential friend of Oxford and Bolingbroke, was dispatched to Paris in July, to put the last hand to an engagement which was to decide the fate of Europe.

During the progress of a negotiation so fortunate for the

* Bolingbroke's Correspondence, v. 1, p. 172.

CHAP. XIX.
1711.

House of Bourbon, the court of Spain appeared as if inclined to separate its interests from France; and evinced more spirit and independence than it had ever ventured to display, since the recal of the princess Orsini.

In the midst of the recent success, the joy of Philip had been damped by the declining health of the queen. That dreadful malady,* which finally hurried her to an early grave, already preyed on her constitution, worn down with incessant cares and exertions. But though her personal charms began to fade, and her native vivacity to diminish, her spirit continued unbroken, and she maintained her usual ascendancy over the mind and affections of her doting husband. Philip, on the contrary, was deeply affected by the sufferings of one so tenderly beloved: brooding over the prospect of his approaching loss, he shrunk from the bustle of a military life, and the necessary occupations of government.

At the same time, the removal of external danger gave new force to internal discontents. The national jealousy of foreigners revived: the nobles renewed their complaints, that repeated proofs of zeal and loyalty had only led to the diminution of the royal favour, and the retrenchment of their just rights. The lofty spirit of Vendome, too independent to bend even to the controul of Louis, irritated the native generals, Aguilar and Valdecañas, who, proud of their recent services, were solicitous to appropriate the management of military affairs, and bitterly censured the operations of their chief. Disputes also arose as before among the french themselves, and amidst the warmest professions of friendship and confidence, great jealousy existed between Vendome and Noailles.

As these contentions gave birth to mutual aversion among

* The King's evil.

those, who had recently acted in unison ; and as the pending negotiations for peace rendered it necessary to acquire a more perfect controul over the court of Madrid, the french monarch delegated Noailles to Saragossa, to perform the functions, without the title of an ambassador. Nor indeed did it appear possible to make a more appropriate choice. Habituated to courts from his infancy, he was supple, insinuating, sagacious, and discreet. He possessed the full confidence of Louis himself, he was protected by the duchess of Burgundy, sister to the queen of Philip, favoured by his relative madame de Maintenon, and the intimate friend of the princess Orsini from her first career in Spain. He had recently been honoured with the title of a grandee, and the order of the golden fleece, accompanied with a flattering letter from the queen, in which she expressed her own and her husband's gratitude for his valuable services. Finally, his early attendance on Philip, and his past experience, had made him intimately acquainted with the disposition of the court and the character of the spanish nation.

The picture drawn by Noailles for the information of his sovereign, is almost a counterpart of that sketched by Tessé, notwithstanding the changes produced by past revolutions. It contains also hints, by no means equivocal, relative to the misunderstanding between the two courts, which had extorted from Torci the complaint, that the secrets of Spain no longer found their way to France.

" I must," he observed, " strongly recommend the appointment of an ambassador, who is likely to be both feared and respected, and who will take upon himself only the affairs of France. Provided I am not charged with the commission I shall be satisfied, for since I see its difficulties, I consider it as one of the least desirable. In regard to France, I can discover only embarrassments and opposition : what may be the consequence

May 19.

CHAP. XIX.
1711.

when the spaniards no longer need our succours, I know not ! Pretences will not then be wanting to efface the remembrance of past benefits. It will be said, Louis the fourteenth has consulted only his own interest in supporting his grandson on the throne. They will censure the convention of Italy, concluded without the co-operation of Philip ; the intention of abandoning Spain when France hoped to do it with advantage ; the little share which she has been permitted to take in the conferences for peace ; the conduct of our countrymen on many occasions, and the seizure of the american treasures.

“ The king and queen and those who surround them are always the same : petty and private reasons overpower the consideration of the general good. Instead of returning to Madrid, the court, without any reasonable motive, chuses to reside at Corella. Since the battle of Villaviciosa a general lethargy prevails : application indeed is not wanting, but it is useless, because without order or rule. Those who restored affairs after the battle of Saragossa, are become suspected, and removed as much as possible. Court intrigues predominate, and no confidence is given except to five or six wretches, without experience or talents.

“ It is necessary to take advantage of the opportunity afforded by the death of the emperor. Peace must be made, and will be made, if Philip is still supported. Provided he keeps Spain and the Indies, he ought to deem himself fortunate, whatever commercial advantages he may grant to the enemy. It is a fine *appanage* for a younger brother. France united with Spain, without being able to give the law, has no other resource, than to persuade Europe, that the union is neither prejudicial nor dangerous. It is for *the interest of France itself*, no less than *for that of the allies*, that Spain should lose something ; since we cannot confide in the disposition of the court of Madrid any longer than it has occasion for our services.

“ With respect to the approaching campaign, notwithstanding all my exertions, no provisions are ready; there is a sad deficiency of arms. Great expences have been incurred for brilliant projects; but the essential point has been neglected. The best determination which can be taken, is to hazard nothing, to support as much as possible an air of superiority over the enemy without undertaking the projected sieges; to confine ourselves to the reduction of the mountainous country; to occupy the strong holds; and to open such a communication as will secure a retreat for the french troops, should any contest arise between the courts of Versailles and Madrid, on the terms of peace.”

Alluding to the queen and princess, though without naming them, he continued :

“ They not only govern the king, but direct all affairs. They place no confidence in any minister who is capable of governing. A presumptuous restlessness carries them beyond bounds. They flatter themselves with recovering all they have lost, and preserving all they possess; while there is reason to fear that all may be lost. The queen, proud and high spirited, ill brooks the sacrifices which are necessary to obtain peace; the princess conforms to her sentiments, but doubtless, labours to maintain herself against a formidable faction; the king acts only from the impulse of one or both. Thus the government floats with the current of prejudice, without order and without stability. Spanish tardiness heaps up the measure of embarrassment.

“ The spaniards are more discontented than ever. They murmur at the little consideration which they enjoy, and the preference given to Italians and Flemings. They expect to see the government entirely confided to foreigners. The phantom of a council of war is without power; its resolutions are only fol-

CHAP. XIX.

1711.

lowed when approved by the secret cabinet, which reserves to itself the minutest details; nothing is carried into execution, because no one knows to whom to apply in the most trifling concern. The evil is incurable, but our sovereign must be apprised of it, that he may know how to act when he has business with this court. A blind confidence, founded on recent success, is the cause of this singular lethargy; and although Philip feels his obligations to his grandfather, he will not be more tractable with regard to the terms of peace.” *

Fixed habits of discretion; the principles or at least the semblance of religion, and the sense of past obligations, did not suffice to repress in the mind of Noailles, a love of rule; like the other ambassadors, we soon find him affected by the atmosphere of the spanish court.

He united with his friend Aguilar, in a design to alienate the king from the queen, and thus to undermine her influence, as well as that of the princess. He urged Philip to separate himself from her bed under the pretext of her ill health; and adopting the cant of hypocrisy, recommended him to take a handmaid to his bosom. The very mention of the revolting proposal deeply affected a devout prince, who both from motives of religion and affection, had preserved inviolable fidelity to the marriage bed. He not only manifested his abhorrence, but instantly communicated the proposal to the queen and princess. Such an attempt justly roused the wounded feelings of the queen. She imparted it to her sister the duchess of Burgundy, and the princess to her protectress madame de Maintenon; and at the austere court of Versailles, where gallantry was no longer tolerated, it produced no less sensation than in Spain. Noailles was recalled; and Aguilar deprived both of his military command and civil offices, and

* Noailles, t. 4, p. 223—228.

exiled from court. The delicate cause of this change was however involved in mystery. The recal of Noailles was cloaked with the pretext of ill health; while the disgrace of Aguilar was ascribed to his disputes with Vendome; nor was the secret known, till it was disclosed by St. Simon, the great collector of court anecdotes, and the recorder of court scandal.*

CHAP. XIX.

1711.

August.

From the memorial of Noailles, it was evident, that notwithstanding the weakness of Spain and its dependence on France, considerable difficulties would arise in obtaining the assent of Philip and his heterogeneous council, to the dismemberment of the monarchy, and the grant of commercial advantages to the maritime powers. The recal therefore of a nobleman in the confidence of both courts, and, before the late imprudent attempt, highly respected both by Philip and his queen; so agreeable to the princess, as well as so conciliating in his demeanour towards the spanish nobles, could not fail to throw additional obstacles in the way of the pending negotiation. He was succeeded by the marquis of Bonnac, who, in order to avoid disputes of etiquette, was only invested with the character of envoy extraordinary. His instructions, drawn up by Torci, will exhibit the peculiar embarrassments which existed in the relations between France and Spain, and at the same time will shew the selfish policy of the court of Versailles, which, in the midst of professions of disinterestedness and anxiety to secure the integrity of the monarchy, was only anxious to purchase favourable terms at the expence of Spain.

After detailing the preceding conduct of Louis in regard to Spain, since the accession of Philip, Torci adverted to the recent negotiations in Holland, and the inflexible resolution of

August 5.

* We should scarcely have relied on the mere authority of St. Simon, had we not found it supported by obscure hints in the Memoires of Noailles and St. Philippe.—Noailles, t. 4, p. 230, 237.—St. Philippe, t. 2, p. 8.—St. Simon, t. v. p. 510.

the allies. "They were," he observed, "convinced that the union between France and Spain would never be broken while Philip maintained himself on the throne. Nevertheless, the king has *concluded no treaty with his grandson*, he has always supported him *gratuitously, and without condition*; he only *acquiesced in the wishes of the Spaniards, when he accepted the will of Charles the second*. He was, therefore, at liberty either to continue or to withdraw his aid; and, perhaps, he would long ago have withdrawn it, had he felt less affection for his grandson, or less esteem for the Spaniards.

"Since the battle of Villaviciosa, the enemy have softened their tone. They found that all their efforts would not deprive Philip of the crown; they are desirous that he should accept the share which they before refused to allow, and have made indirect attempts for that purpose.* But the king of France would not understand their hints; he continued the war without any further demand for peace. His decision and firmness produced a good effect. The new succours have convinced the allies that the conquest of Spain is impossible: peace is at length become the object of their wishes. A close union between France and Spain is necessary, for the advantage of both; but it must not bear the smallest appearance of dependence on the part of Spain. Even could the king regulate the affairs of that kingdom, it would not be prudent, because it would only excite the jealousy of the european powers. Let the interests of the two crowns be united, while each is governed according to its peculiar usages and maxims. At the same time, the enemy, who consider Spain as merely dependent on the orders of the king of France, must not be permitted to flatter themselves with having sown divisions between

* This, doubtless, alludes to the clandestine overtures made at this period by the tory party.

the two kings. The appearance of a perfect concert will be as useful for the attainment of peace, as for the prosecution of war.

CHAP. XIX.
1711.

“ For some years, the true state of Spain has been carefully concealed. Whatever may have been the motive, it becomes necessary to know the real situation of things, and the views of those who govern. Political affairs depend too much on the passions and interests of individuals, and it is no novelty to see the fate of princes regulated by the secret machinations of their courtiers. Bonnac will, therefore, endeavour to discover the hidden wheels which move the machine of government. It is a well known fact, that these secret springs of action are injurious to the real interests of Philip. The government is bitterly censured by the spaniards. Although their complaints may not be just; yet they at least prove some disorder in the administration of affairs. We must discover the evil, to provide the remedy; and if Spain is to be supported, her resources must be well known, in order to ascertain the proportion of assistance.

“ The king of Spain, it is to be feared, is the first who is deceived. He considers presumption as a virtue; he obstinately persists in his opinions once formed, and, if he makes a bad choice, he is not easily persuaded to recede. Should the queen employ her influence, as she seems inclined, the king will be happy to be directed by her, since he must necessarily be governed. For some time, the princess Orsini has affected to withdraw from business; but her credit is undiminished. Philip deliberates and decides with the queen and the princess, and all other transactions are mere form. There is no doubt that the princess is zealous in the cause of France, and anxious to maintain the strict union between the two crowns; yet she may err in her views, and support those as good, which are really bad. Bonnac, while he pays her *extreme deference*, must not conceal the truth.

CHAP. XIX.
1711.

“ The negotiations for peace, and the inevitable dismemberment of the monarchy, will have aggravated the prejudices of the spaniards against France. Yet neither their resentment nor opposition should, in the present circumstances, render them suspected. But those who are the secret advisers of the king, ought to convince him that the happiest moment of his reign will be that in which he signs a peace. Besides, he is too just not to sacrifice his own interests to the tranquillity of his people. Should he, however, neither be moved by this consideration, nor by a regard for France, the king will not be inclined to continue the war, when the only effect must be to procure a few advantages for Spain.”

After enjoining Bonnac to investigate the complaints made by the french merchants of vexations in their commerce, he proceeds: “ Bonnac will solicit the execution of the proper acts for ceding the sovereignty of the Netherlands to the elector of Bavaria. He will appear in all his proceedings to have nothing in view but the splendour of the spanish monarchy, and the recovery of the conquered provinces; but he will not consider their loss as an evil. If Philip continues to possess Spain and the Indies, his states will be better governed, and the union between the two crowns more closely maintained, than if he were to recover the whole monarchy.”

The french minister concludes his instructions with recommending a speedy overture to Portugal, through the agency of the jesuits, and to terminate the dispute with the pope without weakness; because, to break with the court of Rome, was only to labour for the enemy. He acquaints him with the mission of Mesnager to London, and transmits his instructions, with which Bonnac was to conform. “ He must,” it is said, “ act boldly; peace is so necessary to both crowns, that no efforts should be spared to accelerate the desirable event.”*

* Noailles, t. 4, p. 246.

Bonnac is represented as a man of talents, experience, and discretion, and he did not belie his character: notwithstanding the delicate situation of the two courts, he obtained from Philip full powers, authorising the king of France to gain the english by the cession of Gibraltar and Minorca, and the grant of the Asiento, with a port in America, for the security of their commerce.

CHAP. XIX.
1711.

In the interval, the negotiation had proceeded with England. The british ministry insisting on four places in America, Louis did not hesitate to make concessions even beyond their demands. Profiting by the selfish eagerness with which they grasped at commercial advantages, and desirous to leave a perpetual cause of irritation between England and Spain, he tendered as a pledge for the security of the asiento trade, the permission to occupy Cadiz with a swiss garrison. This proposition was even given in one of the public papers in London, as an article of the preliminaries.*

The bare mention of an expedient so dishonourable, roused the indignation of the whole spanish court. Philip himself declared that he would never listen to a proposition which would virtually occasion the loss of Cadiz, and the ruin of the spanish trade to America. Fortunately, the court of London declined the offer; and, after a discussion of some months, reduced its pretensions to an establishment on the bank of the Rio de la Plata, where the british merchants might carry on the commerce of negroes, under the inspection of a spanish officer; and an exemption from some of the duties imposed at Cadiz, on merchandize of british growth or fabric.

Louis acceded to these conditions in the name of his grandson, and communicated to him the result of his negotiation.

“ I trust,” he wrote, “ you will not repent of the confidence

Sept. 13.

* Tindal, v. 17, p. 44.—Noailles, t. 4, p. 249.

CHAP. XIX.

1711.

which you have reposed in me. If I engage you to conditions which you did not foresee, they are essentially necessary to evade the obstinate demands of the English for four places in the Indies. There are opportunities which must not be neglected. Do not, therefore, be surprised, if I have interpreted your full power without consulting you. Had I waited for your answer, much precious time must have been lost; and, I trust, I am labouring for your advantage, when I yield a little to preserve much, which you consented to abandon. I acquaint Bonnac with the details of the negotiation. As he will give you the necessary information, I have only to assure you, that I wish for peace as much for you as for myself; and that I shall be satisfied if I see you firmly established on the throne of Spain. In contributing to that great object to the utmost of my power, I give you a solid proof of my affection.”*

The hints in this letter sufficed to alarm the king and queen, and when Bonnac communicated the conditions, the ministers exclaimed against terms so subversive of the honour and interests of Spain. Philip and the queen were borne away by the torrent. “Do not the English,” they said, “abuse our eagerness for peace, to extort all the advantages which their selfish policy can suggest? Will they not profit by the apathy into which we are thrown by these deceitful negotiations, to raise their exorbitant demands? Is not the best method of procuring peace a determined resolution to prosecute hostilities? enemies are not disarmed by pity, but fear.” They reluctantly announced their acquiescence: yet declared that they yielded from respect and gratitude to the king of France, and not from any dread of new misfortunes.†

Sept. 20.

In virtue of this assent, the arrangements with the british

* Noailles, t. 4, p. 251.

† Ibid. t. 4, p. 253.

ministry were matured, and special and general preliminaries were signed with Mesnager the french agent, who had been secretly dispatched to London, and admitted to an interview with the queen.

CHAP. XIX.

1711.

Oct. 8.

The special preliminaries, which related to England in particular, contained the acknowledgment of queen Anne and the protestant succession; the rasure of Dunkirk, the possession of Gibraltar, Minorca, and St. Christopher's by the english; the transfer of the Asiento for thirty years on the same terms as enjoyed by the french; privileges of trade in Spain equal to the subjects of France; and a portion of territory on the Rio de la Plata. The arrangements relative to the fisheries at Newfoundland, were reserved for future discussion.*

The general preliminaries, signed at the same time, contained the terms offered by France, as the basis of a peace with the allied powers.

The long contested question which had given rise to the war, was passed over, with the vague and unsatisfactory declaration, that Louis would take just and reasonable measures to prevent the union of France and Spain under the same head. The acknowledgment of the protestant succession, and the rasure of Dunkirk, were again referred to; a general promise was given of a barrier for the dutch in the Netherlands, and for the empire and Austria on the side of the Rhine; and the whole was concluded with the favourite phrase, that all the belligerent powers should receive just and reasonable satisfaction.†

As these terms implied the virtual acknowledgment of Philip as king of Spain, there was little reason to expect that he would hesitate in forwarding the negotiation, or demur in

* Bolingbroke's Correspondence, v. 1, p. 374.

† Ibid. v. 1, p. 402.

CHAP. XIX.

1711.

fulfilling his promise of ceding the Netherlands to the elector of Bavaria, as a prelude to their transfer to Austria, and the establishment of a barrier for the dutch. Yet new difficulties were raised on a point apparently decided, and the objections of the spanish court were coupled with a demand for the admission of their plenipotentiaries at the intended congress.

When Bonnac pressed for the cession of the Netherlands, and represented, that as the word of Louis was engaged, his honour would be affected by the refusal; and that the objections made by Spain to a general accommodation, would reduce Louis to enter into a separate treaty, the queen indignantly replied, "France has adopted a new system of proceeding. She expects every thing to be granted by Spain, and employs menaces when arguments fail!"

Philip also dwelt on the refusal of the allies to receive his plenipotentiaries, and could scarcely refrain from reproaching Louis for acquiescing in an exclusion so dishonourable to his crown. "What," he observed, to Bonnac, "will my subjects think, if they see the interests of the spanish monarchy placed in the hands of french plenipotentiaries?" "They will think," replied the ambassador, "that as your majesty relied on the king, your grandfather, for the support of the war, you ought also to rely on him for the conclusion of peace." To a similar objection from the minister, count Bergueik, he rejoined with asperity: "You ought not to forget that the plenipotentiaries of Charles the second had no other share in the peace of Ryswick, than affixing their signature." But all his arguments were fruitless, for both the king and queen were immovable, and persisted in requesting Louis to pay no less regard to the dignity than to the interests of his grandson, and engage the allies to expedite passports for his plenipotentiaries.*

* Noailles, t. 4, p. 264.

The french envoy was irritated by this decided opposition. "The best resolution," he wrote to his court, "is to proceed directly to the point, and not attempt to gain their consent, either by promises or threats. Secure the acquiescence of the english in what relates to Spain, and by their means, that of the dutch, and then extort the acquiescence of the spaniards. This is more suitable to the interests and dignity of France. For whatever is wrested from Spain, will appear a sacrifice to the cupidity of the enemy, and to the necessity of concluding peace; whereas direct demands made to Philip, will create bitterness and distrust between the two courts; and the king of France will be incessantly accused of sacrificing the interests of Spain to his own."

The chief instigator of this opposition was the count of Bergueik, who from the post of vice governor of the Netherlands, was called to the direction of the important departments of war and finance. Possessing a considerable share of the royal favour and confidence, he was the sole agent of the communications with Bonnac. From his long residence in the Netherlands, joined to the influence of his local connections, and frequent intercourse with the dutch, he had learnt to appreciate the due importance of those valuable territories; and while he suspected the sincerity of the british government, he was persuaded that a separate accommodation might easily be arranged with the states. His representations were favourably received both by Philip and the queen, who were equally proud of their late success, and equally zealous for the honour of their well earned crown. Even the princess Orsini, however attached to France, concurred or affected to concur in the sentiments of the sovereigns and minister.

"The king," observed Bonnac, "forms no decision by himself. The queen is absolute mistress of his heart and mind."

Sept. 20.

CHAP. XIX.
1711.

She has lofty thoughts, takes her resolution at the moment; and having triumphed over so many misfortunes, she hears with indifference, nay with contempt, all representations of future danger. Prejudices derived from the experience of good, and contempt of adverse fortune, have made a deep impression on a person of her age.

“The princess Orsini, more moderate, is alone capable of softening these high-flown sentiments of her royal mistress. Her credit is therefore necessary. She appears no less zealous for France than devoted to the king and queen; yet she does not entertain the same notions on public affairs as prevail at Versailles. She will yield to argument, when she is persuaded that the interests of Spain are not sacrificed. She is capable of rendering service, if we avoid wounding her delicacy, and convince her that we do not wish to act without her intervention. Doubtless the french cabinet would encounter obstacles perhaps even invincible, should Philip give his confidence to the spaniards.”*

Meanwhile the dutch government, encouraged by the discontented whigs in England as well as by the emperor, shewed scarcely less reluctance than Philip to accede to the proffered terms. Their repugnance was however at length overcome by the threats of England, and measures were settled for opening a congress of all the belligerent powers at Utrecht. Louis announced this arrangement to his grandson in a style which shews the embarrassment derived from the captious spirit manifested by the spanish court.

“The dutch have at length consented to give passports to my plenipotentiaries. I do not know when the conferences will be opened, and when your ministers will be received. But before they depart, convince Bergueik if possible of the ab-

* Noailles, t. 4, p. 255.

surdity of attempting to negotiate separately with the dutch. Suffer me to manage your interests, and finish, I intreat you, the business of the elector of Bavaria, the delay of which is not honourable to your majesty, and may injure the negotiation. Be assured that you will find in my advice no view except for your advantage."

Even the remonstrances and threats of Louis seemed now to have lost their effect. New difficulties were raised by Bergueik, and at length no other resource was left but to employ the agency of the princess. Fortunately means yet remained to overcome her real or affected delicacy.

After attaining all the honours which could be conferred on a subject, she aspired to the possession of a small but independent sovereignty. At her secret instigation, the queen had induced Philip, when he engaged to transfer the Netherlands to the elector of Bavaria, to reserve a small territory producing an annual revenue of 30,000 crowns; but no hint was given of the purpose for which it was destined. As Philip was now called upon to fulfil his promise to the elector, he recurred to this petty sovereignty. Designating the princess Orsini as the person for whom the gift was intended, he requested the intervention of his grandfather to obtain the acquiescence of the elector, and the guaranty of the allies. The queen also seconded his instances by an application to madame de Maintenon.

"You doubtless know the demand which the king made to his grandfather on the conclusion of the treaty, by which the Low Countries were ceded to the elector of Bavaria, to reserve for us a petty sovereignty of 30,000 crowns, annual value.

July 17,
1711.

"The king of France acquiesced, and the elector consented. We now demand the fulfilment of this promise. The king

CHAP. XIX.

1711.

writes to day to his grandfather on this subject, and I intreat you to speak to him on my part. Although we regard this affair as already settled, and likely to meet with no difficulty, we shall, nevertheless, be grateful for it. I think you will interest yourself the more readily in it, when you know that we destine this principality for the princess Orsini, who deserves it for her past services, and merits also the interest which you may take in her favour; for, I can assure you, you have not a better friend. Would it not be shameful for the king and myself, after all our obligations, to give her no marks of our esteem? There is no dignity, except this, which we can confer on her, because she already possesses all; so, I think, no one can blame our gratitude.

“For you, my dear madam, I have no doubt of the pleasure which you will receive from it, and that our request will meet with your entire approbation. I must also add, that what the king gives is his own, and no detriment to the king, his grandfather; and it will, doubtless, please him to see a devoted subject, like the princess Orsini, so highly distinguished. I am, I confess, sufficiently vain, with doing more for my cameraramayor, than preceding queens have done for theirs. She will not abuse it, and there is no fear that she will keep up large armies to alarm her neighbours. I conclude then that we shall enjoy this satisfaction; but to you, my dear madam, and to my sister, I would have the obligation, that it should meet with no difficulty, and be concluded without delay, since it wholly depends on the king, our grandfather, who can induce the elector to accede to so reasonable a demand.”*

Louis profiting by the ambitious views of the princess, promised his concurrence, and, as a prelude to her elevation to the rank of a sovereign, she received the congratu-

* Noailles, t. 4, p. 381.

lations of the court, and an order was given that she should be addressed with the title of highness. After a slight demur, the spanish nobility acquiesced, and the princess had at length the flattering prospect of attaining her darling object.*

CHAP. XIX.
1711.

October.

Grateful for the support of Louis, she laid aside her scruples, silenced or over-ruled the objections of Bergueik, and obtained from Philip, not only an unequivocal assent to the conditions concluded in his name; but a declaration that he would no longer press for the admission of his plenipotentiaries into the congress, and would give full powers to Louis to continue and conclude the negotiation.

The accustomed harmony and confidence seemed once more restored between the two Bourbon courts; and the correspondence of the two monarchs again afforded proofs of personal regard and mutual attention.

"Do not," observed Louis, "be surprised to find yourself called only duke of Anjou. These are the last efforts of the vulgarity and despair of the dutch party, who are desirous for the continuance of the war. They will soon change their style, as they are at present obliged to change their conduct."

December.

"You will have learned," he wrote in a subsequent letter, "from M. de Bonnac, that I was not deceived when I foresaw the difficulty of procuring passports for your plenipotentiaries. I know the measures, which the *good party* in England are obliged to keep to realise their favourable intentions: be assured that they have done much in obtaining the acceptance of the preliminaries, with the clause which I caused to be inserted, expressly to secure your continuance on the throne of Spain. We should lose too much by wishing to hurry a work which is well begun. Your majesty, therefore, must not be surprised, if the passports, of which you are so desirous, are

Dec. 17.

* St. Philippe, t. 3, p. 29.

CHAP. XIX.
1711.

still delayed. It would be but a weak reason to press the grant of them, to say, that it is the interest of the english to deserve your friendship. The nation is not sufficiently unanimous to be touched by this consideration ; and those who are desirous of peace, think they have already done enough for you to deserve some gratitude on your part.

“ Speak not, therefore, of the interest which they have to acquire your good will, nor of protests which would be foreign to the present juncture. Send your plenipotentiaries when you please. After the conferences are opened, I will take the proper measures for their admission ; but forward the peace, and think what would be your situation, should I be obliged to join my forces against you. To prevent such a calamity, I have required a new power from you, for there will be no time to lose if an advantageous conclusion can be effected. You are aware that the power you have already sent me to treat with England, would at present be injurious to your interests, if I suffered it to appear,* and you may rely on my regard that I shall do nothing to your prejudice.

“ I have just received your letter of the 15th, and learn with pleasure the resolution you have taken to cause the patent which the elector of Bavaria demands, to be expedited. I assure you, I will do nothing contrary to your interest ; but, I love you too well to have observed without pain, your tardiness in fulfilling your engagements. Knowing your sentiments, I am aware of the violence you do yourself.”

Dec. 23.

Philip replied, “ The marquis of Bonnac, by the orders of your majesty, has informed me of the state of the negotiation for peace, and the difficulties made by the english and dutch to receive my plenipotentiaries. He has also demanded in

* Alluding to the commercial advantages which were already granted to the English as the price of their defection.

your name, another full power, to treat with them. My desire to give you new marks of my gratitude and friendship, joined to that of contributing as much as possible to your satisfaction, and the tranquillity of all who are implicated in this cruel war, would not permit me to hesitate in sending you this new full power, that you may, in my name, sign the preliminaries with the dutch, as you have done with the english. I hope they will be shortly concluded. I doubt not, I shall soon feel the effects, and that England and Holland will acknowledge me, and admit my plenipotentiaries at the congress. I flatter myself, you will employ your interest to this end, as a grandfather who has so much regard for me, and that I shall have no cause to repent of the confidence I repose in you. I send an ostensible letter for the english, that they may not be surprised to find the preliminary advantages which I have granted them, are not inserted in the present full power, and that they should be apprised of the reason which prevented me from inserting them."

CHAP. XIX.
1711.

In the midst of this interesting negotiation, Philip had the additional satisfaction of being relieved from the presence of his rival.

In consequence of the death of his brother, Charles quitted Barcelona in September, leaving his queen as regent of his spanish dominions; and the command of the army, which had been augmented with a reinforcement of 7,000 men, to Staremburg. He took leave of the Catalans, in an affectionate letter, stating the causes of his absence, praising their attachment, announcing his speedy return, and recommending his queen as the most precious pledge which he could intrust to their fidelity.* In his progress through Italy, he was received by the republics of Venice and Genoa, and the dukes of

Sept. 6.

* History of Europe for 1711, p. 361.

CHAP. XIX.

1711.

Parma and Tuscany, as king of Spain, and made his triumphal entry into Milan, amidst the acclamations of his new subjects. He was here saluted with the joyful tidings of his elevation to the imperial throne, by the unanimous consent of all the members of the empire, except the electors of Bavaria and Cologne, whose votes were suspended for their contumacy.

On the 22d of December, he was crowned at Frankfort, in the customary forms, and with unusual pomp. In addition to his other titles of king of Hungary and Bohemia, he assumed that of king of Spain; and testified his resolution to assert his rights by creating several knights of the golden fleece. From thence he repaired to Vienna, took quiet possession of the hereditary dominions of the House of Austria, which had devolved on him by the death of his brother, and made the most vigorous preparations to continue the war against the House of Bourbon, and to traverse the pending negotiations.

But the endeavours of the emperor, though aided by the support of the dutch, and the whigs in opposition, were of no avail. The friends of the bourbon cause had the satisfaction to witness a breach of the public correspondence between England and Austria, in consequence of the dismissal of the imperial minister, count Gallas, for caballing with the whigs. Nor was even the subsequent mission of Eugene himself to London more effectual. That great general was received with cold politeness by those in power, and, at the same time, exposed to the most ridiculous, as well as calumnious, accusations, which party malice could invent. He had the mortification to witness the disgrace of his injured friend, the duke of Marlborough; and, after his fruitless attempts to bring the queen to a sense of her honour, and the interests of her crown, departed from England, leaving the cause of his imperial master more hopeless than ever.*

* House of Austria, vol. 2, p. 2.

Meanwhile the british ministry had extorted the consent of the dutch to their recent arrangement, by the threat of concluding a separate accommodation; and, in the beginning of 1712, conferences were opened at Utrecht, by the plenipotentiaries of France, England, Holland, and the duke of Savoy. The emperor, also, finding remonstrances fruitless, did not refuse to take a share in the negotiation, though he affected to receive the propositions of France, not as preliminaries, or as obligatory, but as simple projects for deliberation. To avoid irritating discussions, no minister was admitted from either of the contending parties, as king of Spain.

At the second conference, propositions were brought forward on both sides, by France, according to the clandestine arrangements with the british ministry, and by the emperor, according to the principles of the grand alliance. But the increasing division among the allies favoured the views of France; and at a congress, professedly called for the purpose of a joint negotiation, Louis succeeded in leading the different parties into separate discussions of their respective demands, and thus daily widened the breach. He likewise seized every pretext of chicane and delay, to obstruct the public conferences; while he redoubled his efforts to cajole and influence the court of England, on which the continuance of peace or war ultimately depended. In consequence of this change, Polignac, one of his plenipotentiaries, exultingly wrote to Torci, "We now play the part of the dutch at Gertruydenberg, and they ours. It is a perfect retaliation."*

During the delays occasioned by these artifices, Louis maintained a constant and intimate intercourse with the court of London, by means of his private agents. As he justly dreaded the abilities and influence of Marlborough, he employed the

* Torci, t. 3, p. 406.

CHAP. XIX.
1711.

assistance of the court of St. Germain, and the jacobite party, to co-operate with the british ministry, in removing their great antagonist. He had finally the satisfaction to see him driven from power, and exposed to the malice of his enemies, and the hatred of the nation he had so ably served. On this event he justly observed to his agents, "The dismissal of Marlborough will do for us all we can desire."* The command of the army was transferred to the duke of Ormond, whose attachment to the exiled family was not unknown.

The effect of the pending negotiations was felt even in Catalonia. Assured of the servile support of the british ministry, Louis adopted the advice of Noailles, to risk nothing, and confine the military operations to a war of posts. Nor was he disappointed in the expectations he had formed from the co-operation of England; for, although, to justify the diminution of the army in the Netherlands, the ministers expressed great solicitude to prosecute the war in Spain, yet they soon adopted methods equally effectual to thwart the operations in that quarter.

The duke of Argyle was dispatched with a trifling reinforcement, to assume the command of the british troops, but came without remittances, and was detained at Genoa, until he had raised a loan on his own personal credit. The subsequent supplies, extorted by his complaints, were granted with the same sparing hand, and his utmost exertions only tended to maintain the passes, and harass the enemy in a series of frequent, but trifling, skirmishes. At length, an indisposition obliging him to quit the camp, he repaired to Minorca, where he more usefully employed his active mind in fortifying Port Mahon, and strengthening the defences of an island, which was already conceded to Great Britain.

* Somerville's Queen Anne, p. 497.

Nor were the operations on the part of Philip more effectual. Vendome, indeed, too spirited to submit to the temporising orders of his sovereign, attempted to resume the offensive, by laying siege to Cardona. But the cabals of the court, and the want of supplies, joined to the judicious manœuvres of the imperial general, Staremborg, compelled him to retreat with disgrace; and, at the close of the campaign, the two hostile armies reoccupied nearly the same positions as at its commencement.*

CHAP. XIX.
1711.

* St. Philippe, t. 3, p. 22.—History of Europe for 1711.—Cunningham, v. 2, p. 371.—Ortiz, lib. 22, c. 15.—Targe and other Historians as before.—Correspondence of Lord Bolingbroke, passim.—Report of the Secret Committee of 1715.—Memoires de Polignac.

CHAPTER XX.

1712 - 1714.

Deaths of the new Dauphin and his eldest Son, and hopes of Philip to be called to the French throne—Negotiations to prevent the union of the two Crowns—Correspondence of Louis and Philip—Philip agrees to renounce his pretensions to France—Progress of the arrangement between France and England—England separates from the Allies, and agrees to a suspension of Arms—Success of the French in the Netherlands—Philip makes his public Renunciation—Establishment of the new french Colony of Louisiana—The Dutch compelled to accept the Mediation of England—The Ministers of Philip admitted to the Congress—Conclusion of the Negotiations for Peace—Treaties of Utrecht, Rastadt, and Baden.

CHAP. XX.

1712

1714.

PHILIP had now secured the possession of Spain and the Indies, by sacrifices which, however reluctantly made, were not ultimately detrimental to the real interests of his crown, nor favourable even to the union of those very powers to whom they were conceded. But in the height of his satisfaction, new hopes and fears were excited by a disastrous mortality in the elder branch of his family. The decease of his father, the dauphin, was followed in the course of a short period by the death of his brother, the duke of Burgundy, with that of his nephew, the duke of Brittany; while the duke of Anjou, a sickly infant not two years old, was thus left the only bar against his succession to the throne of his ancestors.

Philip was of too sanguine a disposition, and too affectionately attached to France, not to feel more hope than regret from these events. Daily anticipating the death of the infant prince, he was so anxious to return to France in order to assert the rights of his birth, that he was, with difficulty, persuaded by Vendome and Bonnac to suspend his departure, till he could obtain more precise information, and receive the advice of his grandfather, which he was bound to respect both by gratitude and affection.

CHAP. XX.

1712

1714.

In this juncture, an active correspondence ensued between the courts of France and England, to obviate the consequences of these unlooked for events. Although the separation of the two crowns was a condition of the preliminary articles settled with England, yet Louis, no less than Philip, was solicitous to evade its execution; and he hoped to attain his object by means of the ascendancy which he had acquired over the british ministry. He, however, made an offer to concert with the queen the necessary measures for preventing the much dreaded union.

Accordingly the british cabinet sent Gaultier to Versailles with a laboured memorial, demanding the immediate renunciation of the crown of France by Philip, to be sanctioned by the spanish cortes, and confirmed in the future treaty under the guaranty of the contracting powers.*

An awful suspense ensued, which evinced the embarrassment and secret inclinations of the french monarch; and it was not till after repeated applications that he announced his decision in a counter-memorial. In regard to the proposed renunciation, he frankly declared in the strongest terms which language could furnish, "No power on earth can alter the

* Bolingbroke's Correspondence, v. 2, p. 207.

CHAP. XX.

1712

1714.

constitutional law of the kingdom. The prince, next to the crown, necessarily succeeds. He owes his crown not to any edict, not to any decree, not to the generosity of any one, but to the law. This law is considered in France as the work of Him who has established all monarchies, and by Him only can it be abolished. *No renunciation, therefore, can destroy it, and if the king of Spain should renounce for the sake of peace, and in obedience to my will, those who might receive such a renunciation as an expedient sufficient to prevent the evil we wish to avoid, would only deceive themselves and build upon sand. It would likewise prove the source of civil commotions, and open the way to a general war in Europe.**

Now it was that the wisdom and foresight of those who had planned and consolidated the grand alliance, became as evident as the rashness and folly of the new ministry in England, who had precipitated their country into dependence on France, and had no resource left to prevent a far more dangerous union of power and dominion under one head, than that which they had pretended to dread in the person of the new emperor.

After the unequivocal declaration just cited, that the divine and indefeasible right of succession to the throne of France, could not be annulled by any human power, the obvious reply would have been, "Since then Philip cannot renounce the rights of his birth, he must relinquish Spain." But such a just and spirited determination could not be expected from men who had already sacrificed the safety and interests of their country, and who were styled, even by Mesnager, the plenipotentiaries of the french king.† They persisted in demanding a formality which they were assured was nugatory, and Bolingbroke, with a sophistry which at once excites our contempt

* Torci, t. 3, p. 292.—Bolingbroke's Correspondence, v. 2, p. 222.

† Somerville's Queen Anne, p. 497.—*Note.*

and indignation, replied, "We are willing to believe that you in France are convinced God alone can abolish the law, on which the rights of your succession are founded; but you will permit us in Great Britain to be also convinced, that a prince can depart from his right by a voluntary cession, and that he, in whose favour this renunciation is made, will be supported in his pretensions by the powers who are guarantees of the treaty."*

CHAP. XX.

1712

1714.

As Louis still demurred, the british ministry assumed a firmness which they had not before ventured to display. Mr. Harley, the cousin of the treasurer, was dispatched to Utrecht, to announce the inflexible resolution of England, not to recede from the demand. Lord Strafford, one of the british plenipotentiaries, was recalled, till the answer of Louis was known; all public intercourse with the french ministers was broken off, and the proposals of France for a suspension of arms rejected. The british government even endeavoured to regain the confidence of those allies, whom it had so shamefully abandoned; and, detaching reinforcements to the Netherlands, gave indications of a resolution to resume hostilities.


As the season for military operations was now returned, Louis was too prudent again to trust the fate of his crown to the fortune of war. He, therefore, acquiesced in the demand, and Torci pledged the royal word to obtain the consent of Philip. "I hope," he said, "the king of Spain will conform to the advice of the king. But if, contrary to my expectations, he should not submit, the king will take all the measures which the queen of Great Britain may think proper, to decide *even by force, if*

* Letter to Torci.—Corresp. v. 2, p. 227.—It must be confessed that this remark comes with an ill grace from the minister who had just proved the futility of the most solemn guaranties, by the breach of the grand alliance.

CHAP. XX.

1712

1714.

July and
August.

April 18.

necessary, the choice of the catholic king, and secure peace to Europe.*

This promise was accepted with alacrity. The temporary spirit of the british cabinet evaporated, and secret instructions were instantly transmitted to Ormond, restraining him from either risking a battle or engaging in a siege, though he was to conduct himself in such a manner as to give no jealousy to the allies. This virtual suspension of arms, which was allowed by Bolingbroke himself to have been the salvation of the french army, was immediately repaid by an attack on the british West India islands, in order to crush our trade in that quarter at the moment of returning peace.†

Louis had no sooner effected an arrangement with the british ministry, than he imparted his instructions to Philip. After announcing the proffered alternative of Spain or France, he observed, "The instances of the british ministry become more and more urgent. The necessity of peace daily increases, and the means of prosecuting the war are exhausted. I shall,

* Bolingbroke's Correspondence, v. 2, p. 278.—This gratuitous offer to employ *force* against Philip, excites a smile, when we recollect the horror affected by Louis, at the bare hint in the conferences at Gertruydenberg, and the pathetic declamations of some of our own writers on this outrage to his royal feelings.

† "We expected," writes the duped and chagrined minister, "that Cassart's squadron might be gone to the coast of Brazil, or to Surinam; but we never imagined that our colonies would have been attacked by him, at a time when we were knitting the bands of friendship between the two nations, with all possible industry, &c." * * * "Compare this conduct with that of the queen, the moment I read the letter from Monsieur de Torcy, by which it appeared that the king of France would oblige his grandson to accept the alternative of quitting one of the two monarchies, her orders were dispatched to the duke of Ormond to engage in neither siege nor battle, and she prevented the French even from making the demand. *I will not say that this order saved their army from being beat, but I think, in my conscience, it did.*"

Bolingbroke to Prior, Sept. 19, 1711.—Corresp. v. 3, p. 77.

therefore, be compelled to treat on conditions equally unpleasant to you and myself, if you do not obviate the fatal extremity by making your choice. Bonnac will impart to you my sentiments on this delicate business, which admits of no deliberation. As I rely on your affection for me and the House of Bourbon, I exhort you to adopt the advice I am under the necessity of giving, which is not contrary to the friendship I feel for you. It is, to retain Spain and the Indies, and yield to the obstinacy of the English, by renouncing the crown of France ; *a condition with which they will be satisfied, and which they are persuaded can be carried into effect.*" *

CHAP. XX.

1712

|

1714.

Philip having complied with this injunction, and made his election for Spain, the british ministry, who had been cajoled by Torci † into a belief that he would prefer the reversion of France, now discovered that this arrangement would still leave the important question dependant on uncertain contingency : for if Philip retained Spain, there was no bar to his eventual succession in France, except an engagement already declared in the most positive terms of no effect. To lure him therefore from Spain, the queen was induced to offer a new alternative, namely to relinquish Spain to the House of Savoy, to receive in return the immediate possession of Sicily, and the dominions of Piemont, Savoy, the duchy of Montferrat, all of which were to be united with France, should he be called to

* Torci, t. 3, p. 299.

† " Si vous demandez, Monsieur, quelle precaution l'on prendra pour assurer une renonciation que je vous ai représenté comme contraire à l'ordre établi en France pour la succession à la couronne, je repondrai, premièrement, *qu'il n'y a pas lieu de croire que le Roi d'Espagne choisisse la Couronne d'Espagne préferablement à celle de ses pères*, par mille raisons, aisées à comprendre, et trop longues à deduire." Torci to Bolingbroke, April 8, 1712. Corresp. v. 2, p. 246. It is worthy remark that this letter was written only ten days before that of Louis quoted in the text.

CHAP. XX.

1712

1714.

that crown, except Sicily, which in that case was to be transferred to the House of Austria.

The nervous and irritable mind of Philip had been greatly agitated during the progress of this negotiation. But he was peculiarly affected by this last proposal, which promised too high advantages to France, not to receive the warmest support from Louis himself. Torci has preserved the interesting correspondence of the two monarchs on this occasion.

May 17.

“I own to you,” wrote Louis, “that notwithstanding the disproportion between the respective states, I have been sensibly gratified to think you will continue to reign; that I can always regard you as my successor, and that your situation will permit you to visit me from time to time. Judge how agreeable it would be to me, to be able to rely on you for the future; to be assured that if the dauphin lives, I shall find in you a regent accustomed to command, and capable of preserving order, and repressing the cabals in my kingdom. If this infant should die, which from his sickly constitution is but too probable, you will enter on my succession according to the order of your birth; and I shall have the consolation of leaving to my people, a virtuous sovereign, able to rule them, and who in succeeding to me, will unite to the crown states so considerable as Savoy, Piemont, and the Montferrat. I am so gratified with this idea, and principally with the pleasure of passing with you and the queen a part of the remnant of my life, and informing you myself of the state of my affairs, that I can imagine nothing equal to the pleasure you will give me if you accept this new project.

“If the gratitude and affection of your subjects are with you pressing motives to continue among them, I may say that you owed the same sentiments to me, to your family, and to your country, before you owed them to Spain. I now require

you to give them effect. I shall regard as the greatest happiness of my life, your resolution to draw nearer to me, and preserve rights which one day you may in vain regret, if you relinquish them.

"I have, however, engaged to treat on the principle, that you will renounce these rights to preserve only Spain and the Indies. If your majesty should reject the proposal of this exchange with the duke of Savoy, all I can do is to leave you the choice, the necessity of concluding of peace becoming daily more pressing."*

In the conflict of contending passions which this proposal roused in the mind of Philip, his ambition assumed the tincture of devotion, and he did not adopt a final decision until he had addressed himself in supplication to the King of Kings. After receiving the holy communion, he summoned into his presence the marquis of Bonnac, and said: "I have made my choice. No temptation shall ever induce me to abandon this crown, which I consider as the gift of God." He then delivered a letter to his grandfather, announcing his resolution.

After thanking him past for marks of his friendship he proceeded, "The idea your majesty holds forth of being placed near you, would be highly flattering to me, if I deemed myself capable of accepting the new offer tendered by England; but there are many reasons against it. It appears to me much more beneficial that a branch of our House of Bourbon should reign in Spain, than to place this crown on the head of a prince, of whose friendship we cannot be assured: this advantage outweighs that of eventually uniting to France, Savoy, Piedmont, and the Montferrat. I think therefore I better prove my regard to you and your subjects in keeping the resolution I have already taken, than in adopting the new plan proposed

CHAP. XX.

1712

|

1714.

* Torci, t. 3, p. 308.

CHAP. XX.

1712

1714.

by England. I thus equally give peace to France; I secure to her as an ally, a monarchy which might otherwise at a future period be joined to her enemies. At the same time I follow myself the *path which appears most conformable to my glory, and to the welfare of my subjects*, who by their zeal and attachment have so essentially contributed to maintain the crown on my head." *

This decision being imparted to the british ministry, the next object was to settle the formalities of the renunciations, and the conditions of the suspension of arms, which was to be the prelude for the conclusion of peace. As Louis had repeatedly violated the most solemn engagements, the british ministry proposed that the acts, which were intended to secure the separation of France and Spain, should be sanctioned by the states general of France and the cortes of Spain, as the highest legislative authorities in both kingdoms. But as the confirmation of the states general would have rendered future evasion† difficult, Louis eluded the demand under the plea, that the convention of that assembly was dangerous to the royal authority, and might give rise to civil troubles as on former occasions. In return he offered the sanction of the parliaments, as more conformable to existing usages, and to the constitution of the monarchy. Bolingbroke made no objection to an alternative which in reality rendered the engagement a mere form, and obtained the acquiescence of the queen and his colleagues.‡

* Torci, t. 3, p. 312.

† It is needless to examine the sincerity of these renunciations; because the declaration of Louis already quoted, and the subsequent conduct of Philip, prove that they were considered by both princes as vain and idle formalities. On this subject the reader is referred to a pamphlet of the times, *The Sighs of Europe*, in which this question is treated with equal irony and argument.—*State of Europe*, for 1712, p. 225-6.

‡ Bolingbroke's Correspondence, v. 2.—Duclos, t. 1, p. 63.

A suspension of arms was next agreed to, and Louis even consented that Dunkirk should be yielded to the English as a temporary deposit, the day on which the armistice commenced.*

CHAP. XX.

1712

1714.

Meanwhile the campaign had opened, and although Ormond was restricted from joining in offensive operations, yet the presence of a british force contributed to keep the french in awe; and Eugene, with the imperial and dutch troops, besieged and captured Quesnoy.

July 4.

The loss of this fortress was, however, amply compensated to Louis by the proclamation of the armistice on the part of England; and the separation of the british troops from the allied army. This incident aggravated the bitter disputes which had already arisen from the inactivity and defection of England. The dutch opposed the march of the troops destined to take possession of Dunkirk; while the auxiliaries in the pay of the two maritime powers refused to obey the orders of the british commander, and generously resolved to share the fate of those with whom they had so frequently triumphed.

July 17.

The consequence of these disputes was the defection of England from the grand alliance. The discussions at Utrecht were suspended, and the negotiation confined to the courts of Versailles and London. England withheld the pay of the auxiliaries; a garrison was transported by sea from Dover to Dunkirk; Ormond seized Ghent and Bruges to secure the retreat of the troops under his command, and arrangements were immediately commenced for a suspension of hostilities both by land and sea.

* May we again recal the attention of the reader to the negotiations of the Hague and Gertruydenburgh, and remind him of the cavil made by Louis and his new friends, against the demand of cautionary fortresses of far less importance than Dunkirk.

CHAP. XX.

1712

1714.

Notwithstanding the departure of the english, the imperialists and dutch, with the auxiliaries who were taken into their pay, continued offensive operations, and after the surrender of Quesnoy invested Landrecies. It was hoped that their united forces, directed by the abilities of Eugene, would obtain some brilliant success which might suspend or frustrate the pending negotiation. But their hopes were vain; for the departure of the English gave Villars, the french commander, the advantage of superior numbers, while it revived the spirit of his troops. That able general in his turn became the assailant.

July 24. He forced the lines of Denain, where a strong corps was posted to cover the passage of convoys to Eugene, and killed or made prisoners above 5,000 men. This brilliant exploit decided the fate of the campaign. The siege of Landrecies was instantly raised, and by the precipitate retreat of the allies,

July 30. the french reduced Marchiennes, which contained their principal magazines. So fortunate a blow was followed by a rapid series of successes. Douay, Quesnoy, and Bouchain were re-

Sept. 4. covered in the presence of Eugene himself; and at the close

Oct. 4. of the campaign no army remained in the field capable of arresting the progress of the french.

The british cabinet scarcely less rejoiced at the misfortunes of the allies, than the french themselves. But their exultation was soon checked by unexpected difficulties in the negotiation. To remedy the mischiefs which were likely to flow from their impolitic concessions, they now found it necessary to raise a new power in Italy, as a counterpoise to the House of Bourbon; and on the surrender of Dunkirk, they brought forward a series of demands in favour of the duke of Savoy. They required for him a barrier on the side of the Alps, calculated to give him an entrance into Dauphiné; the cession of Sicily, and the eventual succession of Spain after the extinction of Philip's issue.

These demands, scarcely expected by the bourbon sovereigns, after the past liberality of the british government, suspended that confidence which had hitherto prevailed. After some ineffectual expedients to arrange these important points, Bolingbroke himself repaired to Fontainbleau to hasten a final adjustment.

CHAP. XX.

1712

1714.

August 19.

Louis had now the gratification to see the minister of that nation to which only a few months before he had humbly sued for peace, appear in his court, a suppliant for terms far less advantageous than those he had himself tendered in vain. It is not probable that considerations of gratitude or humanity would have prevented so arrogant a sovereign from retaliating for past mortifications; but he was sagacious enough to discover that he might presume too confidently on the compliance of the british ministry. The queen had formally communicated to parliament the general principles which were to form the basis of an accommodation; and the spirit of the nation, so long accustomed to victory, was too elated to receive the law from a prince whom they had recently seen a suppliant for peace. Besides, the declining health of the queen rendered it not improbable that the throne might shortly be filled by a sovereign of far different character and principles; at the same time his own advanced age, as well as the extreme youth of his apparent successor, rendered him anxious to prevent the revival of domestic troubles by the restoration of external peace.

June 17.

These considerations weighed with the french monarch. In a few conferences Bolingbroke and Torci amicably arranged the most material points in dispute. A general suspension of arms for four months was settled between the two countries; and both ministers in their subsequent correspondence exulted in the consternation of the allies, and considered the peace as already concluded.

CHAP. XX.

1712.

1714.

July 8.

In consequence of these arrangements the stipulated renunciations were formally made. Philip first announced the design before his court and council. After hinting at the terms of the peace in general, he added, "The king my grandfather has urged me to prefer the kingdom of France to Spain; but neither his instances nor the prospect of succeeding to the great power possessed by my ancestors, have been able to outweigh my gratitude to the spaniards, whose loyalty has preserved the crown on my head. For their sake, I would not only prefer Spain to all the monarchies in the world, but would rather be reduced to the possession of the smallest portion of this kingdom than abandon so faithful a people. To prove the truth of what I now say, and my earnest desire that this crown should descend to my posterity, I declare that I am willing to renounce both in my own person and those of my descendents, my rights to the crown of France in favour of my brother the duke of Berri and his heirs, and of my uncle the duke of Orleans.*"

This decision was the same day announced to the nation in general, by a royal decree. Shortly afterwards, lord Lexington repaired to Spain, to witness the ceremony of the renunciation on the part of England.

In any other negotiation except the present, it might have appeared extraordinary, that although according to the preliminary arrangements the title of Philip was not to be acknowledged until he had fulfilled the conditions stipulated in his name, the condition was evaded by a quibble. Torci observed that as the treaty was only *conditional*, the acknowledgment was *conditional* likewise; and Bolingbroke, with his usual complaisance, immediately discovered that it was "*natural, civil, and unexceptionable*, and any other mode of proceeding absurd and inconsistent." He therefore revoked, by

* State of Europe for 1712, p. 203.

his own authority, the positive orders given to lord Lexington. The acknowledgment was accordingly made in a private audience; and Philip was thus enabled to render almost nugatory the conditions stipulated for England, and absolutely to evade the demands in favour of the Catalans.*

CHAP. XX.

1712

1714.

Meanwhile, the proper measures were adopted for assembling the cortes, and lord Lexington arranged with the spanish ministers the form and terms of the renunciation.

On the 5th of November, Philip signed and swore to his renunciation, in a full council of state, the british agent attending in a private capacity. In the afternoon, he proceeded to the hall where the cortes were assembled, accompanied by the president of Castile, and the members of his council, and after declaring his renunciation, required them to sanction it with their assent. The account of this ceremony cannot be better given than in the words of the queen herself, to madame de Maintenon.

“ You will learn from M. de Bonnac, what he witnessed yesterday; so it is needless for me to enter into a detail. I will only say, that in the morning, the king read his renunciation of the french crown, with all the clauses which were required, signed it, and solemnly swore to maintain it, calling as witnesses the chiefs of our houshold and the counsellors of state. In the afternoon, all the states of the kingdom assembled in a capacious and handsome apartment, which was filled with a concourse of well dressed persons, though large without confusion.

Nov. 6.

“ The king began by a discourse which he delivered perfectly well, and with which the whole assembly was satisfied; for if I alone had been so, you would not perhaps have relied

* Report of the Secret Committee.—Political State.—Tindal, v. 18, p. 257.—Bolingbroke's Correspondence, v. 3, p. 63.

CHAP. XX.

1712

1714.

on my approbation. Then a paper was read containing a longer detail of the reasons for which the king had assembled the states, and of the conditions settled between France and England, for the conclusion of peace. Afterwards a deputy of the town of Burgos spoke in the name of the whole kingdom, and made the king a reply expressive of their extreme gratitude for the sacrifice to which the king submitted from a love of his subjects. I regret that lord Lexington does not understand spanish; for, I think, a translation will not do justice to this speech.

“ The states will open a new sitting immediately to pass into a law the king’s renunciation, and that which is to be made by the french princes. There is sufficient matter for reflection on such a subject; but I have already indulged myself too far. I add, however, that the king hopes this will contribute to hasten the repose of Europe, and particularly of France, and of the king, his grandfather, which he so ardently desires. See what sacrifices he makes for this object.”*

The renunciation was accordingly ratified by the cortes, and a law passed, by which, in failure of Philip’s issue, the crown and dominions of Spain were entailed on the House of Savoy.

Philip profited by the present juncture to introduce a new order of succession, calculated to remove to a greater distance the transfer of the crown to a foreign family. He had already superseded the dispositions in the will of Charles the second, by substituting the House of Orleans, in the order of succession, for the duke of Berri, preferably to the archduke, and the duke of Savoy. He now brought forward a species of salic law, entailing the crown on the males of his issue, according to the order of their birth, and excluding all females, while a single male, however distant, remained, under the condition that the

* Noailles, t. 4, p. 386.

prince called to the succession should be born and brought up in Spain. Should the crown eventually revert to a female, the same rule, with regard to a male succession, was to be rigorously re-established.*

CHAP. XX.

1712

|

1714.

This change of a fundamental law, and of that very order of succession which had occasioned the union of Castile and Aragon, and to which Philip himself owed the crown, excited great discontent. Means were found to secure the approbation of the council of state; but in the council of Castile, the immediate organ of the royal will, it experienced the most strenuous opposition from the president Ronquillo, and many other members. The first decision of the council was so adverse to the views of the king, that he ordered it to be burnt as a source of future doubts and divisions, and required each member to give his separate opinion signed and sealed. This expedient was calculated to produce more docility. Those who had joined in a common opposition, were too prudent to encounter the royal displeasure singly, and no dissenting voice was found. The change thus sanctioned was embodied in a royal decree, and received the ratification of the cortes, as a law of the kingdom.†

As the british government had so readily receded from their demand for the sanction of the states general of France, the renunciations of Philip and the french princes were merely registered in a formal sitting of the parliament of Paris, and Louis revoked the letters patent, which he had before issued, reserving the rights of Philip to the french crown. The ceremony was performed in the presence of the duke of Shrewsbury and Mr. Prior, as the ministers of England, and the duke of Ossuna, the spanish ambassador.

* Ortiz, t. 7, p. 259.

† St. Philippe, t. 3, p. 64—68.

CHAP. XX.

1712

1714.

The renunciation of Philip was confirmed by a solemn oath; but it is a remarkable fact, that either from negligence or connivance the dukes of Orleans and Berri gave only a mere declaration. The circumstance is recorded in a letter from the duke of Shrewsbury, and the answer of Bolingbroke presents a curious specimen of the reasoning by which his conduct was uniformly guided in this negotiation.

“ We really took it for granted here, that the princes of the blood in France had sworn to their several renunciations of the crown of Spain, as king Philip did to his renunciation of the crown of France, and the words at the latter end of the renunciations of the dukes of Berry and Orleans confirmed this opinion. It is there said, ‘ *Nous jurons solennellement sur les evangiles contenus au missel,*’ &c.

“ I confess, my Lord, the insertion of these words in the acts, and the omission of the solemnity of the oath, carry something along with them which I do not like. The queen seemed to be of the same mind; and, if I have nothing more particular in command to say to your grace upon this head, I believe it is *because things are thought so far advanced, that there is hardly time to overhale this proceeding*; and in such case, perhaps it were better to take it for granted, that the princes have sworn, than enter into a contest which may give ground to other people now, and to the french hereafter, to cavil about the validity of these acts. Will your grace allow me to add my private sentiment? If you find the want of this solemnity may be still supplied previously to the peace, or on the ratifying of it, the princes, I think, ought to swear, not as if at your grace’s instance they were doing an act which they before neglected, but as if they took the oath in a proper time and place.”*

* Letter to the Duke of Shrewsbury, Whitehall, March 24, 1712-13.—Bolingbroke’s Correspondence, v. 3, p. 509.

It is not among the least extraordinary circumstances of this iniquitous transaction, that, notwithstanding the most solemn engagements of Louis, not to appropriate any part of the spanish territories, he seized this opportunity to aim a new blow against the commercial prosperity of England, as well as against the spanish possessions of the new world. This was the grant of a royal patent to a merchant of the name of Crozat, empowering him to colonize a country which the french court had hitherto in vain attempted to occupy, with the view to form an establishment in the Gulf of Mexico, and circumscribe the british and spanish colonies on the west. This country, which under the new name of Louisiana was in reality dismembered from the spanish provinces of Florida and Mexico, was watered by the Mississippi, comprised a vast and indefinite extent of territory inland, afforded the means to appropriate the lucrative trade of Mexico, divided the northern colonies of Spain, and commanded the navigation between Vera Cruz and the Havannah. The subsequent transactions and wars in America proved but too well the high importance and real motive of this acquisition.*

The disastrous events of the campaign in the Netherlands, the pressure of the subsidies to Austria, and the dread that England would sign a separate treaty, overcame the reluctance of the dutch, and they, at length, confided their interests to the british cabinet, as their only resource. It was scarcely possible to have selected more improper agents. In the discussion which ensued, the french monarch gained essential advantages.

* Raynal's History of the East and West Indies, v. 7, p. 16.—Eng. transl. —State of Europe for 1712, p. 208.—There are some able observations on this subject in Postlethwayte's Great Britain's Commercial Interest. —The reader is also referred to the Maps of these regions, prior to the close of the 17th century.

CHAP. XX.

1712

1714.

Sept. 12.


Dec. 12.

CHAP. XX.

1712

|

1714.



He chicaned with regard to the terms of the treaty of commerce, and instead of the barrier which had been established by the sound judgment of the preceding ministers, he obtained the restoration of the important fortresses of Lisle and Maubeuge, and excluded the towns of Nieuport, Lierre, and Halle, which were necessary to secure the country between the Scheldt and the sea. He would even have obtained Tournay, had not the complaisance of Bolingbroke been checked by the more manly or more cautious sentiments of the treasurer.

The arrangement was accepted, though reluctantly, by the states, and became the prelude to their peace with France.*

This event was speedily followed by the conclusion of a general peace between France and all the members of the grand alliance, except the emperor and empire. The terms regarding France, England, and Holland were nearly the same in substance as the preliminaries.

Philip was acknowledged king of Spain and the Indies.

* Bolingbroke's Correspondence, v. 2 and 3, passim.—Lamberti, t. 7, p. 319.—t. 8, p. 34, &c.

We find the British minister even furnishing arguments on this subject to the french court.

“The queen,” he says, “can never do any thing which shall look like a direct restraint on her allies, from demanding what they judge necessary; but as long as they act the part which they now do, she can very justly be passive and neuter as to their interests. * * * * * This is advantage enough for France, and such a one, fairly speaking, as a year ago they would have given more than Tournay to have been sure of. * * *

“I think, in my own opinion, and I believe I speak the queen's upon this occasion, that it were better the French should, in the course of the treaty, declare, that whatever they intended to give the Dutch, when the queen spoke from the throne, their conduct has been such, and the situation of affairs so altered, that the king is resolved to have Tournay restored to him.”

Bolingbroke to Prior, Sept. 10, 1712.—Corresp. v. 3, p. 65.

His plenipotentiaries, the duke of Ossuna, and the marquis of Monteleone, were at length admitted into the congress, and signed treaties with England and Savoy. To prevent the union of France and Spain, he renewed his renunciations, and declared the duke of Savoy successor to the crown, on the extinction of his own issue. He acknowledged the title of queen Anne and the protestant succession in the House of Hanover, ceded Gibraltar and Minorca to England, granted to the british nation the asiento for thirty years, and promised to restore their commerce to the same footing as during the reigns of the austrian sovereigns. He yielded the Netherlands, Naples, and Milan, with the isle of Sardinia, to the House of Austria, and Sicily to the duke of Savoy, with the title of king, to revert to the spanish crown in failure of his issue. Finally he engaged never to sell or alienate to France, or any other nation, any town or province in America. This was the substance of the treaties with England and Savoy, to which they engaged to procure the accession of the other powers.

All parties employed their efforts to include the emperor in the pacification. But Charles rejected the proffered terms, refused to relinquish his rights to Spain, the Indies, and Sicily, and was little satisfied with the conditions on which he was to receive the Netherlands. He persisted in his resolution to prosecute the war, and prevailed on the empire to support another campaign. Unable, however, to maintain hostilities in all quarters, he concluded a neutrality for Italy, consented to evacuate Catalonia and the islands in the Mediterranean, on the sole condition of a general armistice for all his adherents, and concentrated his whole force on the Rhine, where he hoped to make a vigorous and decisive effort.

The result of the experiment proved the fallacy of his hopes, that when deserted by the allies, Austria could maintain a war

CHAP. XX.

1712

1714.

May 14,
1713.

CHAP. XX.

1712

1714.

alone against France. Villars, who was transferred to the command of the army on the Rhine, took Spire, Worms, and Keiserslautern, forced Landau to surrender after an obstinate siege, and crossing the Rhine captured Friburg, in the Brisgau. These reverses convinced the emperor that he had miscalculated his own strength and resources; and despairing of support from the maritime powers, he entered into a separate negotiation with France. Conferences were opened at Rastadt, between Eugene and Villars, the commanders of the respective armies, and speedily terminated in the signature of preliminaries. These became the foundation of a general treaty between France, the emperor, and empire, which was signed at Baden in Switzerland.

The treaties of Westphalia, Nimeguen, and Ryswick were made the basis of the peace, as far as it regarded the House of Austria and the empire. Landau was ceded to France; Friburg, Old Brisach, and Kehl, were restored to the emperor, and France agreed to leave him in possession of Naples, the Milanese, and Sardinia, and of the Low Countries on the conditions of the last treaty of barrier. The electors of Bavaria and Cologne were reinstated; and the princes of Italy were to be maintained in the peaceable enjoyment of their actual possessions. As Charles persisted in his refusal to renounce his pretensions to Spain, no accommodation could be effected with Philip, and the decision of the grand question relative to the spanish dominions, was still left to future wars or future negotiations.

Meanwhile, numerous difficulties had protracted the conclusion of a particular treaty between Philip and the dutch, notwithstanding he had announced his acquiescence in the terms arranged by the intervention of England; for the demands of the republic, in regard to commercial privileges, and

the payment of the arrears due from the austrian kings of Spain, produced a tedious discussion.

Nor were the terms arranged between England and Spain carried into effect without new quibbles and delays. From real or feigned reluctance to submit to the dismemberment of the monarchy, Philip withheld the instruments for the delivery of Sicily to the duke of Savoy, and employed the interference of the inquisition to raise objections to the cession of the ecclesiastical rights in Gibraltar and Minorca. He chicaned also with regard to the commercial regulations, and positively rejected the demands made for the king of Portugal.

To obviate these difficulties, the british ministry imitated the example of Louis in flattering the princess Orsini, and by her intervention the commercial treaty was at length arranged. "We are," said Bolingbroke, "I believe, obliged to the princess des Ursins for having this treaty sent us back in the manner it is; and I beg of you to let the spanish ministers perceive that the queen thinks so, and that you appear warmly for this lady's interest. As long as this queen of Spain lives, she will govern her husband; and as long as the princess lives, she will govern her; so that the advantage of flattering this old woman's pride, for her avarice we cannot flatter, must be solid and lasting."*

The failure of all attempts to secure to the princess her duchy of Limburg, deprived the british government of her further assistance.† Among the points which were still left in suspense, was the arrangement with Portugal. As early as 1711, Philip had opened a secret negotiation with the court of

* Bolingbroke to Strafford.—Corresp. v. 4, p. 473.—This letter deserves an attentive perusal, being an invective of extraordinary vehemence against the Court of Madrid for its equivocations and delays in fulfilling its engagements.

† See the next Chapter.

CHAP. XX.

1712

1714.

Feb. 13.
1713.

CHAP. XX.

1712

|

1714.

Nov. 7.

Lisbon, but it was frustrated by the interference of England; and a desultory warfare continued in Estremadura with little advantage on either side. The suspension of arms between England and Spain was followed by a similar armistice with Portugal, which was likewise prolonged till the signature of the definitive treaty.

The british government affected considerable solicitude for the interests of Portugal; but cooled in proportion to the objections raised by the court of Madrid. At length, the king of Portugal voluntarily receded from the claims to which he was entitled by former treaties, and after the discussion had been prolonged till 1715, he relinquished his hopes of aggrandisement on the side of Spain, to acquire the long contested colony of Sacramento, at the junction of the Paraguay and Rio de la Plata. He likewise obtained from France the abandonment of her pretensions to certain districts on the borders of Brazil, and of a free navigation on the river of the Amazons.

Thus terminated a negotiation which proved the salvation of the House of Bourbon, and set the seal to the degradation of England. We cannot close a narrative which, at every step, has awakened sentiments of shame, regret, and indignation, without adopting the words of bishop Fleetwood, in one of the most admirable compositions of which our language can boast. "Never did seven such years together pass over the head of any english monarch, nor cover it with so much honour. The crown and sceptre seemed to be the queen's least ornaments. These other princes wore in common with her, and her great personal virtues were the same before and since. But such was the fame of her administration of affairs at home, such was the reputation of her wisdom and felicity in chusing ministers, and such was then esteemed their faithfulness and

zeal, their diligence and great abilities in executing her commands; to such a height of military glory did her great general and her armies carry the british name abroad, such was the harmony and concord betwixt her and her allies, and such was the blessing of God upon all her counsels and undertakings, that I am as sure as history can make me, no prince of ours was ever yet so prosperous and successful, so loved, esteemed, and honoured by their subjects and their friends, nor near so formidable to their enemies. We were, as all the world imagined, then just entered on the ways that promised to lead us to such a peace as would have answered all the prayers of our religious queen, the care and vigilance of a most able ministry, the payments of a willing and obedient people, as well as all the glorious toils and hazards of the soldiery: when God, for our sins, permitted the spirit of discord to go forth, and by troubling sore the camp, the city and the country, (and oh! that it had altogether spared the places sacred to his worship), to spoil, for a time, this beautiful and pleasing prospect, and give in its stead I know not what.—Our enemies will tell the rest with pleasure.”*

And the exultation of our enemies has sufficiently told the rest. It is needless to quote a less authority than that of Torci himself.

“ England quitting her allies, who were afterwards defeated at Denain, *had the glory* to contribute in restoring to Europe a happy and stable peace; *advantageous to France by the restoration of the principal places which she had lost during the*

* Fleetwood’s Preface to his four Sermons.—It is scarcely necessary to apprise the reader that this preface was burnt, by order of the House of Commons. The interest which it excited may be judged from the circumstance that no less than 4,000 copies were circulated through the medium of the Spectator. See an excellent Letter of the Author to Bishop Burnett on this occasion, in Rapin, vol. 17, p. 537.

CHAP. XX.

1712

1714.

war, by the preservation of those which the king had offered three years before; *glorious by the maintenance of a prince of the royal family on the throne of Spain*; necessary from the fatal loss which the kingdom incurred four years after that miserable negotiation, and two years after the peace, of the greatest king who had ever yet worn the crown.”*

And in terminating his Memoirs, after expatiating on the restoration of Aire, Bethune, and St. Venant, and regretting the necessity of consenting to the rasure of Dunkirk for the sake of breaking the grand alliance, and the concessions made to the duke of Savoy, he triumphantly concludes; “But the monarchy of Spain, the object and the price of a bloody war during twelve years, was preserved in the royal house; and the right of the descendants of St. Louis acknowledged by so many powers and nations who had conspired to force king Philip to descend from the throne on which God had placed him.”†

* Torci, t. 2, p. 228.

† For the contents of this chapter have been consulted and compared, Actes du Traité d’Utrecht, Lamberti, t. 7 and 8. The different treaties in the general Collection of Treaties of Peace and Commerce—Public Papers and Documents in the Political State of Europe—Report of the Secret Committee of 1715, and other Parliamentary Proceedings of the period—Tindal, v. 18, whose dry pages contain a treasure of useful facts—Swift’s Four Last Years of Queen Anne and Conduct of the Allies—Mem. de Villars, de Polignac, du Prince Eugene, écrits par lui-même—Memoirs de Torci passim—St. Philippe, t. 3.—Mably Droit Public—Koch Abregé de l’Histoire des Traités de Paix—Paix d’Utrecht, t. 1.—Larrey, Histoire de Louis xiv.—Somerville’s Queen Anne—Cunningham’s History; and last, not least, the Collection of Bolingbroke’s Correspondence, which brings to light many proofs of the weakness and infatuation of the British Cabinet, which otherwise would not have been credible.

CHAPTER XXI.

1712—1714.

*Departure of the English troops from Catalonia—Afflicting case of the Catalans—
Their spirited resolution—Treaty for the evacuation of Catalonia concluded
by the Emperor—Negotiation between England and Spain relative to the
Catalan constitution and privileges—Their cause abandoned by England—
They reject the offer of the Castilian Government, and prepare for an obsti-
nate defence—Military operations in Catalonia—March of the French army—
Siege, defence and storm of Barcelona—The Catalan constitution abrogated—
Surrender of Majorca—Letter from the Emperor to General Stanhope on
the fate of the Catalans.*

BEFORE the signature of the definitive treaty with Por-
tugal, Philip had secured the possession of all the territories
assigned to him at the peace of Utrecht by the recovery of
Catalonia, Majorca and Iviza.

The campaign of 1712 in Catalonia was not more decisive
than that of the preceding year; for the death of Vendome at
Vimeros early in the spring, occasioned a sudden and tempo-
rary suspension of military operations.*

Immediately after the conclusion of the general armistice
between France and England, the english troops withdrew

CHAP. XXI.

1712

1714.

Sept.

1712.

* Vendome died of an indigestion, the consequence of his gluttonous in-
temperance, in the fifty ninth year of his age.

CHAP. XXI.

1712

1714.

from Barcelona, amidst the clamorous indignation of the people, whom the english government had excited to join the austrian standard. To prevent the effects of popular despair, the empress found it necessary to send four persons of distinction and influence, to facilitate their departure, and supply them with provisions. After encamping a short time on the very spot where Charles had first landed, and sympathising with the brave nation whom they were compelled to abandon, they embarked on board the squadron commanded by sir John Jennings, and were conveyed to Minorca.*

Notwithstanding the departure of the english troops, the campaign on the side of Philip was merely defensive, from an unwillingness to expose himself to the fortune of war, when he could more confidently rely on the successful issue of the pending negotiations. The whole year, therefore, presents no other incident worthy of notice, except an unsuccessful attempt of Staremburg against Gerona, in which the marquis of Brancas sustained a siege of the unusual length of nine months.

Towards the close of the season, the imperial general repaired to Barcelona, to ascertain the disposition of the Catalans, and arrange a plan of future operations in conjunction with the states. He found this high spirited people not depressed by the desertion of the english, and the probable result of the pending negotiations; but firm in their attachment to the sovereign whom they had chosen, and resolved to maintain their darling constitution though with the sacrifice of their fortunes and lives.

The emperor was highly gratified with this proof of their disinterested and affectionate attachment. But the reverses in the Netherlands, the forced defection of the dutch, the increasing

* Tindal, v. 18, p. 29.—St. Philippe, t. 3, p. 39.

complaisance of England towards the Bourbon courts, left him no other resource than to concentrate his whole strength on the borders of the empire, and make a decisive effort for the preservation of his honour and safety. He did not, however, repay the affection of his faithful Catalans with unavailing regret. In treating for the evacuation of the principality, he struggled to save their constitution, and in spite of all the disadvantages under which he laboured, he succeeded in obtaining a general armistice for all his partisans in Spain, and extorted from England and France a solemn promise, which was inserted in the convention, to employ their intervention at the future peace for the preservation of the Catalan privileges. In consequence of this agreement, which was guarantied by England, he was to withdraw his troops and give no future succour to the Catalans; and on the commencement of the armistice either Barcelona or Tarragona, at his own option, was to be yielded to Philip.*

CHAP. XXI.

1712

|

1714.

When the moment of the execution arrived, and the empress took her departure on board the english squadron, the Catalans, who regarded her as a pledge for the protection of Charles, burst into transports of indignation. Personal respect for a princess to whom they were sincerely attached, restrained their ardent passions, when the first division of the troops embarked; but it required all the address of Staremburg to prevent the effects of their despair on the departure of the last. During the interval before the return of the british squadron, he pacified them by offering to assist in the defence of their city, and when the fatal moment arrived, he amused the chiefs with proposals for a capitulation, while the troops quitted their posts, and silently drew towards the shore.

March 19.

May 15.

* Convention for the evacuation of Catalonia.—Political State for 1712, p. 81.

CHAP. XXI.

1712

|

1714.

Though hopeless of external aid, and abandoned by all, the Catalans disdained to bend to their adverse fortune. A small but desperate body made a rapid march to occupy Tarragona at the moment the imperialists withdrew, and would probably have anticipated the royal troops, had not the citizens themselves shut the gates and prevented their entrance. Yet though foiled in this attempt to secure one of the keys of their province, they had the satisfaction to be joined by the greater part of the garrison, and by 4,000 men, who deserted from the imperial ranks, with the connivance of Staremberg. In addition to this force, 6,000 regular troops remained in arms in the capital, besides the neighbouring garrison of Cardona, and the numerous parties of miquelets, who still occupied the fastnesses of this impracticable country. With this force they determined to make a decisive stand, and they relied on the promises of England and the secret encouragement of their beloved sovereign.

Philip, who was anxious to reduce his whole dominions under one form of government, and had already freed his crown from the restraints of the Aragonese constitution, was resolved to abrogate the privileges of Catalonia, which had often favoured internal revolt, and as often invited foreign invasion. He therefore carefully avoided the slightest engagement contrary to his view; and in offering to the Catalans a general amnesty and oblivion of past offences, he tendered them the Castilian constitution, in terms calculated to give it the appearance of a favour. The offer, however, was received with contempt by a people who participated with the Aragonese in attachment to their native customs and laws, and in antipathy to those of Castile.

In consequence of this contumacy, Philip next employed his efforts to deprive them of the countenance or support of

England; and it is with regret that we again see our government displaying new instances of servility to the common enemy, again breaking its solemn engagements, and again sporting with the feelings and interests of its unfortunate allies.

When the queen excited the Catalans to take up arms for the austrian prince, she pledged herself to maintain their privileges; and this promise had been confirmed in the recent treaty of evacuation. Yet, Philip found means to influence a part of the british cabinet, and induced them to evade the performance of a promise twice pledged in the face of Europe. In the articles, therefore, which were submitted to the spanish court in virtue of the previous arrangements with France, lord Lexington made no mention of the Catalan constitution, but confined his demand to a simple armistice. In the correspondence of Bolingbroke with the plenipotentiaries at Utrecht, these privileges are described as contrary to the interests of England; and the constitution of Castile, which was tendered as an alternative, as far more valuable to subjects who intended to live in due subjection to authority. The queen also, in her eagerness for peace, was easily induced by her secretary to adopt similar language and sentiments.

A temporary opposition, however, was made by the more independent members of administration, who evinced a wish to vindicate the national honour, and contended for the fulfilment of the royal promises. Hence arose discordant opinions, vacillating counsels, and contradictory orders and instructions. Hence we find lord Lexington at one time requiring only an armistice; at another the Catalan privileges; conceding the point in one instance, and in another reviving the question by a fruitless protest.

Philip was too well assured of the real state and disposition of the british court, to be alarmed by this struggle

CHAP. XXI.

1712

1714.

CHAP. XXI.

1712

1714.

of discordant sentiments. He treated the remonstrances as mere forms to preserve appearances, and save the honour of the queen: he coolly observed to the british ambassador, "Peace is no less necessary to you than to us; you will not break with us for a trifle," and on the protest of lord Lexington, Bedmar, the minister for foreign affairs, expressed his surprise, adding, "your excellency will recollect that you signed this article with your own hand; the king cannot enter into farther negotiation on a point already settled."

This dry and abrupt repulse, as Philip had doubtless expected, silenced all objections. The treaty with Spain was ratified at London without further hesitation or remonstrance, and dispatched to Utrecht, to be incorporated in the arrangements for the general peace. Nor was this the only proof of complaisance which he received from the bourbon partisans. The british government displayed the utmost eagerness for the reduction of Barcelona, employed the warmest remonstrances to reduce the regency to submission; supported the complaints of the bourbon courts against the emperor, for encouraging them to persevere in their resistance against the royal authority; and pressed the conclusion of a peace with Portugal, in order to unite the whole force of the spanish monarchy, in the reduction of its rebellious subjects.

These circumstances induced Philip to make an earnest appeal for assistance, as well to England, as to France. Louis, disengaged from all the embarrassments of the war by the treaty of Rastadt, did not hesitate to comply with the request, and collected a force of 20,000 men, which under the command of Berwick was destined to cross the Pyrenees and assist in the reduction of Barcelona. The queen of England, also, not only approved this co-operation, but in spite of her solemn and repeated pledges, sent a squadron into the Mediterranean, under

admiral Wishart, who was charged with instructions to straiten the supplies of Barcelona, and contribute to its surrender.

While, however, the crown and the ministry were thus degrading themselves, the heroic spirit and impending fate of the Catalans awakened an honourable sympathy in the british nation. In spite of the superiority which the ministry had obtained in parliament, the House of Lords spoke the public sentiment, by addressing the queen "to continue her interposition that the Catalans might enjoy their just and antient privileges." This incident, for a moment, overawed the ministry. The queen once more renewed, before her people and Europe, her solemn promise in favour of the Catalans. A hint from Bolingbroke restricted admiral Wishart from fulfilling his orders with rigour; the clause was duly inserted in the instructions of lord Bingley; and, after a delay of two months, we find Bolingbroke himself making a faint complaint to the spanish secretary, "that the Catalan privileges were not yet granted, nor any reasonable terms offered, which, if they failed to accept, they must forfeit the queen's compassion, and that of the whole world.*"

In the mean time admiral Wishart arrived with his squadron at Cadiz. As the prevailing sentiment in England, and the revocation of his original orders, were not unknown at Madrid, he was received with a coldness amounting almost to studied disrespect. At the same time, however, to profit by the presence of his fleet, without incurring the obligation of his assistance, Philip again opened a negotiation with the Catalans, and offered them a free pardon, and a general amnesty, if they would lay down their arms and submit to the castilian government.


* Case of the Catalans considered in the Report of the Secret Committee.
—Bolingbroke's Correspondence, 1713—1714, passim.

CHAP. XXI.

1712

|

1714.



Nothing, however, could vanquish the spirited resolution of this brave people. They rejected every condition, except the preservation of their constitution and laws, though they offered to purchase the concession by a considerable contribution.* This alternative producing no effect, they determined, though abandoned by all, to relinquish their darling constitution only with their lives. They raised and disciplined new levies, repaired their fortifications, fitted out a squadron of light ships, amounting to fourteen sail, besides frigates and armed barks; and, to supply the consumption of an extensive capital, as well as to furnish resources for their army, they seized the vessels of every nation, laden with provisions, though they paid the full value of the cargoes. They even formally declared and waged a regular war by sea, against the French and Spaniards. The military command was intrusted to Villaroel, who had received the rank of general in the austrian service, and he was ably seconded by native officers, both superior and subaltern, who had been formed in this long and dreadful conflict. To repress the timid as well as to awe the partisans or agents of Philip, a tribunal was constituted under the name of a council of conscience, and composed of the superior clergy, both regular and secular. It was empowered to judge without appeal, and by the summary rules of military law, all who failed in their duty to their country, or hinted the very name of capitulation, and a body of officers, popularly termed *Matamoros*, were appointed to carry its decrees into immediate execution.† At the same time the citizens were encouraged by frequent supplies from the austrian parts of Sardinia and Naples, as well as from the neutral coasts of Italy. They conceived hopes from the pending disputes of the court of Madrid with

* Report of the Secret Committee.—Bolingbroke's Correspondence.

* Desormeaux, t. 5, p. 317.

Holland and Portugal; and they kept up an extensive correspondence with numbers of disaffected, in their own province, as well as in the bordering parts of Aragon and Valencia, to whom the slightest reverse of the royal arms, would have been a signal for immediate insurrection:

CHAP. XXI.

1712

1714.

Meanwhile the storm gathered heavily and fearfully around them. The duke of Popoli, with the main army, as well as strong detachments under the marquis of Tuy and the count of Montemar, gradually dispersed the desultory hordes which infested the mountainous districts, and straitened Barcelona by land, while a spanish squadron blockaded it by sea. The french troops also had already begun their march to co-operate with those of Philip, in reducing his contumacious subjects.

On the seventh of May, a bombardment commenced, but the assailants were driven from their works by a vigorous sally, and were only saved from defeat by the arrival of a french detachment. This repulse again reduced the siege to a blockade, till the arrival of marshal Berwick, with the french army of 20,000 men. The allied force now united under his command, amounted to 35,000 men before the place; 8,000 were stationed at Girona, to preserve the communication with France; a corps of cavalry scoured the country to disperse the flying parties of insurgents, and 8,000 were scattered over the districts between Barcelona and the Ebro.

1714.

To this imposing force, the catalan chiefs could only oppose 16,000 regimented troops, besides the armed citizens; but the imminent and inevitable danger only roused that chivalrous spirit by which the spanish people have been ever distinguished. Hopeless of relief, they disdained submission, and looked forward to no other alternative than the repulse of the royalists, or utter destruction. Every expedient which art could devise was employed to give effect to their efforts. The fortifications

CHAP. XXI.

1712

1714.

both of Montjuich and the town were strengthened, barricades formed in the streets, the walls of the houses pierced to render every dwelling a citadel, and no precaution omitted for defence while an inch of ground remained to defend. The aged, sickly, and timid, were removed to the protection of their friends and confederates, the islanders of Majorca; priests, monks, and even women, flew to arms; the bishop, and the different orders of the clergy, excited the popular enthusiasm, both by exhortations and example; and every motive of religion and patriotism, as well as the powerful influence of the social passions, was called into action. Finally, they deposited the promise of the queen of England to maintain their laws and constitution, on the high altar of their cathedral, as a solemn appeal to Heaven against that desertion of which they were destined to become the victims.

The unexpected firmness and menacing aspect of the Catalans convinced Philip that the impending contest would require all the support which he could draw from foreign aid. He, therefore, changed his conduct towards the british admiral, and by favours and presents, not only induced him to concur in straitening the supplies of Barcelona, but obtained from him a threatening remonstrance to the regency, for presuming to plunder british ships, and ill treat the sailors. To this menace, the catalan chiefs pleaded the excuse of necessity, and promised redress; but, at the same time, they made a pathetic appeal to british humanity, and requested his mediation for a suspension of arms. The appeal was fruitless: for to enable the Spaniards to maintain the blockade with undiminished forces, the admiral detached three of his own ships to convoy the flotilla returning from America.*

Aug. 1.
1714.

At this crisis, the long expected death of Anne, and the

* Case of the Catalans, as before.

accession of George the first, inspired the besieged with new hopes, and as the unfortunate are elated by the faintest gleam of relief, they flattered themselves that the change would produce a speedy and effectual interposition in their favour. Nor, indeed, was their confidence wholly unfounded. The very first measure of the new government was an urgent application to France in their behalf, declaring them under the protection of the british crown, and remonstrating against the march of the french troops and the investment of Barcelona, after the solemn promise given by the french monarch to concur with England in obtaining the preservation of the catalan constitution and privileges.

CHAP. XXI.

1712

|

1714.

These instances were, however, too late to be availing. Louis replied, "he had already employed his good offices ; their obstinacy alone was the cause of their misfortune, and a regard for his own honour would not permit him to recal his troops." To preclude farther remonstrance, he hurried reinforcements to the army, and ordered the commander to redouble his efforts for the reduction of Barcelona.

Embarrassed with factions in his new kingdom, and restrained by the fear of a jacobite insurrection, George could not enforce his instances by renewing hostilities. All appeals to the honour of Louis and the humanity of Philip proving ineffectual, he gave the only support to the Catalans, which his circumstances would permit, by enjoining admiral Wishart not to molest the besieged, nor to hinder any relief which might be brought by sea.*

As the emperor had now concluded a peace, and repeated appeals, not only to the christian powers, but even to the turks, had produced no effect, the Catalans were left to their own courage, exertions, and resources.

* Tindal, v. 18, p. 303.—Also Case of the Catalans.

CHAP. XXI.

1712

1714.

On the 12th of July, the trenches were formally opened against the city, and, under the skilful direction of french engineers, advanced regularly towards the ramparts. In spite of the most desperate sallies, the batteries began to play on the 25th, and five days afterwards, a lodgment was made on the covert way. On the 12th of August, breaches were effected in two of the bastions, but it required a struggle of three days before the assailants could gain a footing on the rampart.

Here generally ends the most desperate resistance of a fortified town; though, in this instance, it was scarcely more than the commencement of the conflict. While preparations were arranging for three assaults at the same moment, Berwick compassionately made an effort to save the city from the horrors of a storm, and deferred the signal for a combat which was likely to prove no less destructive to his own troops than to the besieged. All his benevolent offers serving only to rouse new transports of enthusiasm, the fatal signal was at length given on the morning of the 11th of September.*

A contemporary author,† who wrote under the horrible impression of the moment, has traced a glowing picture of this deplorable event.

Fifty battalions of grenadiers commenced the dreadful work, and were supported by forty others. The French attacked the eastern bastion, the Spaniards that of St. Clara and the new gate. The resistance was obstinate even to ferocity. Cannon loaded with grape made the most dreadful carnage in the breaches. Without being able to advance a single step, the assailants perished by hundreds. Fresh troops incessantly arriving, at length overpowered the weaker numbers of the besieged. The french and spanish columns mounted the breaches

* Memoires de Berwick, t. 2, p. 174, et seq.

† St. Philippe.

at the same instant, and the french pushed forward into the town. But here it was that the conflict really commenced. Every street was intersected with barricades; every inch of ground was purchased with the sacrifice of lives. Unprovided with means to force the barricades, or fill up the ditches, the assailants were swept away by an incessant fire from every house. At length, all obstructions were overcome by torrents of blood. In the heat of the combat, the victors spared none: the Catalans, lavish of life, demanded no quarter. When they were driven into the great square, the assailants deemed the conflict at an end, and dispersed for pillage. But the insurgents, profiting by the moment, returned to the charge; the assailants were driven back to the breach, and would have been again precipitated into the ditch, had they not been rallied by the bravery and exertions of their officers. Again the combat raged with aggravated fury, for the spanish column which had penetrated by the other breach was driven back as the French retreated.

CHAP. XXI.

1712

1714.


Numbers and bravery at length vanquished all resistance. The Spaniards turned their own cannon against them, and additional artillery was brought up to the breach. Yet though thrown into disorder, they did not cease to combat. The assailants, galled with a continual and terrible fire, by a desperate effort forced the bastion of St. Peter, where the besieged their principal stand, and turned its artillery against them. In this crisis, the chiefs led them to a new charge, but were repulsed, and Villaroel desperately wounded. Though discouraged by the misfortune of the commander, the besieged still maintained the struggle for twelve hours, in every quarter of the town, and there was scarcely an inhabitant of any age, sex, or condition, who did not share in the defence. The history of this century does not furnish an example of a siege so long and bloody.

CHAP. XXI.

1712

|

1714.



The women at length retired into the convents; the populace, vanquished and straitened on every side, and unable to defend themselves, did not demand quarter, and the french massacred all without distinction. At this moment some individuals raised a white standard, and Berwick seized the opportunity to suspend the carnage, ordering the troops to maintain their posts, till he had heard the proposals of surrender. But a sudden cry of "kill and burn" bursting from the ranks, revived the fury of the troops, the streets were again deluged with blood, and the authority of Berwick himself scarcely sufficed to arrest the disorder. Night arrived, and with it new horrors; for in the short interval of suspense the inhabitants resumed their arms and again poured a destructive fire from the houses.

Deputies at length advanced to the breach to parley with marshal Berwick, but required a general pardon and the restoration of their privileges. The marshal contemptuously rejected the demand, and threatened to give no quarter if they did not surrender before morning. His answer inflamed the spirit of the insurgents; and the combat raged with redoubled fury, a storm of fire pouring upon the assailants from the houses which by order of the marshal had been respited from destruction.

This night was one of the most horrible that imagination can form. The marshal ordered the dead and wounded to be removed, kept the troops under arms, and prepared to reduce the town to ashes. Day broke, and notwithstanding the obstinacy of the insurgents, he granted a delay of six hours. This concession producing no effect, the houses were set on fire. Apprised of their danger by the burst of the flames, the insurgents once more hoisted a flag of truce. The fire was extinguished, the deputies of the magistracy yielded

the town without condition ; and the offers of Berwick procured the immediate surrender of Montjuich and Cardona.

The lives and property of the inhabitants were spared ; but twenty of the chiefs, among whom were Villaroel, Armengol, the marquis de Peral, and Nebot, were consigned to perpetual imprisonment, in the castle of Alicante, and the bishop of Albaracin with two hundred ecclesiastics banished to Italy. Of the rest, the inferior officers were dismissed on taking the oath of allegiance. The standards of the town were publicly burnt, the privileges of the province annulled, and a new government established according to the constitution of Castile. The prince of Tzerclaes was nominated captain general of the province, and the marquis of Leide governor of Barcelona.

Thus ended a conflict which recalls to recollection the fate of the ancient Numantia and Saguntum,* and in recent times finds a parallel in the immortal defence of Saragossa. The royalists purchased their victory with the loss of no less than 6,000 men in the siege, and 4,000 in the assault, and we can scarcely doubt that the besieged were not equally sufferers. This ferocious resistance induced some of the counsellors of Philip to recommend the rasure of the place, and the erection of a pyramid in commemoration of the rebellion. But he was too prudent as well as too humane to destroy one of the most valuable cities of his dominions for the sake of personal resentment ; and faithfully fulfilled the conditions which Berwick promised to the inhabitants.†

Majorca alone had not yet acknowledged the authority of Philip, but the dreadful fate of Barcelona was not sufficient

* The modern Murviedro, which has been recently illustrated by a gallant defence against the french arms.

† In addition to the animated description of St. Philippe, the reader is referred to the more brief account of Berwick, which does equal justice to the desperate defence of Barcelona.

CHAP. XXI.

1712

1714.

to reduce these hardy islanders. At length, the arrival of 10,000 french and spanish troops, convinced them that farther resistance was fruitless: after a short deliberation, they accepted the offer of a general pardon, and of more favourable conditions than had been granted to the Catalans, and pledged their obedience to Philip.

The noble struggle and melancholy fate of the Catalans, excited sympathy even in the breasts of those who were adverse to their cause. The british monarch and nation naturally witnessed their downfall with deep regret; but no heart more sincerely bled than that of the emperor, who considered himself as the innocent and unfortunate cause of their ruin. Notwithstanding the desertion of England, he had resumed his instances in their favour at the conferences of Rastadt, and the memoirs of Villars bear an honourable testimony to his zeal and firmness in their behalf, and the sorrow and reluctance with which he abandoned them to their fate. A letter written to general Stanhope, who had equally witnessed their fidelity and sufferings in his cause, will prove that the feelings of the monarch were lost in those of the man.

Sept. 8.
1714.

After expressing his grateful affection for Mr. Stanhope, and those who had acted in his cause, and his satisfaction at the recent change of government in England, he continues, "Convinced as I am of your goodness of heart, I am persuaded that you and your friends will compassionate the fidelity, constancy, and misfortune of my poor Catalans, whose attachment to me is without example. Neither calamities, nor perils, nor persuasion, have been able to weaken their generous fidelity. All this pierces my heart. I leave you to judge, you who can best judge, whether it is in my power to succour them without a naval force; on the contrary, I should only aggravate their ruin. I place my reliance on you and your friends, and doubt not but

you will reflect on the dreadful state to which they have been reduced by the evil minded of your countrymen, contrary to the most sôlemn and repeated promises."

CHAP. XXI.

1712

1714.

* The letter from which this abstract is taken, written in the french language in the hand of the emperor himself, is preserved in the Harrington Papers.

CHAPTER XXII.

1714.

The Princess Orsini obstructs the conclusion of Peace, to extort the cession of her Sovereignty in the Netherlands—Death of Maria Louisa, Queen of Spain—Despondency of Philip, and influence of the Princess—Administration and financial regulations of Orri—Fruitless attempt to reform the Abuses of the Church—Disputes and reconciliation of the Princess with the Court of Versailles—Her negotiations and intrigues for the re-marriage of Philip—Choice of Elizabeth Farnese, Princess of Parma—Arrival of the new Queen in Spain—Disgrace and banishment of the Princess—Remarks on this singular Event—Her subsequent Adventures—Changes in the Spanish administration.

CHAP. XXII.

1714.

AS Louis had concluded the peace from apprehensions lest a change in the british government should occasion the renewal of the war, he was no less sincere in desiring to terminate the complicated business of the negotiation, by an arrangement between Spain, Holland, and Portugal, which had been suspended from various causes. He therefore called on Philip to ratify the conditions concluded in his behalf, through the intervention of England. But he found Philip less grateful to the hand which had raised him to the throne, than sensible of the sacrifices extorted from him, and indignant at the insults which he had experienced from the dutch and the emperor. Various circumstances also contributed to increase his reluctance.

Among others, the most essential obstacle was derived from the opposition of the princess Orsini. The sovereignty which had been promised to her, rather as the price of future, than as the reward of past services, however inconsiderable it was at first represented, was no less important a territory than the duchy of Limburg. In addition to the absolute promise of Louis to extort the consent of the emperor, her useful agency had been repaid with a promise equally solemn from England, and the intended transfer was accordingly secured with every requisite formality.

CHAP. XXII.
1714.

Before the cession of the Netherlands, a grant of the duchy of Limburg, with such additional territories as should produce an annual revenue of 30,000 crowns, was passed by a legal act, and introduced in the convention concluded between Spain and England, by the agency of lord Lexington. The same clause, by the express injunction of the british ministry, was afterwards inserted in the treaty of Utrecht; and the queen pledged her royal word never to permit the transfer of the Netherlands to any prince whatsoever, till the princess was quietly established and acknowledged in her sovereignty.* Both before and after the conclusion of the treaty, members of the british cabinet continued to lavish on the princess their professions of service, and repeatedly pledged their own personal credit † as well as the word of their royal mistress, for the fulfilment of this condition.

March 27,
1713.

July 13.

Nothing appeared wanting to crown the hopes of the princess, but the acquiescence of the dutch, and the consent of the emperor. But they were bound by no personal obligations to

* Treaty between Great Britain and Spain.—See Collect. Treaties, v. 3, p. 492.

† See in the Correspondence of Bolingbroke, v. 3 and 4, numerous letters from him to the Princess, written in a style of the most extravagant adulation.

CHAP. XXII.

1714.

conciliate her favour; and, therefore, the states refused their guaranty, and the emperor opposed the cession of so valuable a territory in the heart of a distant province, to a dependent of France and Spain. All arguments failing to overcome their objections, the zeal of the british court gradually cooled; and finally, Louis himself, in the conferences of Rastadt, after a slight affectation of reluctance, gave up a point of such inferior importance, compared with the restoration of a general peace.*

Stung with disappointment, the princess exerted her powerful influence to protract the negotiation with Holland; and she unfortunately found both Philip and the queen too sensible of a refusal which they considered as a personal affront to themselves.

Feb. 14,
1714.

In the midst of the suspense derived from this cause, the queen of Spain fell a victim to the fatal and lingering disorder which had long afflicted her. She died in the twenty-sixth year of her age, leaving two sons, Louis and Ferdinand; regretted by the Spaniards, by whom she was beloved and respected; and deeply lamented by her husband, who, to her lively temper and amiable character, owed the comforts of domestic life and tranquillity of mind, and to her exertions and magnanimity was scarcely less indebted for the preservation of his throne.

The interregnum, for so it may be truly called, between the death of one queen and the arrival of a second, became the reign of the princess Orsini.

In the first moments of despondency, Philip abandoned the reins of government to the cardinal del Giudice, a neapolitan prelate, recently raised to the important post of grand inquisitor, and justly meriting his confidence, by integrity, candour, and zeal for the catholic faith. Unable to support the view of a palace which brought his beloved con-

* Memoirs de Villars, t. 2, p. 316.

sort to his recollection, he retired to the hotel of the duke of Medina Celi at Madrid, and shut himself up with no other companion than the princess, who, by her post of governess to the prince of Asturias, was entitled to share the royal residence. As the hotel was too small to contain the numerous attendants of the court, the princess established herself in an adjacent convent; and the capucins to whom it belonged, were transferred to another monastery. By her order, the party walls which separated the convent from the hotel were demolished, and an open gallery, which formed a communication between the two buildings, was closed, to enable her to pay her visits to the royal widower at all seasons without restraint, and without observation.*

CHAP. XXII.
1714.

In this state of seclusion, a woman of such refined talents had full opportunity to establish her sway over the mind of the king, and to appropriate the royal authority. At her suggestion, the powers granted to the cardinal del Giudice were recalled within the short interval of three days, and the principal direction of affairs transferred to Orri, who, in the late political revolutions, had been again summoned to Spain.

The primary object of the princess and her dependent, was to introduce a new system of administration, and to exclude from all share in the government the native Spaniards, on whose attachment they could not depend. Grimaldo, who, in his post of secretary of state, possessed a degree of influence which clashed with their views, was dismissed from those offices which might render him a dangerous opponent, and confined to the departments of war and the Indies. The other secretary, Meiorada, was supplanted by don Manuel Vadello: don Francisco Ronquillo was removed from the presidency of Castile, which was divided among five different persons. Four

* Duclos, t. 1, p. 73.

CHAP. XXII.

1714.

presidents were also appointed to the council of finance, and three to that of the Indies. Similar changes were made in the other branches of the administration, and regulations were introduced which were calculated to rouse the proverbial torpor of the spaniards, and give effect to the measures of the government. Lastly, the important department of the finances was divided between Orri and the count of Bergueik.

Orri was however soon left in the uncontrolled possession of ministerial authority. Bergueik, who was no less untractable and overbearing than himself, was offended with his airs of superiority; and, like preceding ministers, entered into cabals against the princess. Like them too, disappointed in the attempt, he resigned in disgust, and returned to Flanders.

In justice to the memory of Orri, we ought to observe, that many of the changes which he introduced into the spanish system of administration, were directed by sound views and attended with happy effects. Without giving full credit to the extravagant praises of his partisans, we ought to vindicate him from the equally exaggerated accusations of his enemies. At this distant period, it is difficult to trace the whole extent of his plans, but a brief sketch of his principal improvements will be a sufficient proof of his merits.

Formed in the french school, he naturally copied the french system in the plan of political œconomy which he originally laid down for Spain. He was, however, equally thwarted by the french ambassadors, and by the spaniards, and during his first residence in Spain, appears to have confined his efforts to the introduction of temporary expedients, calculated to meet the current expences, to improvements in the œconomy of the army, and to such partial changes in the public offices, as time and circumstances would permit.

He in particular formed a plan for the resumption of the

royal fiefs in the two Castiles, which had been pledged or alienated during the troubles of the monarchy. This measure had been repeatedly recommended by different kings of Spain, in their testamentary directions to their successors; but no hand was bold enough to make the attempt. Orri reunited all these fiefs without distinction; and to reconcile the rules of justice with the royal prerogative, he appointed a junta, which was authorised to judge and decide on the claims of those individuals who could produce proper titles. With his recal in 1704 his plans were suddenly suspended; and though his system was kept in vigour by the superintendence of Amelot; yet in the subsequent changes and troubles the affairs of Spain relapsed into the same disorder from which he had endeavoured to rescue them.

CHAP. XXII.

1714.

Returning at the auspicious period of the conclusion of peace, and raised to power by the uncontrolled ascendancy of his patroness, he resumed his extensive designs. To obviate the endless vexations and abuses derived from a host of farmers, collectors, guards, and officers, not only in the same department of finance, but even in the same province and town, a royal decree was issued on the 26th December 1713, which reduced this complicated and jarring machinery to one simple and effective system. The whole internal revenues were divided into twenty-one provinces, each administered according to the same rules, and farmed at least by a single proprietor.* Within a month the same mode of simplification was introduced into the still more confused department of the customs, in which the competition of different officers and guards belonging to different branches in the same ports, had given rise to every species of fraud and abuse, to the ruin of

* In the first instance, the number of proprietors amounted only to eleven, because one proprietor took several farms.

CHAP. XXII.
1714.

the native fabrics and trade, and the detriment of the royal revenue. This department was at first divided into seventeen farms, like the internal taxes, but ultimately placed under the sole administration of the council of finances. So perfectly were the measures matured for the adoption of the new system, that it took effect without apparent difficulty or delay. The publication of these two decrees may be considered as a new era in the political history of Spain; and as the foundation of that extensive system which the spanish court has since invariably laboured to bring to perfection.*

In his zeal for reformation, Orri extended his views to reduce the power and privileges, and restrain the abuses, of the church; and in particular, to diminish the formidable authority of the inquisition. In this design he was supported by the confessor Robinet, and assisted by Don Melchior Macanas, whose vigorous understanding and energy of character had raised him from the office of a petty judge in the kingdom of Aragon to that of attorney general of the council of Castile, and who had already proved his hostility to the immunities of the clergy. At the instigation of Orri and the princess, he presented a memorial to the king, proving that the abuses of the church had injured the rights of the crown; that the privilege of sanctuary had rendered the sacred places an asylum for crimes; that the civil immunities of the ecclesiastical body were equally detrimental to the royal authority and the public revenue; and that the tribunal of the papal nuntio had been gradually erected into an intolerable despotism.

The memorial made a deep impression on the mind of Philip, and was referred, in the regular course of business, to the examination of the council of Castile. This circumstance,

* Uztariz, Theory and Practice of Commerce, v. 1, p. 263. v. 2, p. 360. St. Philippe, t. 3, p. 82—88.—Noailles, t. 2, 3 and 4 passim.

whether occasioned by accident or necessity, was dangerous to a plan so ill calculated for the meridian of Spain, as well as to its authors. The memorial was instantly discovered by the watchful eyes of the inquisition, and solemnly denounced as heretical, and subversive of the true faith. In this sentence two french jurists, who had been consulted, were involved; but from respect to the king, the name of Macanas was omitted. The decree, after being dispatched to Paris,* to be sanctioned by the grand inquisitor, the cardinal del Giudice, was posted in every church and public place in the kingdom, and even affixed to the walls of the royal palace.

CHAP. XXII.

1714.

The reformers collected their whole strength to parry this dangerous and unexpected blow. They represented the publication of the inquisitorial sentence as a glaring insult against the crown; and so highly exasperated the king, that he demanded its revocation, and caused it to be removed from the churches. He even conceived the design of suspending the Holy Tribunal, nominated Robinet, and the brother of Macanas, a dominican friar, as temporary inquisitors, and enjoined del Giudice to resign his office. He also recalled the cardinal from Paris, and on his arrival at the frontier, dispatched an order forbidding him to enter Spain.†

The inquisition, however, confiding in its long established authority, defied even the mandates of the sovereign, and found means to frustrate the designs of the ministry. The removal of del Giudice was prevented by the refusal of the pope to accept his resignation, and the deputy inquisitors declined entering on their office. Attacks were made on the conscience of the scrupulous monarch; and a council of divines which he

* In the interval since his removal from the direction of public affairs, del Giudice had been dispatched on a public mission to Paris.

† St. Philippe.

CHAP. XXII.
1714.

was induced to consult, gave their opinion in favour of the holy office, and censured the offensive memorial. This decision was confirmed by the council of Castile, which, though it faintly approved some particulars, censured the whole plan as too violent, and contrary to the principles of the catholic faith. Philip therefore bent before the highest, civil, and ecclesiastical authorities, and declined adopting the bold advice of his ministers, though he continued to protect Macanas from the vengeance of the dreadful tribunal, which a zeal for the royal service had urged him to provoke.*

These different reforms, and particularly the attempt to restrain the power of the church, excited general odium against their authors. But the influence of the princess was too deeply rooted, to be shaken by popular discontent, or even by the influence of the church, had she not offended the court of Versailles by her ambitious designs and opposition to the peace, and still farther had she not committed one of those errors from which the most sagacious, prudent, and circumspect, are not always exempt.

Louis, who was pressing the conclusion of a general accommodation, was irritated by her opposition, and ordered Berwick, when nominated to the command in Catalonia, to repair to Madrid, under the pretence of condoling with Philip on the death of the queen, but in reality to extort his consent to a peace. The princess, however, discovered the object of the journey; and not only possessed sufficient influence to prevent it, but persuaded Philip to accompany his refusal with the remark, that the presence of Berwick with an army before Barcelona would be more advantageous to his service than a compliment of condolence. Irritated by this ungracious expression, Louis replied, that neither troops nor ships

* St. Philippe, t. 3, p. 120—150.

should be sent to Barcelona, until the peace was signed with Holland.

CHAP. XXII.
1714.

Still, however, the princess was so determined to secure the cession of her promised territory in the Netherlands, that she over-ruled the impatience of Philip to reduce the Catalans, persuaded him to make no reply to the notification, and dispatched Orri into Catalonia, to ascertain whether the resources of Spain were sufficient to complete the reduction without foreign aid. Discovering, at length, that the assistance of France was indispensable, she made new applications at the court of Versailles, though without evincing the slightest inclination to desist from her purpose.

Meanwhile, the capital again witnessed the revival of indecorous altercations between the princess and the french ambassador, the marquis of Brancas. The princess excluded the ambassador from all interference at court; and he, in return, accused her of intercepting his dispatches, and inveighed against her baneful influence. He charged her with thwarting the operations of Berwick, to the disgrace of the french arms, and the ruin of Spain, and declared that she would suffer the french troops, detached into that country, to perish with famine.

These representations still more inflamed the resentment of Louis. He repeated his resolution to send no farther succour to the assistance of Philip, and even to suspend the march of his troops destined to act against Barcelona. He added in a tone of offended dignity, "I will make a separate peace with Holland and the emperor, and leave Spain to defend herself against her enemies. I am resolved no longer to plunge myself in new misfortunes for the sake of the princess Orsini; but to give my subjects that repose which they so much need." To excite the national odium against the princess, Brancas was permitted to circulate this declaration in the name of his sovereign.

CHAP. XXII.
1714.

The princess now caught the alarm, and called forth all her address to pacify the french monarch, through the agency of Madame de Maintenon. In vain she protested that her pretensions had not obstructed the peace; in vain she revived the memory of her past services; in vain she urged Philip to demand the recal of Brancas. No assistance was sent against Barcelona, and the Catalans were enabled to augment their means of resistance. At length, the firmness of the french court, and the dread of its resentment, compelled her to submit. The cardinal del Giudice was dispatched to Paris, and restored the good correspondence between the two courts, and Philip transmitted to his plenipotentiaries at Utrecht full powers to conclude the peace.

This timely submission allayed the gathering storm. Louis appeared satisfied with her apologies; and the troops which had evacuated Sardinia, were ordered to join the force destined to act against Barcelona. But at the moment of this apparent calm, the aspiring views and overweening confidence of the princess involved her in a new disgrace as sudden as it was unexpected.

In consequence of the known complexion and character of Philip, the deceased queen was scarcely interred, before a design was formed to provide him with a new consort. As before, it was deemed necessary to select a princess, who, with the qualities proper to sway his mind, did not possess talents or spirit to rule without controul; and Louis, who intended to direct the choice, proposed a princess of Portugal or Bavaria, or a daughter of the prince of Condé.

But the future destiny of Spain, and the choice of a queen, who, under the name of Philip, was to pacify or trouble Europe, was not left to the option of the french monarch: for the princess, the sole arbitress of the will of Philip, was too

sagacious, as well as too ambitious, to neglect a crisis which was to consolidate her power, and decide her future fate.

CHAP. XXII.
1714.

The voice of scandal even accused her of consoling the royal widower for the loss of his Louisa; but with stronger appearance of truth, reports were spread that she aspired to share his bed and throne. With any other sovereign, such a project, at her advanced age, would have appeared too wild to justify even suspicion, but with a man, whom Alberoni coarsely characterised by the phrase "he needs only a wife and a prayer-book,"* and with the arts, the character, and aspiring temper of the woman, it does not appear entirely destitute of a shade of probability. Age had not totally robbed her of her personal charms, and the resources of art were lavished to supply the deficiency. With a person which had not yet lost its original elegance, with winning manners, fascinating address, and undiminished vivacity, she had acquired that imposing decision of character which is derived from long habits of rule; she possessed likewise the strongest claims to the respect and esteem of the monarch, from her faithful services, her solicitude to lighten the burthens of government, and her tender care of the royal children. Lastly, the habits of constant and familiar intercourse, and the consolation which her society had administered, when his mind was softened and subdued by sorrow, had given birth to a sentiment which may almost be termed affection. It is not improbable that a consciousness of these advantages tempted the ambition of a woman, whose passions were all lost in her love of rule; and who, with the power and ostentation, was capable of aspiring to the title and station of a queen.

Such a project is necessarily involved in impenetrable mystery, but if we may attach credit to the assertion of Al-

* Duclos, t. 2, p. 64.

CHAP. XXII.
1714.

beroni and Elizabeth Farnese, and even the avowal of Philip himself, the design was certainly formed, and perhaps frustrated only by a sense of shame, which the well-timed sarcasms of the confessor excited in the mind of Philip.*

But leaving these remarks to the judgment of those who are fond of penetrating into the details of private history, it is at least certain that she was interested to select a queen as zealously devoted to her as the last, and that she was too artful to contribute to the elevation of any princess likely to be swayed by the influence of a foreign court. She, therefore, adroitly thwarted the recommendations of the king of France, while she turned her attention to discover a princess of a petty court, who, to an amiable disposition, and moderate talents, united graces of person, and whom she might govern by the ties of gratitude and respect. In this search, a casual suggestion of Alberoni, the subtle agent of the duke of Parma, induced her to fix her choice on a princess of the House of Farnese.†

Being engaged in conversation with Alberoni, while the funeral procession of the late queen was passing, she remarked, "We must provide a new wife for the king," and added the

* *Le Roi*," says Duclos, "aimant à s'entretenir des nouvelles de France avec son confesseur, lui demanda un jour ce qui se disoit de nouveau à Paris: Sire, repondit Robinet, *on y dit que V. M. va épouser Madame des Ursins. Oh! pour cela, non*, dit le Roi séchement, et passa."—*Mem. Secrets*, t. 1, p. 74.

† The author of the *Life of Alberoni*, published at the Hague in 1722, introduces a letter from Alberoni to a friend, in which he asserts that the marriage was arranged without the knowledge or consent of the Princess Orsini; but this letter is a palpable forgery, both from the authentic testimony of Poggiali, author of the *Memoire Istoriche de Piacenza*, and from the declaration of Alberoni himself, in the *Apology* written after his disgrace.

names of different princesses. The wily Italian raised objections to each, and penetrating her design, observed, "You must find one quiet and docile, and not likely to interfere in state affairs." The princess asking, "Where shall we discover such a person?" He rapidly recapitulated the princely families of Europe; and then, as if by accident recollecting himself, carelessly mentioned Elizabeth Farnese, daughter of Edward, deceased duke of Parma, adding, with the same tone of simplicity and indifference, "She is a good girl, plump, healthy, and well fed, brought up in the petty court of her uncle, duke Francis, and accustomed to hear of nothing but needle-work and embroidery."* He dexterously adverted also to her reversionary claims on the duchies of Parma and Tuscany, which might afford the means of regaining the spanish power in Italy.

The princess made no direct reply to the artful suggestion, but her confidence in Alberoni secretly influenced the choice. After a lapse of three months, in which the impatience of Philip daily increased, she yielded to his wishes, and proposed to obtain the acquiescence of Louis in a new marriage, though without alluding to the princess of Parma. She accordingly sent for her nephew the count of Chalais, an officer of the spanish guards, then engaged before Barcelona, to fulfil this commission. He was presented by the princess to Philip; but as the timid monarch was embarrassed, and hesitated to communicate his desire, the favourite assumed the conversation. "His ma-

* We quote the expressive language of Poggiali. He says he drew the information from a person of credit, to whom it was communicated by Alberoni himself.

"Questo pur freddamente e come a mezza voce, la nominò, aggiugnendo per altro, ch'ella era una buona Lombarda, impastata da buttero e formaggio Picentino, elevata alla casalinga, nella picciola Corte del Duca Francesco, suo zio e patrigno, ed avezza di non sentirsi di altro parlare che di mertelli, ricami e tele."—Poggiali Memorie Storiche di Piacenza, p. 279.

CHAP. XXII.
1714.

jesty," she said, "is desirous to marry again, and orders you to repair to Paris, and obtain the consent and recommendation of the king of France." By this remark the embarrassment of Philip was dissipated, he gave the requisite authority for the important mission, and Chalais took his departure.

At this very moment, or immediately afterwards, she succeeded in persuading Philip to demand the princess of Parma; but urged the necessity of secrecy to prevent the emperor from obstructing a match calculated to give Spain a footing in Italy. A counter order was instantly dispatched to Chalais; but the courier passing him on the road, reached Paris before him. The sudden appearance of Chalais did not fail to excite the curiosity of the french cabinet. Although he alleged the pretence of private business, they were too accurately apprised of his movements to be easily deceived; and after refusing to disclose the object of his journey to Torci, he obeyed the positive commands of the king himself, and imparted it in a private audience.

Meanwhile the princess had gained the private dispensation of the pope, and through the agency of Alberoni, secured the consent of the court of Parma. She now thought proper to make a formal communication to Louis, and the requisite orders were accordingly dispatched to Chalais. Louis, however surprised at the preceding communication, was still more displeased and astonished at the secrecy and haste with which this match had been concluded; and indignantly replied "Well then, since he must marry, let him marry."* Chalais returning with this assent, however ungracious, was made a grandee of Spain; and measures were adopted to accelerate an

* These particulars are drawn from the Memoirs of St. Simon. They were communicated to Louis the fifteenth in his presence by Chalais himself. *Oeuvres de St. Simon. Note sur la princesse des Ursins, t. 12, p. 282.*

union to which the princess fondly looked, as the seal of her authority.

CHAP. XXII.

1714.

In the midst of her exultation she discovered, with indignation and alarm that she had been grossly deceived in the character of the future queen; who, instead of a simple and pliant girl, was of a temper and genius which scorned controul; and though apparently obedient to the mandates of a severe mother and rigorous stepfather, possessed a spirit and understanding far above her age and sex. The information was not lost; for the jealous favourite instantly dispatched the most pressing orders to suspend the conclusion of the match. Her messenger arrived at Parma on the very morning of the ceremony; but as the object of his commission was suspected, he was stopped at the entrance of the city, and by bribes and threats induced to delay his appearance till the ensuing day.*

On the 16th of September the nuptials were celebrated at Parma, by Ulysses Joseph Gozzalini, bishop of Imola, as papal legate; the duke, as proxy for the catholic king, receiving the hand of his niece.† A messenger instantly conveyed the joyful tidings to Madrid; and the princess, concealing her chagrin and disappointment, affected no less satisfaction than Philip himself.

In a few days the new queen took her departure with a splendid retinue, and embarking on board a galley at Sestri, reached Genoa after a troublesome passage. From thence she continued her journey by land. She was received with regal honours in her journey through France, and at St. Jean Pied de Port passed two days with her aunt, the queen dowager of Spain. On reaching the frontier she dismissed all her attendants, except the marchioness of Piombino, and their

* Duclos, t. 1, p. 76.—† Poggiali, xvi, p. 282.

CHAP. XXII.
1714.

places were supplied by the officers and servants of her new household. At Pampeluna she was met by Alberoni, who for his important services was created a count, and received the appointment of envoy from the court of Parma to that of Madrid.

On the news of her approach the king quitted the capital to meet his bride at Guadalaxara, where the nuptials were to be consummated. He was accompanied by the princess Orsini and her nephew Chalais, and surrounded with officers and domestics of her appointment. On the evening of the first day he reached Alcala; and here the princess, who had resumed her office of camerara-mayor, quitted him to meet her new mistress. She passed on to Xadraca, a small village four leagues beyond Guadalaxara, where the queen arrived while she was taking some refreshment. She instantly quitted the table, met the queen at the foot of the stairs, and, kneeling, kissed her hand. She was received with apparent complacency, and in virtue of her office conducted her royal mistress to her apartment.

She began to express the usual compliments, and to hint at the impatience of the royal bridegroom. But she was thunder-struck when the queen interrupted her with bitter reproaches, and affected to consider her dress and deportment as equally disrespectful. A mild apology served only to rouse new fury; the queen haughtily silenced her remonstrances, and exclaimed to the guard, "turn out that mad woman, who has dared to insult me." She even assisted in pushing her out of the apartment.

She called the officer in waiting, and commanded him to arrest the princess, and convey her to the frontier. The officer, hesitating and astonished, represented that the king alone had power to give such an order. "Have you not," she indignantly exclaimed, "his majesty's order to obey me without reserve?"

On his reply in the affirmative, she impatiently rejoined, "Then obey me." As he still persisted in requiring a written authority, she called for a pen and ink, and wrote the order on her knee.

CHAP. XXII.
1714.

The princess was instantly placed in a coach, with only one female attendant, and two officers, without being permitted to change her dress. In this manner, and under an escort of fifty dragoons, she was conveyed during the whole night, which was so severe, that the hand of the coachman was frost-bitten and mortified; and so dark, that they were guided by the light of the snow. Astonishment and consternation at first benumbed her senses, and suspended her faculties. But this state of sullenness gave place to indignation and despair, and these passions were succeeded by deep and bitter reflections on such unexpected, such violent, and unjustifiable treatment. Gradually she began to imagine that the king, whom she supposed to be ignorant of what had passed, would resent such an abuse of his authority, and that some of her numerous adherents in the court would interest themselves in her behalf. Absorbed in these reflections, she passed the rest of this long and dreadful night without breaking silence, till morning arrived, and it was necessary to stop and bait the horses at a small hovel. She had now time to compose her countenance and weigh her expressions. To her companions she testified her extreme surprise at what had happened, and related the circumstances of her interview with the queen. The two officers, accustomed, as all Spain had been, to fear and respect her more than even the sovereign, suggested such motives of consolation as occurred under the astonishment with which they were themselves overwhelmed.

As she proceeded on the journey, and no news arrived from the king, her hopes became fainter and fainter, and at length

CHAP. XXII.
1714.

gradually vanished. Circumstances which in the first emotion had not touched, now began to affect her. No beds, no provisions, no change of dress, nor even of linen; no defence against the severity of the weather, was to be expected till she arrived at St. John de Luz. These multiplied inconveniences excited the most violent transports of rage in a woman so imperious and ambitious, so long accustomed to unbounded power and public consideration, so long habituated to the servility of a court, and the luxuries and indulgencies of authority and affluence.

On the third day she was joined, at a small village, by her two nephews, the count of Chalais and the prince of Lanti, with a letter from the king. Disdaining to give any outward sign of depression, she replied to their condolence, "Why do you come to me with that doleful countenance? shake it off, or leave me. I have nothing to reproach myself with, and am perfectly tranquil." As she anxiously enquired respecting the behaviour of the king, and the circumstances which had passed since her departure, they told her that the whole evening he had passed at cards, and expressed impatience to receive a message from her. At one in the morning he retired to rest. When he rose, he was attended by Chalais, and proceeded to Guadalaxara. Here Chalais first heard, from one of the domestics, the news of her arrest, and requested leave for himself and the prince his cousin to follow. Grimaldo brought the permission of the king; and a packet, which, according to his account, contained a donation of the principality of Roses; but they were ordered not to depart before the queen arrived. Soon afterwards Alberoni appearing, was admitted to a private audience, and at eight came the queen herself.

The marriage ceremony was then performed; the king and queen retired to their apartment, and not a word transpired

relative to the fate of the princess. At length, Chalais was permitted to depart, but instead of the donation originally offered, he received a letter, cold and formal, permitting the princess to remain at the place where he might overtake her, and promising that her pensions should be duly discharged.

CHAP. XXII.
1714.

This faithful account took away all hope; but, at the same time, relieved her from anxiety, and composed her agitated mind. She became suddenly resigned; she shed no tear; she uttered no sigh; she expressed neither regret nor reproach; she shewed no symptom of feminine weakness. She supported without complaint the extreme cold, the want of common necessaries, and the fatigues of the journey, and by her patience and fortitude excited the admiration of her guards and attendants.*

At length, after a journey of twenty-three days, she reached St. Jean de Luz, where she was restored to liberty, and left to brood over the recent catastrophe, which appeared as the illusion of a dream. Here she desired permission to wait on the queen dowager at Bayonne, but her request was rejected. Still, however, she entertained hopes of being favourably received at Versailles, and wrote to madame de Maintenon in her customary tone of friendly confidence. "I now inhabit," she said, "a small house near the sea. I see that element sometimes calm, but oftener agitated; fit emblem of courts, of what I have seen; of what has recently happened to myself, and what must excite your generous compassion." She also

* The reader will please to recollect, that in Spain scarcely any accommodation can be procured on a journey; travellers carrying with them provisions, and even beds and cooking utensils. From the extreme precipitancy with which she had been hurried away, the Princess was unprovided with money; she was reduced to borrow a trifling sum of her conductors, and it was not till after the arrival of her nephews that a messenger overtook her with a supply of 1,000 pistoles.

CHAP. XXII.
1714.

dispatched her nephew with letters to Louis, and to the ministers, soliciting an asylum in her native land.

After some delay, she was allowed to proceed to Paris, and found a temporary asylum in the house of her brother, the duke of Noirmoutiers. She received numerous visits rather of curiosity than of compassion; and, repairing to Versailles, experienced such attention from the monarch and his courtiers, that she resumed her native gaiety. But in this moment, her reviving hopes were again crushed. At the instigation of the queen, Philip made overtures of reconciliation to the duke of Orleans, and, attributing their former misunderstanding to the princess, released his two agents Renaut and La Rotte, who had been retained in strict confinement. In consequence of this reconciliation, the duke manifested his resentment against the princess, and obtained from Louis an order forbidding her to appear before any part of the family of Orleans, and thus virtually excluding her from the court.*

* We have drawn this account from various authors, all worthy of credit, who derived their information from persons actually concerned in the transaction. Among these we may distinguish Duclos, who received his intelligence from the Duchess of St. Pierre, the Marquis of Brancas, and others who obtained their information from Alberoni; and St. Simon, who has preserved a very interesting Memoir, written by the Duke of Luynes from the information of Chalais, and from the communications of the Queen of Spain herself to the Duchess of St. Pierre.—St. Simon, t. 5, p. 227—239.—t. 12, p. 282—309.

We quote the information given by the Queen, as decisive of the most contested point in the preceding narrative.

“ J’ai marqué un grand detail sur Madame des Ursins. Madame de Luynes, en parla à Madame la Duchesse de St. Pierre, pour qui la Reine d’Espagne avoit beaucoup d’amitié. Madame de St. Pierre dit à Madame de Luynes qu’elle avoit beaucoup questionné la Reine d’Espagne sur cette aventure, et que la Reine l’avoit assurée qu’elle n’avoit agi dans toute cette affaire, que sur un billet du Roi d’Espagne. Que le Roi d’Espagne étoit persuadé que Madame des Ursins avoit fait tout ce qui avoit dépendu d’elle, pour l’engager à

Of the remaining life of the princess few notices are preserved. All that we know with certainty is, that her attempts to regain the favour of Louis, and the confidence of madame de Maintenon, were fruitless. During the height of her power, she had employed her favourite, d'Aubigné, to build a magnificent palace at Chanteloupe, which she destined as her future residence, purposing to exchange her principality in the Netherlands, for the province of Touraine, and the Pays d'Amboise, to revert to the crown on her death. But in her disgrace, she never acknowledged this pompous edifice as her own, and left it to be occupied by d'Aubigné.* She hovered about Paris and Versailles till the last illness of Louis; but dreading the resentment of the duke of Orleans, in the event of his death, she quitted Paris; and, after being refused an asylum in Holland, resided a short time at Avignon: she next established herself at Genoa. In vain she solicited permission to resume her residence at Rome, during the life of pope Clement; but obtained her request under his successor, and attached herself to the establishment of the Pretender, doing the honours of his house, and as Duclos observes, "consoling herself with the

l'épouser, et qu'il avoit écrit à la Reine qu'elle fît en sorte d'éloigner Madame des Ursins, qu'elle les empêcheroit assurément de vivre dans l'union où ils devroient être. La Reine d'Espagne ajouta que lorsqu'elle rencontra Alberoni elle assaya de l'engager à la servir dans ce dessein, mais n'ayant pu le déterminer, elle fut obligée de lui montrer la billet du Roi d'Espagne ce qui mit totalement l'abbé Alberoni dans ses intérêts. La Reine d'Espagne convient, qu'elle prit l'apparence d'un prétexte dans la crainte de manquer la moment."—St. Simon, t. 12, p. 309.—Duclos, t. 1, p. 82.

We likewise refer the reader to St. Philippe, who differs from St. Simon and Duclos in some particulars, t. 3, p. 141.

* Chanteloupe was the temporary residence of Lord Bolingbroke, afterwards the favourite seat of the Duke of Choiseul, and since the Revolution, has been inhabited by the celebrated chymist, Chaptal, ex-minister of the interior.

CHAP. XXII.
1714.

shadow, in default of the substance, of royalty.* She died in 1722 at an advanced age.

The intrigues which occasioned the sudden disgrace of this celebrated woman in the very meridian of her power, and the singular manner in which it was effected, have long exercised curiosity and conjecture. The most probable opinion seems to be, that Louis the fourteenth was offended with her conduct in retarding the peace, and concluding the marriage of Philip; that the pride of madame de Maintenon was wounded by the ostentation and ingratitude of a woman, who in the height of favour forgot her past obligations; Philip himself was shocked with her attempts to raise herself to his bed and throne; and indignant at the bondage in which she had long held him; Lastly, the young queen was offended by the attempt to break off the marriage, and was anxious to free herself from the superintendence of a woman whose abilities she knew, and whose controul she dreaded.

The interests of all parties uniting in her disgrace, little difficulty occurred in arranging the means, though the particulars are uncertain. It appears, however, that Philip, not having the courage to dismiss her in person, sent a private order to the queen, and left the execution to her spirit and discretion. A part of the letter containing the order has been preserved. After requesting the queen to dismiss the princess, he added, "at least take good care not to delay it; for if she converses with you only two hours, she will captivate you."

From the intriguing character of Alberoni, and his subsequent influence with the queen, this event has been attributed to his machinations, but without foundation; for he was totally ignorant of the design when he met the queen at Pampeluna. When apprised of it, he endeavoured to dissuade her from the

* *Memoires Secrets*, t. 1, p. 83.


attempt, but she silenced his objections by throwing the letter of Philip on the table; exclaiming, "read that and fear nothing." With this sanction, he contributed his advice and assistance, and conveyed the intelligence to Philip.*

CHAP. XXII.
1714.

Orri and his subalterns were involved in the disgrace of their protectress. By the suggestion of Alberoni, the cardinal del Giudice was restored to the royal confidence, re-established in his inquisitorial authority, again intrusted with the direction of foreign affairs, and nominated governor of the prince of Asturias.

When restored to office, he retaliated on the princess and her partisans. He represented to Philip, that the holy office was the support of his monarchy; and procured the signature of a royal decree, enjoining the different councils to represent the injuries done to religion and the state during the late administration. Orri withdrew into France, Robinet was dismissed, and Daubenton replaced in the office of confessor. The innovations introduced into the different departments of administration were revoked; and Grimaldo was not only reinstated in his original posts, but as private secretary to the queen enjoyed a principal share in the government. The fall of a foreign domination gave universal satisfaction to the spanish people; and after this great political convulsion, a temporary tranquillity ensued which had been long unknown both in the court and kingdom.

* St. Philippe, t. 3, 151—163.



CHAPTER XXIII.

1715—1716.

Death of Louis the Fourteenth—Change of policy in the court of Madrid—Rivalry between Philip and the Regent Duke of Orleans, and his animosity against the Emperor—Character of the new queen Elizabeth Farnese—Rise, ascendancy, and designs of Alberoni.

CHAP. XXIII.

1715

1716.

ON the 1st of September, 1715, Louis the fourteenth closed his long and chequered reign, leaving as his successor his great grandson, Louis the fifteenth, a weak and sickly boy in the fifth year of his age. By his will the regency was intrusted to the duke of Orleans, who, in consequence of the renunciation of Philip and the death of the duke of Berri, was presumptive heir to the crown; but the care of the young king's person, and the command of the royal guards, were vested in the duke of Maine, and other restrictions established, which were calculated to reduce the authority of the regent. However, as Louis himself had foreboded,* the duke of Orleans in an instant swept away all restrictions, and obtained the sanction of the parliament and the acquiescence of the peers in a form of government scarcely less absolute than if he had succeeded to the throne in his own right.

* St. Simon, t. 6, p. 220.

The death of Louis gave a new aspect to the views and situation of the court of Madrid, by changing the relations of France and Spain, and leaving Philip to pursue new political maxims.

CHAP. XXIII.

1715

|

1716.

Hitherto Spain had been merely subservient to the will of Louis. Not only the great operations of war and policy, but even the minutest affairs of the court, and the most trivial arrangements in the administration, had been regulated by his orders. In vain the subdued spirit of Philip occasionally revolted against the slavery in which he was held: on the slightest symptom of independence he was haughtily reminded of his endless obligations to the sovereign who had sacrificed his own ease, tranquillity, and interest, to place him on the throne, and was again awed into silence and submission.

The death of Louis dispelled the charm. Philip now deemed himself at liberty to pursue his own principles, and to consult his own interests, and those of his adopted country. Personal considerations also contributed to alienate him from the existing government of France. Though he had renounced his pretensions to that crown, he never for an instant relinquished his intention to assert his birth-right in case of a vacancy; and at different times had even hesitated whether he should not descend from the throne of Spain to render his pretensions more valid. As the means for attaining his object, he was desirous to secure the regency, which, according to the constitution of France, and the public opinion, would have belonged to him as presumptive heir. He therefore had no sooner heard of the decease of Louis than he assembled his confidential counsellors to deliberate on this subject, and was only persuaded to desist from his purpose by the apprehension that an avowal of his claims would rouse the principal powers of

CHAP. XXIII.

1715

|

1716.



Europe against him.* He was consequently both disappointed and indignant at the conduct of the duke of Orleans in seizing the whole power of the government, which not only frustrated his immediate purpose, but tended to increase the difficulty of realising his distant views, on the reversion of the crown.

The peace of Utrecht also formed a new æra in the history of Spain, and the life of the sovereign. Philip, though his faculties were benumbed by the indolent habits derived from his hypochondriac malady, was animated by the lofty spirit which distinguished the princes of the House of Bourbon. He had imbibed from his french education and french advisers a rooted jealousy of the commercial prosperity of the maritime powers, particularly of England, as one of the causes which had materially contributed to diminish the population, depress the trade, and reduce the naval power of Spain. Without losing sight of his eventual succession to the throne of his ancestors, he was not the less anxious to recover the strength, promote the welfare, and restore the splendour of his adopted country. Not even the dangers of a struggle involving the very fate of his crown could divert his attention from his darling object, and he eagerly seized the first moment of returning peace to bring forward measures proper for its attainment. In the treaty of commerce concluded at Utrecht with England, the same influence which had so effectually served the House of Bourbon on other occasions, had enabled him to introduce into the act of Ratification a series of supplemental

* According to the dispatches of Mr. Doddington, (Sept. 6, 1716,) it was the prevailing opinion at Madrid, that on the death of Louis, Philip would instantly repair to Paris, and Alberoni, in his Apology, claims the merit of dissuading him from the journey.

conditions, under the title of explanatory articles,* which furnished the pretext to deprive the english of their commercial privileges in Spain ; and by the imposition of heavy duties, and incessant vexations, abridged their means of entering into competition with the native trade and fabrics. From this cause the public intercourse with the court of England, during the short period since the peace of Utrecht, presented little but a series of complaints and discussions on commercial grievances.†

CHAP. XXIII.

1715

|

1716.

The same motive which rendered Philip anxious to restore the commercial prosperity and naval power of Spain, impelled him to recover its territorial grandeur. Notwithstanding the possession of Spain and the Indies, he brooded with sorrow and regret over the dismemberment of the monarchy, and panted for an opportunity to re-unite the Italian territories, Gibraltar, Minorca, and perhaps the Netherlands, to his empire. To political, were likewise added personal motives, for aspiring to these acquisitions. He was urged by the powerful stimulus of resentment against the emperor, who still retained the title, and assumed the honours attached to the crown of Spain.

The different changes in the constitution and state of the kingdom, had greatly contributed to consolidate the power and augment the resources of Philip. The recent dismemberments had rather lopped off the superfluous branches, than weakened the trunk of the monarchy, which was rooted and nourished in the peninsula. By the regulations of Orri, a foundation was laid for a new system of finance and œconomy, and the way opened for eradicating innumerable abuses.

* Treaty of Commerce between England and Spain, Dec. 9, 1713, in Lamberti, t. 8, and other collections of public papers.

† Instructions and Correspondence of the British Envoy, Mr. Doddington. Melcombe Papers.

CHAP. XXIII.

1715

1716.

Finally, in abolishing the free constitutions of Aragon, Valencia, and Catalonia, Philip had removed a fertile source of internal discord, and a perpetual restraint on his prerogative; while by subjecting those countries to the same system of administration as the two Castiles, he weakened the local antipathies which had divided Spain into as many nations as provinces, restored vigour to the sinews of government, and made a certain, as well as considerable addition to the royal revenue.

Besides these causes, personal and political, which led to a change in the conduct and policy of Philip, he received an additional impulse from the spirit and ambition of his new queen Elizabeth Farnese.

Melancholy, indolent, and reserved, the slave of habit, uxorious without delicate attachment, fond of splendid enterprizes without the talent to plan or resources to pursue them, he was formed to be governed by his queens, to become the instrument of those designs to which they were prompted by their own interests and passions, or the suggestions of their advisers. The death of his first consort, and the dismissal of the princess Orsini, produced no change in his solitary and monotonous life; the new queen succeeded to the power as well as the place of her predecessor, and by the same arts became in a few months no less absolute mistress of his will, and arbitress of his monarchy.*

The character of Elizabeth Farnese, who till the death of Philip had so great a share in embroiling or pacifying Europe, was almost totally opposite to that of her husband. Though educated in a retired corner of the palace of Parma, and secluded from the world by a severe and vigilant mother, she had assiduously cultivated her mind, and was better acquainted with history and politics than the generality of her sex. She

* St. Philippe, t. 3, passim.

also spoke several languages, and possessed an elegant taste for the polite arts.* She was plain, but not uninteresting in countenance, graceful in person, obliging in her address when she wished to conciliate, and gifted with the most fascinating powers of conversation. Imperious and aspiring by nature, she was habituated to constraint and self command by the mode of her education; a perfect mistress of dissimulation; artful and stedfast in her designs, and animated with a spirit which neither time, difficulty, nor opposition could subdue.

All these qualities she called into action to govern her doting husband. Aware that he was jealous of his authority, she ruled without appearing to rule, by practising all the refinements of coquetry, praising him for the beauty of his person granting or withholding her caresses to serve her political purposes, and affecting the utmost zeal for his glory. She was indefatigable in her attentions, never contradicting him, approving what he approved, or disliking what he disliked; yet adroitly and vigilantly watching all the emotions of his mind, and leading him to adopt her wishes, however contrary to his own. She strengthened his aversion to society; she shared his only and favourite amusement of the chace; she passed a perpetual tête à tête, with a hypochondriac and unsocial husband, discovering neither disgust nor fatigue; and enlivening the tedium of constraint, solitude, and etiquette with an inexhaustible fund of gaiety and good humour. She thus acquired and consolidated a power which neither time nor accident could shake, and to the last hour of his reign was the real sovereign of Spain.

Recently delivered of a son, Don Carlos, and looking forward to the prospect of a numerous offspring, the ruling

* Poggiali in his *Mem. Istoriche* has given a well drawn but too highly coloured portrait of this princess. T. 10, p. 279, 280.

CHAP. XXIII.

1715

1716.

CHAP. XXIII.

1715

1716.


principle of her actions was the aggrandisement of her children. She encouraged the views of Philip on the succession of France, with the hope of entailing that crown on her own issue, while the sons of the first wife were left to vegetate in Spain. But as this was an uncertain and at best a distant object, she brought forward her own pretensions to Parma, Placentia, and Tuscany, from the succession of which she was only separated by three princes, all without issue.* She looked forward to the

* GENEALOGICAL TABLE

OF THE

HOUSES OF FARNESE AND MEDICI,

SHEWING THE CLAIMS OF ELIZABETH FARNESE TO THE DUCHIES OF
PARMA AND TUSCANY.



acquisition of these duchies as an advantageous establishment, should the untimely death of Philip frustrate her more splendid and distant designs.

CHAP. XXIII.

1715

|

1716.

The first guide of this enterprising princess, and her master in the science of politics, was Alberoni, who as her countryman, and the original cause of her elevation, became her counsellor, and the depositary of her confidence.

Giulio Alberoni was the son of a labouring gardener in a suburb of Placentia, and was born May 21, 1664. He was brought up conformably to his humble station, without instruction, even in the lowest rudiments of learning; and for a time assisted in the daily labours of his father. He shewed little aptitude for this toilsome occupation; but like the celebrated Sixtus the fifth displayed striking proofs of premature talents, and an ardent desire of instruction. About the age of twelve he became in succession servant to the sextons or clerks of two parochial churches. In this situation he attracted the notice of a priest, who taught him to read; afterwards he acquired the rudiments of the Latin tongue; and finally became a pupil in the school of the jesuits. Under these able masters he displayed equal ability and industry, and left several volumes in his own hand writing, which were preserved in the time of his biographer Poggiali,* and shew an intimate and extensive ac-

* This account of Alberoni's early life is principally drawn from Poggiali's *Memorie Istoriche di Piacenza*. He was a native of Placentia, a contemporary of Alberoni, librarian to the duke of Parma, and derived his information either from notes written by Alberoni himself, or from persons intimately connected with him, who received their intelligence from his own mouth.

We have also had recourse to St. Philippe, St. Simon, and Duclos, and have consulted the *Vita di Alberoni*, which though erroneously supposed to have been written under his own direction, and teeming with errors, contains much curious and authentic information.

CHAP. XXIII.

1715

1716.

quaintance with sacred and profane literature. To a lively, bold, and enterprising genius, he joined a supple and insinuating behaviour, and a watchful attention to seize every opportunity of improving his knowledge, which his sagacious mind had discovered to be the surest instrument of fortune.

By these talents and winning manners he gained many friends and protectors; and particularly acquired the patronage of Ignazio Gardini di Ravenna, a judge or coadjutor of the criminal court at Placentia. This patron, however, falling under the displeasure of the sovereign, sought an asylum in his native city; and the young Alberoni voluntarily shared his disgrace.

Such was the path which was marked for his future elevation. At Ravenna he attracted the notice of the vice legate count Barni, who being promoted to the bishopric of Placentia, made him his steward. Being, however, as little qualified for the details of this office, as for the labours of a gardener, Alberoni turned his views to the church, was ordained priest in 1690, admitted to a small cure, and by the interest of his patron received a prebend in the cathedral.

He next became preceptor, or rather companion, to count John Baptista Barni, nephew of his protector, and accompanied him to Rome. In this situation he not only improved his knowledge of classical literature and philosophy, but acquired the french tongue, which was the instrument of his further rise. At Rome he cultivated the acquaintance of many distinguished persons, particularly count Alessandro Roncoveri, afterwards bishop of Borgo St. Domino, the travelling companion of the heir of Parma. On his return to Placentia, chance opened to him a channel of promotion, which he adroitly improved. During the campaigns of Vendome in Italy, the french and spanish armies were quartered in the

duchy, and oppressed the people by heavy contributions. To obtain some relief from these exactions, the duke employed the bishop of St. Domino as his agent to Vendome, and the prelate being ignorant of the french tongue, chose Alberoni to accompany him as his interpreter.

CHAP. XXIII.

1715

1716.

The vivacity and insinuating address of the young priest had already captivated all to whom he became known, had gained him numerous patrons, had converted those patrons into friends, and had inspired them with the same solicitude for his interests as for their own. He was no less successful in acquiring the favour of the rough and soldier-like Vendome, than in pleasing his more refined and polished countrymen. During the course of the negotiation, he enlivened the tediousness of discussion with sallies of wit and buffoonery; he gratified the gross taste of the french commander by the most extravagant flattery, and libertine conversation, and by preparing with his own hand such poignant italian dishes as were calculated to provoke a jaded appetite. By these means he gained new favour in every conference. The bishop soon perceived the superior influence of his interpreter, whom Vendome called his 'dear abbot', and being disgusted with the gross manners of the french commander,* advised his sovereign to transfer the whole negotiation to Alberoni. The duke adopted the advice, and gave additional consideration to his agent by conferring on him a canonry of Parma; and as he was the guide and interpreter of many french officers of high distinction, who repaired to the court, a salary was added to the donation, with a house in the city to receive his military guests. In this situation he is described by a contemporary writer: "The french officers are pleased with his jocose humour; they amuse the duke of Vendome with repeating the jests,

* St. Simon, t. 12, p. 117.—Duclos, t. 1, p. 248.

CHAP. XXIII.

1715

1716.

repartees, and witty conceits of Alberoni, whose person is as comical as his conversation; for he has a monstrous large head, a swarthy complexion, a very short neck, broad shoulders, a very low stature. In a word, he is a pigmy, of whom fortune has made a colossus.*

Intimate acquaintance endeared him still more to Vendome, and when he quitted Italy at the close of the campaign Alberoni readily accepted the offer to enter into his service, instead of remaining at the petty court of Parma. He was intrusted with the most secret correspondence of his new master, became his confidential secretary, and accompanied him in the campaign of Flanders. After this arduous period of service, he was introduced, by his patron himself, to Louis the fourteenth, as a man of superior merit, skilful and indefatigable in business, whose advice and exertions had rendered essential service in that difficult campaign. So strong a recommendation procured him the most flattering marks of royal favour, and a pension of 1,600 livres. †

When the presence of Vendome was demanded in Spain, the powerful influence of Alberoni was employed to induce him to accept the command. He accompanied his patron, displayed his talents and address on numerous occasions, and was repeatedly recommended in the official dispatches to Versailles as a model of fidelity and intelligence, and as assisting, by his dexterity, to rouse the loyalty of the spaniards. Vendome endeavoured likewise to promote his interest at the court of Madrid, by representing him as a man of profound knowledge in finance. Alberoni was accordingly employed to draw up a plan for the regulation of the revenues; and by the assistance

* Essay towards the Life of Alberoni, in Political State for September 1718, p. 206.—Likewise Preface to the Vita del Card. Alberoni.

† Poggiali, t. 10, p. 236.

of Macanaz, then in the humble situation of a provincial lawyer, he performed the task with such ability that he received the thanks of the king and a gratuity of 500 pistoles.*

CHAP. XXIII.

1715

|

1716.

Vendome wanting a confidential and discreet agent near the princess Orsini, could not select for the delicate commission a more proper person than Alberoni, who by his conciliating manners and insinuating address acquired her confidence, removed her jealousy of his patron, and by her influence obtained a pension from Philip. He paid the last tribute of affection to Vendome, who expired in his arms; and even this event, which appeared to cloud all his further prospects, contributed to his advancement. As the confidant of the deceased commander he repaired to Versailles, described the state of the army, developed his plans, and detailed the measures adopted to ensure success. He was consequently received with great favour and marked distinction, and returning to Madrid with new recommendations, continued to increase his influence with the princess. By the generosity of his patrons, as well as by the produce of his ecclesiastical benefices and pensions, he was now in a state of affluence; and employed his wealth with a liberality and grace which is ever inherent in great minds.

While he was pursuing his fortune in Spain, he did not neglect to improve his interest in his native country. He succeeded in preventing the dismissal of the Parmesan agent when the duke incurred the displeasure of Philip by acknowledging Charles † as king of Spain, and in consequence of this proof of his influence, was soon afterwards appointed to fill the office himself. In this situation he became the means of raising Elizabeth Farnese to the throne of Spain.

* Account of Ripperda, by the Sicilian abbots. MS. in Walpole Papers.

† St. Philippe, t. 3, p. 16.

CHAP. XXIII.

1715

1716.

The new queen, having according to the customary etiquette dismissed her Parmesan attendants, was perfectly insulated in the solitary court of Madrid. She naturally, therefore, turned to her countryman Alberoni, to whom she principally owed her elevation, and who, besides his services and attachment, and capacity of agent from her father in law, was best adapted to become her counsellor, from his experience in public affairs, and intimate acquaintance with the court in which she was to figure as a sovereign. By his advice she was principally governed; and from the moment of her arrival his power may be dated; for the disgrace of the princess relieved him from an irksome dependence, and left him without a rival.

Among the first effects of his political power may be reckoned the revocation of the ecclesiastical reforms projected by Orri, the restoration of the holy office to its functions,* and the reinstatement of the cardinal del Guidice in the direction of foreign affairs, as well as his appointment to the office of governor to the prince of Asturias. Alberoni had also the address to recommend as confessor to the queen Dominico di Guerra, a native of Italy, whose moderate talents and servile character fitted him to become a docile and useful agent. If he did not promote, he at least did not oppose the recal of Daubenton, from a conviction that the memory of past disgrace would curb his meddling spirit, and deter him from thwarting the living, as he had attempted to oppose the deceased queen.†

Too adroit and discerning to mar his rising fortunes by a premature attempt to seize the reins of government, Alberoni continued with no other public character than that of minister

* St. Philippe.

† St. Philippe, t. 3, passim.—Alberoni's Apology, in the Historical Register.—Duclos and St. Simon, as before quoted.

from Parma, which intitled him to the privilege of a constant and familiar access to the cabinet. In this situation his profound knowledge of policy, fertility of resource, facility in transacting business, and insinuating address, gave him daily new interest in the mind of an indolent prince, who was no less attached to the splendour, than unequal to the burthens of royalty. He thus gradually rose from the capacity of an occasional adviser to that of a favourite and confidential counsellor, and finally was enabled to wrest from the real ministers the principal management of affairs.

CHAP. XXIII.

1715

1716.

Perfectly acquainted with the ruling passions of Philip and the queen, he knew that his hopes of advancement depended on holding forth the prospect of realising their respective designs. He found, indeed, the nation exhausted by the recent contest, by a defective system of government, and by an endless series of abuses; but he won the royal ear while tracing remedies and improvements; and he calculated on the native energy of the spanish character and the vast resources of the monarchy. Aware, however, that a period of tranquillity was necessary to give effect to his measures and accumulate the means for future enterprise, he does not appear to have flattered the passion of Philip for war; but according to his own avowal, which is corroborated by the tenour of his discourses with the british envoy, he invariably inculcated the maxim, "If your majesty will maintain your country in peace for five years, I will pledge myself to render you the most powerful monarch in Europe."* To prove the truth of his promises, he employed the able assistance of his friend baron Ripperda, in tracing a new system of political œconomy, for improving the finances, reducing the expenditure, correcting abuses, reviving trade, raising a navy and army, and restoring Spain to its

* Apology of Alberoni.—History of Europe for 1722, p. 201.

CHAP. XXIII.

1715

1716.

former ascendancy in the civilised world.* This plan, presented and supported by the queen, captivated the sanguine imagination of Philip, who was fond of splendid designs, and conscious of the mismanagement which pervaded every department of the state.

* Account of Ripperda, by the two Sicilian abbots, Platania and Caraccioli. MS. Walpole Papers.

CHAPTER XXIV.

1716—1717.

State of Europe—Political and commercial Disputes between Spain and England, and views of Philip on the French throne—Alberoni promotes a Breach with France and an Union with England—Signature of a commercial Treaty—Declaration of Philip against the Pretender—Correspondence of Mr. Dodington, British Envoy, and his intercourse with Alberoni—Overtures to England for an Alliance against the Emperor—Declined—Treaties which led to the conclusion of the Triple Alliance.

AS the means of tracing the progress, and developing the designs of a minister under whom Spain was destined to assume a new character, it is proper to take a brief review of the different powers more immediately interested in the affairs of the peninsula, as they were affected by the peace of Utrecht.

Although the emperor could no longer cherish the hope of wresting the spanish sceptre from his more fortunate competitor, he still persisted in bearing the title of king. He bestowed the spanish order of the golden fleece; he established at Vienna a tribunal formed of his spanish adherents, under the presidency of the ex-bishop of Valencia, and called from its functions The Council of Spain, and confiscated in the Netherlands and in Italy the property of those who had acknowledged Philip.

CHAP. XXIV.

1716

1717.

CHAP. XXIV.

1716

1717.

The disputes arising from the hasty and imperfect arrangement which closed the war of the succession, had occasioned a breach between Austria and the maritime powers. The emperor was indignant at the loss of Sicily, and still more irritated at the onerous terms on which he was to receive the Netherlands; the occupation of the principal fortresses by the dutch garrisons, with the appropriation of the revenues for their maintenance; and the shackles imposed by the commercial cupidity of the maritime powers, on the trade and manufactures of this rich and industrious people. At this juncture he was involved in a war with the Turks, which obliged him to draw his forces into the remote provinces of Hungary, and leave his newly acquired dominions in Italy almost defenceless.*

The dutch were scarcely less alienated from Great Britain than from the emperor, by the discussions relative to their barrier; and, besides their jealousy of the English, who had deprived them of many of their commercial advantages, they were vigilantly watching for an opportunity to recover their lucrative trade to the spanish territories in the old and new world.

George the first, the new king of England, in addition to his disputes with the emperor and the dutch, was involved in peculiar difficulties. He had, indeed, ascended the british throne with unexpected tranquillity, and had seen the party who had so lightly sacrificed the national interest exposed to the vengeance of their offended country. But the calm was of short duration. The jacobites, who, at the close of the late reign, had acquired a dangerous ascendancy, had now broken into open rebellion, and were favoured by the disappointed and factious of other parties. The Pretender had actually landed in Scotland to make a decisive effort for the throne, and was encouraged by the secret assistance both from France and Spain.

Jan. 1716.

* House of Austria, Chapters 3 and 5.

The whigs, who had paved the way for the accession of the House of Brunswick, were weakened by their own personal contentions, and the schism was already commencing which, in the following year, threw the most powerful chiefs of the party into the opposition. Even the royal palace was the scene of feuds; and the rising disputes of the king with the prince of Wales at once disturbed his domestic peace, and increased the insecurity of his throne.

CHAP. XXIV.

1716

|

1717.

The popularity attending the accession of a new sovereign, and the formation of a new administration, had rapidly subsided. A train of mistresses and adherents, by their rapacity excited the national jealousy against foreigners, and every measure of the sovereign was censured as derived from german views, and directed by german agents.

George had equally offended the two great powers of the north, Sweden and Russia, by wresting from Sweden Bremen and Verden, and by thwarting the attempts of Russia to form an establishment in the Empire. With France he was also engaged in disputes relative to the fulfilment of the recent treaties, particularly to the two important points, the rasure of Dunkirk, and the dismissal of the Pretender. Finally, in his intercourse with Spain, he encountered still greater difficulties, both political and commercial, derived from the same fertile source; for notwithstanding the positive engagements of the treaty, the assiento was still unsettled, and the british merchants daily exposed to new vexations.*

The war of the succession had only contributed to exasperate that political rivalry which had rendered France the most dangerous and inveterate enemy of England. Although the effects of the recent conflict were yet too severely felt in her finances

* Memoirs of Sir Robert Walpole, chs. 9—16.

CHAP. XXIV.

1716

1717.



and population to permit the resumption of those ambitious designs which had endangered the liberties of Europe, motives were not wanting for indirect hostility, nor means for aggravating the troubles which impended over the House of Brunswick. While, however, the government was thus profiting by the internal disorders of a rival power, the nation itself was agitated with a ferment which threatened the renewal of civil wars. The change in the order of succession appeared to have shaken the very foundations of the monarchy. A numerous party both in the cabinet and the country, fostered a zealous attachment to Philip as the lineal descendant of their late monarch, and the principal support of that political system which had rendered France the arbitress of Europe.*

Victor Amadeus, king of Sicily, was dissatisfied with the cessions which had been made to reward his services in the late war. With the characteristic cupidity of his house, he was anxious to obtain the Milanese with the title of king of Lombardy, in exchange for Sicily, which, however valuable in itself, was a distant and precarious possession to a prince without naval power. For this purpose he was engaged in a secret negotiation with the emperor; and he flattered himself with the hope of obtaining an eventual claim to a part of the austrian succession, by uniting his son, the prince of Piemont, with one of the Josephine archduchesses. He was, however, not the less ready to listen to any overture which might increase his consequence, or afford the prospect of advantage in other quarters.

The pope did not, without jealousy, behold the House of Austria uniting Naples with the Empire and the Milanese, and reviving the dangerous power possessed by the Suabian emperors in Italy. To this general ground of jealousy were added

* Memoirs of the Regent Duke of Orleans.

inferior causes of dispute, concerning the principality of Comocchio, and the feudal superiority of Parma and Placentia. Hence, although of little weight as a temporal prince, the pope was disposed to grant his spiritual support to Philip, and the favours of the church were too important to be disregarded in a catholic country like Spain.

CHAP. XXIV.

1716

|

1717.

The minor states of Italy, harassed by the exactions of the emperor, and alarmed by his claims of feudal superiority, were looking forward to the support of some foreign power, under whose protection they might find security.

In such a situation of public affairs, Alberoni duly estimated the weight of England and Holland in the political balance, and the value of their assistance, or even connivance, in his design to restore the spanish dominion in Italy. He, therefore, successfully laboured to overcome the aversion of his sovereign to the two powers who had been his most dangerous enemies in the recent contest, and even pledged himself for their secret or open assistance. He assiduously courted the friendship of the dutch minister, baron Ripperda, and by his intervention endeavoured to purchase the naval support of the republic, by proposing to take twelve of its ships into spanish pay, as a protection to the american trade. Aware also that Holland would be essentially influenced by England, he employed the agency of Ripperda to introduce himself to the notice of the british government, and tendered his services to restore a good understanding with Spain.

The british envoy * thus describes the first appearance of

* The British envoy at this period was Mr. Bubb, who afterwards changed his name to Dodington, and terminated his political career under the title of Lord Melcombe. He was left in charge of the British affairs on the departure of Mr. Methuen, and though young gave proofs of great discretion and talents in this delicate crisis.

CHAP. XXIV.

1716

1717.

this new political agent, whom he had hitherto never spoken to, or even seen.

“ Baron Ripperda informs me that he received a message to repair to court, where a person waited to speak with him, by order of the king. He went, and found a gentleman * of great consequence, who, he says, shewed him a power from the king, authorising him to speak on the part of his majesty. They talked much relative to dutch affairs, on which full satisfaction was promised. Afterwards the gentleman desired him to come to me this evening, and inform me, as from the king, that his majesty was perfectly disposed to live in good understanding with my sovereign. To give all imaginable proofs of it, he was ready to consent to annul the explanatory articles, and do every thing calculated to promote a good intelligence between his britannic majesty and himself. Of this the gentleman desired I would apprise my sovereign this night.”†

In a subsequent letter, the envoy adds, “ I have found out the gentleman, who alone is absolute here. He has gained an entire ascendant over the queen, and, by that means, over the king, who is not a lover of business, and suffers himself to be governed by her majesty. I ought to add, I see no party forming capable of opposing him.”‡

In the first public intercourse which had succeeded the peace of Utrecht, the british government had struggled against all the influence of the great bourbon party, headed and directed by the cardinal del Giudice, the principal minister, and against all the tardiness, contradiction, and prejudices of the spaniards

* Alberoni.

† Mr. Dodington to Secretary Stanhope, Sept. 20, N. S. 1715.—Melcombe Papers, in the possession of H. P. Wyndham, esq. M. P.

‡ Ibid. Oct. 11, N. S.

themselves. No sooner, however, did Alberoni appear on the scene, than all difficulties vanished. The commercial discussions, which had been thwarted at every step, were immediately terminated. Alberoni became himself the bearer and advocate of a project for a new treaty, abrogating the explanatory articles, obviating all the points in dispute, and restoring the English to the commercial advantages which they enjoyed under the austrian princes.*

CHAP. XXIV.

1716

1717.

The british envoy, triumphantly announcing this transaction to his court, observes, "We signed the treaty, which is inclosed, last night after a thousand wranglings. * * * I flatter myself, that upon the whole we shall find ourselves in right to pretend to all the advantages we enjoyed at the time of king Charles the second, and the first article seems to set our duties on the same foot, with the same advantages and favours.

Dec. 12.

"The ratification is agreed to in six weeks, of which I was very glad, that we may finish as soon as possible. For you will please to observe, that the ministry here have done every thing they could against us, partly from the narrowness of their views, partly from the monstrous inventions which the Irish have spread about our disturbances at home, which some of them are weak enough to believe in a great measure. I have not thought it consistent with the honour of the king to endeavour to undeceive any of them, except his catholic majesty, who I hope is in a very sincere diposition to live in perfect friendship with his majesty. However, this being so, whatever we settled with the king in the morning, the cardinal del Giudice and his party undid at night; and raised a thousand suspicions, that I never knew what to depend on. We have been on the point of signing any time these eight days.

* Project of the Treaty. Melcombe Papers.—Treaty of Commerce between Spain and England, Dec. 3-14, 1715.

CHAP. XXIV.

1716

1717.

“Yesterday I got a friend of ours (Alberoni) to draw up this instrument, and go to the king, and, with my duty, tell his catholic majesty, that I conceived it contained exactly what he had several times been pleased to approve; and as I had in every thing obeyed his commands to the utmost, in bringing it to his very words, I hoped he would consider, that no more lay in my power, and would be pleased to end this affair one way or other. The gentleman did so; the king read it over, and asked his opinion. He said he thought the demand very reasonable, and if his majesty approved of it, it would be best to declare and finish it at once. The king said he was very well satisfied, and bid him have it signed. He went to the office and ordered a full power for the marquis of Bedmar, and as soon as it was ready in the evening, we met at Bedmar's house, who keeps his bed, and I fancy never heard of the matter till dinner time. There, after reading the instruments, they were signed, and the other sent to the king. This was the first time, and probably may be the last, that I ever saw the marquis of Bedmar.

“Count Alberoni has behaved very obligingly and heartily in this affair, and orders me to say abundance more to you, of service for you, than I shall trouble you with at present. Only any thing that you will order me to say to him from the king or yourself, will be very well taken, and may be of use.”*

Nor did the services of the adroit and insinuating favourite end here. He persuaded the king not only to withhold the assistance promised by his ministers to the Pretender, but even prompted him to adopt the strongest terms of solicitude and friendship for the king of England. When del Giudice ventured to express his surprise at the conclusion of so advan-

* Mr. Doddington to Secretary Stanhope, Dec. 12, 1715. Melcombe Papers.

tageous a treaty with a prince who tottered on his throne, and recommended the interests of the Pretender, whose progress in England he exaggerated: Philip, to his surprise and consternation, interrupted his representations with the brief, but decisive reply, "I consider the king of England as my brother, and am determined to live in friendship with him. Let me hear no more on this subject."*

CHAP. XXIV.

1716

1717.

Not content with this private declaration, Alberoni obtained from the sovereign a public and solemn pledge of his determination to give no support to the Pretender or his adherents. The paper was arranged between Alberoni and the british envoy, and the sanction of the king given with the same alacrity as to the commercial treaty. The publication of this paper made a great sensation in Spain, and essentially contributed to discourage the partisans of the exiled family, both in England and abroad.

The services of Alberoni were so warmly acknowledged by the british government, that he deemed himself secure of its support, or at least its connivance, in whatever designs he might chuse to undertake. He therefore availed himself of the occupation of Novi by the imperial troops, to appeal to the king of England as a guarantee of the neutrality of Italy; and even laboured to entangle him in an alliance with Spain, under the plausible plea of maintaining the faith of his public engagements. Confiding in the effect of these representations the king of Spain offered the genoese the support of a corps of spanish troops, and his effectual protection against the oppressions of the emperor.†

The british envoy himself was induced to become the proposer and advocate of this new connection with Spain. "I by

* Dispatch of Mr. Dodington to Secretary Stanhope, April 27, 1716.

† St. Philippe, t. 3, p. 169.

CHAP. XXIV.

1716

1717.

no means," he observed, "presume to form new schemes of power; but I fancy it might be so contrived, that by a compliance with our guaranty in a point, which it appears necessary to engage in, we might entirely ruin the french power here, and utterly divide the two nations. We might so highly oblige the queen, who is absolute, that his majesty would be looked upon as the protector of Spain, and be more favoured in commerce than ever. We might induce this crown to enter into the guaranty of the protestant succession, the strengthening of which alone, while there is any virtue in England, will be more valuable to us than any thing under heaven, to say nothing of the joint guaranty of the barrier for the dutch, to which Spain may possibly be brought, and which I regard as an essential, though remote part of our security."

Cautiously suggesting the proposal, he continued, "I proceed to explain, what I believe are the views of this court, and what may probably engage it to make such alliances and take such measures as his majesty pleases, both now and in future. I know not what may have been written to you on this affair, but I believe they have asked nothing specifically, because they have asked nothing of me, that they might not expose themselves to a denial. But in case his majesty should think of making a fast friend of Spain, and determine in their favour, I imagine the first thing asked of him, will be to interpose his good offices with the emperor to innovate nothing in Italy; and to send some men of war up the Mediterranean to countenance the king of Spain's ships as his ally, under the pretence of hindering a landing by the Turks. If in the mean time his majesty will set a negociation on foot, for a stricter union with Spain, I am satisfied he may obtain conditions which we had very little reason to expect six months ago."

He did not conclude his dispatch without adverting to an

article calculated to gratify the queen. "His majesty is already guaranty of Italy. If he would go one step further, and guaranty the preservation of the states of Parma and Tuscany to the queen and her heirs, I am of opinion he might obtain very ample conditions, at the head of which I consider the guaranty of the crown in his majesty's royal family and of the barrier treaty. I thought on this particular thing, because we shall thereby so highly oblige the queen, whose son is the fourth prince of Spain, and can pretend to nothing from the succession, that I doubt not his majesty will in time be as much considered here, and more beloved than ever the french were."

CHAP. XXIV.

1716

1717.

"I think it is at present in his majesty's breast to make as strict an alliance as he pleases, and to lay so firm a foundation, by the conditions he may obtain, that the nation will soon be brought to its ancient bent, which was always in our favour, and his majesty be more considered here than ever his predecessors have been. As to the french, they have not the least influence here; and the creating and advancing that breach has been the chief difficulty in the negociation. This court has treated them very indifferently of late, and is disposed to treat them just as his majesty pleases, so that I believe they will never be able to lift up their heads here, unless we let slip this favourable conjuncture.

"The king of Spain has broken entirely with his old friends, in making a treaty which has highly disoblged them, without any condition for himself, and in opposition to all his ministers. Since he seems to have thrown himself so fairly into our hands, if we should now refuse him, he will be most sensibly mortified.

"As low as Spain is, there is no nation can so soon retrieve itself; and sooner at present than ever. Formerly the domi-

CHAP. XXIV.

1716

1717.

nions in Italy and Flanders were a vast charge to them instead of an advantage. They were maintained by the resources of the Indies and of the two Castiles, whereas at present this expence is at an end; the Castiles pay rather more than ever, while the king draws considerable resources from Aragon and Catalonia, which paid little or nothing before. In fact his resources exceed, by one third, those of any of his predecessors; and his expences are reduced one half; so with a little order he will soon make himself an useful ally.

“It would be a most sensible pleasure to me, nor do I despair of it, to see his majesty in a twelve-month’s time; and it is hardly so long since he began to act in the affairs of Spain, make his subjects trade supportable here; bring so great a guaranty into the succession and barrier treaty; separate Spain and France more effectually than a war of fifteen years has done, and establish a lasting alliance in the place. In short, to see him do more good for his people with respect to Spain in one year, than all our late mismanagements have done hurt in four.”*

Had England been disposed to sacrifice her political to her commercial interests, this was the opportunity to have formed an intimate connection with Spain. But the british cabinet, fully acquainted with the rooted jealousy fostered by the spanish court against the commercial prosperity of other powers, were too prudent to engage in hostilities for the sake of maintaining a treaty which might be as lightly revoked as it had been lightly concluded. Sensible also that the nation needed repose to recover from the weakness occasioned by a long and expensive contest, and embarrassed by civil war, they were chiefly anxious to establish the public tranquillity,

* Mr. Dodington to Secretary Stanhope, Feb. 19, 1716.—Melcombe Papers.

and to deprive the jacobites of the dangerous support of France. CHAP. XXIV.
1716

Hence they dexterously evaded the proposal of the spanish court, though with professions of amity calculated to soften their refusal. "His majesty," they observed, "was perfectly disposed to enter into a new treaty with the catholic king, to renew and confirm the past; but the actual situation of affairs did not permit him to form other engagements, which, far from contributing to preserve the neutrality of Italy, would give rise to jealousies tending to disturb it."*

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1717.
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The failure of the regent to regain the french ascendancy in Spain, his personal anxiety to secure the eventual succession to the crown, joined with the overthrow of the rebellion in favour of the Pretender, induced him to overstep the antiquated system of policy; and adopt new maxims with regard to England. This coincidence of public and private interests led to the formation of a great alliance, the sole object of which was the restoration of public tranquillity, and the confirmation of the provisions in the treaty of Utrecht, concerning the succession to the two crowns.

The progressive steps to this alliance were a series of individual treaties. In February, the king of England renewed his union with the states general, and in May, entered into an alliance with the emperor, for the reciprocal defence of their respective territories, with an unusual clause comprising the guaranty of such future acquisitions as they should make by mutual consent. These treaties were the prelude to an arrangement between France and England in June, by which the Pretender was to be sent beyond the Alps, the fortifications of Dunkirk to be rased, and the succession of both crowns, according to the treaty of Utrecht, secured by a mutual guaranty. All

1716.

* Secretary Stanhope to Mr. Dodington, March 13, 1715-6.

CHAP. XXIV.

1716

1717.

subordinate points being thus separately accommodated, these different engagements were, in July, consolidated in the Triple Alliance between France, England, and the United Provinces, and as the means of rewarding the accession of the Emperor, secret arrangements appear to have been formed for securing to him the island of Sicily in exchange for Sardinia.

CHAPTER XXV.

1716—1717.

Indignation of Philip at the treaties between England, the Emperor, and France—Artful conduct of Alberoni—His attempts to alarm or lure England into an alliance with Spain—Conferences of Alberoni with the British Envoy—Extracts from the correspondence of Mr. Doddington, relative to the situation and views of Alberoni.

WHILE Philip and Alberoni were flattering themselves with the prospect of obtaining the assistance of England in their designs against Italy, they were thunderstruck with the intelligence of the treaty between England and the emperor, the very rumour of which had already excited their alarm.

When the unwelcome account of the negotiation was transmitted by Monteleone, the spanish ambassador in London, the king bitterly reproached Alberoni with his rashness and overweening confidence: “Where,” he tauntingly asked, “are your english and dutch, of whose friendship and assistance you so much boasted? What can you say in their defence, after seeing them engage in new alliances with our greatest enemies, and after granting at your suggestion all their demands, and entering into all their measures?” To the reply, that even if the intelligence was true, England had nevertheless offered her alliance, the king impatiently rejoined, “I will not believe it.

CHAP. XXV.


1716

1717.

CHAP. XXV.

1716

1717.



Let them do as they will. I will take measures, which, however disagreeable, are unavoidable; for I cannot trust to these two nations. But I will persevere in my friendly disposition, till I am convinced there is no remedy." Then, apostrophising Alberoni, he continued, "On your word I have abandoned my old friends. To what an extremity am I reduced. I have not a single friend. You have finely advised me!"

Alberoni was, if possible, still more mortified than Philip himself; and his imperious temper swelled with indignation at being made the dupe of his own sanguine hopes, as well as of the professions of the british court. But, conscious that resentment was fruitless, he suppressed the emotions of anger and disappointment; and continued to hold the language of conciliation and friendship, though mixed with expressions of complaint and regret. In his conferences with the british envoy, he chiefly dwelt on the disappointment and chagrin of his royal master. "I never before," he declared, "saw him so deeply affected. He never treated me with equal indignity, regarding me as the cause of this unexpected, this unheard of affront, for advising him to break with the regent, and connect himself with England. It is scarcely possible to transact business with him.

"His majesty complains that the article by which the two parties not only guaranty their present possessions, but also whatever may be acquired by mutual consent, is directly levelled against him, because the emperor can make no acquisition in Italy except to his prejudice. He objects likewise to the stipulation that no power shall be admitted into the alliance except by mutual consent, as expressly intended to exclude him. But what alliance can England make with Spain? what compensation can she give for the favourable terms of the late convention, if she at the same time enter into

a connection with the emperor? Spain has no cause to fear France; and we are convinced that the maritime powers will not become our enemies, nor England maintain her engagements for the guaranty of Italy. We only require that the king your master will enter into a discussion of our rights, and adopt the part which is most just, and most consonant to his own interests.

CHAP. XXV.

1716

|

1717.

“Next to God, the king, my master, looks up to yours: he is disposed to cultivate his friendship, and to favour the commercial interests of his people. For your sake he has broken his covenants with France, and irrevocably separated himself from the other branch of the bourbon family. We can indeed never be induced to harbour so unworthy a sentiment as to imagine that England will join our enemies without a cause; but you must not wonder if my royal master is indignant; you must not deem it extraordinary if we are astonished at a treaty concluded at a time when you have nothing to fear, and for which no possible cause can be assigned.

“Consider, I intreat you, the cruel situation in which I stand. I, who alone persuaded my master to renounce his family connections. I, who persuaded him to remove the grievances laid on the english trade by the treaty of commerce. I, who persuaded him to grant the recent treaty, so advantageous to your interests; and am equally ready and willing to procure for you the settlement of the Asiento so long delayed. How can I appear before my royal master; I, who pledged my word for your sincerity; and became the organ of your repeated assurances that England would cultivate his friendship? How can I appear before him, who have so recently deceived him?”

To all the declarations of the british envoy that the alliance with the emperor was purely defensive; to all his assevera-

CHAP. XXV.

1716

1717.

tions that it contained nothing injurious to Spain, the same answer was repeatedly given, "England has made an alliance with our mortal enemy; with one who refuses to acknowledge Philip as king of Spain; with one who has heaped on him insult upon insult, and whose vast power in Italy will involve all the minor states in one common destruction."*

But, however deeply Alberoni felt his disappointment, he was still unwilling to relinquish the hope of detaching the king of England from France, and of inducing him not to oppose, if he would not assist in reducing, the austrian power in Italy. He therefore adopted a mode of conduct calculated to operate equally on their fears and hopes. He suffered the spanish officers to exercise new vexations on the british merchants, and suspended the execution of the recent treaty.

By his connivance the english merchants were subjected to all the exactions which the convention was intended to remove. They were even charged with additional imposts, called on to pay the local and municipal taxes, from which they had hitherto been exempted, and compelled to permit the quartering of soldiers in their houses, or punished with confinement for asserting their privileges.

Still, however, he affected to appear as the unalterable friend of England; as anxious to soothe the irritation of Philip, and to obtain a redress of grievances, and the execution of the treaty in which he had so considerable a share. In reply to repeated remonstrances of the british envoy, he lamented his own want of power; expatiated on the malicious opposition of the spanish ministers, who were equally his own enemies, and the enemies of England, and referred to the time

* Mr. Dodington to Secretary Stanhope, April 27, and May 4, 1716. Melcombe Papers.

when he hoped to assume the name and authority of a prime minister, and prove his sincerity by deeds, not by words.

“I see plainly,” he said, “that the king has a set of people about him who are my enemies; but he is so full of doubts and so irresolute, that notwithstanding the ascendant the queen has over him, it is inconceivably difficult to bring him into any vigorous measures. For my own part, I have been so discouraged, that I had made a solemn declaration never more to concern myself with business. However, notwithstanding the umbrage which his majesty has taken at your treating with the court of Vienna, I will speak once more, and let you know my success. You may depend upon it that I will serve you to the utmost of my power, and what I would not do for you, I would not do for any one living.”*

By this dexterous management, Alberoni succeeded in preventing an open breach, and endeavoured by lures and threats to detach England from France and the emperor, while he laboured to soothe the irritation of Philip, and protract a rupture till he was better prepared for the renewal of hostilities, which he deprecated as the ruin of Spain.

His frank and insinuating address, his repeated and solemn promises of future service, in some measure prevailed; and the british envoy looked forward to his elevation to the roman purple, as the period which was to terminate all existing difficulties, and as a new æra in the political relations of England and Spain.

In the preceding pages we have frequently employed the correspondence of the bourbon sovereigns and their agents as the most authentic expression of their sentiments, and the most faithful detail of their views and designs. We are fortunately enabled to follow the motions of the spanish court, in

* Mr. Dodington to Secretary Stanhope, July 18, NS. 1716.

CHAP. XXV.

1716

1717.

July 18.

CHAP. XXV.

1716

1717.

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1717.

its change of policy, and to trace the conduct and rise of the new favourite, from the correspondence of the british envoy, with whom he maintained an almost daily intercourse. It would be difficult to produce examples of more profound dissimulation and exquisite address.

One of the many instances in which the assistance of Alberoni was employed with advantage, was the establishment of a secret and direct correspondence between the two courts, in order to supersede the agency of Monteleone, who, from a partisan of England, was become an adherent of del Giudice and the french faction, and in his situation of ambassador at London, was enabled to raise continual difficulties in the arrangement of the various points at issue. The origin of this correspondence was the renewal of an acquaintance which Mr. Stanhope, when a prisoner at Saragossa, had formed with Alberoni, then in the service of Vendome, and the first letter which occurs, was written to return thanks for the conclusion of the treaty of commerce. After adverting to their former intimacy, and recalling the predictions which he had then hazarded that merit so distinguished could not fail of advancement, Mr. Stanhope expresses his satisfaction that he had so skilfully divined, and proceeds:

Dec. 30.

1715.

“The king, my master, is much gratified with the conduct of the king of Spain in terminating our discussions at a season which might have furnished specious pretexts for cavil, had he been disposed to take false impressions on the state of our affairs. His catholic majesty has acted like a wise and just prince. I may venture to promise that the event will shew he has not been deceived. England knows how to be a friend. She has expended 200,000,000 crowns, with the sole view of having a king of Spain her friend. The present king has just given a solid proof of his amicable intentions. Judge then what we would

do for him, should it happen that he has occasion for us. In all cases, sir, behold the foundation of a sincere and lasting friendship. You have begun the edifice, and to you I am ordered, by the king my master, to address myself for its completion.

CHAP. XXV.

1716

1717.

“ Mr. Dodington will have the honour to speak to you on the affair of the Asiento. Enlightened as you are, I am persuaded, you will be fully convinced, that Spain is more interested than England in what he will propose to you on the part of the south sea company. I entreat you to give him a favourable hearing, and to make such a report to the king of Spain as you may judge suitable to his interests. This stumbling block once removed, I see nothing to affect the union between the two powers, which we, in England, think absolutely necessary, not only for the welfare of both nations, but for the tranquillity of all Europe. I wish, with all my heart, that you may have the honour to strengthen this salutary union more and more, by your advice and good offices.”

Alberoni was flattered with these professions from the confidential minister of George the first, and anticipated the zealous support of England. The correspondence thus begun, was continued with equal cordiality by both parties, and few letters had passed, before the trammels of office were completely superseded. A letter from Mr. Dodington shews the nature and effect of this new mode of intercourse.

“ I went to Aranjuez, and got thither Wednesday the 6th, in the morning, before M. Alberoni was up: I left your letter to be delivered to him as soon as he waked, and went into the garden. At my return, he was in the queen’s apartment, from whence I sent for him. I told him what you did me the honour to write to me about his majesty’s good intentions for the king of Spain, and read to him the latter part of the letter. He seemed mightily pleased, and told me that


May 11.

CHAP. XXV.

1716

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1717.



you had written to him a very obliging letter. That he had already read it to the queen, and they would take their measures, and shew it to the king in the afternoon. I am a little acquainted with him, and saw that it had an extraordinary good effect, and might be a favourable occasion to push the matter. I told him that from what I had read to him, it was plain how much it was his majesty's resolution to cultivate a strict friendship with the catholic king; but I had good grounds to suspect that it had been much misrepresented of late. That I must inform him we knew most certainly the marquis of Monteleone was entirely in the french interest, and his enemy, as well as a friend to the Pretender, and a creature of the cardinal. From most incontestable proofs, the king was so fully convinced of this, that I thought I should be wanting in my duty, if I did not demand his recal.

“ He answered, he was much surprised at what he had heard. Monteleone was a man who had nothing at all in Spain; he had served a good while, and had been trusted with some secrets, and, therefore, they must do what they did with as little *eclat* as possible.

“ Finding that he was not well disposed, I told him I would not affirm that the point which so much alarmed them was wholly false, because I knew nothing of it either directly or indirectly. But I would venture to affirm that it was either false or of no consequence. I said, if it were otherwise, it is inconceivable that a thing of such importance should be confided to a minister of Spain, and that at a time when his majesty did me the honour to inform me that he had most ample demonstrations of his being an improper person to promote the union between the two crowns; so improper that I could not avoid insisting that he should be recalled.

“ He replied, he had all imaginable reason to hope there was

nothing in it, from your letter, which came very luckily, and, I can assure you, did a great deal of service. He promised me that Monteleone should be recalled, and shortly. In the mean time, he desired that no regard might be had to any thing he said; and assured me no sort of credit should be given here to what came from him. He requested when any thing was to be done you would be pleased to write to him or to me, and we would settle it among ourselves; and it should never be seen except by the two kings, the queen, and us three. He told me you had wrote to him all in your own hand, and fetched the letter to shew me how many pages there were of it. I mention this last to remind you that there are some people who love mightily to be complimented. I must repeat to you that the letter has done an infinite deal of good, and came at the conjuncture when there was the most need of it.

“ I then told him that it was obvious these proceedings were the effects of the rage of the french partisans in this court, headed by the cardinal, who had made use of his emissary, Monteleone to create groundless jealousies, and break the union between the two crowns, which *he* had established with so much glory to his catholic majesty and himself.

“ The french party hoped by these extravagant misrepresentations to precipitate the king into some hasty measure and lessen his credit, since it could not be cleared up in less than six weeks; and if their workings should prove ineffectual in that time, they were at last but where they set out, that is, entirely defeated. I told him, this was an occasion not to be overlooked of striking at the root; and routing them at once, or else they would sooner or later overturn *him*. He might depend upon it, the king of Spain would always find a true friend in his majesty, and he as many friends as his majesty had ministers, and a particular one in you. I am of opinion

CHAP. XXV.

1716

1717.

CHAP. XXV.

1716

1717.

I have persuaded him so far, that he will not lose an opportunity of revenging himself.

“From thence I took an occasion to represent the propriety of finishing the Asiento, that I might dispatch the messenger, and we might both write more freely to England. He told me it should be done next week, and I settled with him to come this day se’night and fetch it.”

* * * * *

“At the same time I cannot say the late treaty is put in execution, or the necessary orders given for placing things on a right footing. But this I ascribe to the great disorders of their government; their continual parties of hunting, and frequent absences from Madrid, with this last alarm, rather than want of will, which I cannot but think to be good. Though M. Alberoni is absolute with their majesties, he is not yet entirely master of the ministry, but if the king our master pleases to support him, I believe he will shortly be so. * * * *

“The queen, either really or out of complaisance to the king, is as much given to hunting as he is. M. Alberoni has talked to me much about our English horses, for the Spanish are too fiery for a lady, and she was lately in danger of being thrown. He says he has orders to send for some. If his majesty should think fit to send her two or three, I fancy it would be taken as a high compliment, and would certainly keep her more a friend than is to be imagined from such a trifle.”*

We soon discover proofs that these representations were not without effect.

“The day,” writes Mr. Dodington, “when I thought to go to Aranjuez, M. Alberoni came to me, and saved me the journey. The next, which was last Wednesday, we were together all the morning.

* Mr. Dodington to Secretary Stanhope, May 11, NS. 1716.

“ After having talked over the business of the Asiento, I represented to him, in the warmest manner, the delay in executing the treaty, and the mode of treating our merchants here. I detailed to him all the reasons contained in the inclosed memorial; and the ill consequences which must necessarily result from such proceedings. He told me he hoped the king of England was sensible that by the channel I had employed, we had made some steps, certainly not useless to his service, and he doubted not the rest would follow. That I might assure his majesty he was convinced of the justice of my representations, and was as much mortified at these things as we could be; that he would always continue to do the utmost for his majesty’s service, believing that it was for the interests of Spain.

CHAP. XXV.

1716

1717.

“ I am not,” he added, “ yet master here; nor have the queen or myself a single person on whom we can depend. *If I did not hope to overcome the foreign spirit which reigns in these counsels, I would not remain twenty-four hours in Spain.* The queen is forced to proceed gradually; and I cannot always induce her to apply herself so much as I wish. Indeed it is difficult to engage a young lady in examining matters of trade.

“ After much discourse, we agreed that I should present a memorial to the king, pressing the execution of the treaty. I drew up the inclosed, and gave it to Alberoni, who promised me to use all the means in his power to put things in better order, and indeed I believe it is not his fault.

“ I shall take the liberty to trouble his majesty with a little sketch of the situation of this court, to which he will be pleased to refer what I have the honour to write to him hereafter.

“ We have two parties here, one spanish, and the other french. The spaniards oppose, and create as many difficulties

CHAP. XXV.

1716

1717.

as they can, rather because things are not done by themselves, than from any real ill will to us. You well know that these grandees are accustomed to treat their kings like cyphers, and to do and dispose of every thing according to their fancy. This the queen will by no means permit, however the king might, which makes them raise as many obstacles as they can in the way of all business.

“The french faction, from which we have the most to apprehend, and which is indeed the most active, and I believe the most powerful, because it fills the principal offices of state, has the cardinal del Giudice at its head. Whether he really continues in that interest, as he certainly was before the death of the late king of France, or whether he espouses the party from ill will to us, I cannot determine. It is not, however, surprising, that he should be a zealous enemy of our’s in general, and of mine in particular, considering the figure we have reduced him to make, in consequence of the late treaties.

“Finding his power decrease, this gentleman, by some of his party, prevailed on the king to name a committee from all the councils, at first in order to regulate some disputes with France, and now to take cognizance of all foreign affairs under the title of *Junta de dependencias extrangeras*. He has contrived to make himself master of this junta, and it is there that most of our affairs suffer. After they have been favourably determined in the councils, he draws them into this committee, and then he does with them what he pleases. He still sets up for prime minister. Though he has not really power to do any thing, yet he has enough to stop much business, by suggesting objections to the king, who, though a prince of great probity and good natural sense, is startled by the least difficulty, and not easily persuaded to examine it.

“I have often represented all this to M. Alberoni in the

warmest manner, and told him if he does not dissolve this junta, and place himself publicly at the head of affairs, Spain will be ruined; we can never establish that perfect confidence which is so necessary to us both, and I shall be obliged to return with the mortification of having been unable to render the least service to my sovereign. He promises me that the junta shall be broken, and every thing placed on a right footing in a little time; but I can by no means pretend to fix when that time will be.

“This much I think certain. Without the queen we should never have done any thing here; and when she desists from supporting our interests, we may take our leave of Spain. I am fully persuaded she is heartily for us now, and a sworn enemy to the french; and I believe his majesty may keep her so as long as he pleases. Thus, though our affairs are much disordered, and hitherto we have obtained nothing but promises; yet it seems to me we have united ourselves to the party which sooner or later must prevail. In a word, the absolute controul over Spain will belong to *the highest bidder for the queen's son*. This is the grand and the only maxim, which has never changed since I have been here.”*

To one of the repeated representations of the british minister of the vexations practised on our merchants, Alberoni replied, “I see it with sorrow, but I cannot remedy it. The malicious servants of the king have sown such secret jealousies of the negociation, that I have declared to the queen my resolution not to speak any more about business. The greatest sacrifice I can make to you is to represent the complaint again, after which I will say no more. I do not intend to become a trafficker in promises which I cannot fulfil.”†

* Mr. Dodington to Secretary Stanhope, June 3 and 15, 1716, NS. Melcombe Papers.

† Mr. Dodington to Secretary Stanhope, July 6, 1716.

CHAP. XXV.

1716

1717.

July 17.

At length the intrigues of Alberoni prevailed over the patience and pertinacity of del Giudice, who, relying on the interest he had acquired with the king, maintained his post in spite of every species of insult and mortification. The agency of the confessor was therefore now employed to injure him in the mind of Philip, and the jealousy of the queen was roused by the accusation that he endeavoured to prepossess the mind of his royal pupil against her and her children. Accordingly, he was removed from all his ministerial offices, except his place in the council of state; and the charge of governor to the prince was transferred to the duke of Popoli.

The correspondence of the british envoy represents the mode and effects of this change. "You will easily conceive," he wrote to the secretary of state, "that del Giudice is not a man of much resentment, not indeed of what is becoming his quality and fortune, or he would have thrown up his employ at the notorious slight that was put upon him in the grossest manner, with relation to the late treaty of commerce. It set him in the most ridiculous light imaginable, both as first minister, and as particularly deputed to treat that affair, which was the most important of any public one then or since depending, and was concluded while he was declaring that it never could be concluded on those terms. We were in hopes that such mortifying usage would have prevailed upon him to ask leave to retire; which his not having spirit enough to do, has drawn on him this new slight. We shall soon see how far the serenity or rather insensibility of his temper extends.

"It is thought a great deal to have brought the king thus far, and it is to be hoped he may be persuaded further, if the cardinal is resolved to stand out. However, it is certain there is so much done by removing him from the palace, that he will scarcely ever see the king but when others do. The day after the dismissal, he presented himself at council,

and the king did not refuse him, though he has since asked leave to lay down his post of inquisitor general, and retire, which the king has granted him. But as he cannot do it without the pope's permission, he may protract it as much as he pleases, and possibly for some time.*

CHAP. XXV.

1716

1717.

The cardinal was unable to submit to this partial disgrace, or discovered that resistance was vain. He obtained the papal permission to relinquish the only office which he held in Spain, and repaired to Rome. The ostensible place of minister being thus left vacant, the management of public business was diverted into the hands of Alberoni and Grimaldo.

Still, however, Alberoni did not think proper to assume a public character, and incur the consequent responsibility; but contented himself with directing the puppets of administration behind the curtain, until he had attained the roman purple, which, besides being a natural object of his ambition as a churchman, gave additional weight to a minister in Spain, and afforded an eventual security in case of disgrace. To this object, therefore, all his views were now directed. He spared neither professions nor promises to acquire the favour of the pontiff, and his instances were supported by earnest and repeated solicitations from the king and queen. While he applied with success to the different members of the roman court, he tendered his assistance to promote an accommodation of the existing disputes between the king and the holy see, and the re-establishment of the nunciature.

As a proof of zeal for the cause of christendom, he induced the king to dispatch a squadron with a force of 8,000 men into the Levant, to assist the Venetians against the Turks, and by this succour saved Corfu, the key of the Archipelago. In return for this service, and the promises of future aid to the

* Mr. Dodington to Secretary Stanhope, July 18, N. S. 1716.

CHAP. XXV.

1716

1717.

christian cause, he obtained the papal grant of the usual contribution, from the clergy of Spain and the Indies, for the prosecution of a war against the infidels, the promise of a cardinal's hat, and a plausible pretext for continuing his naval and military preparations.*

At this moment, however, he was exposed to a dangerous attack from the regent of France, who could not contemplate with indifference his rising ascendancy, his apparent devotion to England, and the decline of the french influence with the fall of del Giudice. The agent employed on this occasion was Louville, the early favourite and counsellor of Philip, who had been removed from the court under the rule of the princess Orsini. Though the duke of St. Aignan filled the post of regular minister from France, Louville was charged with private credentials to the king, and even with letters of recommendation to Alberoni himself. His ostensible commission was to promote an accommodation with the emperor, as the means of restoring a general peace; but it was evidently expected that the habits of former familiarity and confidence would give him sufficient influence over the mind of the king to balance the power of the queen and Alberoni, and re-establish the political connection of the two bourbon courts.

July 24.
1716.

Alberoni, however, was too jealous of the royal favour to give Louville either time or opportunity to fulfil his commission. At the very moment of his arrival, a letter from the secretary of state, Grimaldo, was presented to him, expressing the displeasure and surprise of the king at his presumption in returning to a court from which he had been banished, and enjoining his instant departure. In the midst of the agitation occasioned by this unexpected mandate, he was visited by Alberoni himself, who loaded him with compliments of condo-

* St. Philippe, t. 2, p. 174—179.

lence, lamented his own want of power to prevent such a mortification, and employed all his address to obtain the communication of his instructions. Louville shewing his full powers, and demanding an audience, the wily Italian traversed the apartment with great apparent emotion, exclaiming, "this is a terrible court! people believe that I have power, but I possess none!" In vain Louville expatiated on the danger of offending the court of France; in vain he declared that he was deputed for the purpose of restoring harmony between the two crowns; in vain he persisted in demanding an audience of the king, to disclose the object of his mission. His demands, remonstrances, and expostulations, were all equally fruitless; and, though he was not compelled to depart from the capital, such representations were dispatched to the regent, that orders were sent for his recal before he could render an account of his unsuccessful embassy.*

This attempt on one side, and the disappointment on the other, inflamed the mutual jealousy of both courts, and gave rise to new machinations both at Paris and Madrid. The connections which Louville had formed during his short stay in a discontented capital, and his exaggerated accounts of the public feuds, induced the regent to continue his intrigues through the agency of the accredited ambassador, who was accordingly instructed to embroil the new favourite with the confessor, and to employ the spiritual authority of the confessor over the mind of Philip. These attempts were, however, frustrated, and the failure served only to widen the breach, and to establish the power of the queen and the influence of Alberoni.

Alberoni did not fail to make a merit of this stroke of policy with England, and, in declaring that Spain was totally se-

* Noailles, t. 5, p. 45—55.—Dispatch from Mr. Dodington to Secretary Stanhope, Aug. 5, 1716.

CHAP. XXV.

1716

1717.

CHAP. XXV.

1716

1717.

Aug. 5.

parated from France, redoubled his instances for an intimate connection between the two countries. He also gave a new proof of his anxiety to gratify the british court, by terminating the long pending discussions relative to the Asiento.

In rendering an account of this arrangement, the british minister observes, " Inclosed is the asiento treaty, signed by the marquis of Bedmar and myself, with the catholic king's ratification.

" On the receipt of Mr. Stanhope's letter, in which I am ordered to renew my instances in the warmest manner, for the execution of the late treaty, as I had so often done it ineffectually to the ministers, I took a resolution of addressing myself directly to the king. Accordingly, on Saturday the 1st, after having communicated it to M. Alberoni, and settled with him some points that might be proper to be introduced, I went to the levée, and desired leave to speak to the king. As soon as he was dressed, he carried me into his closet, where I had the honour to talk to him some time.

" I took the occasion of giving thanks for the conclusion of the Asiento, to express the sense I had of his goodness in having pleased to make me a means of establishing the confidence between the two crowns, by the conclusion of two treaties of so much importance: that the king, our master, never could be wanting on his side to cultivate it; as I hope he had given his majesty proofs both by his proceedings in Jamaica, and by the communication of his counsels and plans. That the surest basis of that important union, and indeed the only thing which could give both parties force to be reciprocally useful to each other, was the re-establishment of commerce. That I had the honour to make a treaty wherein his majesty had been pleased to declare his intention to that purpose; but it was so far from being executed by his officers,

that every post brought me complaints of new oppressions. That I endeavoured, indeed, to avoid, as much as possible, importuning his majesty with them, though I received more in a week than I could represent in a month, or than I could get redressed in the councils and tribunals in a year; for which reason, I intreated his majesty to refer me to his ministers again, if he continued in the same favourable disposition, and to name one in his confidence to execute the treaty. I observed to him how prejudicial the ruin of commerce would be to himself; and how shocking it would be to the king, our master, after having given and received so many marks of friendship, to see, that instead of redressing the old grievances, as was agreed on by the treaty, new ones were daily imposed.

“What his majesty said was, in substance, that he should be glad to give new marks of his friendship to the king, and it was his intention that the treaty should be punctually observed.

“I replied: Since you have pleased, sire, to express yourself so obligingly on that head, I hope you are satisfied with what has been done, as your majesty was thoroughly acquainted with every step which has been taken, and well knows that I have in all these affairs applied to M. Alberoni alone. Indeed, without him I have reason to fear that your majesty's good intentions would have been rendered fruitless by those who were jealous of the union which they saw growing up between the king and your majesty. Nor can I sufficiently commend the choice of so faithful a minister, and so proper for those affairs, by the great esteem which he has acquired in England, and the personal value our ministers have for him. If your majesty should think fit to honour him with orders to put the treaty in execution, I flatter myself that from his zeal for the common interest, he will settle it to the advantage of both crowns, though

CHAP. XXV.

1716

1717.

CHAP. XXV.

1716

|

1717.



either by him, or by any other way that your majesty shall please to complete so good a work, I shall always receive and obey your orders with the greatest respect and submission.

“ After his majesty had been pleased to express his personal satisfaction at my way of proceeding, in a very obliging manner, he told me that he would give the necessary orders for the execution of the treaty. On this I retired.

“ I should not indeed have ventured to meddle with their councils, or the choice of their ministers, had I not been sure that if affairs were put into any hands but Alberoni's, it would be impossible to do any thing; and having agreed with him, and being sure of the queen, I thought it could not succeed very ill.

“ I heard no more of this till Alberoni sent for me. After some discourse about the payment of the Asiento, where Monteleone has been pleased to create some difficulties, he said to me: The queen has spoken to the king and me about what passed between his majesty and you. He seems mightily pleased with what you said to him. His majesty told me he never had designed to put that negotiation into any other hands than mine. He is very desirous that it shall be finished, and has ordered me to examine into it, and settle it in the best manner I can, independently of every body. You, at the same time, must know, that a regulation of that nature is what I do not understand. I am, however, willing to enter upon it, and do what I can, if you will inform me what is to be done, and what is the best way of doing it.”

It, however, appears that, notwithstanding these professions, little or no progress was made in this arrangement.

Aug. 29.

“ By the inclosed state of the councils, you will see the confusion and difficulties that every trifle meets with.

“ I am ashamed to beg his royal highness * to believe that

* The King being at Hanover, the Prince of Wales was now at the head of the regency.

I use all possible applications to advance our affairs here, considering the little progress I make in them. But till the king of Spain will publicly set some man at the head of the ministry, with sufficient authority to act vigorously, and to go to the bottom of the present disorders, I can hardly think we shall be able to root out entirely the difficulties under which we lie. For, while every council, and indeed every body in the public employments, out of ignorance, want of application, or malice, perpetually frustrate and perplex every thing that passes through their hands, it seems to me that we cannot settle our affairs advantageously, otherwise than by some man, who has capacity and power to see and put in execution what is just and reasonable wherever he finds it. So that, instead of employing myself about the affairs themselves, I am labouring to get somebody named who will be able to treat and settle them independent of any body else."

CHAP. XXV.

1716

|

1717.

Philip had scarcely recovered from the chagrin occasioned by the treaty which England had concluded with the emperor, than he received the still more mortifying intelligence of her alliance with France, and the unexpected union and friendship of George the first and the Regent. He was equally irritated at the conclusion of a treaty, which not only cut off his darling hopes of succeeding to the throne of France, should the infant king die, but precluded him from the prospect of securing the regency, or even of interfering with the government.

Of too irritable a temper to conceal his indignation, Philip gave vent to his resentment against the English, whom he designated as the perpetual enemies of the House of Bourbon, for presuming to decide the question relative to the right of succession in France, which exclusively belonged to the states of the realm. He inveighed against the partiality and injustice

CHAP. XXV.

1716

1717.

of the allies, in requiring him to abide by the strict terms of the treaty of Utrecht, while they permitted the archduke, as he contemptuously called the emperor, to usurp the title, and exercise the functions of king of Spain. His indignation was aggravated by his suspicions of the secret promise made by France and England to assist the emperor in procuring the exchange of Sardinia for Sicily. This arrangement he justly considered as a glaring infraction of the treaty of Utrecht, which had precluded the alienation of Sicily, by entailing it on the spanish crown, should the issue of Victor Amadeus become extinct.

The queen was no less indignant at the prospect of such an accession of power to the House of Austria, as would render the emperor the arbiter of Italy, and retard, if not prevent, her expected succession to Parma and Tuscany.

Alberoni fully participated in the resentment and mortification of the king and queen; but the same motive as on the former occasion, induced him to suppress his emotions. He was still unwilling to renounce the hope of detaching England from France; and employed all his address to prevent a hasty resolution. While he soothed the king and queen, he renewed his appeals to the british government, dwelt on the embarrassments of his situation, insulted by the king, and reprobated by his patroness, on whom depended his present favour, and future hopes. He repeated his overtures for an union, and continued to urge, that by the late arrangement with England, his sovereign had irreconcilably offended the regent, and broken with France.

At his suggestion, even the king and queen vanquished their resentment, and assumed a tone of friendship and confidence, hitherto unknown in the intercourse between the Houses of Bourbon and Brunswick. "Tuesday the 29th," writes the minister, "I had my public audience. The king

Oct. 5.

received me with extreme kindness, and in return to my compliment, talked longer than I ever saw him do to any body on such occasions. The queen seemed to be mightily satisfied with my expressions of his majesty's esteem, and behaved herself in so obliging a manner, all the while I had the honour to speak to her, that every body took notice of the satisfaction she was pleased to express in her looks and actions. She made me a very obliging answer, with all possible assurances of her esteem for his majesty, and her desire to preserve his friendship. Her majesty was pleased to do me a particular honour, in giving me audience without making me wait her return from mass, contrary to her constant practice. The next morning Alberoni came to see me, and gave me abundance of assurances of the king's good intentions, and his own friendship. God send that I may see the effects of the one and the other."

CHAP. XXV.

1716

1717.

Speaking of Alberoni in a subsequent dispatch, he observes, "Though I can do very little with him, I should do nothing without him. As to the settling of our commerce, I have strong promises that it shall be done. Alberoni protests to me, that which he does not do, he cannot do; and that the whole ministry unanimously do all they can to perplex and frustrate every thing he undertakes, both by themselves and friends, and I believe him. He hopes shortly to break through them, and pretends that we shall have justice and favour, and that he will protect our commerce in every thing. I fear he will not be able to act openly and with authority till he has the character from Rome, which is stopped by some little difficulties."

Nov. 19.

"If Alberoni was openly at the head of affairs, I should expect effects instead of promises. As it is, I must be contented with promises; for either he cannot, or will not put his promises in execution at present. If he cannot, which I

Nov. 30.

CHAP. XXV.

1716

1717.

believe to be the case, it is more reasonable that we should have patience; if he will not, it is much the same, since he has always the excuse of want of power, not being publicly declared minister."

Dec. 21.

"It is a delicate thing to press people that are not yet charged with affairs in any public station; and consequently not obliged to engage themselves further than they have a mind to do, out of complaisance. The truth is, the unsettledness and disorder in this administration are so great, that it is as difficult and tedious to bring about the most trifling things, as those of the utmost consequence. The delays are such and so unseasonable, that though I have neglected nothing in my power to shorten them; yet it were unreasonable to expect that any body else should think so. It is a little more excusable in considering the present situation of this court.

Dec. 28.

"Since the dismissal of the cardinal del Giudice, the public ministers have nobody delegated to treat with them. It always used to be a counsellor of state. We have nobody to apply to openly, but Grimaldo, as the king's secretary, who has no apparent power, is no minister of state, nor has any voice in the council. Alberoni, who has the power, is in no public situation, and is to be seen and applied to, only when, and by those that he thinks proper. So that those to whom we can always apply have not the authority, and those who have the authority are not to be engaged further than they themselves please, besides numberless other inconveniences, which must result from such a mode of treating. This I fear cannot be thoroughly redressed, till the disputes are wholly made up with Rome."*

Jan. 25,
1717.

"Last Thursday I saw Alberoni, and represented to him our difficulties, and the causes from whence I imagined they pro-

* Alluding to the nomination of Alberoni as Cardinal.

ceeded. He told me he was sensible we had suffered much and long, and I might believe he had done so too. That I knew very well he had once resolved to meddle no more with affairs; but now in a little time he should be freed from those difficulties; I might be sure he would then take all occasions that lay in his power to redress ours. In a week's time he believed the alterations in the ministry would be ended, and then he would use his best endeavours; and it should not be long ere we found the good effects of his hearty desire to serve us. In effect, considering the present situation of our affairs, I do firmly believe that sooner or later they will be regulated to our mutual satisfaction. I shall not pretend to fix the time; but on the whole, they cannot fail of coming to a final and advantageous settlement."

CHAP. XXV.

1716

1717.

At length some partial changes were made in the administration, which tended to increase the power of Alberoni, and to give him a superiority in the departments of finance and the Indies.

Jan. 11.

In alluding to these circumstances, Mr. Dodington observes, "I am of opinion that there will be more changes, and in the mean time the fear of them puts a stop to business. My reason for appearing desirous to promote these alterations, has been to have the ministers reduced to some sort of regular dependence on one another. For, as it is, there is little confidence between them and Alberoni. He will not permit them to do every thing they have a mind to do by their own authority, and what he designs doing, being to be dispatched through their hands, they endeavour to perplex and obstruct it as much as they can; all which subjects every thing to a perpetual intricacy and confusion. I pray God we may see the end of it by any means."

Jan. 11.

1717.

But it was not by removing the ostensible members of ad-

CHAP. XXV.

1716

|

1717.

ministration, or substituting one puppet for another, that Alberoni gained a real accession of strength. Spanish ministers, even if appointed by his influence, soon became hostile to the controul of an upstart foreigner; and directly or indirectly opposed the measures which tended to annul long existing customs, or to eradicate abuses sanctioned by time. Alberoni therefore introduced an essential change into the mode of conducting the business of each department, which threw the whole power into his hands, and rendered him the sole depository of the royal confidence, and the chief organ of the royal will. Besides reducing and modifying the councils, to the exclusion of those members whose talents and influence he dreaded; and the advancement of those who favoured his views, he obtained from the king, under the pretence of maintaining the requisite secrecy, an order enjoining the foreign ministers, not to address their correspondence through the public channel, called *Via de Estado*, but, by the private mode of communication called the *Reservada*, directly to the royal cabinet, by which means he became the immediate agent of the sovereign with foreign powers.

Although he could not overcome the king's partiality to Grimaldo, and was compelled to leave him in the office of secretary for foreign affairs; yet he reduced him to the situation of a mere clerk, and transferred the secretaryship of war to a dependent, Don Michael Fernandez Duran, marquis of Tolosa.*

* St. Philippe, t. 3, p. 194—405.

CHAPTER XXVI.

1717.

Hesitation of the Dutch to join in the Triple Alliance—Proposals of reconciliation made to Spain and the Emperor—Conferences of the British Minister on the offer of Parma, Placentia, and Tuscany—Arrest of the Spanish Inquisitor General, by the Austrian Governor of Milan—Indignation of Philip—Fruitless attempts of Alberoni to prevent a Rupture—Letter to the Duke of Popoli—Obtains the Sanction of the Council of State for the commencement of Hostilities.

NOTWITHSTANDING the reconciliation between England and France, and the union of England with the united provinces, the leading members of the dutch government deprecated hostilities with Spain, and Beretti Landi, spanish ambassador at the Hague, retarded the accession of the states to the recent treaty, which was to form the triple alliance, till the commencement of 1717.

The triple alliance was, however, no sooner consolidated, than the contracting powers directed their efforts to prevent a rupture, by mediating an accommodation which was calculated to favour the interests of both parties. The emperor was already gained by the promised exchange of Sicily; and it was hoped that the king, or at least the queen of Spain, would be gratified with the reversion of 'Tuscany and' Parma. But when

CHAP. XXVI.

1717.

CHAP. XXVI.
1717.

this proposal was brought forward, Philip disappointed their expectations by declining a distant and uncertain compensation for present and positive pretensions; and particularly as he well knew that this reversion, however distant and uncertain, must be the price of his consent to the transfer of Sicily to the emperor; a virtual renunciation of all his hopes to restore the spanish power in Italy. A dispatch from Mr. Dodington to the secretary of state, contains the cold and repulsive answer given to a proposition, which it was hoped would have been received with alacrity.

April 12,
1717.

“ M. Alberoni sent me a billet this morning, desiring me to come and see him at the palace, where he talked a great deal to me about the overture of accommodation, that his majesty has been pleased to make between this court and that of Vienna. He desired me to assure his majesty, in the king of Spain's name, that he was very much obliged by his good intentions to favour him on the occasion. He told me M. de Beretti Landi had acquainted him with the discourse which Mr. Stanhope held with him on that subject at the Hague. That he had given him for answer, from the king of Spain, that he had never thought of coming to an accommodation by the interposition of the pope. If he had any thought of an accommodation, he would certainly have desired to owe it to the good offices of the king our master, whom he regarded as his very good friend. That he loved quiet and tranquillity, and should never be averse to make all reasonable steps to procure them, and re-establish the balance of Europe.

“ He afterwards spoke of the proposals that had been made concerning the states of Tuscany and Parma. The king, he said, did not look upon them to be sufficient to establish a balance, though they were even to be yielded up by treaty to one of the queen's children; for while the emperor was so strong in Italy,

he would always be the master to keep his word or not; and a thousand occasions might happen in time, which might incline him to break it. Further, that by this the king would be obliged to renounce for ever *all his just pretensions in Italy, which he might make good on a proper occasion*, and for the sake of rights, which might perhaps never, or late, fall into his hands; (there still surviving three in one house, and two in the other) and even when they should fall, might not be faithfully preserved, there being but a simple verbal promise in his favour, and the other party having all the strength. Indeed, if the king was permitted to put garrisons into the places where there are any at present in these states, till the accomplishment of the treaty, it was an affair which might be entered upon. But if he could have only verbal assurances, he would rather leave things as they are, and endeavour to find *occasions to make good his pretensions in Italy, as time might serve*, since the worst would be to see the emperor the master, which might well happen, notwithstanding the treaty in question, and *his rights would be yielded up besides*. It is not, said M. Alberoni, that the king does not very much regard his britannic majesty's guaranty, and even will not make any treaty with any one without it; but he believes that in the present affair, the emperor may put himself in possession before his majesty or himself can be capable of making any opposition.*

Meanwhile the hostile preparations were actively continued. The prospect of a war, as well as the rigorous reforms in the internal administration, and the national aversion to a foreign domination, created such discontents, that the court thought proper to apply to England for permission to raise 3,000 irish troops, which might be employed to curb the capital.

“ I have only touched,” writes the british envoy, in mak-

June 7.

* Mr. Dodington to Secretary Methuen, April 12, N. S. 1717.

CHAP. XXVI.

1717.

ing the proposition, “ upon what M. Alberoni said to me about the 3,000 men, in my letter to Mr. Secretary Addison, and I should not have mentioned it had I not been compelled, because I comprehend that his majesty has no mind to grant the favour. It is certain it would be looked upon as the greatest favour imaginable, and a couple of regiments only, to shew his majesty’s inclination to oblige the king, would be highly esteemed. The reason which makes them so very pressing on this head ; (for I have been perpetually tormented with it) is, because it is extremely necessary, there being great dissatisfaction here among the people. They have so far disobliged the walloon guards, that they cannot very well reckon on them, and they would have a body of men entirely at their devotion, who have no habitation in the country, in case of an accident.”*

Disappointed in the hope of preventing the union of France and the maritime powers, and foiled in the different attempts to create a breach in the alliance, Alberoni was the more anxious to defer an open rupture, and endeavoured to persuade the king to temporise till he had prepared a fleet and army to give weight to his pretensions. Possibly he might again have over-ruled the inclinations of Philip ; but, at this juncture, an unexpected incident baffled his efforts, and prematurely hurried on a war.

Don Joseph Molines, spanish ambassador at Rome, was appointed grand inquisitor in the place of the cardinal del Giudice. In returning through Italy to take possession of his office, he traversed a part of the Milanese, on the faith of a papal safe-conduct, and the promise of the imperial ambassador. He was, however, arrested by the austrian governor, and confined in the castle of Milan, and his papers being seized, were transmitted to Vienna, with the expectation that they

* Mr. Dodington to Secretary Stanhope, June 7, N. S. 1717, private.

would furnish intelligence relative to the designs of the spanish court. CHAP. XXVI.
1717.

This insult from a prince, against whom so many motives of complaint existed, roused the highest resentment in the punctilious and vindictive mind of Philip. Without reflecting on the imperfect state of his preparations, or the impolicy of drawing on himself the whole force of Europe, he determined to avenge this injury to his own person in that of his minister, and to vindicate the honour of his crown.

Alberoni was thus reduced to the most embarrassing dilemma. He had in vain laboured to obtain the support or even the connivance of England; he had been equally disappointed by Holland; contrary to his expectation he saw even France united with the maritime powers and the emperor, to guaranty the austrian possessions, and the successions of the two crowns of France and England as established by the peace of Utrecht. Spain was without an ally, or even the hope of assistance, except from the weak and distant diversion of the Turks, or the desultory efforts of the rebels in Hungary, and the faint prospect of co-operation from the northern powers. The navy was yet only in embryo; the reforms and changes, in the army and administration, too recent to be efficient. A formidable party in the kingdom opposing or thwarting all his measures, himself without public authority, relying only on the support of the queen, and directing the helm of state under the sanction of temporary and occasional mandates.

Seeing the danger both to the country and himself, should he engage in a war thus unprepared and unsupported, he called forth all his address and talents to defer a rupture. His efforts and arguments made but a faint impression on his indignant master, whose impotent resentment, and passion for

CHAP. XXVI.

1717.

grand enterprises, were not curbed by the calculations of ordinary prudence. Nor were his applications to the queen more availing, for though his remonstrances frequently extorted tears,* yet her lofty spirit, or zeal for the glory of her husband, rendered her equally untractable.

Indignant at this procrastination, and desirous to oppose the judgment of a person of consequence to that of the minister, Philip wrote a letter, demanding the opinion of the duke of Popoli, who, besides sharing the royal confidence, was distinguished for his rank and employments, and possessed considerable influence among the nobles. The duke, penetrating the wish of the king, like an adroit courtier, gave his opinion in favour of war, and after inveighing against the conduct of the emperor, detailed many arguments to prove that the resources of Spain were equal to the contest. From his own local connections, he recommended the invasion of Naples.

Satisfied with this confirmation of his opinion, the king sent the letter to Alberoni, as a decisive answer to all his arguments. In return Alberoni had recourse to a similar expedient in his own defence, and profited by the opportunity to address a letter to the duke, enforcing his opinion in stronger terms than he could have employed towards the sovereign himself.

June 10.

“The king, my master,” he said, “has put into my hands your excellency’s letter, on a matter which fills me with horror and consternation; as in my poor judgment, should it take place, it would ruin this poor exhausted country, which cannot recover without the benefit of a long peace.”

After stating the question whether the arrest of Molinez was an infraction of the neutrality of Italy, and even admitting the affirmative, he proceeds:

* Account of Ripperda, by the Sicilian abbots MS.

“ But with what force, with what treasure can the catholic king attempt to invade the kingdom of Naples? For even granting that there are two millions of dollars in the treasury, that we have another fleet, transports, provisions, ammunition, artillery, granting that it reaches Naples, that the whole country declares in favour of the king, that the fortresses surrender; who is the person that can answer for the maintenance of the conquest? All these requisites, however, are not yet there. Let the duke of Popoli state how much time is necessary to collect them? Is your excellency ignorant that two months would be required for an expedition to Majorca. So long a time then being necessary for such preparations, the squadron destined for this glorious enterprise must be left in the port of Cadiz or Barcelona to rot in inactivity, to the shame and scandal of the world.

“ Consider, my lord duke, that before the declaration of war against the Turks, the archduke obtained through the pope the assurance that the king of Spain would not attack his Italian dominions. Can the king consider the arrest of Molines as an infraction of the neutrality, and in consequence as a motive to recal his promise? My lord duke, according to the guaranty of the maritime powers and France, no hostilities were to take place in Italy, nor any change in the existing possessions. Now reprisals, whether they happen or not, cannot be regarded as acts of hostility between two powers already at enmity.

“ Supposing then that our troops effect a landing, and take possession of the kingdom, this very success will be desirable to the germans; because it will furnish them with a reason to carry into execution those vast designs which might be opposed, should they be attempted without a motive. Doubtless then, on the first intelligence of the invasion the court of Vienna will hasten a peace with the Turks, or suddenly pro-

CHAP. XXVI.

1717.

CHAP. XXVI.

1717.

viding for defence, will be able to dispatch a detachment of 18,000 men into Italy, and instantly occupy the states of Parma, Placentia, and Tuscany. Supposing, however, a successful debarkation and peaceable occupation of the kingdom, it will still be necessary to keep the fleet at Naples, and all the vessels ready for transport, otherwise the king might be unable to withdraw his troops.

“What will the dutch say to see such an attempt at the time, when they appear willing to form a league with Spain, and reconcile the king with the archduke? What will France say, who offers to induce the maritime powers to secure for Don Carlos the states of Parma, Placentia, and Tuscany? What will England say, who knows and promotes such arrangements? Oh, my lord duke, these are wild ideas, thus to involve two young and innocent sovereigns in the utmost distress! In a word, this is leading the world to imagine that a *few mad Italians*, from attachment to their native country, have urged the king to the extermination and ruin of Spain.

“Without allies the catholic king cannot hope to conquer Italy, particularly at a time when he has neither troops nor money, nor able commanders. With three kingdoms* more disaffected than ever, with a people enraged, with a nobility discontented, finally deprived of all human help; in this state we are not able, according to your excellency’s phrase, to oppose force to force. Lastly, in such an important affair, I want the courage of your excellency to say, or think, that notwithstanding so many difficulties we should throw ourselves into the hands of Providence, and trust to the justice of our cause. This I declared to their majesties, on the first word with which they honoured me on the subject; and I should be most

* Catalonia, Valencia, and Aragon.

gratified, even were the enterprise attended with the most happy result, that the world should know, my weak judgment did not approve it. I request your excellency to receive these my crude sentiments, written in haste, to peruse and return them, observing this religious secret, confided to your honour and probity, with the protest, *salvo saniori judicio*.*

CHAP. XXVI.
1717.

This masterly composition, which remains a monument of the judgment, foresight, and policy of Alberoni, made a deep impression on the duke of Popoli. He had the candour to address a new letter to the king, revoking his former opinion as crude and imprudent, and deprecating the premature commencement of hostilities. This opinion he adroitly sanctioned by contriving to communicate at the same time the letter of Alberoni, which he described as the cause of his change of sentiment.

Philip accordingly sent the confessor, d'Aubenton, with the letter to Alberoni himself, to demand whether he acknowledged this paper which had fallen into his hands, and probably with the hope that fear would induce him to disavow it. But the minister was superior to such weakness. He boldly owned the letter; he expressed his satisfaction that it had reached the royal eye, and declared that he was too zealously attached to the honour and interest of his royal master, to revoke an opinion founded on such irrefragable principles. This declaration he induced d'Aubenton to indorse on the letter itself, though at the moment of subscribing it, the confessor observed, "I decide for war, and I must candidly inform you, that your refusal will exasperate the king, and may expose you to disgrace."

Still, however, Alberoni continued to combat the obstinacy of the king, with almost equal perseverance. He urged the

* Storia del Cardinale Alberoni, P. 2, p. 152.

CHAP. XXVI.
1717.

impracticability of an attempt on Naples, represented that the season was too far advanced for the invasion of Sardinia, and recommended an attack on the infidels, or a descent on the coast of Africa, as conformable to the promise pledged to the pope, and as an enterprise of more easy execution, and more suitable to the honour of the crown, and the interests of Spain.*

* It is singular that almost every writer, whether domestic or foreign, has accused Alberoni as the only cause of the aggression, and St. Philippe, whose judgment, in other instances, we have found reason to approve, considers the correspondence through the duke of Popoli as a mere political farce. We feel it, however, necessary to differ from such respectable authorities. The characters of Philip and his Queen, as drawn by those who most accurately observed them, shew that they wanted no foreign stimulus to excite their ambition; while the situation of the two courts of Madrid and Vienna, and the known reluctance with which Philip abandoned Italy, render it as little necessary to argue, that Alberoni was not the original projector, but merely the able executor of their hostile designs. We may refer to the very letter of the minister himself, which we have given in the text, and appeal with confidence to every impartial judge, whether it was possible to use such cogent arguments, without feeling their force, and as a mere blind to the purpose which he was determined to execute.

The two Sicilian abbots, Platania and Carraccioli, who possessed the most accurate knowledge of the court and cabinet, exculpate Alberoni from the charges of being the instigator and prime mover of war. The whole correspondence of the British envoy, Mr. Dodington, who was in almost daily intercourse with this great statesman, evinces his anxiety to avert a rupture in the early stages of the dispute. The mighty preparations, yet only commenced in Spain, as well as the imperfect state in which the expeditions both against Sardinia and Sicily were sent out, fully demonstrate, that it was his interest rather to temporise than to hurry into a war. Lastly, to these decisive proofs, we may add his own solemn, invariable, and frequent asseverations, both in public and private, both during his ministry and after his fall, and the virtual acknowledgement in the Answer to his celebrated Apology, which reluctantly admits his justification that he was not the author of the war. *Storia del Cardinale Alberoni*, P. 11, p. 146—158.—Apology for Alberoni in the same work.—Translations in the *Historical Register* for 1722.—St. Philippe, t. 3, p. 197—200.—Ortiz, t. 7, l. 23, c. 2.—Desormeaux, t. 5, p. 330—340.—Noailles, t. 5, p. 74.

The positive injunctions of Philip over-ruling all objections, he was too apprehensive of the event to incur the heavy responsibility which was annexed to the enterprise; and, submitting the question to the council of state, obtained the sanction of its vote for war.

CHAP. XXVI.
1717.

CHAPTER XXVII.

Hostile preparations in the eastern Ports of Spain—Promotion of Albertoni to the dignity of Cardinal—Departure of the Spanish Expedition against Portugal—Attempts of Albertoni to secure the courts of England and France—Invasion and Conquest of Savoy—Justification of Spain—Albertoni and preparations of England and France—Overtures of accommodation made to Spain—Preparations for a new Expedition—Alliance of Mr. Stanhope to Madrid, to propose overtures of accommodation—England finally overcomes the hesitations of France and Holland—Conferences of the British ministers with Albertoni on the subject of the overtures—The Spanish court affects to accept the proffered terms—Illness and recovery of the King—Unpopularity of Albertoni—Albertoni relates to his business acquaintances with the Duke of Devonshire, the Duke of Devonshire, and others, who were in the habit of visiting him at his house in the Strand, that he had been ordered to leave the country, and that he was to be banished from the kingdom.

THOUGH reluctant to engage in hostilities, Albertoni was no sooner convinced that war was inevitable, than he pressed the requisite preparations with the same zeal and alacrity as if the design was his own. He was, however, too anxious to secure the Roman people, the primary object of his personal ambition, to omit any effort for its attainment, before he risked the displeasure of the pope by a breach of his solemn and repeated promises. But it was no easy matter to overcome the indecision of the Roman court; where the wishes of

CHAP. XXVII.
1717.

CHAPTER XXVII.

1717.

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CH. XXVII.
1717.

THOUGH reluctant to engage in hostilities, Alberoni was no sooner convinced that war was inevitable, than he pressed the requisite preparations with the same zeal and alacrity as if the design was his own. He was, however, too anxious to secure the roman purple, the primary object of his personal ambition, to omit any effort for its attainment, before he risked the displeasure of the pope by a breach of his solemn and repeated promises. But it was no easy matter to overcome the indecision of the Roman court; where the wishes of

Philip and the personal credit of the minister were opposed by the influence of the emperor, and the intrigues of del Giudice, who did not neglect so favourable an opportunity to retaliate for his past mortifications. This delay of the pope, combined with the displeasure testified by the king for the opposition of Alberoni to the war, was hailed by his numerous enemies as a certain signal of his approaching disgrace.*

CH. XXVII.

1717.

Nothing therefore but a stroke of authority could relieve Alberoni from this embarrassing situation ; and this resource he did not hesitate to employ. Notwithstanding the reconciliation with Rome was finally settled, and the new nuntio had advanced as far as Perpignan,† a prohibition was issued, suspending his entry into Spain ; while a messenger was dispatched to Rome with the hint that the long expected honour must be the price of the reconciliation. To counterbalance the representations of the imperial partisans, this message was accompanied with a declaration, that the preparations of Spain were not directed against the emperor, and a renewal of his promises to prosecute the war against the infidels.

So decisive a mode of negotiating vanquished the hesitation of the pontiff, who was as little inclined to relinquish the advantages of a reconciliation with Spain as Alberoni to lose the cardinal's hat. He therefore signified his compliance. The nuntio was received in Spain ; and in a solemn consistory the pontiff announced the nomination of Alberoni, with a pompous eulogium of his character and services. He added the declaration that he could not resist the instances of the king and queen of Spain, who had testified more solicitude for this promotion than had ever before been shewn even for a prince of the blood. In vain del Giudice vehemently harangued

* Noailles, t. 5, p. 70.

† Dodington's Dispatches.

CH. XXVII.
1717.

against the person and administration of the new cardinal; his eloquence made no impression, and on the 10th of July, the usual messenger carried the welcome tidings to Madrid.*

The intelligence of this promotion was the signal for the execution of the enterprise. While all Europe was held in suspense; while England apprehended a new invasion in favour of the pretender; the emperor trembled for Naples, Victor Amadeus for Sicily, and the Genoese for their own coasts; while the pope anticipated a decisive blow against the infidels, and while the capital and kingdom were occupied with rumours and conjectures which only tended to increase the general uncertainty, Don Joseph Patiño, the friend and confidant of the minister, was dispatched to Barcelona, bearing the final orders for the departure of the expedition.†

Aug. 9.

At this moment Alberoni redoubled his wiles, as if to gain yet a trifling interval of suspense, or as a final effort to sow divisions among the allies. From the correspondence of the british envoy, we find that he adroitly contrived again to bring forward the question of commercial regulations, and again lavished his promises to redress the grievances of our merchants, and cultivate the friendship of England. Still, however, he clogged his promises with his usual pretexts for delay, particularly the pressure of his own occupations, and the absence of Patiño, the only person competent to the arrangement of so difficult a point.

Aug. 30.

To the customary application, relative to the object of the armament, he gave no specific answer until it was ready to sail. Then with an air of affected candour, as if yielding to the pressing instances of the envoy, he confessed that it was intended against the emperor, though without affording the slightest hint relative to its specific destination. He concluded

* St. Philippe, t. 3, p. 200. † Dodington's Dispatch.

CH. XXVII.
1717.

with the observation, "I have no part in this enterprise, except the execution; and, I do assure you, that I have strongly represented to the king, both in writing and discourse, the inconveniences which will follow it. But the king is determined, and all my arguments have failed to dissuade him." This mixture of candour and dissimulation made the expected impression, and the envoy, in transmitting the intelligence to his court, betrays a conviction by no means faint, of the sincerity of his professions, and testifies a hope that his promises would ultimately be fulfilled.*

At the moment when he thus cajoled the English, with regard to their commerce, Alberoni made an overture which appeared equally calculated to produce an effect on the french court. To the french ambassador he observed, "It is the general opinion that Spain can do nothing of herself; yet her preparations alarm the world. What would have been the consequence, if the king had followed my advice to remain quiet some years, and apply himself to the restoration of his finances?" To the answer of the ambassador, that such conduct would have been worthy of a great minister, and no less conformable to the wishes of France, than to the interests of Spain, he replied, by insisting on the necessity of an union between the two Bourbon crowns. "The king of Spain," he continued, "is only interested to conciliate France; and, therefore, I am not anxious to receive proposals from other quarters. The king of England, for instance, has long solicited us to make peace with the emperor, and offered his mediation. Yet, to his utter astonishment, we shall cut him out work elsewhere." At the same time, he offered to accept the mediation of France, provided the liberty of Italy and the pretensions of the queen were secured.†

Aug. 17.

* Mr. Dodington to Mr. Secretary Addison, Aug. 9 and 30, 1717.

† Noailles, t. 5, p. 74—75.

CH. XXVII.
1717.

To gratify the spaniards, as well as to sow jealousies between France and the maritime powers, he caused rumours to be circulated that the object of the armament had been secretly communicated to the regent, and that there was no doubt of his connivance, till a favourable opportunity should occur of declaring for Spain.

Aug. 2.

Meanwhile the armament, which had occupied the attention of Europe, departed from Barcelona in two divisions, forming a force of twelve ships of war, and 9,000 men, commanded by the marquis of Lede. The first soon shewed the object of the enterprise, by appearing in the bay of Cagliari; but contrary winds delayed the second for twenty days. Had not this delay occurred, Cagliari must have fallen without resistance, and the conquest of the island would have been instantly effected. But the unforeseen delay gave time to the austrian governor, the marquis of Rubi, to prepare for defence. The works were strengthened, the artillery mounted on the ramparts, and the garrison reinforced with a body of militia and Catalans in the austrian pay; the posts in the interior were also fortified and guarded by the native troops, or by those who volunteered their service for their austrian sovereign.

The summons of the spanish commander being rejected, a force of 6,000 infantry, and 600 cavalry, was disembarked, the garrison were driven within their walls, and the greater part of the neighbouring country declared for Philip. However, the intemperance of the season, the scanty supply of fresh water, and the want of requisites for a siege, enabled the governor to protract the defence of the capital; and when, at length, further resistance was hopeless, he made his escape into the upper district, to maintain the austrian cause, while a foot of ground remained to defend. On the departure of the governor,

the garrison surrendered; but the reduction of the capital and the neighbouring districts did not ensure the possession of the whole island; for the strong posts of Castel Aragonés and Alguer still remained, and the spanish army had yet to traverse a country of 40 leagues in extent, harrassed by the active mountaineers, and exposed to the pestilential air in the midst of the autumnal heats.

CH. XXVII.
1717.

Alguer was first attacked, and, though the garrison was reinforced by means of small vessels from the coast of Naples, was compelled to surrender on the 28th of October. The reduction of Castel Aragonés, as well as the conquest of the whole island, was not completed before the beginning of November. A general amnesty being then proclaimed, many of the austrian partisans, among whom was the archbishop of Surfari, profited by the usual permission granted to those who chose to quit the island. As the season was too far advanced to commence any further enterprise, if any was yet intended against Naples, the marquis of Ledesma left 5,000 men to maintain his conquest, and with the remainder, exhausted by fatigue and sickness, returned to Barcelona.*

Philip was highly gratified with the recovery of an island which once belonged to the crown of Spain, and the successful commencement of his long meditated hostilities against the emperor. *Te Deum* was publicly performed, the capital illuminated, and every testimony of national triumph displayed. But Alberoni did not participate in these feelings of exultation. To gratify the sovereign, he assumed in public the tone and appearance of satisfaction; yet in private he lamented the obstinacy of his royal master, in hurrying into hostilities before his preparations were fully matured for the attainment of a

* Dodington's Dispatches.—St. Philippe, t. 4.—Ibid. t. 3, p. 208—228.
—Historical Register for 1717, p. 388, &c.

CH. XXVII.

1717.

more valuable object than the possession of a barren island. The blow was, however, struck, and it was necessary to justify the aggression; but the language of this justification sufficiently bespeaks the embarrassment of the minister. According to his direction, the marquis of Grimaldo, as secretary of state, issued a circular letter to the ministers of Spain in foreign courts, containing the principal arguments which they were to employ in vindicating the conduct of their sovereign. In this curious document, the secretary virtually throws the blame on the king, as the prime mover of the enterprise, by avowing his own ignorance of its object, and his surprise when it was carried into execution. He proceeds, however, with a laboured detail of the insults, provocations, and injuries which Spain had experienced from the emperor. He recapitulates the various infractions of the most solemn engagements by the austrian court, from the peace of Utrecht till the moment of the rupture, and he sums up his series of accusations and grievances, with expatiating on the arrest of Molinez, as a glaring breach of the neutrality of Italy, and sufficient cause for the declaration of hostilities.*

The emperor was indignant at this invasion of his dominions, at the time when he was engaged in war against the infidels, and in violation of the solemn promise which the king of Spain had pledged to the pope. He appealed to the members of the triple alliance to fulfil their guaranty, by protecting him against this unmerited aggression, and he called on the pope to justify himself against the suspicion of connivance, by breaking off his connection with Spain, recalling his nuntio, annulling the grant of the tax on ecclesiastical property, as

* Rousset, t. 1, & 2, passim.—Ortiz, t. 7, p. 307.—Tindal, v. 19, p. 166.—In the Historical Register for 1717, p. 376, the reader will likewise find various documents on this subject.

unjustly obtained, and depriving Alberoni of the purple. In case of refusal, he menaced the Roman see with the loss of Benevento.

CH. XXVII.
1717.

However anxious for the reduction of the austrian power in Italy, the pope could not fail to feel high resentment at the deception practised on him in the face of Europe. He therefore solemnly vindicated himself against the imputation of connivance; and addressed a brief to the court of Madrid in language which marks the poignancy of his feelings. He accompanied this appeal by suspending the further perception of the ecclesiastical tax.

Though the nuntio was ordered to enforce the contents of the brief with his personal representations, and though it was publicly circulated in Spain, as well as every other country of Europe; yet Alberoni contrived to prevent its formal presentation, and the only notice taken of this appeal by so high an authority was the contemptuous observation of Philip, "I have seen a letter said to be written by the pope, but it is a clumsy forgery; for it is impossible that his holiness can employ such language, so abusive, and so unworthy of the father of Christendom."*

The reduction of Sardinia was rather a deviation from the projects of the minister, than a part of the original plan; and was principally intended to suspend the arrangements for the transfer of Sicily, which was one of the primary objects of attack. Alberoni therefore now called forth all his activity, to recover the lost time, and to employ the short interval of suspense occasioned by the advanced season, in accumulating the means for a new expedition. To provide the requisite funds, he made the most rigorous reform in the public establishments,

* See this Brief in Ortiz, t. 7, p. 304, and Historical Register for 1717, p. 369.

CH. XXVII.
1717.

not sparing even the royal household. He did not hesitate to controul the taste of his royal patroness for buildings and improvements, and to her remonstrances and demands for money, replied, "Your majesty would rather be countess of St. Ildefonso than queen of Spain."* He continued also the exaction of the ecclesiastical tax, in spite of the papal prohibitions, imprisoning or banishing the refractory priests who defended the privileges of their order. Finally, he recurred to anticipations of the revenue, to an increase of various duties, to impositions on wealthy individuals, and even to the sale of lucrative offices.

The energy of the minister gave a new impulse to every wheel of the state machine. Ships and naval stores were obtained from every maritime nation where they could be purchased, and neutral vessels seized for transports. Metal was procured from Holland; founderies of artillery built at Pampeluna; an activity long unknown was introduced into the armouries of Biscay; and native establishments formed for the fabrication of various articles of naval and military equipment, hitherto drawn from abroad.

The enthusiasm of the towns and provinces was also awakened, by the glory which the recent success had cast over the spanish arms: they not only added to the resources of the government by voluntary contributions, but raised an efficient force of sixteen regiments of infantry and eight of cavalry.

Besides the ordinary means of recruiting, the minister did not hesitate to call forth the assistance of a tribe hitherto the object of suspicion and dread. He found means to allure the miquelets from the mountains of Catalonia and Aragon; and to form six regiments of these desultory bands, of all people

* M. de Villars, t. 2, p. 437.

the best calculated for irregular warfare, by their vigour, enterprise, and activity, by their dexterity in the use of arms, and their patience of fatigue and hardships, the natural effects of their climate and predatory habits of life. A similar force of two regiments was drawn from the hunters of the Sierra Morena.

CH. XXVII.

1717.

Meanwhile the allies laboured with the utmost solicitude to prevent a war, by arranging articles of accommodation, which were regarded as favouring the interests of both the rival powers. They expected to satisfy the anxiety of Spain for an establishment in Italy, and to promote an accommodation with the emperor, by flattering the views of the queen on the successions of Parma and Tuscany. In return for this acquisition, it was imagined that Spain would acquiesce in the transfer of Sicily; and the two sovereigns were respectively to renounce, one his pretensions to Spain, the other, those to the dismembered provinces. To give additional weight to these offers, Mr. Stanhope, the relative of the secretary of state, was dispatched to Madrid.

Contrary, however, to public expectation, the spanish court shewed not the slightest inclination to desist from its designs on Italy; and received every proposal of inferior importance with indifference or contempt; though in the first instance, the transfer of Sicily was rather mutually understood, than formally proposed. From the correspondence of our two envoys we collect the authentic expressions of the spanish minister.

Bitterly inveighing against the imperfect arrangements of the peace of Utrecht, Alberoni exclaimed, "You made war to establish the balance, and you concluded a peace without any balance, and left the emperor in a situation to disturb every moment the public tranquillity of Europe. The king,

Oct. 18.

CH. XXVII.
1717.

my master, has no repugnance to propositions of peace; but those propositions must be such as to re-establish, in some measure, the antient balance, and not leave the emperor in a situation to make himself master of Italy whenever he pleases. Nor will the king of Spain send a minister, until he knows the condition on which he is to treat for an accommodation." To the proposition relative to Parma and Tuscany, he made the same reply as before, though in less conciliating and guarded language.

Wearied at length with repeated appeals to the neutrality of Italy, and the obligation of the king of England to maintain it, he exclaimed, with that vivacity which was natural to him, "For the successions of Tuscany and Parma the king cares not; such trifles are not worthy the attention of his catholic majesty. All he requires is such an arrangement as may re-establish the balance in Europe, which he considers as incompatible with the power possessed by the emperor in Italy. With regard to the engagements which the allies have taken, it is a well known principle that princes and states are not bound to observe a treaty contrary to their interest. This principle is acknowledged by all religions, whether catholic or protestant. You," he ironically added, "have always acted thus. For instance, did you not acknowledge Philip as king of Spain? Yet soon afterwards finding it to be your interest, did you not endeavour to dethrone him and place another in his room? Nor do I blame you for pursuing your interest as a nation."

After this apostrophe, he adverted to the proposed conditions, which he censured as disadvantageous to Spain, on three principles. First, because the emperor would continue too powerful in Italy; and from thence might foment troubles in Spain. Secondly, the successions in question would afford no

means to obviate this danger, on account of their distance and uncertainty, and the impossibility of maintaining them against the emperor, if he chose to attack them. Thirdly, because the king could not rely on the proffered guaranty, as he had unfortunately experienced, in the breach of the treaty for the evacuation of Catalonia and Majorca.

CH XXVII.
1717.

Argument and persuasion were in vain employed to obviate the objections of a man determined not to yield. He found also an additional plea for equivocation and delay, in the reluctance and lukewarmness with which the vigorous remonstrances of the british ministers were seconded by their french and dutch colleagues. To the frequent declaration, that the members of the triple alliance must support their guaranty by arms, he as frequently adverted to the silence of the french and dutch governments, and he positively denied that the regent, either by his private correspondence, or through the channel of the regular ambassador, had ever specifically announced a resolution to extort the acquiescence of Philip by force.

Indeed, the reluctant avowal of the ministers themselves proves the embarrassment derived from this want of concert. "We are fully convinced the french ambassador has never signified that the regent would maintain the guaranty of the neutrality of Italy, except by good offices, or that he should be obliged to send troops into that country, in case the peace should be disturbed by Spain. We have so closely pressed the ambassador on the subject, that he has been obliged to confess he had received no order to adopt this language. So that this point, which would probably be the most effectual to influence the determination of Spain, has not been touched, or at best but slightly. This confirms our conjecture, that the king, our master, alone, acts heartily and without reserve in this affair."*

Messrs. Stanhope and Dodington to Lord Stanhope, Nov. 1, N. S. 1717.

CH. XXVII.

1717.

The address of the wily Italian was, however, encountered by equal address. At length, the dutch and french ministers were induced to assume a more manly tone, and Alberoni, after in vain endeavouring to extort the cession of Sardinia, consented to open a negotiation on the basis of the proffered conditions. From the numerous dispatches which trace the progress of this delicate transaction, we present that * which marks the result.

Nov. 15.

“ Soon after the return of the king from the Escorial, we paid a visit to the cardinal, and opened our discourse by hoping that he had received from the french ambassador the declaration of the regent in favour of our propositions. He replied, He had not yet received more than general expressions, on the desire of the regent to contribute as much as lay in his power to the accommodation between the two crowns. * * *

“ Finding him a little calmed, we expressed our hopes that, after due reflection, he had seen the great advantage which would accrue to his catholic majesty from these propositions, and would no longer reject them as insufficient preliminaries for opening a negotiation.”

“ The king, my master,” he rejoined, “ will never be adverse to give peace to Europe. And, as a proof of this truth, as soon as he is assured by the regent, that the propositions meet with his approbation, his majesty will accept them as preliminaries. But as he has received information that the emperor has sent troops into Italy, and has already levied contributions on the states and princes, it is his positive resolution not to enter into any accommodation, if the emperor raises the most trifling imposition, or takes any step to trouble the repose of Italy. It is a resolution from which he will never swerve.”

* The originals of this, and many other dispatches, are in the French tongue, for the purpose of being directly communicated to the King, who did not understand the English language.

“ On this we retired, and going to the french ambassador, told him what had passed. He promised to deliver, on the following morning, to the cardinal himself, the declaration which he required ; and when Alberoni refused to see him for some days, he extorted an interview by a strong letter. After the interview, the ambassador came to us, and told us he had declared in the fullest manner the assent of the regent to our propositions. He had also pressed the cardinal to send a plenipotentiary to London, to treat on these conditions, but received for answer, the catholic king would never treat till he was assured that the emperor would not disturb Italy.

“ We requested, the same day, another interview, which the cardinal did not grant till the twelfth. After having observed, that as all difficulties were now removed on the side of France, we hoped the catholic king would now make no delay in accepting these preliminaries, and sending a plenipotentiary to London? ‘ I have, as yet,’ he replied, ‘ received only general declarations from the regent. He has, indeed, written to me ; but he neither mentions any specific proposition, or hints at the mission of a plenipotentiary ; nor does the ambassador say any thing satisfactory. However, to convince you of the king’s regard for his britannic majesty, and of his sincere desire for peace, he is willing to accept the preliminaries, and to open a negotiation as soon as he is satisfied that the emperor will make no attempt on Italy, but not before.’

“ We replied, Reflect on what you said to us in our last conference. We are come to assure you, that the king, our master, will not refuse to give the catholic king this proof of his friendship ; but he cannot make instances to the court of Vienna to remove all causes of complaint, with proper dignity, unless certified that the king of Spain will send a minister to

CH. XXVII.
1717.

London, to open a negociation as soon as the emperor has consented.'

" 'The proofs,' replied the cardinal, 'of my royal master's sincerity are evident. At the request of the king of England, he stopped the movement of his troops, and suspended the embarkation already begun. He has paid more than 50,000 dollars for the transports, and has declared his resolution to be satisfied with Sardinia, a promise which he will religiously observe. I do also affirm, that without the interference of the king of England, he would have dispatched ten thousand men to the kingdom of Naples. He would then have been enabled to treat of an accommodation in a different manner from what he can do at present. Neither does he wish to prevent the emperor from arming in any way he pleases, provided he does not in the slightest degree infringe the neutrality; for then he will break every treaty. All this is a sufficient proof of the catholic king's sincerity, to induce his britannic majesty to take the step which we desire. But it is idle to suppose that the king will send a plenipotentiary to London, before he knows what will be required of him. This he will not do; nor, indeed, will this step be of the consequence which you attach to it. The delay will be trifling; for you cannot know that our ambassador, already at London, has not either full powers to treat as soon as the said declaration is made by the emperor, or that he will not receive them before that time. But in all cases, I pledge the word of the king, that a plenipotentiary shall be dispatched without a moment's delay, to open a negotiation on the basis of the preliminaries, as soon as his majesty receives the assurances which he demands for the security of Italy.'

" Finding it useless to continue this debate, we had recourse to another expedient, and required him to give a declaration

in writing, that the catholic king accepted the preliminaries to treat of a peace, and would dispatch a plenipotentiary as soon as he should receive the required satisfaction from the emperor. He promised to send us this declaration, in a letter, this very afternoon.

CH. XXVII.
1717.

“ We have taken occasion to repeat to him the two preliminary observations respecting the reversion of Parma and Tuscany, in the terms of Mr. Stanhope’s instructions. We remarked also, that, after having engaged his majesty to make that overture to the emperor, if the king of Spain did not act with sincerity, his majesty could not any longer delay the execution of his treaty with the court of Vienna.

“ He particularly assured us, that the king of Spain would not give any subject of complaint on his side, and would not undertake the smallest enterprise contrary to this solemn promise.

“ The preliminaries being thus settled, we deemed it prudent to say a few words on the treaty in general ; and we touched again on the necessity of forming it on the basis of the reciprocal renunciations, without which all proceedings will be useless. To this the cardinal replied in the affirmative, adding that it was necessary for the conclusion of peace, which was the object of both crowns. He rose up, and we repaired to the french ambassador, and communicated the object of our conference.

“ The next morning he sent us the promised letter. But as it was not conceived in such precise and specific terms as the importance of the business required, and we were unwilling to trust to the chance of an equivocal expression in the spanish tongue, we instantly sent another letter to the cardinal, in which we recapitulated the promise of the king of Spain to treat on the basis of the preliminaries, and to undertake nothing during the negotiation, as soon as the emperor

CH. XXVII.

1717.

shall have equally promised not to infringe the neutrality of Italy. We worded it in such a manner, that the silence of the cardinal should have the same force as a positive answer. A messenger delivering the letter to him, he read it, and returned the envelope, with the reply, 'there is no need of an answer.' We hope we have thus placed the question beyond a doubt, and that there will not be the smallest opening for cavil, however well they may be inclined. * * *

"In a word, by our letter to the cardinal, by his answer, and by what has passed in general concerning the reciprocal renunciations, our principal view was directed to soften things, to place our sovereign in a situation to prevent further acts of hostility on either side, and to give time for the operation of his good offices, towards completing the glorious work of peace, or taking proper measures in case of a rupture. Such were our principal intentions, and we hope that our letters and the answer of the cardinal will produce these effects; at least, we flatter ourselves, that they will exonerate his majesty from any obligation to take an open and direct part, even according to the most rigorous interpretation of his engagements."

In the midst of these negotiations, the cardinal had cause to tremble for the stability of his newly acquired power. Philip, afflicted with a relapse of his hypochondriac disorder, was unequal to the transaction of public business, and the whole management of affairs was left in the hands of the queen and Alberoni. In the moment of a more violent attack, accompanied with faintings, and the most alarming symptoms, the confessor was summoned at midnight to perform the last offices of the church; and the king made his testament with the usual formalities.

This temporary suspension of the royal functions, and the power assumed by the queen and cardinal, gave new force to

the national antipathy against a foreign minister. To increase the unpopularity of the Italian government, rumours were industriously circulated, that the regency was to be intrusted to the queen, which would not only have militated against the constitution of the kingdom, but would have left the administration in the hands of Alberoni.

CH. XXVII.

1717.

"You have already seen," observe the british envoys, "the state of the king's health. He is a little better to day; as his disorder is one of the most flattering, its termination cannot be placed at any certain period. But we believe that cabals have already commenced, and we will endeavour to ascertain the real situation of affairs, as much as is possible in so delicate a matter. By the will, which the king executed a few days ago at the Escorial, we do not at all doubt that the queen is nominated regent; but it is contrary to the custom of this country, to see the government exercised by a princess who is not the mother of the king; and all those who speak out, are of one opinion on this point. Further, the queen has not acquired a single friend in the country, as far as we can discover; so that it is nothing but fear, which can induce these people to submit to her regency. Reason therefore persuades us that this pretended disposition of the king will not be followed, in case of his death; but on the other hand, the experience we have of the degradation of this nation leads to conclusions far different from those so clearly deduced from reason."*

At the same time, the most horrid reports were spread to rouse the national odium, and an intention imputed to the queen of poisoning the children of Philip by the late queen, in order to place her own issue on the throne.

Such rumours, however extravagant, raised violent emotions

* Messrs. Stanhope and Dodington to lord Stanhope, Madrid, Nov. 1, NS. 1717.

CH. XXVII.
1717.

among a people, as proverbially jealous of foreigners, as they are zealously devoted to their established forms of government. Application being made by the discontented to the regent of France, they received from him the most solemn promises of protection, accompanied with assurances, that he would employ his utmost endeavours to restore their national government, and baffle the machinations of the step-mother and her upstart favourite.

It is doubtful to what extremities this discontent might have led, had not the recovery of Philip given a new direction to the public sentiment. Still, however, some of the malcontents, among whom we find the names of such distinguished characters as Aguilar, Veraguas, and Las Torres, suggested the plan of deposing the hypochondriac monarch, and placing the prince of Asturias on the throne. In the memorial transmitting this proposal to the regent, they observed, "Either our king is no longer capable of transacting the business of state, or he is under the controul of cardinal Alberoni and the Italians. In the last case, we must deliver him from bondage; and in the first we must place the affairs of the monarchy in the hands of those who have the right to direct the helm when the king is incapable."*

March 24.
1718.

The complete recovery of Philip, and the failure of these intrigues, only served to establish the power of the queen; and to inflame the personal and political animosity of Philip and the regent, as well as to furnish a plausible pretext for more direct interference in the affairs of France. The cardinal, also, experienced the most flattering proofs of the ascendancy of his royal patroness. He was rewarded with a liberal pension of 20,000 ducats per annum, and the rank of a grandee, and presented to the vacant bishopric of Malaga.

* Noailles, t. 3, p. 88.

The noble retailer* of court anecdotes has recorded an adventure which happened at this period, and which will serve to shew the singular constitution of the spanish court, and the great unpopularity of the Italian government. During the illness of the king, no person was admitted into the royal apartment, except those whom the queen and Alberoni chose to permit. As the medical department is under the controul of the lord chamberlain, the consultations of the physicians ought to be held, and the medicines administered, in his presence. The duke of Escalona, then holding the important office, was a grandee respectable for his rank, age, talents, and virtues, who, as viceroy of Naples, and on many other occasions, had displayed his zealous attachment to the sovereign; but he was still more remarkable for his austere manners and punctilious character. As he evinced his intention to fulfil the duties of his charge, it was intimated to him by order of Alberoni, that he would do better not to intrude on the king's privacy; and content himself with proper inquiries at the door of the apartment.

This intimation being only received with contempt and indignation, Alberoni, by the order of the queen, gave orders that the intrusive grandee should not be admitted. One afternoon, however, the duke presented himself. Having in vain demanded an entrance, he burst open the door in the face of the page in waiting, and after upbraiding him with his insolence, advanced into the royal bed-chamber. He observed the queen sitting at the head of the bed, the curtains of which were closely drawn, the cardinal standing by, and the attendants at a respectful distance. The duke, who, besides his advanced age, was crippled with the gout, slowly traversed the apartment, by the help of his cane. Being observed by the queen,

* The duke of St. Simon.

CH. XXVII.
1717.

she beckoned the cardinal, who sent one of the attendants, ordering him to retire. As the duke still continued to advance, the cardinal himself approached and told him, the king wished to be alone. "That is not true," exclaimed the indignant grandee, "I am not blind. You did not approach the head of the bed, nor did his majesty speak to you."

Alberoni continuing to urge him to retire, gently pressed him by the arm. This insult roused the choler of the lord chamberlain, who burst into reproaches against the insolence of the cardinal for preventing him from approaching the royal person, and performing the duties of his office. A struggle ensued; the duke, who was the weakest, sunk into a chair; but grappling with his antagonist, in a paroxysm of rage, struck him on the head and shoulders with his cane, calling him a little contemptible varlet, who deserved nothing but a drubbing, with various epithets, which the irritation of the moment suggested; and declaring that if not restrained by the respect due to the royal presence, he would kick him out of the room. The cardinal with difficulty disengaged himself; but the duke, when unable to reach him, still continued to abuse, and threaten him by his gestures, while the queen and attendants witnessed the singular scene in silent astonishment.

Soon after his return home, the duke received an order of banishment from Madrid, and the moment his disgrace was known, his house was filled with a crowd of all ranks, who hastened to testify their respect and regard. No other notice was however taken of this singular scene. As the cardinal was apprehensive of increasing the general odium by a more vigorous act of authority, the duke was recalled in a few months; but he indignantly rejected all overtures for a reconciliation, and never again spoke to the minister while in Spain. To add to the singularity of this adventure, the

king of Spain knew nothing of the squabble, nor the banishment and recal of the duke, till after the disgrace of Alberoni.*

CH. XXVII.
1717.

* Memoirs de St. Simon, t. 7, p. 215, 220, who informs us he received the anecdote from the duke of Escalona himself.

As it soon became evident that the solemn promise given by Alberoni in the name of his sovereign to accommodate the disputes with the emperor on the basis of the preliminary propositions was merely intended to gain time, and amuse the allies, and that nothing less than the ruin, or at least the reduction, of the Austrian power in Italy would satisfy the court of Madrid, England spurned at the temporising spirit of the dutch government, and the velleitating measures of the regent, and adopted the resolution to exert the consent of Philip, or join the emperor in offensive measures.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

1717—1718.

New efforts of France and England to promote an Accommodation—Mission of the Marquis de Nancré to Madrid, and cabals of the Regent with the disaffected Spaniards—England equips an Armament to check the Aggressions of Spain—Indignation of Philip—Reproachful Letters from Alberoni to Mr. Dodington—His Intrigues in France and England—Negotiations with Victor Amadeus—Invasion of Sicily—Arrival of the British Armament on the Spanish Coasts, and new attempts for an Accommodation—Conclusion of the Quadruple Alliance—Arrival of Earl Stanhope, and his Negotiations at Madrid—Destruction of the Spanish Fleet by Admiral Byng—Indignation of the Court—Fruitless offer of Gibraltar, as the recompence for the Accession of Philip to the Quadruple Alliance—Departure of Earl Stanhope—Manifestos of Spain relative to the Invasion of Sicily.

CH. XXVIII.

1717

1718.

AS it soon became evident that the solemn promise given by Alberoni in the name of his sovereign to accommodate the disputes with the emperor on the basis of the preliminary propositions was merely intended to gain time, and amuse the allies, and that nothing less than the ruin, or at least the reduction, of the Austrian power in Italy would satisfy the court of Madrid; England spurned at the temporizing spirit of the dutch government, and the vacillating measures of the regent, and adopted the resolution to extort the consent of Philip, or join the emperor in offensive measures.

The regent, either to give more force, or rather the appearance of more force, to his representations, sent the marquis de Nancré to Madrid, as his ambassador extraordinary, to second the instances of England. But this ostensible commission was merely a veil to cover the real design, which proves how seldom a cabinet is induced to contravene its fundamental principles of policy. While Nancré was instructed to establish a private understanding with Alberoni, and to avoid any communication with the disaffected nobles, or the slightest appearance which might give umbrage, St. Aignan, the regular ambassador, was to direct a personal attack against the cardinal, to continue the cabals with the disaffected, and stimulate them to overthrow all foreign influence. Indeed, from the combined instructions given to the two ambassadors, it is evident the purpose of the regent was to amuse all parties, to take advantage of the progress of events; and while he gratified his personal animosity against Alberoni, and deluded the british cabinet with an affectation of zeal for the re-establishment of tranquillity, to avoid measures which might occasion an absolute breach with Spain, or tend to reduce the power of the House of Bourbon in either of its branches.

This double intrigue did not escape the notice of Alberoni, who endeavoured to turn the machinations of the regent against himself. By a parade of his correspondence and communications, he sowed suspicions of his sincerity among the grandees; and he employed the same expedient in his intercourse with the british ministers, to inspire a jealousy of France, or to evade the force of their representations and remonstrances by adducing the more moderate language and sentiments of the regent. He even caused rumours to be circulated, that the princess Orsini and Orri were to be restored to power, by the support or the connivance of the

CH. XXVIII.

1717

1718.

CH. XXVIII.

1717

1718.

french court. The effect which this artifice produced among the grandees may be estimated by the answer of the regent to their representations.

“ You may,” he wrote to the ambassador, “ inform them that this news is perfectly indifferent to me ; and that I, in particular, can have no share in the measure. Having taken the resolution to liberate the Spaniards from the domination of foreigners, I should hardly be inclined to replace their government in the hands of a french woman, who is my personal enemy.”*

The cardinal omitted no endeavour to work even on the hopes and fears of the regent himself. He declared to Nancré that the king was apprised of his intention to sign a treaty with the emperor and England, and intreated him to desist, or at least to suspend its execution. ‘ In this case,’ he said, ‘ his majesty will regard his interests as his own ; on the contrary, neither time nor services will ever appease his indignation ; the regent must consider him as a personal and inveterate enemy.’†

The british ministers were at length wearied with these affected delays, and petty cabals. Convinced that a rupture could not be prevented by such contemptible machinations, they assumed a tone and aspect becoming a nation which possessed so great a share in the transactions of Europe. Without further regarding the hesitating conduct of the dutch, the equivocations of the regent, or the illusions of Alberoni ; the king gave a public proof of his resolution to take a decisive part in the rising commotions. He appealed to the parliament on the alarming state of Europe, and the danger of a war, obtained large supplies of money, and equipped a fleet to sail to the Mediterranean, for the protection of the coasts of Italy. Its

* Noailles, t. 5, p. 86—93. † St. Simon, t. 8, p. 241.

destination was imparted to Monteleon, with the hope that the dread of encountering this powerful armament would make some impression on the court of Spain. These measures, however, only called forth resentment and reproaches; and Monteleon presented a vehement remonstrance against the equipment of the fleet in time of peace, which he declared would cause umbrage to the king his master, and affect the good intelligence between the two courts.*

CH. XXVIII.

1717

1718.

Philip felt extreme indignation at this interference of the only power whose maritime force could check his enterprises in the Mediterranean. But no one was more deeply mortified than Alberoni, who calculated on the gratitude, if not the assistance of the british nation. Equally chagrined and indignant to see his machinations foiled by those whom he had fondly hoped to cajole, he wrote two reproachful letters † to Mr. Dodington, who had laid down his ministry, and returned to London, which are strikingly expressive of the irritation of his mind.

“The catholic king will take no resolution on the subject of the commercial treaty, until he sees the developement of the piece. You are a good witness of the sincerity of his intentions towards the king of England. You well know that he did not hesitate to sacrifice, by two new conventions, all the advantages which he had gained by the treaty of Utrecht; forgetting that by the means of England he had been despoiled of his revenues, provinces, and kingdoms; an injustice which will always cry for vengeance, as contrary to all laws divine

April 5.

* Tindal, v. 19, p. 202.

† This and the following letter from Alberoni to Mr. Dodington have already been published, in the original French, in Seward's Anecdotes, v. 2, p. 262, from the Melcombe Papers, in the possession of H. P. Wyndham, Esq.

CH. XXVIII.

1717

1718.

and human. By so great a sacrifice, the catholic king thought he should bind the king of England to a grateful return, and the british nation to a closer union with Spain; or that on occasions, where neither of the two nations had any particular interest, the king of England would at least continue neuter.

“Nevertheless, with unspeakable chagrin I see it, neither of these cases will happen; and I shall be exposed to the just resentment of their catholic majesties. Every Gazette proves that your ministry is no longer English but German, and basely sold to the court of Vienna; and that through the cabals so common in your country, attempts are making to draw the nation itself into the snare. It is a strong proof of what I say, that having exhausted England of men and money, to acquire states and kingdoms for the archduke, they have recently supplied him with a large subsidy.

“The sentiments of esteem and friendship which I entertain for you, and which I shall always continue to entertain, oblige me to speak to you with sincerity.”

April 16.

“Mr. Patiño is arrived here, and has brought the list of duties, which is approved by the chiefs of all the different nations at Cadiz. It is in the hands of his majesty, but he will not sign it till he has seen the developement of the piece, as I have already informed you. I cannot believe that your nation will relinquish its advantages to concern itself in the affairs of a prince, with whom it has no interest, and from whom it can draw no advantage, against the king of Spain, from whom it has received so many marks of good will. I cannot think that so wise a people will place in the hands of the archduke, a kingdom of Sicily, to render him formidable to all Europe. Excuse me, Sir; but I cannot help saying that all the cabinets of Europe are lost to common sense, that policy has given place to the caprice of a few individuals, who without

rhyme or reason, (perhaps for their private interests) cut and pare states and kingdoms as if they were dutch cheeses."*

He had soon fresh motives for resentment in consequence of a personal attack, from a quarter, and on a subject, likely to produce a serious effect in Spain. The imperial minister at Rome laid a formal complaint against him, for entering into negotiations with the infidels, and supplying them with arms, stores, and money, to the detriment of a Christian prince, and the injury of the Christian faith. He concluded with supplicating the pope to withhold the bull for investing Alberoni with the archbishopric of Seville, to which he had been recently nominated.

The minister did not tamely acquiesce in the charge. He made a spirited reply, denying the facts alleged against him. But he at once avowed and justified his alliance with the Mahometans, as grounded on the acknowledged principles of human policy, and adduced the examples even of the popes themselves, who had united their arms with those of infidels to reduce the power of a public and dangerous enemy.† His arguments, however plausible, did not produce the desired effect. After accepting his resignation of the see of Malaga, the pope refused to invest him with that of Seville; and thus his very promotion terminated in an exclusion from all ecclesiastical preferment, in a country where he was scarcely less master than the sovereign himself.

Personal mortifications and public opposition served only to stimulate the spirit, and call forth the resources of Alberoni. He tampered with every power in Europe, which from prin-

* Lesquels sans rime et sans raison, et peut etre par des fins particulieres, coupent et rognent des etats et des royaumes comme s'ils etoient des fromages d'Hollande.

† Historical Register for 1718, p. 183—283.

CH. XXVIII.

1717

1718.

CH. XXVIII.

1717

1718.

ciples, connections or situation, might contribute to embarrass his opponents. To shackle the efforts of the emperor, he opposed the attempts of the maritime powers and France to mediate a peace with the Turks. He opened a communication with Ragotski, the exiled prince of Transylvania, and offered him a subsidy sufficient to purchase the auxiliary aid of 30,000 Turks. In France he endeavoured to excite internal commotions, by fomenting the discontents against the regent, encouraged the protestants in the Cevennes to raise again the standard of revolt, and opened a communication with the discontented in Brittany.

He attempted to awaken the commercial jealousy of the dutch, and lured them with the hopes of securing the advantages which were to be wrested from England. In England, also, he endeavoured to give a new impulse to those feuds, which are the natural effects of a free government, and the struggles of contending parties. By means of his agents he published exaggerated complaints on the infractions of the constitution, the burthen of the taxes, and the usual topics of popular declamation. He did not forget also to touch on the delicate subject of commercial advantages. In England, as in Holland, he wrote circular letters to the merchants, expatiating on the losses of trade which must ensue from a rupture with Spain. He found zealous partisans in the opposition, which consisted not merely of the excluded tories, but numerous chiefs of the whigs, among whom are distinguished the names of Walpole, Townshend, Carteret, Methuen, and Pulteney.* Lastly, he entered into a direct and intimate connection with the jacobites, and raised their drooping hopes with the pro-

* Letters from Monteleon, Alberoni, and Secretary Craggs, Hist. Reg. for 1718, p. 300—393.—Tindal, v. 19.—Memoirs of sir Robert Walpole, ch. 17.

mise of foreign support. And as he was now convinced that England had decidedly embraced the cause of the Emperor, he urged his sovereign to divert the armament destined for Sicily to the british isles, and lay the axe to the very root of the confederacy ; but fortunately for our national tranquillity, Philip was too much ruled by his personal resentment, and too anxious for an establishment in Italy, to adopt the bold advice.

CH. XXVIII.

1717

1718.

Although he despised the impotent resentment of the pontiff, he gratified his own personal vengeance, by dismissing the nuntio, recalling the spaniards from Rome, and suspending the usual ecclesiastical contributions.

But it was with Victor Amadeus, whose assistance or connivance was so essential in his designs against Italy, that this great master of political intrigue employed all his resources. Aware that a prince of so grasping a character must be indignant at the prospect of an exchange which was to satisfy the emperor at his expence, he lured him with the tender of a part of the Milanese and the duchy of Modena, instead of the barren island of Sardinia, which was the inadequate and uncertain compensation offered by the allies in return for Sicily. His offers were received, at least with a favourable attention, by a prince who was watching the progress of events to sell his services to the highest bidder. The wily monarch even publicly testified his determination to embrace the cause of Spain. "He had acquired Sicily," he said, "in the last war, and would preserve it, with the last drop of his blood ; faithful to his engagements, he would never abandon the catholic king." Aware that he should ultimately be compelled to acquiesce in the proposed exchange, he resolved to throw on the emperor the principal burthen of defending his expected acquisition, and drew a considerable part of his troops from Sicily to parade them on the frontiers of the Milanese.

CH. XXVIII.

1717

1718.

He even sent a private agent to Madrid, who was charged with a series of propositions as the basis of an alliance with Spain. These were; a million of crowns before he took the field; a weekly subsidy of 7,000 for carrying on the war; the assistance of 15,000 spanish auxiliaries in Lombardy; and a diversion by the spaniards on the side of Naples. The contributions levied on the conquered countries were to be equally divided; the conquered places to be garrisoned by a force of half piedmontese and half spaniards, commanded by a piedmontese governor; and finally after the subjugation of Naples, 20,000 spaniards were to march into Lombardy, to complete the reduction of the Milanese, which was to be the price of the assistance given by the king of Sicily.*

While Europe was agitated by these cabals and negotiations, the spanish minister redoubled his efforts, to hasten the departure of the powerful armament, collected for the invasion of Sicily, which, from his intrigues with Victor Amadeus, and the secret connections formed with the natives, he hoped to find an easy conquest. The expedition, consisting of twenty three ships of the line, with transports carrying 30,000 veteran troops, and all the requisites for the field, departed from Barcelona on the 18th of June; and after touching at Cagliari, to take on board a part of the troops left in Sardinia, directed its course towards Sicily. On the 1st of July, the spaniards effected their landing near Cape Solanto, four leagues from Palermo, under the command of the marquis of Lede, who, besides the chief direction of the expedition, was appointed future viceroy of Sicily.

The great powers of Europe beheld with astonishment, Spain awakening from a lethargy of an hundred years, dis-

* Manifeste du Roi d'Espagne.—Rousset, t. 1, p. 234.—Ortiz, t. 7, p. 317.

playing a vigor and enterprise worthy the brightest days of the monarchy, and threatening the renewal of the war, which had scarcely been terminated by the peace of Utrecht. Apprehension of the rising troubles gave new firmness to the determination of the british government, and fixed the wavering policy of the regent. A new alliance was speedily arranged between Stanhope and Dubois, the confidential ministers, in each of the two countries. Means were instantly taken to accelerate the conclusion of the treaty between the emperor and the turks; and a strong austrian force was transferred from the Hungarian frontier into Italy. To acquire a claim to the support of this alliance, the emperor announced his consent to accept the mediation of England for the arrangement of the long pending contest with Philip; and measures were taken to obtain the accession of the dutch.

CH. XXVIII.

1717

1718.

This treaty, originally concluded by the emperor, France and England, and afterwards called the Quadruple Alliance, from the accession of the dutch, was founded on the same general principles as had been already proposed. The treaty of Utrecht was considered as the basis. But a formal engagement was introduced for the transfer of Sicily to the emperor, and the reversion of Tuscany and Parma was entailed on Don Carlos, and the other sons of the queen of Spain; and for the accomplishment of this condition, the strong places of both duchies were to be garrisoned by 6,000 Swiss in the pay of the mediating powers. To satisfy the honour of Philip, the emperor agreed to renounce the empty title of king of Spain. As an indemnification for the loss of Sicily, Victor Amadeus was to receive Sardinia; and the emperor not only confirmed the cessions made to the House of Savoy, in 1703; but acknowledged its right to the eventual succession of Spain, in case of the failure of issue to Philip. Lastly, the term of three

Aug. 2.

CH. XXVIII.

1717

1718.

months was to be allowed for the accession of Philip and the king of Sicily, and in case of further delay, the whole force of the contracting parties was to be employed in extorting their acquiescence.

Before the formal signature, the terms of the treaty were communicated to the court of Madrid. On this occasion Alberoni inveighed bitterly against the two contracting powers, but more particularly against the duke of Orleans. "The regent," he said, "has, in the face of the world, declared himself the friend of a power which is the enemy of the king his uncle; and the time is probably arrived when he will be entangled in acts of hostility against his august relative. Marshal d'Uxelles, in signing this alliance to avoid a rupture, will see France in arms against the king of Spain. His catholic majesty, for his part, is resolved to wage eternal war, rather than consent to such an infamous proposal; and while he has life and strength will wreak his vengeance on those who presume to extort his acquiescence by force. Should Stanhope speak in the tone of a legislator, he will be ill received. The passport which he required is expedited. His propositions will be heard, but will not meet with the slightest attention, unless they differ entirely from the project; and he will be surprised to be informed that the king will not at present listen to any offer of Tuscany, but will reserve his rights for a proper time and place."*

June 4.

In the midst of this paroxysm of disappointment and indignation, earl Stanhope repaired to Spain, and the british fleet under admiral Byng took its departure for the Mediterranean to give weight to the propositions of peace. Before, however, Stanhope had reached Madrid, the spaniards had effected their debarkation in Sicily; and the british admiral, appearing off

* St. Simon, t. 8, p. 253.

Cape St. Vincent, dispatched a messenger with a formal declaration of his arrival and instructions to the envoy, Mr. Stanhope.

“ You will please,” he said, “ to acquaint his catholic majesty with my arrival with the fleet in the Mediterranean, and that I am instructed in the king my master’s name, to promote all measures which may contribute to compose the differences subsisting between the king of Spain and the emperor.

“ Should his catholic majesty not please to accept the mediation of our master, but continue in the resolution of attacking the emperor’s territories in Italy ; in that case, I am commanded by the king my master, to maintain the neutrality of Italy, and defend the emperor’s territories, by opposing all force that shall endeavour to attack him in that quarter.”*

In an interview with the cardinal, the british envoy, after expatiating on the anxiety of France and England, to preserve the peace of Europe, produced this letter, to enforce his representations. Such a peremptory message could not fail to irritate the high spirited and impetuous minister, and he indignantly replied, “ My master will encounter all perils, and rather be driven from Spain, than recal his troops, or consent to a suspension of arms. The Spaniards are not to be intimidated ; and I am so confident of the bravery of our fleet, that if your admiral should think proper to attack it, I shall be in no pain for the result.”

To this rhodomontade the envoy made no other reply than to present a list of the british fleet, and desire him to compare it with that of Spain. The mortifying coolness which accompanied the notice, roused the choler of the cardinal ; he snatched the list, tore it to pieces, and trampled it under foot.

* Admiral Byng to Mr. Stanhope, June 20, O. S. 1718.—Political State for 1718, p. 248.

CH. XXVIII.

1717

1718.

June 20.

July 1.

CH. XXVIII.

1717

1718.

To all further representations, he sullenly replied, "I will communicate your message to the king, and apprise you of his majesty's resolution in two days." But either from contempt, or for the sake of gaining time for the spanish fleet to take refuge at Malta, he delayed the performance of his promise for nine days, and then returned the admiral's letter, with a brief note, added in the form of a postscript:

"His catholic majesty has done me the honour to tell me that the chevalier Byng may execute the orders which he has received from the king his master. (Signed)

"Escorial, July 15. ALBERONI."*

July 13.

Meanwhile, the spanish troops had commenced their operations in Sicily, with the fairest prospect of signal success. Three days after their landing, they advanced towards Palermo, and were joined by crowds of the nobles, who hailed the restoration of the spanish government. The piedmontese governor, leaving a detachment in the citadel, retired to Syracuse, the city opened its gates, and, after a blockade of a few days, the citadel itself surrendered. The revolt instantly became general. A scanty force of 7,000 men, which was the amount of the piedmontese troops, was too weak to restrain a whole people, and make head against a superior enemy; and several of the smaller posts were reduced by the partisans of Spain themselves. After the reduction of Palermo, the fleet transported the infantry to Messina, while the cavalry approached the place by land. Here, as in other instances, the appearance of the victorious troops was the signal of revolt; the natives themselves drove the Piedmontese into the citadel, where they were instantly besieged, and welcomed the Spaniards with acclamations of joy.†

July 23.

In this situation of affairs, Sicily would have proved an

* Tindal, v. 19, p. 202.

† St. Philippe, t. 3, p. 270 — Historical Register, p. 390.

easy conquest, had not the british fleet appeared off the coast. The admiral anchored a few days in the bay of Naples, and, as the arrangements for the transfer of Sicily had been already completed, he agreed to cover the passage of 3,000 germans across the strait, to reinforce the garrison in the citadel of Messina. The approach of this powerful force greatly embarrassed the Spaniards, both in their naval and military operations: the naval commanders, after spending much time in deliberations, whether they should resist or retire, quitted their station before Messina, and bore away to the south. Having completed the embarkation of the german troops, admiral Byng drew towards the Faro, and in his passage sent a letter to the spanish commander, deprecating hostilities, and proposing a suspension of arms. His overture being rejected, and news arriving that the spanish fleet was in the strait, a short distance ahead, he sent back the germans to Reggio, made sail, and on the 11th of August came up with them, in the vicinity of Syracuse.

CH. XXVIII.
1717
|
1718.
Aug. 1.

The spanish admiral, Castanietta, though a brave and excellent seaman, was yet unequal to the direction of a numerous fleet, and his embarrassment was increased by the uncertainty of his situation. Though it is probable the minister intended that the fleet should retire to Malta in case of necessity; yet no positive orders appear to have been given. The admiral, without any rule for the direction of his conduct, did not deem himself authorised to become the aggressor, and was unwilling to quit the coasts of Sicily. Applying to Don Joseph Patiño, who superintended the expedition, he received instructions which rather increased than relieved his embarrassment. He well knew that his fleet was inferior to the english in force, discipline, and equipment; and, therefore, he could not but deprecate a conflict with an enemy who had made the sea their element.

CH. XXVIII.

1717

1718.

Thus hesitating and embarrassed, his movements gave advantage to a skilful and determined antagonist. On the first appearance of the english fleet, he had passed the strait to occupy a position near Messina, under the protection of batteries on shore. But on the advance of Byng into the bay of Naples, he weighed anchor, and stretched away to the south, to rejoin a division detached to keep open a retreat towards Malta or Sardinia. Even when the british ships were descried, he seems to have doubted whether they would commence the attack, and slowly continued his course, to avoid equally the appearance of alarm or defiance.

On the 11th, in the morning, the advance of Byng convinced him that it was too late to avoid a battle; but the baffling winds and contrary currents of this narrow sea occasioned the separation of his ships, and prevented him, if inclined, from disengaging himself from the british fleet, which was soon intermixed with his own. In this situation, admiral Muri, with six of the lighter ships and the gallies, quitted the main body, to draw towards the coast, and even the men of war could not take their places in the line, though towed.

Meanwhile, the british admiral detached a division to cut off Muri, and, by favour of a partial breeze, continuing his progress after the main body, an engagement began. The Spaniards, without order and union, were attacked almost singly by superior force, and successively compelled to yield; for, though they fought with desperation, this celebrated conflict was rather a running fight, than a regular action. The commander in chief, after a most obstinate resistance, and being dangerously wounded, was made prisoner, and the whole fleet either captured or destroyed, except four ships and six frigates, the division of admiral Cammock, who made his escape, and gained the harbour of St. Valetta. The division of

Muri was driven on shore near Aosta, and all the ships shared the fate of the rest.

After this destructive action, the british admiral, affecting to deprecate the imputation of having been the aggressor, sent one of his captains with a letter of excuse to the marquis of Lede, stating that the spaniards had commenced the battle, and urging that this accident ought not to be considered as a rupture between the two countries.*

Before the intelligence of this disastrous event reached Madrid, earl Stanhope arrived, and joined with the french plenipotentiary, the marquis de Nancré, in tendering the mediation of the neutral powers, and proposing the accession of Spain to the Quadruple Alliance, which was now on the point of being signed by France, England, and the emperor. At first, Alberoni condescended to employ his usual dissimulation, and amused them with the hope of bringing their negotiation to a pacific issue. But the news of the successful descent on Sicily, the enthusiasm which it excited in the capital, and the fortunate arrival of treasure from America, encouraged him to throw off the mask, and induced the court to assume its usual haughty tone.

The allies, however, omitted neither lures nor threats to divert Philip from further aggressions. So anxious was the king of England to prevent a general war, that he offered, first through the channel of the regent, and afterwards by the mouth of earl Stanhope, the restoration of Gibraltar, provided Philip would accede to the Quadruple Alliance without delay.† But with the brilliant hopes which the conquest of Sardinia, and the successful debarkation in Sicily, had inspired, even this darling

* Political State, v. 16, p. 56, 488.—St. Philippe, t. 3, p. 297—306.
—Tindal, v. 19, p. 216.

† Dispatch from Lord Stanhope to Horace Walpole. Oct. 11, 1725.

CH. XXVIII.

1717

1718.

object was not regarded, and the offer was peremptorily rejected, as an inadequate compensation for the rights and pretensions which Philip fondly expected to realise.*

In two audiences which were granted to the ambassadors, the king and queen expressed, with unusual energy, their dissatisfaction with the proffered treaty, as unjust in itself, and equally prejudicial to their interests, and offensive to their honour.

* The offer of Gibraltar, made through the regent, was enveloped with such mystery, that it has never been clearly traced. The assertion of that prince himself, which was never contradicted by the British court, leaves no room to doubt, that he was duly authorised by George the first to make the offer; but in what manner, and whether it was conditional or not, cannot now be ascertained, though the subsequent discussions on this subject furnish reason to suppose that it was coupled with some condition besides the immediate accession of Spain to the peace.

Duclos, however, has given an account of this arrangement, which carries improbability on its very face. He says, the object of Louville's secret mission to Madrid was to communicate this offer, and that measures were even settled for the clandestine surrender of the fortress. At the moment of signing the peace, Philip was to receive an order, under the royal sign manual, directing the governor of Gibraltar, to deliver up the place to a Spanish army, which was to approach and summon the garrison to surrender. In virtue of this order, the Spaniards were to be admitted without opposition, and the British garrison to withdraw to Tangier.

The bare relation of these circumstances proves how little foreigners are acquainted with the forms and mechanism of our government. Without laying stress on the circumstance that at the time of Louville's mission the intimate connection of France and England was not formed, and, allowing the offer to have been afterwards made, yet the royal signature, unless countersigned by the proper officer of state, would not have been obeyed by any military commander; and we are convinced that no minister would have been sufficiently rash to affix his name to so clandestine and informal a transfer. We have discussed this subject at large in the *Memoirs of Sir Robert Walpole*, ch. 34, and shall hereafter resume it in the present work. Duclos, t. 1, p. 276.—*Moore's Life of Alberoni*, p. 104.

Their indignation was still further roused by a peremptory memorial, with which the communication was followed, allowing only three months for the acceptance of the Quadruple Alliance, and announcing that any additional delay would be followed by a declaration of war from France and the maritime powers. In answer to this threat, the cardinal was ordered to declare that his sovereign would never lay down his arms till Sardinia and Sicily were ceded to Spain ; and till the emperor, besides gratifying the house of Savoy for the loss of Sicily, had engaged to maintain only a certain number of troops in Italy.

CH. XXVIII.

1717

1718.

All hopes of an accommodation having vanished, earl Stanhope took his departure. But before he quitted the capital, some intelligence of the discomfiture of the fleet probably reached Alberoni ; for in the final interview, he recurred to his former professions of amity, dwelt on his own pacific inclinations, and threw the blame of the rupture on the personal antipathy of the king against the emperor and the regent. With tears of vexation and disappointment, he declared that he was reluctantly forced into hostile measures, and sincere in his wishes to promote a speedy accommodation.

“ Whether,” observes lord Stanhope, “ the cardinal deceives M. de Nancré and me, I cannot determine ; but I will own to your lordship, that I think he was desirous to have had the suspension of arms, and that he will still endeavour to accommodate matters. He complains bitterly of the king’s obstinacy, who is at present more governed by his personal animosity against the emperor and the regent, than by any reasons of state. He represents him, besides, as exceedingly jealous and mistrustful of all about him ; insomuch that for a considerable time, no person has ever spoken to the king and queen asunder ; nor does any other minister ever dare to speak but in the presence of the king, queen, and cardinal, who by what

CH. XXVIII.

1717

1718.

I can judge are every one jealous of each other. The cardinal shed tears when I parted with him ; has promised to write to me, and to let slip no occasion which may offer of adjusting matters.”*

July 25.

Still anxious to preserve appearances with Victor Amadeus, the spanish minister did not, as on the preceding occasion, publish a justification of the attack on Sicily, nor represent it as a conquered country. On the contrary, he wrote a cajoling letter to Victor Amadeus, apprising him of the disembarkation of the spanish troops, and the capture of Palermo ; representing it, not as an act of aggression, but as a precautionary measure to prevent the island from being wrested from the rightful owner, by the very powers who had guarantied it at the peace of Utrecht ; and professing to hold it in deposit till it could be safely restored to him.†

This application, however, did not produce the effect for which it was probably calculated. Victor Amadeus, either really offended by the attack, or expecting to gain more advantageous terms from the emperor than from Spain, appealed to France and England as guarantees of the peace of Utrecht. He added bitter complaints against the perfidy and injustice of Alberoni, who had amused him with feigned proffers of amity to obtain a more favourable opportunity for the invasion of his dominions.

This memorial at length drew from the spanish court a counter manifesto, retorting the charge of perfidy and duplicity on the court of Turin. The king now declared, that no longer considering Sicily as a deposit, he had determined to prevent its transfer to his bitter and implacable enemy, by incorporating it with the spanish monarchy, from which it had been dis-

* Bayonne, Sept. 2, 1713. Schaub Papers.

† Ortiz, t. 7, p. 336.

membered. The manifesto concludes with an attempt to throw the blame of the enterprise on the courts of Paris and London, by representing, that in their affected candour, they had, in the preceding May, divulged to the spanish minister the secret negotiation for the transfer of Sicily to the emperor. This communication alone, it was urged, reduced the king to the indispensable necessity of opposing force to force.*

CH. XXVIII.

1717

1718.

* Vie d'Alberoni, p. 420.—Manifeste de la Cour d'Espagne, sur l'entreprise de la Sicile in Rousset, t. 1, p. 234.

CHAPTER XXIX.

1718—1719.

Remonstrances of the Spanish court against the conduct of England—Cabals of Alberoni with the different powers of Europe—Arrangements with Sweden and Russia for an invasion of England—Conspiracy against the Regent of France detected—Papers and Manifestos published on the occasion—France declares War—Philip heads the army—Unsuccessful campaign—Capture of the frontier Fortresses, and destruction of the Docks and Arsenals—Death of Charles the Twelfth, and neutrality of Sweden and Russia—Fruitless Expedition to Scotland in favour of the Pretender—Unsuccessful attempt on Brittany—Misfortunes of the Spanish arms in Sicily—Accession of the Dutch to the Quadruple Alliance—Ineffectual manœuvres of Alberoni to divide the Allies.

CH. XXIX.

1718

1719.

ALBERONI, however mortified and disappointed, was not discouraged by the fatal discomfiture of the fleet which he had employed such exertions to form; and which, in the energetic language of Spain, was described as sprung out of the earth.

Vehement complaints were instantly made to the british government against so flagrant a breach of that good faith for which the nation was honourably distinguished. In a letter, addressed to the secretary of state, but calculated for the public eye, the ambassador, Monteleon, remonstrated

against this unprecedented outrage, in contradiction, as he stated, to the very declaration of the admiral himself, that he was commissioned only to defend the dominions of the emperor. He testified the indignation felt by the king and all true spaniards, at this hostile and unprovoked assault from a nation to whom they had shewn peculiar favour. He concluded with a declaration, calculated to work on the feelings of a generous people, that notwithstanding these unmerited aggressions, the king, his master, would punctually distribute the effects of the flota as soon as it arrived from America, that he would religiously observe the civil and commercial relations of the two countries, and would maintain the english in all the grants and advantages which they had hitherto enjoyed.

CH. XXIX.

1718

|

1719.

Lastly, the cardinal himself seconded and confirmed the instances of the ambassador in a letter, which was intended as the public expression of the sentiments of his sovereign. In this piece, besides repeating and dwelling on the complaints made by Monteleon, he artfully introduced hints calculated to convey the impression that the admiral, with the connivance of the ministry, had been induced to swerve from the instructions prescribed to him, by the instances and bribes of the imperial viceroy count Daun. He even affected to find in his official account of the battle, expressions of remorse for his unjust aggression.*

It was not, however, by memorials and papers that the spanish minister manifested his resentment; but he employed all the resources of policy to confound and embarrass the allies, and in particular to turn the attack against France and England.

In no instance were his efforts more successful than in the

* St. Philippe, t. 3, p. 34.—Ortiz, t. 7, lib. 23. c. 6.—Tindal, v. 19, p. 386, 393.—Letters of Monteleon and Alberoni in Hist. Reg. for 1718.

CH. XXIX.

1718

1719.

North. During the recent war, the king of Denmark had conquered Holstein, Sleswic, Bremen, and Verden; but unable to resist the attacks of Charles the twelfth, after his return from his turkish captivity, he ceded Bremen and Verden to George the first, as elector of Hanover, to purchase his accession to the confederacy formed against Sweden, and thus obtained the co-operation of a british squadron in the Baltic.

Charles the twelfth was highly provoked by this interference, and in return caballed with the jacobites in England, as well as with the exiles in France and Holland. His pride was still more deeply wounded by the consequent arrest of Goertz and Gyllenborg, his ministers in England and Holland, the disclosure of his intrigues with the discontented, and his plans for the invasion of England.*

Peter the great was equally dissatisfied with the british government, for counteracting his attempts to obtain dominions in the empire. He likewise testified his resentment by caballing with the jacobites, and the discontented party, though he affected to feel great abhorrence at the attempts of the british court to implicate him in the charges advanced against Charles the twelfth.

Alberoni profited by these circumstances to promote a reconciliation between these two rival monarchs, and turn their united force against a country which had equally offended both. He even sent the duke of Ormond into Russia, to negotiate a marriage between Anne, the daughter of Peter, and the son of the Pretender. This mission was not openly countenanced by Peter; but the interference of the spanish minister was attended with effect. Swedish and russian ministers met in the isle of Aland, and, under the mediation of an agent from the spanish court, signed the preliminary articles of an ac-

May, 1718.

* St. Philippe, t. 3, p. 252, 344.

commodation. By this arrangement, Charles was to yield to Russia the territories on the shore of the Baltic, and in return was to be assisted in the conquest of Norway, and the recovery of Bremen and Verden. Their united forces were finally to concur with those of Spain, in the invasion of the British Isles, in order to restore the exiled family.*

CH. XXIX.

1718

1719.

In France the state of parties presented ample scope to the machinations of the spanish minister, and encouraged him to imitate the cabals which the regent had formed at Madrid, to overthrow his own authority. All the partisans and admirers of the old court were combined against the existing government, for its connection with England, and dereliction of the long established maxims of french policy. Marshal Villars presented a strong memorial against the recent alliance, recommending a reconciliation with Spain, and a junction of the bourbon crowns against the emperor. These representations were supported by the duke of Maine and Villeroy, in the council of state; and their arguments made such an impression on their colleagues, that the marshal d'Uxelles, head of the department of foreign affairs, would not affix his signature to the treaty till compelled by the personal authority of the duke of Orleans himself.† This party was supported by all the legitimated princes and princesses, not excepting even the wife of the regent, who were all indignant at being robbed of the rights and honours granted by the deceased monarch. Nor was this sentiment confined to personal or political opponents; St. Simon, his devoted friend, did not scruple to acknowledge the superior claims of Philip to the government. "If," said he, addressing the duke, "the king of Spain should enter France unarmed, and, throwing himself on the nation, demand the regency in

* St. Philippe, t. 3, p. 357.

† Mem. de Villars, t. 2, p. 383.—St. Simon, t. 10, p. 251.

CH. XXIX.

1718

1719.

his own right; I confess, that, however attached to you, I should take my leave of you with tears, and acknowledge him as the true regent. If I, attached as I am to you, thus think and feel, what can you expect from the French in general?"* The parliaments also, degraded collectively and individually, ranged themselves under the banners of the discontented nobility, as the means of recovering their former power, and vindicating the rights of the nation.

The conduct of the duke of Orleans gave additional strength to the general odium. The dilapidated state of the finances, though in reality derived from the ambitious wars of Louis the fourteenth, was attributed by popular prejudice to the existing government, and the evil was aggravated by the ruinous system of finance, of which Law was the author, and the personal extravagance of the regent. Religious feuds were added to civil dissensions; the contending sects of jesuits and jansenists had been equally humbled; the jesuits in particular were irritated against the regent, for robbing their order of its influence at court, by the removal of le Tellier from his post of royal confessor, and the transfer of his office to the abbot Fleury. These united causes, joined to the shameful profligacy of the regent, and the still more shameful enormities of his favourite Dubois, rapidly obliterated the respect and affection which he had at first gained by his superior abilities and captivating deportment.

The malcontents soon found a head in the duchess of Maine, the spirited daughter of the prince of Condé. She opened a communication with the queen of Spain, through Cellamar, the spanish ambassador, to whom the management of the whole intrigue was intrusted, and her faction was augmented by distinguished persons in every department of the church and

* St. Simon, t. 7, p. 148.

state, as well as by officers of rank in the army. The different leaders of this party were, as is usual, actuated by different views. Some wished only to restore the last regulations of Louis the fourteenth; some hoped to employ the aid of Philip for their own aggrandisement, or that of their body; some merely to gratify personal resentment or political rivalry. But the skilful hand of Alberoni reduced their clashing interests to one general principle. He united all classes, professions, and parties, in one common design to overthrow the government of the duke of Orleans, and transfer the regency to Philip, as the means of breaking the impolitic alliance with England and Austria, and facilitating his eventual succession to the crown, in case of the untimely death of the young monarch.

At once to abridge the resources of the regent, and to collect a powerful force of native frenchmen beyond the Pyrenees, the spanish government employed the most flattering encouragement to purchase the services of the disbanded officers, among whom, besides many of merit little inferior, we distinguish the name of the celebrated tactician Folard. By their connections and agency, levies of men were secretly made in the discontented provinces. A communication was also opened with a numerous party in Britanny, who were dissatisfied with the government, and were excited to revolt by the promise of military aid from Spain. Lastly, these designs were furthered by a powerful body among the jesuits, headed by the celebrated father la Tournemine, who maintained a direct and secret correspondence with the spanish court, through the channel of the confessor d'Aubenton.

So far, at length, was the conspiracy matured, that arrangements were made to seize the person of the regent, and convoke the states general to authorise the change of government.

CH. XXIX.

1718

1719.

CH. XXIX.

1718

1719.

addresses were actually prepared by cardinal Polignac, and the literary dependents of the House of Maine, to be presented to the king, the parliaments, and the states, in the name of Philip.

With all the precautions which the most intelligent head could devise, so extensive a design would scarcely have escaped the vigilance of the french government; much less when Cellamar himself seemed almost to court detection. Besides openly receiving the discontented of all ranks, he held his nocturnal interviews with the duchess of Maine, with an affectation of mystery, which was rather calculated to excite than baffle curiosity; employing the carriage of the marquis of Pompadour, and being driven by the count of Laval, who officiated as coachman. Lastly, to complete his unaccountable indiscretion, he employed persons little known and of doubtful fidelity, to transcribe and compose his most important papers.

It is no wonder that the secret transpired by all these avenues to publicity. General information of the plot was transmitted to the regent by the french ambassador at Madrid, the king of England, and by the subordinate agents of Cellamar. The government, however, betrayed no sign of suspicion or alarm, but suffered the conspirators to mature their arrangements, and to lay the train which, in the figurative language of the spanish minister, was "to spring the mine."*

For greater security, these dangerous papers were intrusted to Don Vincente Portocarrero, nephew of Cellamar, whose rank and connections were expected to secure him from the risks of an ordinary courier. So great was the confidence which the apparent tranquillity of the government inspired, that neither cipher, nor any of the usual precautions, were employed to conceal their contents, or the names of the persons interested.

While, therefore, the court of Madrid anxiously expected

* Intercepted letter from Alberoni to Cellamar. Hist. Reg.

the arrival of this important messenger, they were confounded with the intelligence that their design was discovered. Don Vincente was arrested at Poitiers, his papers seized, and by the information which they contained, a clue was found to trace the agents and outline of the conspiracy. Cellamar received notice of the incident sufficiently early to destroy the most dangerous documents; but his person was put under arrest, and his papers examined. At the same time many of the chief conspirators were seized, particularly the duke and duchess of Maine, their sons the count of Eu and the prince of Dombes, cardinal Polignac, the duke of Richelieu, the marquis of Pompadour, and many persons of all ranks and orders, from whose papers and confessions additional information was drawn. These documents being submitted to the examination of a private council, the regent justified his conduct by publishing an account of the conspiracy, addressed in a circular letter to all the foreign ministers resident at the court, and accompanied with all the requisite proofs.*

The draughts of the intended letter to the king, and the addresses to the parliament of Paris, were likewise made public. These contained strong professions of attachment to the memory of Louis the fourteenth, bitter invectives against the person, government, and political connections of the regent, and a request for the convocation of the states general, the organ of the national voice, as the only proper expedient to deliver the king and his people from oppression; for the remedy of past and the prevention of future evils. But in the

* For the account of this mysterious conspiracy have been consulted and compared, *Memoires de St. Philippe*, t. 3, p. 333—336 — *St. Simon*, t. 7, p. 137. — *Richelieu*, t. 3, ch. 10. — *Memoirs de Mad. de Staal, ou Anecdotes de la Regence*, t. 2, and 3. The authoress, then Mlle. de Launay, was maid of honour to the duchess of Maine, and one of her agents, and has given the most authentic narrative of the part taken by her mistress.

CH. XXIX.

1718

1719.

proposed manifesto to the states, these accusations are more forcibly and amply urged. It contains laboured complaint against the cruelty and injustice of the Quadruple Alliance, and the unwarrantable conduct of the duke of Orleans, "*the mere depositary of the royal authority*," in daring to league with the natural enemies of the House of Bourbon, without consulting the nation or parliaments; without even referring to the mature deliberation of the council of regency.

The same general topics form the subject of all the papers; but in the memorial intended to be dictated to the states, the real views of Philip are more clearly developed.

"Sire, all the orders of the states throw themselves at your feet, and implore your assistance, in that situation to which the present government has reduced them. Your majesty is not ignorant of our misfortunes, though unacquainted with their extent. Our respect for the royal authority in whatever hands, and however exercised, leaves us no resource but in your support.

"This crown is the patrimony of your ancestors. He who now wears it, is bound to you by the strongest ties; the nation looks up to you *as the presumptive heir*, and hopes to find you animated by the same sentiments as your late grandfather, whose death we daily lament. With this view we lay before you our misfortunes, and implore your assistance."

After expatiating on the immoral conduct of the regent, his alliances with the enemies of the religion and of the monarchies of France and Spain, the want of public confidence, the disorders in the finances, and the countenance given to foreigners; after dwelling on the arbitrary and violent treatment of the parliaments, and the measures pursued against the natives of Britanny, the memorial proceeds:

"If your majesty should demand what remedy can be ap-

plied, we answer, It is in your hands. Although you wear a foreign diadem, you are still a son of France. As uncle to a minor king, who can deny your power to convoke the states, for the re-establishment of order, and the arrangement of the guardianship and regency?

CH. XXIX.

1718

1719.

“All France has perceived that in burying your own claims, you have consulted only the public tranquillity; and in this conduct all France acknowledges the heart of a true father of his country. Your majesty may be assured that if you should appear with your household attendants only, all hearts would pant to meet you; and every citizen would be your guard. But if for greater security you enter the country with 10,000 men, and are opposed by the duke of Orleans with 60,000, you may be confident that the very troops on which he may rely, will be the most zealous in obeying your orders. There is not a single officer, who does not lament, not a soldier, who does not feel, the perversity of the government; not a subject, who does not regard you as his deliverer. All will vie in acknowledging and admiring you as the grandson of that beloved sovereign, who still reigns in our hearts. What have you to fear from the people or nobles, to whom you come to give security? Your army is already in France, and you may expect to become as powerful here as Louis the fourteenth. At your discretion you will be received either as administrator or regent, or as a prince who re-establishes with honour the testament of his august grandfather.

“Thus, Sire, you will see the revival of that union so necessary for the safety of the two crowns, which renders them both unshaken; thus will you restore the tranquillity of a people who regard you as their father; thus will you prevent misfortunes to which we dare not turn our eyes.

CH. XXIX.

1718

1719.

What reproaches will you not cast on yourself if the event* we so much dread should happen ! What tears will you not shed for having disregarded the instances of an imploring nation !"

On the discovery of the plot, the king of Spain openly avowed the measures adopted against the regent, and recurred to the hostile preparations already commenced for supporting his pretensions. The french ambassador at Madrid had been previously arrested on a slight pretence, and ignominiously sent out of the country. Troops from all quarters were drawn towards the frontier.

Dec. 25.

Philip justified his conduct, in a manifesto containing the preceding topics of accusation ; and after describing his hostile preparations as directed solely against the person and authority of the regent, concluded with an appeal calculated to operate on the honour and loyalty of the french nation. With a view to excite the public discontent this manifesto was circulated at Paris, and through every part of France.

Jan. 9,
1719.

The discovery of the plot, and the insulting language of these papers, compelled the regent to declare war ; after he had resisted both the exhortations and examples of England and the emperor. The spanish manifesto was condemned by the parliament of Paris, as a treasonable publication. The declaration of war against Spain was accompanied with a manifesto detailing the causes of the rupture ; tracing the motives which had occasioned the conclusion of the Quadruple Alliance, and inveighing against the opposition of Spain to all endeavours for restoring the peace of Europe. As Philip had coupled his accusations against the regent, with professions of regard towards the king, the regent in return

* The eventual death of Louis the Fifteenth.

spared the person of the monarch to direct the public indignation against Alberoni.

To this the spanish court replied by a counter-declaration, justifying its refusal to assent to the proffered conditions of accommodation.

CH. XXIX.

1718

|

1719.

Feb. 29.

Among other arguments, it was urged ; “ The convention for the neutrality of Italy was null, because it had been repeatedly violated by the emperor ; the intended cession of Sicily to the duke of Savoy was equally null, because the duke did not observe the conditions annexed to it. The acceptance of the Quadruple Alliance was proposed by the united powers, who affected to give the law to Europe, in such an absolute and imperious style, as seemed to deprive kings of the sovereign rights derived from God.” Complaints were introduced against the ingratitude of England, after the advantageous terms of commerce obtained from Spain, and the perfidy of the british admiral, in attacking the spanish fleet without a declaration of war. To these were joined a vehement invective against the ambition of the House of Austria, and a new recapitulation of the hackneyed charges against the regent.

Notwithstanding the discovery of the conspiracy against the regent, the court of Spain was flattered by the general expression of the public sentiment in France ; and particularly by the disposition manifested by all ranks in the army. Villars, the most distinguished general in the service, had not only refused to accept a command against a prince of the House of Bourbon, but had made an appeal to the regent and his council, deprecating a war, and recommending a reconciliation between two crowns so nearly connected by blood and interest.* Besides the officers actually engaged in the conspiracy, a large party in the army was actuated by similar sentiments,

* Memoires de Villars, t. 2, p. 383.

CH. XXIX.

1718

1719.

April 26.

and the provinces bordering on Spain teemed with malcontents.

Animated with new hopes by these appearances, which were exaggerated by the sanguine descriptions of his agents and partisans, Philip quitted Madrid at the commencement of spring, to head the army, which was to realise his design of resuming his birthright, and give the first impulse to that general revolution which he expected to effect, for the honour of the catholic religion and the interest of the House of Bourbon. He himself led the first division; the queen accompanied the second; the third was headed by Alberoni, who, like a Ximenes or a Richelieu, affected to blend the characters of the ecclesiastic and the warrior. It was not, however, on force alone, that Philip placed his reliance. He flattered himself that no french soldier would bear arms against the first prince of the royal blood, and he was so sanguine in this expectation that he appointed the different regiments, in which those, who should abandon the standard of the regent, were to be enrolled. With the same expectation he published an appeal to the french soldiery.

After expatiating on the reciprocal interests which ought to unite France and Spain, and reprobating the connection of the regent with England, as the means of disturbing this happy union, and reducing both nations to a disgraceful servitude, he exhorted the soldiery to repair to his standard, and aid his efforts to regenerate the nation. "If the french troops," he added, "will concur in this generous design, their young king, when he attains his majority, will acknowledge and gratefully reward the services of those who have co-operated for the security of his crown and life. By this necessary union, we shall respectively fulfil our duty. I that of my blood, and of the regency, which is *my right*; the french that of generous

and brave subjects, who have raised themselves above vain apprehensions, disguised under the mask of obedience, forcibly extorted by the *pretended regent*." He concluded by promising to preserve the battalions which should pass over to his standard entire, with all their officers, and to distinguish them with those honours and rewards, which they were entitled to expect both from the importance of their service, and from his royal word. So confident indeed was he of the impression which his declaration would make on the army, that he formed the design of advancing with only a small escort into the french ranks, and appealing to the loyalty and affection of the soldiery. His romantic project was however frustrated by Alberoni, who, by a false order, contrived to delay the march of the intended escort.

These sanguine expectations terminated in utter disappointment. Although Villars had refused the command, a general scarcely less beloved and respected was found in the marshal Berwick; and the army, however secretly disposed, was awed by the restraints of his rigid discipline, and readily obeyed the impulse of his master hand. The obedience of the soldiery inspired respect for the government, and occasioned equal obedience in the provinces. After treating the declaration of Philip with the usual marks of public dishonour, the regent employed the name of the king in justifying his own measures; and, again holding forth Alberoni as the object of public indignation, announced his resolution never to conclude peace, while so dangerous an enemy to the two countries was suffered to direct the spanish government.*

In the midst of this paper war hostilities actually com-

* The different Papers and Documents adverted to in the text, may be found in Rousset, t. 1. Hist. Reg. and Political State for 1718—1719, and other collections of public papers.

CH. XXIX.

1718

1719.

CH. XXIX

1718

1719.



menced. The french opened the campaign with a superiority which frustrated the hopes of Philip, and disconcerted the plans of the minister. As early as March, Berwick, with an army exceeding 30,000 men, penetrated through the Pyrenees, advanced into Biscay, destroyed the arsenal at Port Passage, with six ships of the line on the stocks, and the magazines of naval stores, and, before the commencement of May, invested Fuenterrabia. The spanish force, which, after the detachments for garrisons, did not exceed 15,000 men, was concentrated at Pampeluna; but too weak to attempt its relief. Philip, indeed, was anxious to vindicate the honour of his crown and arms, by an attack on the besieging army; but he was overruled by the remonstrances and intreaties of the minister. "Hitherto," said Alberoni, "I have passed for the author of the war, and the disturber of the peace of Europe: I have drawn on myself the odium of the whole world, and it was a sacrifice to which I cheerfully submitted, and shall submit. But I cannot see your majesty, at the head of a handful of men, attempt to succour Fuenterrabia, besieged by a more powerful army, advantageously posted. This is to encounter certain ruin; to expose yourself to a catastrophe the most terrible and unheard of. As I am blamed for every thing, it would give colour to the general accusation, that my mad schemes had no other end, and that no better result could have been expected from the counsels of a lunatic."*

June 18.

Philip, after employing all the resources which his situation afforded, to prolong the operations of the siege, had the mortification to witness the surrender of Fuenterrabia. St. Antonio was taken at the same time, by the assistance of an English squadron, the magazines destroyed, and the unfinished ships burnt on the stocks. St. Sebastian was next invested, and

* Storia del Cardinale Alberoni, P. 2, p. 117.

after a blockade of six weeks, reduced by a bombardment. To conclude the campaign in this quarter, the states of Biscay Alava and Guiposcoa were assembled, and offered to submit to the dominion of France on the condition of preserving their privileges; but to shew that the regent was not actuated by motives of aggrandisement or resentment against Philip, the proposal was declined.

CH. XXIX.

1718

1719.

As Pampeluna was too well fortified and garrisoned, to be attacked even in the presence of an inferior force, headed by a sovereign eager to avenge his honour, Berwick withdrew into France, and directed his march north of the Pyrenees, to penetrate into Catalonia; and Philip, leaving the army to follow his movements, returned mortified and indignant to Madrid. The french speedily took Urgel and invested Roses; but the operations of the siege in so difficult a country were greatly obstructed by the weather, and the presence of the spanish army. In consequence of these obstacles, the french, after an arduous attack, abandoned the enterprise, and, relinquishing the design of establishing their quarters beyond the Pyrenees, retired into Roussillon.*

Aug. 31.

Unfavourable as this campaign had proved at home in comparison with the brilliant hopes with which it had commenced, the events abroad were still more afflicting. Charles the twelfth, on whose desperate courage Alberoni had relied for the invasion of England, had fallen a sacrifice to his own rashness before a petty fortress of Norway. With him fell the hopes of co-operation on the part of Sweden and Russia. Ulrica, his sister and successor, was anxious to restore peace to the country, exhausted by a long series of wars; and the ap-

Nov. 30,
1718.

* Mem. de Berwick, t. 2, p. 196—322.—St. Philippe, t. 3, p. 353—402.
—Ortiz, t. 7, p. 344.

CH. XXIX.

1718

1719.

pearance of a british squadron in the Baltic was sufficient to reduce Russia to a neutrality.

Undaunted, however, by reverses, Alberoni was but the more anxious to strike a blow, which might recal the forces of England for her own safety. He was encouraged by the declarations of the opposition, and their partisans, who re-echoed the language of the spanish manifestos, on the impolicy of a war with a natural ally of England, and inveighed against the attack of the fleet by Byng, as a breach of public law, and a dishonour to the good faith of the nation. Mistaking these clamours for the public voice, the spanish minister imagined that the first appearance of foreign support would be the signal for a new revolution, which would restore the exiled family to the throne. He, therefore, prepared at Cadiz a squadron of six ships of the line, with a force of 6,000 men, and arms for 30,000 more, under the pretence of reinforcing the army in Sicily. When the arrangements were complete, the Pretender was invited from Rome to give countenance to the design, and take advantage of events; and the expedition departed under the command of the exiled duke of Ormond, to effect a landing on the coasts of Scotland.

March 10,
1719.

But the same fatality as in other instances attended an enterprize, which may be considered as the forlorn hope of the great, though unfortunate minister. The armament was dispersed off Cape Finisterre, by a storm of unusual violence. Of the whole fleet, only two frigates reached Kintail, their place of destination, having on board the earls Marshal and Seaforth, the marquis of Tullibardine, some field officers, 300 men, and 2,000 stand of arms. If Alberoni had miscalculated on the effects of the public sentiment in France, where a numerous faction really existed, anxious for a change of government, he was still more wofully deceived in trusting to the

struggle of contending factions in England, and giving ear to the representations of Monteleon, that whigs and tories, as well as jacobites, would unanimously concur in transferring the throne to their exiled prince, and liberating their country from what was termed the irksome yoke of a german government. In supporting the cause of the Pretender, he touched the nerve, which vibrated through every member of the body politic. Contending parties forgot their mutual animosities to rally round the throne; while the jacobites, humbled and weakened by their recent discomfiture, were still further discouraged by the general burst of loyalty and attachment to the reigning family.

Favoured by these circumstances, the british government found little difficulty in baffling the meditated attack. Two thousand men were landed from Holland; 3,000 imperialists from the Netherlands; a strong fleet was detached to guard the scottish coast; an army rapidly assembled in the northern counties. The parliament zealously supported the king, and the regent offered an additional succour of 10,000 men. But the rebellion, if it may be so termed, was already crushed. A party of scarcely 2,000 highlanders, who had taken arms on the first appearance of a hostile force, were attacked by the royal troops stationed at Inverness, and driven to their mountains. The Spaniards surrendered, and the rebel chiefs retired to the western isles, from whence they escaped to the continent.*

For this aggression, the british government retaliated by an attack on the coasts of Spain. The squadron which had cooperated with the french army in Biscay, took Vigo, with its citadel, and Ponte Vedra, wasted the neighbouring country,

* Tindal, v. 19, p. 234, 253.—Periodical Publications, particularly Historical Register, and Political State.—St. Philippe, t. 3, p. 358.

CH. XXIX.

1718

1719.

CH. XXIX.

1718

1719.

and destroyed the ships, docks, and arsenals; and then, stretching along the shore of Galicia, committed similar ravages at Rivadao. Naval armaments of considerable strength were also fitted out in the british ports, to carry the war into the american colonies, which were almost destitute of the means of resistance.

Still, however, bearing up against disappointment, Alberoni made vigorous exertions to collect and refit the armament scattered off Cape Finisterre, for an expedition to the coast of Britanny, which was to distract the efforts of the regent. But in this project, he was not more fortunate than in the intended descent on the coast of Scotland. Timidity or disaffection among the chiefs delayed its departure, and before it appeared off the french shore, an army of 20,000 men was collected by the government, which overawed the malcontents, and baffled all hopes of raising commotions.*

In Sicily also the Spaniards experienced the most mortifying reverse. Exulting in their signal success at the commencement of the campaign, they flattered themselves that the occupation of Messina and Palermo would be followed by the fall of Syracuse, Trapani, and Melazzo, the only fortresses still held by the enemy. But circumstances soon altered, with the change which took place in the political system of Europe. Victor Amadeus at length acceded to the Quadruple Alliance, and in acknowledging the emperor as king of Sicily, ordered the governors of the places, still occupied by his troops, to receive austrian garrisons. The emperor also, released from the turkish war by the peace of Passarowitz, and the subsequent reduction of the hungarian malcontents, was enabled to detach an army into Italy, and under the protection of the british squadron, poured continual reinforcements into Sicily.

Nov. 10,
1718.

July,
1718.

* St. Philippe, t. 3, p. 364.

On the other hand, the spanish government, exhausted by unsuccessful struggles and unexpected reverses, vainly endeavoured to keep up the army by succours and supplies in single ships, or light vessels, from the coasts and islands in the Mediterranean. The troops, hourly struggling with increasing disadvantages, maintained the hopeless contest with a firmness worthy of the national character; and several battles were fought, in which both parties displayed equal courage and skill. But every contest, and every victory, was fatal to an army which could not repair its losses; while, on the other hand, continual succours from the neighbouring shore, turned even defeat into an advantage. Accordingly, notwithstanding the affection of the people, and the most obstinate defence, the Spaniards were gradually driven from the open country, and at length blockaded in the fortified posts.*

CHAP. XXIX.

1718

1719.

An unsuccessful negotiation aggravated the embarrassments derived from unfortunate enterprises. Hitherto the Dutch had deferred acceding to the Quadruple Alliance, under various pretences, and their neutrality had been rewarded with an advantageous trade to Spain and the colonies, carried on under the connivance of the court. The attractions of this lucrative traffic had outweighed the pressing instances of France and England, and had been repaid by an indulgence equally favourable to the views of the spanish minister. In the rich magazines of the republic, he found an inexhaustible supply of naval and military stores and provisions; the ports of Amsterdam, and of Zealand, were daily crowded with vessels of all distinctions, laden with these valuable requisites for Spain and Sicily.

At length, the reverses of the spanish arms, and the sinking credit of Alberoni, diminished the number of his partisans in

* St. Philippe, t. 3, p. 329—416.—Ortiz, lib. 23, c. 7.

CH. XXIX.

1718

1719.

Holland; the interest of England and France gained the ascendancy; though, to acquire a merit with Spain, the dutch government made the most pressing instances for the accommodation of the dispute. Alberoni adroitly profited by the overture to maintain a clandestine intercourse with the states, and offered to accept their mediation. With this view, he dispatched the marquis Scotti, agent of the duke of Parma, with instructions to Beretti Landi at the Hague, ordering him to take Paris in his way, and make a formal communication of the proposal to the regent.

This attempt to gain time, and to make the states the arbiters of the negotiation, wounded the pride of the french court. Without rejecting the overture, the regent demurred under the pretence of consulting the emperor and the king of England, and Scotti was detained at Paris, to become the instrument of a counter attack against his employer.

Meanwhile the spanish party daily declined in the states general. After a short demur on the part of Zealand and Utrecht, Holland acceded to the Quadruple Alliance, and the example was speedily followed by the other provinces, though the accession was still clogged with the reserve, that Spain should be allowed a further term of three months to accept the proffered conditions. Alberoni was now compelled to bend to circumstances. He transmitted to the states a plan which was to be made the basis of the pacification. The conditions were the cession of Gibraltar and Minorca by England; the restoration of the conquests recently made by France; the reversion of Tuscany and Parma for Don Carlos, as an hereditary succession, independent of the empire; the transfer of Sicily to the emperor with the right of reversion to Spain; the restoration of Castro and Ronciglione, wrested from the family of Farnese by the popes, and

the regulation of the spanish and west indian commerce, according to the terms of the treaty of Utrecht. A minister was at the same time dispatched with a corresponding proposal to the court of England.* But it was too late to avert by negotiation the danger to which force had been opposed in vain.

CH. XXIX.

1718

1719.

* Tindal, v. 19, p. 313.

CH. XXIX.

1718

1719.

CHAPTER XXX.

1719—1720.

Decline of Alberoni's Credit—Cabals and Machinations to obtain his Disgrace—Interference of the English and French Cabinets—He loses the favour of the Queen—His dismissal and departure from Spain—Incidents of his Journey to the Genoese territories—Arrest and Liberation—Persecutions against him—His Apologies, and the Replies—Evasion—Reappearance and subsequent Adventures—Spirit of his Administration, and Improvements in Spain—His Person and Character—Close of his Life.

CHAP. XXX.

1719

1720.

PHILIP deeply regretted the disappointment of his lofty hopes, and the dishonour of his arms. During the campaign, he frequently testified his dissatisfaction with the minister; but his displeasure was more particularly excited by the opposition of Alberoni to his romantic design of risking his person and army to save Fuenterrabia. His indignation, however, was checked or soothed by the queen, and there was no reason to doubt that her support, with a change of fortune, or even the mere lapse of time, would have enabled this great minister to maintain his original ascendancy. It is no wonder then that the different powers united against Spain, profited by these reverses to accelerate the fall of a man, whose talents and resources experience had taught them to dread. On the

first symptom of his declining credit, the british court made instances to obtain the assistance of the regent, in terms which shew the high importance attached to his removal.

“ We shall act wrong,” writes lord Stanhope to cardinal du Bois, “ if we do not consolidate the peace by the removal of the minister, who has kindled the war. And as he will never consent to peace till he finds his ruin inevitable, if he continues the war, we must make his disgrace an absolute condition of the peace. For as his unbounded ambition has been the sole cause of the war, which he undertook in defiance of the most solemn engagements, and in breach of the most solemn promises, if he is compelled to accept peace, he will only yield to necessity, with the resolution to seize the first opportunity of vengeance. It is not to be imagined that he will ever lose sight of his vast designs, or lay aside the intention of again bringing them forward, whenever the recovery of his strength, and the remissness of the allied powers, may flatter him with the hopes of better success. He is versed in all the negotiations, and in procuring all the connections, necessary for the accomplishment of his schemes ; he will be careful to cultivate those connections, and in due time, he will employ them so much the more dangerously for your nation and ours, inasmuch as his past imprudencies will render him more circumspect, and his past ill success more ardent. He himself has warned us against the dangers of a deceitful peace ; he is incapable of consenting to any other ; he thinks it no reproach to do every thing he is capable of performing ; and we ought to thank God, that he did not more exactly calculate his power and his undertakings. When he is reduced, let us not suffer him to recover. Let us exact from Philip his dismissal from Spain. We cannot make any condition which will be more advantageous both for himself and people. Let us

CHAP. XXX.

1719

1720.

Aug. 22,
1719.

CHAP. XXX.

1719

1720.

hold forth this example to Europe, as a means of intimidating every turbulent minister who breaks the most solemn treaties, and attacks the persons of princes in the most scandalous manner.

“When cardinal Alberoni is once driven from Spain, the natives will never consent to his again coming into administration; even their catholic majesties will have suffered too much from his pernicious counsels, ever to desire his return. In a word, any peace made by the cardinal will be only an armistice of uncertain duration; nor can we depend upon any treaty, till we make it with a spanish minister, whose system is directly opposite, as well in regard to France in particular, as to Europe in general.”*

A plan was accordingly formed by the courts of England and France, to effect his downfall, the execution of which was left to the regent; because, to consummate skill in the arts of intrigue, he united the most effectual means for influencing the spanish court. He easily gained d'Aubenton, who was alienated from Alberoni, for endeavouring to supplant him by an italian adherent, father di Castro. The confessor accordingly indisposed Philip against the person and conduct of the minister. He depicted his plans as extravagant in themselves, and hostile to the interests of Spain, and expatiated on the disorder introduced into every department of the state, to keep the sovereign in dependence, and ignorant of the real situation of affairs. This attack was seconded by private representations from Platania and Caraccioli, two sicilian abbots of good family, high in the confidence of Philip; and finally, by memorials from Ripperda, who, after renouncing his religion and country to establish himself in Spain, had obtained too

* Lord Stanhope to Cardinal du Bois, Hanover, Aug. 22, 1719. Hardwicke Papers.

distinguished a portion of the royal favour, not to become the object of jealousy and displeasure to the minister.*

These united representations made a considerable impression on the mind of a sovereign peculiarly jealous of his authority. But the stroke which levelled the towering grandeur of Alberoni came from his protectress the queen. For the purpose of gaining this princess, lord Peterborough, under the pretext of a journey through Italy, opened a communication with the duke of Parma. It was not difficult to persuade a prince, whose situation exposed him to insult, who was alarmed by the progress of the imperialists, and had been mortified by the ostentation of his former subject. His agency was, therefore, employed to influence his niece, who still retained a warm affection towards her family and native country. The marquis of Scotti, Parmesan envoy, was accordingly sent back to Madrid, with ample instructions from his sovereign, the regent, and the king of England, and his zeal was quickened by the liberal present of fifty thousand crowns.†

But even the privileges of Scotti, as a confidential minister, would scarcely have sufficed to baffle the vigilance or avert the vengeance of his wily countryman, had not this complicated intrigue been favoured by an agent of more importance than celebrity. Laura Pescatori, originally the nurse of the queen, and now her *assa feta*, or first woman of the bed chamber, who, from the influence of early habits, possessed a great share in the affection, if not the confidence, of her royal mistress. This woman, a native of the same parish as Alberoni, and of parentage no less obscure, was imbued with that vanity which is frequently the companion of vulgar minds in sudden elevation. Her upstart pride was wounded by the

* Account of Ripperda, by the Sicilian abbots.

† Sir Luke Schaub's Dispatches.

CHAP. XXX.

1719

1720.

CHAP. XXX.

1719

1720.

state affected by her equally ignoble countryman; and she avenged herself by singing and repeating to her royal mistress the numerous pasquinades which the fertile and satirical genius of the Spaniards daily produced against his administration. She thus unconsciously prepared the way for a more serious attack, and the power of ridicule had already associated the person and character of the minister with ideas of contempt, long before his abilities and services had ceased to inspire the respect which they deserved.*

By the intervention of Donna Laura, Scotti obtained a private interview with the queen, in which he developed the mischiefs resulting from the plans of Alberoni; and, in the name of the english and french governments, assured her of a more certain and substantial aggrandisement for herself and her family, than she could expect from his most successful efforts, if she would contribute to his dismissal. However grateful for his services, and however sensible of his talents, she was too much discouraged by his ill success to resist the temptation, and joined her decisive voice to the cabals already directed against the falling minister.

Dec. 4.

The attack was conducted with perfect secrecy, and Alberoni experienced no apparent diminution of the royal favour; for, on the evening, the last of his political life, he transacted business with the king, and held a long conference with Scotti. But on the following morning, the king departed to the Pardo, and, as if to give greater publicity to his disgrace, instead of the usual letter of dismissal, left a royal decree, to be transmitted to him by the marquis of Tolosa, one of the secretaries of state, announcing his removal from all political power, and enjoining him to quit Madrid in eight days, and the spanish dominions in three weeks.†

* Duclos, t. 2, p. 61. † St. Philippe, t. 3, p. 429.

Thunderstruck with the order, Alberoni demanded in vain an audience of the king, and at last was permitted to write. But the letter, if it ever reached its destination, produced no mitigation of his fate, for he was abruptly commanded to obey. He therefore employed the short interval of his stay in preparing for his departure, and rendering an account of his administration.

CHAP. XXX.

1719

|

1720.

Before he withdrew from the political scene, he experienced a revulsion of the public sentiment, which has seldom occurred in the history of disgraced ministers. Detested as a foreigner and an upstart, and loaded with popular execration, while in power, the moment of disgrace became the signal of a triumph as flattering as it was unexpected. A chivalrous and high spirited nation overlooked his errors, his faults, and his misfortunes, in the recollection of his superior talents, and meritorious services: at his last levée, such a crowd of nobles, gentry, and clergy flocked to pay their final respects, and condole with him in his disgrace, as he had never witnessed even in the height of power. The king was alarmed and chagrined by this proof of public esteem, and ordered him to take his departure a day before the term originally prescribed.*

In obedience to the royal injunction, he departed on the 12th of December, taking the road to Barcelona, as the most direct and commodious for a passage into Italy. At Lerida, he was overtaken by a royal officer, who was deputed to search

* On an incident of this kind, we should have paid little attention to the assertions of Alberoni and his partisans, had we not found the fact tacitly admitted by his answerer, who imputes it to curiosity and compassion, and even suffers the remark to escape him, that all the Spaniards, then in Italy, spoke of the fallen minister with respect.—See his Apology, and the Answer, in *Istoria del Card. Alberoni*, pt. 2; and a translation in *Hist. Reg.* 1722, p. 209, & 298.

CHAP. XXX.

1719

1720.



for papers * missing from the secretary's office. Some of these documents were discovered among his baggage, and he himself tore to pieces a bill of exchange for 25,000 crowns in the officer's presence. He was permitted to continue his journey; but beyond Barcelona was attacked by a body of miquelets, who killed a servant and a soldier of his escort, and rifled his baggage, and he himself escaped with difficulty to Gerona on foot and in disguise. He traversed Languedoc and Provence, by permission of the french government, though closely watched, and attended by the chevalier de Massieu, who was commissioned by the regent to gain his confidence, and obtain such disclosures as were expected to be drawn from him, in the agitated state of his mind. The wily statesman, however, suspecting the snare, amused the spy with pretended secrets of no importance. But he scorned to conceal his sentiments on his unmerited disgrace, and threw on his sovereigns the blame of prosecuting the war. He even accused the king and queen of the basest ingratitude, depicted the monarch as an uxorious bigot, who, after one moment saying in a low tone, "I will be obeyed," finishes the next with obeying; and the queen as possessed with an

* The papers which Alberoni carried away, were principally such as were necessary for his own justification. Some of these were recovered, but the most important, as he himself asserts in his Apology, escaped the vigilance of the royal officers, or had been already sent out of the country with his baggage by the way of Alicante. Some authors have even asserted, that one of the papers recovered, was the will of Charles the second, with which Alberoni hoped to purchase the favour of the emperor. But the assertion rests on no authentic proof. Even St. Philippe doubts the fact; the Answer to his Apology does not advert to it; nor do we perceive, in the situation of affairs at that period, what utility the emperor could have drawn from such a document.

—St. Philippe, t. 3, p. 433.—Ortiz, t. 7, p. 347.—Duclos, t. 2, p. 62.

evil spirit, and as a fire-brand, who, for her interested views, would kindle the flames of war throughout the whole civilized world.*

CHAP. XXX.

1719

|

1720.

Embarking at Antibes, in a galley sent by the genoese government, he landed at Sestri di Levante, with the intention of proceeding to Rome. Here, however, he received a letter from cardinal Paolucci, papal secretary of state, forbidding him to enter the ecclesiastical territory, under pain of imprisonment, and soon afterwards another, threatening him with the censures of the church, if he presumed to receive the inauguration of his see of Malaga. Unable to obtain an asylum in the territories of the republic, he passed in a felucca from Sestri to Spezzia, and taking the route towards the Appenines, in a few days was lost to his persecutors and to the world.

If the circumstances of his fall were honourable to the minister himself, they were degrading to his sovereigns. Philip and the queen had scarcely dismissed him, before they imputed the whole blame of the war to his turbulent spirit. With equal want of dignity and generosity, they lamented his ascendancy, loaded him with unmerited accusations, and meanly joined in the persecution of a minister, whose principal crime was the zeal and fidelity with which he had laboured to realise their vast designs. In the second audience which they granted to the british ambassador, they declared that Alberoni had invariably deceived them, and prostituted their royal names to


* We find many errors in the details of Duclos and St. Simon, which are truly French, and particularly the offer which they attribute to Alberoni to disclose to the regent his connections with the disaffected in France. The imputation carries with it its own refutation, as totally contrary to the character and principles of Alberoni. It is doubted by St. Philippe, who is not prejudiced in favour of the ex-minister, and is supported by no specific authority.

CHAP. XXX.

1719

|

1720.



others; that his impostures tended no less to the detriment of the public, than to that of individuals; that he employed a secretary who could imitate every hand; and had shewed them forged letters for the purpose of ruining in their opinion and removing those whom he suspected; that his suspicions usually fell on persons of character; and, that there was no crime of which he was not capable, even of poisoning and assassination. For these reasons they intreated the king of England to employ his interest with the regent and the emperor, for the purpose of prevailing on the pope to deprive him of the purple, and retain him in perpetual confinement.* These cruel accusations were the prelude to the most bitter persecutions. Spain even vied with the allied powers, in pursuing Alberoni with a virulence and vengeance of which recent periods have seldom shewn an example, in regard to a minister charged with no specific and heinous crime.

It is gratifying to contemplate the behaviour of extraordinary men in those trying situations which shake the firmest mind; and fortunately, the general interest attached to the character and habits of Alberoni, enables us to indulge this curiosity. In the struggle of contending passions, which followed his disgrace, the exiled minister sought consolation in a work, which is calculated to inspire contempt for the delusive vanities of a transitory world. A copy of *Thomas a Kempis de Imitatione Christi*, is preserved in the ducal library at Parma, with marginal remarks in his own hand, recording the ordinary events of his journey, and other occurrences, which shew it to have been his daily companion.† The bitterness of adversity was, however, no sooner past, than the deep rooted habits of the scholar and statesman again predominated. The anecdotes

* Dispatch from Sir Luke Schaub to Earl Stanhope, Madrid, Feb. 17, 1720. Hardwicke Papers.

† Poggiali.

preserved of his late conversations, prove that in the tranquil portion of his varied life, he again recurred to the cultivation of classic literature, and, over the pages of Tacitus and Livy, revived the memory of former greatness and past enterprises.

CHAP. XXX.

1719

1720.

Alberoni has been too generally judged by the exaggerated axiom of a great and successful minister,* that misfortune is but another name for imprudence. While his friends have spared no endeavours to extenuate his faults, and blazon forth his merits, his enemies have represented him as a wild and sanguine projector, guided by no object, and impelled by no passion but an extravagant and restless ambition. Even historians have borrowed the prevailing tone of the times when he fell the victim of personal and political animosity; and the character of this truly great statesman has been transmitted to posterity in colours of unmerited obloquy.

Of his conduct in negotiation and war, let the reader judge from the authentic testimony of his rivals and contemporaries, collected in the preceding pages. That he was neither ignorant or neglectful of internal policy, nor ill-advised in his plans for its improvement, will appear from a brief review of the regulations which took their rise under his ministry, though his power was of too short a duration to give them consistency and effect.

We pass over his measures for raising supplies at the commencement of the war, as mere temporary expedients to meet an emergency which he could neither delay nor avert. But still more provident for the future than solicitous for the present, he extended his views to a gradual and permanent amelioration in the whole system of the spanish monarchy. He rooted out a contraband trade of great extent which was carried on under the privilege enjoyed by the people of Biscay

* Richelieu.

CHAP. XXX.

1719

1720.

Dec. 21,
1717.

of trafficking with the fabrics and productions of their own province free of duty. To lessen the introduction of foreign manufactures, which had hitherto filled the markets, to the detriment of those of Spain, he formed a new tariff of duties, abrogated many indulgencies, and established superintendants in the different ports to prevent abuses. He abolished one of the last remnants of the antient division into separate kingdoms, by removing most of the inland custom-houses to the frontier; and restoring to full liberty the interior communications and traffic. But private considerations appear to have prevented this change in the kingdom of Seville, where it was most wanted, as the great avenue of trade through Cadiz to the new world. At his suggestion, likewise, the municipal taxes in the kingdom of Valencia were abolished; the royal monopoly of strong liquors commuted for a duty on the inland consumption of fish, and a free scope given to the export of wines, which had hitherto languished from the expence of conveyance and want of a demand. New regulations were also established for one of the most profitable branches of the royal revenue, the tobacco trade from the Havannah. Arrangements were made to check the contraband traffic from the Canaries to America; finally a plan was formed to extend and improve the trade of the western shores of that continent by means of the Acapulco ship, without detriment to the fabrics of the mother country. It reflects no trifling honour on the firmness of the minister, to observe that many of these changes were introduced not merely in opposition to private interests and prejudices, but in some instances even to open rebellion.

In conjunction with measures calculated to create a demand, others were adopted to lay the foundation of future manufactures. Attempts were made to introduce a fabric of crystals; 1718. an office was set up for printing religious books hitherto drawn

from Antwerp; a manufactory of woollens was established under the royal patronage at Guadalaxara, and another of fine linens, imitating those of Holland. For these purposes numerous dutch families were drawn into Spain, and the necessary tools and utensils procured from England. To give proper encouragement to these infant establishments, the strictest injunctions were transmitted to the different intendants and governors, to encourage the use of the native manufactures and produce, to restrain luxury in apparel, as the source of dependance on foreign nations, and to remove vagabonds and idlers. Lastly, as soon as the fabric at Guadalaxara had attained consistency, a royal decree was issued that all the troops should in future be clothed with the manufacture of Spain.

CHAP. XXX.

1719

1720.

1718.

Oct. 20,
1719.

In conjunction with these arrangements, a plan was formed to ascertain the state, productions, and resources of the kingdom, as the foundation of further improvements: intelligent engineers were dispatched to survey the different provinces, with instructions which prove that no source of prosperity, however trifling, escaped the attention of the minister.

July 4,
1718.

Looking to the immediate instruments of national greatness, and the security of national prosperity, the naval and military were no less important than the economical plans of Alberoni. He formed the design of rendering Cadiz one of the noblest ports of Europe, prepared to improve that of Ferrol; and in these, as well as in others of inferior importance, established docks, arsenals, fabrics of rigging, and magazines. Within the short and troubled period of his administration, fourteen men of war were launched in the ports of the peninsula, an equal number was nearly completed; and the project was formed for constructing ships at the Havannah, which from the seasoning of the climate would be better adapted to the navigation

CHAP. XXX.

1719

|

1720.



of the American seas than those of Europe. To furnish a constant supply of intelligent and able officers, a seminary was founded at Cadiz, intended for the reception of no less than five hundred pupils, who were to be instructed in the theory and practice of navigation, and the appropriate branches of the abstruse sciences. He sought and encouraged officers of merit in every department both of the navy and army.

Lastly, he revived the foundry of artillery and the native fabrics of small arms, which had fallen almost into total inactivity; and he succeeded in emancipating the country from its dangerous dependence on foreign powers, for the supply of the various articles of naval and military equipment.*

According to the description of contemporaries, Alberoni was of low stature, rather full than thin, plain in his features, and with a head too large in proportion to his height and size. But his look was peculiarly quick and piercing, and perfectly characteristic of his ardent and aspiring mind, though tempered with an expression of sweetness and dignity. His voice was flexible and melodious; and, when he endeavoured to conciliate or persuade, assumed a tone and accent, which gave irresistible force to his language. Though habituated to courts and camps; though accustomed to the intercourse of polished and lettered society; and though, on occasions which roused his lofty spirit, he assumed an air and tone of dignity becoming his high situation; yet he never wholly lost the original coarseness of his manner, derived from his mean birth and early connections.

In the endowments of his mind, nature appears to have

* The outline of these important plans has been traced from an examination and comparison of Uztariz's excellent Treatise on the Theory and Practice of commerce and maritime affairs, and Ulloa Restablecimiento de las Fabricas y Comercio Español, passim;—the different Apologies of Alberoni, and the respective Answers;—the Memoirs of St. Philippe and Ortiz, passim.

lavished the gifts, which she had withheld from his person. At once a scholar and a man of the world, he had equally profited by study and experience. Besides his classical acquirements, he possessed a vast fund of information in almost every branch of human knowledge, and his conversations and letters prove him scarcely less master of the french and spanish, than of his native language. With intense and indefatigable application, he united great strength of memory, quickness of comprehension, and grace of expression; and a fertility of resource which extorts our admiration. He possessed the talent of insinuation in the highest degree, and a natural air of sincerity, frankness, and candour which seldom failed of persuading when he wished to persuade, and of deceiving when it was his interest to deceive. He was irritable and impetuous; but he was so far master of passions highly dangerous to a negotiator, that in all his conversations which are exactly detailed by the french and english envoys, we never discover, amid the most vehement sallies, a single instance in which he was provoked to betray his purposes, or unveil his impenetrable secrecy, either by look or gesture. Temperate in his habits and mode of life, he made a boast which is uncontradicted by his adversaries, that amidst the various avocations of his high station he had strictly conformed to the decorum and duties of his ecclesiastical profession.

Though gentle to inferiors, he was pertinacious and impatient of contradiction, proud and overbearing with his equals and superiors, and scarcely deigned to curb his haughty spirit even in the presence of his sovereigns. By the confession even of his friends, he possessed in a high degree that vindictive spirit which is attributed to his countrymen; and in a still higher, that dissimulation with which they are equally charged. His ambition was lofty and unbounded; but little scrupu-

CHAP. XXX.

1719

1720.

CHAP. XXX.

1719

1720.

lous with regard to the means, provided he attained the end, he often debased the grandeur of his designs by the manner of their execution. In a word, he was one of those gigantic characters which form a compound of extraordinary qualities and extraordinary defects; born to rise in defiance of every obstacle; to change the fate of nations; and alike distinguished from the rest of mankind in success and adversity, power and disgrace.

The prejudices against Alberoni in England and France have been strong and lasting. Indeed, where public and private interests are so deeply involved, as in the examination of his ministry, it is scarcely possible for an individual to judge with impartiality; in estimating therefore the merits of a minister of Spain, it is necessary to assume the principles and prejudices of a spaniard. The indications of the public sentiment are too faint and transient in a country where the press labours under so many restrictions, to be traced with accuracy at this distance of time and place. Yet proofs are not wanting, that even when the degraded minister lay under the heaviest displeasure of the sovereign, numbers of all ranks and conditions concurred in acknowledging the services he had rendered to their country. Ortiz, the latest of their historians, has at length done public and ample justice to his memory, and does not hesitate to place him by the side of Richelieu and Mazarin.*

Philip, affecting a repugnance to lay his hands on the sacred purple, permitted Alberoni to withdraw from Spain; but to render the pope the instrument of his vengeance, he transmitted articles of accusation against him, supported with formal proofs and documents; and exerted the whole influence of the spanish crown to obtain his arrest, trial, and condemnation.

* Ortiz, t. 7, p. 315, 325, 348.

Accordingly, on his arrival in the genoese territories, the pope, by his minister cardinal Imperiali, obtained from the senate an order for his detention as a criminal against the holy catholic faith, and supported the charge by communicating the heads of accusation furnished by Spain. These were,

CHAP. XXX.

1719

1720.

1. That he employed the money which he derived from the cruzadoes and other ecclesiastical taxes, in making war against catholic princes. 2. That he undertook a war against the emperor, at the moment when engaged in a contest with the turks, to the great detriment of Italy and Europe. 3. That for his own private interests he had prohibited the subjects of Spain from soliciting bulls for the benefices conferred by the pope.

After due deliberation, the senate of Genoa declined taking cognizance of these articles, as civil, not ecclesiastical charges; and therefore nobly refused to gratify the interested resentment which actuated the pope, the king of Spain, and the allied powers. They accordingly restored him to liberty, but unwilling to give umbrage to the most powerful sovereigns of Europe, they commanded him to retire from their territories.

During the few days in which Alberoni remained in the territories of the republic, he published various letters and documents in reply to the charges preferred against him. He threw the odium of the war, as well as the breach of promise to the pope, on the king of Spain, and developed the intrigues and ambitious designs of the queen. The first of these is dated Sestri, February 11, in answer to the prohibition of the pope forbidding him to enter the ecclesiastical territory; the second, from the same place, March 20, encloses his celebrated Apology. Another, without date, was accompanied by his

CHAP. XXX.

1719

1720.

letters to the king and the duke of Popoli; and a fourth, dated May 5, vindicating his administration.*

The bold truths contained in these spirited writings, gave additional offence to the court of Madrid; and more urgent remonstrances were made for his degradation. But this new attack was repelled by the members of the sacred college themselves, who united in opposing a precedent which was dangerous to their whole body; though a commission of four cardinals was delegated to judge the charges against him.

When enjoined to quit the genoese territories, Alberoni appealed to his sovereign, the duke of Parma, for asylum in his native land, and, receiving no answer, appears to have made a final and more successful application to some of the swiss states. Accordingly, after remaining some days at Sestri, he sailed to Spezzia, directed his course across the Appenines towards the Modenese, and disappeared on the fourth day of his journey.† His route and place of retreat are uncertain, till we receive a hint of his residence at Lucarno, one of the italian baillages. Here he was protected by the government; for his biographer observes, that attempts having been made to seize his person, the regency of Coire transferred him to a pleasant castle in the recesses of the Alps, and issued the strictest orders to secure him from surprise.‡

After remaining a year in this seclusion, the death of Clement the thirteenth opened to him more favourable prospects. On this occasion, the court of Madrid made a vigorous effort to exclude him from the conclave, on the plea that he

* Storia del Card. Alberoni, pt. 2, p. 128—146.

† From the marginal memorandums written by Alberoni in his copy of Thomas à Kempis, in Poggiali.

‡ Storia, p. 2, p. 146.

still lay under an accusation not disproved. But the interests of the sacred college concurred in his favour, and, besides a safe conduct for his journey, the regular citation for his appearance was affixed in the cathedral of Genoa, and the church of Sestri, where he had last resided before his disappearance. By the zeal of a noble genoese, the abbot Vielato, timely information was conveyed to him; and, quitting his retreat with the same mystery which had before baffled his persecutors, he emerged again into public notice at the house of a friend near Bologna. From hence he repaired to Rome, to assist at the election of a new pontiff.*

CHAP. XXX.

1719

1720.

His reception in that city is thus described by a contemporary author. "It is impossible to express the extreme impatience of the Romans to behold the cardinal on his entry. But as the time of his arrival was not known, the natives, during six or eight following days, crowded to the gates, in order to obtain a sight of this extraordinary man. It would be no exaggeration to say, that, if we allow for the difference of the population, not a more numerous concourse of spectators attended the triumphal processions of the ancient emperors to the capital. There was scarcely a single person, from the highest to the lowest, who did not press forward to the gate. This prodigious concourse continued daily and hourly, till he made his appearance, and then it might have been supposed, that the Romans had forgotten their own affairs, to pay attention to the cardinal, who, merely in passing through in his carriage, charmed the whole city by his address, affability, and condescension. The people were not content with having seen him once, twice, or thrice, for his carriage had no sooner traversed one street, than they rushed in crowds to another through which he was to pass. In this manner he was accom-

* Poggiali.—St. Philippe, t. 4, p. 70.

CHAP. XXX.

1719

1720.

panied to his house with continued acclamations and applauses. In the conclave he experienced a far different reception. Many of the cardinals at first opposed his admission, on the ground that he had not passed through the ceremonies considered as requisite to entitle him to a vote, and the greater part refused to hold any communication with him.”*

By degrees his insinuating manners and dignified conduct vanquished the prejudices against him, and he was permitted to take a share in the acts of the conclave. The new pope, Innocent the thirteenth, was prepossessed in his favour, but in compliance with the instances of Spain and France, he allowed the commission of cardinals to proceed in the trial of his cause.

1721.

Alberoni not only defended himself before his judges with great spirit and truth, but published an apology for his conduct, more bold and argumentative than his preceding compositions, under the assumed title of a roman nobleman in a letter to his friend.† This masterly composition made such an impression, that the spanish party found it necessary to publish a reply, in which, amidst the bitterest invectives, the force of truth occasionally displays itself. These different documents bring to light many particulars otherwise unknown, relative to his life and administration.

Such was the effect of his defence, that the commission terminated its proceedings by condemning him to retire into a convent for three years, and the pope shortened this term to one. At length, his bitter persecutor, the duke of Orleans, being dead, and the indignation of the king and queen of Spain subsiding, Innocent absolved him from all censures, and formally invested him with the purple. On the death of In-

* Voyage Historique de l'Italie, t. 2, p. 436.

† Storia, P. 2, and Appendix.

nocent, he contributed to the elevation of Benedict the thirteenth; and in return, the new pontiff consecrated him bishop of Malaga, and gratified him with the usual pension granted to cardinals.

CHAP. XXX.

1719

|

1720.

The adversaries of Alberoni have asserted that he accumulated great property in Spain, which he spent at Rome in magnificent living. The accusation is contradicted by the testimony of cardinal Polignac, french ambassador at Rome, who describes him as, not in distress, but far from the affluence which was invidiously imputed to him.

Polignac employed his interest to procure some compensation to the ex-minister, for the hostility he had experienced from the french government. He first obtained a present of 10,000 crowns, and afterwards a pension of 17,000 livres. He pays an honourable testimony to his disinterestedness and elevation of mind, and his magnanimity in forgetting his past treatment from Spain, and in rejecting all overtures from the emperor. Polignac even laboured to restore him to the favour of his former master. He endeavoured to procure for him the post of ambassador from Spain at Rome, vacant by the death of cardinal Aquaviva, and afterwards employed the intervention of marshal Tessé, then on a public mission to Madrid, to obtain the salary of 14,000 crowns, annexed to that post, as some compensation for the loss of his pension on the bishopric of Malaga. These representations were supported by the interest of the pope himself.*

Such urgent applications in favour of Alberoni seem to have excited the apprehensions of the british cabinet, who dreaded the restoration of a minister whom they had irreconcilably offended, and employed all their influence to thwart the interest making in his behalf.

* Memoires du Cardinal Polignac, t. 2, p. 218, 468.

CHAP. XXX.

1719

1720.

Jan. 25,

1725.

“ His majesty,” observes the duke of Newcastle to Horace Walpole, then minister at Paris, “ commended your care in the hint you give relating to cardinal Alberoni, and would have you, if you find the least probability of his making any attempt that way, employ your best endeavours with the court of France to engage them to use their interest with Spain in disappointing his views, as well as those of cardinal Gualfieri. He would likewise have you send an account to Mr. Stanhope, that he may do all in his power to prevent his being employed by the court of Madrid. The duke of Parma was written to by the ministers here some time ago, on the report that Alberoni would be permitted to return to Spain. His highness answered in such terms as shew a perfect aversion on his part for the cardinal, and a persuasion that he is equally out of all manner of favour with the king of Spain, who has even rejected the present pope’s repeated intercessions in Alberoni’s behalf, that he might be permitted to resume his bishopric of Malaga, which he had been obliged to resign. However, too much precaution cannot be used in order to keep so dangerous a man out of any share of business, especially considering how odd an appearance it would have at this time.”*

These instances, and the prejudices already existing against Alberoni, frustrated all his hopes of obtaining the slightest proof of returning favour from the court of Madrid. On the formal application of the british minister, the queen petulantly replied, “ I shall be far from consenting to the restoration of a minister who did not allow me sufficient to provide common necessities.”†

In 1732, Alberoni was graciously received by the infant

* Duke of Newcastle to H. Walpole, Jan. 25, 1724-5. Walpole Papers.

† Mr. Keene’s Dispatch.—This remark is itself an eulogium on the firm and æconomical spirit of the minister.

Don Carlos, who had just taken possession of the duchies of Parma and Placentia, and was permitted to establish himself in his native city, where he founded and endowed a seminary, at a considerable expence.

CHAP. XXX.

1719

1720.

During the campaign of 1746 in Italy, his seminary was occupied by the german troops, to favour their attacks on Placentia. He took refuge in the city, and his situation is thus described by a french officer, then in the combined bourbon army, who saw and conversed with him. "He inhabited a single apartment, of which the whole furniture consisted of a bed, a table, and four chairs. Not being able to procure wood, he had cut down an apricot tree, growing in the court yard of the house in which he lived, kindled a fire, and was cooking his scanty dinner with his own hands. He was then eighty, and extremely hearty for his age. His manner was easy and lively. He chiefly engrossed the whole conversation; talked with all the garrulity of old age, and with a spirit rendered more interesting by his communications. He spoke promiscuously the french, italian, or spanish languages, according to the transactions or persons forming the subject of his discourse: He expressed himself in these three languages with equal energy, and supported his reflections by occasional quotations from Tacitus, in the original tongue. The campaigns of Vendome, his own administration in Spain, the affairs of Europe at that period, were the favourite subjects of his conversation; and he was particularly fond of explaining his plan for the establishment of the pretender on the throne of Great Britain. The spanish troops, who defended Placentia, treated cardinal Alberoni with the profoundest veneration. They recollected, with transport, how much Spain owed to his administration, an administration distinguished for the jealousy which united the principal powers of Europe against a man rendered

CHAP. XXX.

1719

1720.

formidable by the strength of his genius, the extent of his schemes, and the depth of his views.”*

Under the pontificate of Benedict the fourteenth, Alberoni was appointed vice legate of Romagna, and again signalled his restless spirit and fondness for intrigue by attempting to reduce under the see of Rome the petty republic of San Marino. But it was the fate of this singular man to be unfortunate in small as well as in great enterprises. He failed at the moment when he appeared secure of success, in consequence of a sudden burst of the popular enthusiasm for liberty, awakened by the bare word in the office of Mass. This last act of his ambition, which has been not unaptly called an heroic comic parody of his exploits in Spain, excited the indignation and contempt it deserved, and the disavowal of the pope overwhelmed him with confusion.

It was not, however, by petty intrigues, that Alberoni distinguished his vice-legation of Romagna. He cleansed the marshes in the vicinity of Ravenna, confined the torrents Ronco and Moncone, which annually overflowed their banks, and excavated a series of canals to carry off the superfluous waters into the Adriatic. “This great work, not unworthy of the antient Romans,” adds the author from whom the account is taken, “formed and executed at the expence of the holy see, and completed under his superintendence, will remain to posterity an illustrious monument of the abilities and talents of cardinal Alberoni.”†

* Grosely Observations sur l'Italie, t. 1, p. 183.

† Ibid. t. 1, p. 353.

In drawing up the whole account of the Administration and Character of Alberoni, we have consulted and compared, besides the general histories of St. Philippe, Desormeaux, and Ortiz, la Vie d'Alberoni, supposed to be written by Rousset,—Storia del Cardinale Alberoni, of which the first part is either the original or the translation of the French work, and the second, in addition to an

He survived his fall above thirty years, and died at Rome, in 1752, in the eighty-eighth year of his age.

CHAP. XXX.

1719

1720.

account of his subsequent adventures, evidently written by a person who knew him, contains his Apologies, and the other curious Documents to which we have referred—an interesting sketch of his Life by Poggiali, in his *Memorie Istoriche di Piacenza*—the *Memoires* of Noailles, Polignac, and Villars—Documents and Papers in the Political State and Historical Registers—Correspondence of our Ministers and Envoys; and a late spirited sketch of the Life of Alberoni, by G. Moore, Esq.

In general, authors imagine that as Alberoni was the sole mover of the war, so he was the only obstacle to the peace, which followed after his dismissal. It was, however, on the contrary, a matter of no small difficulty to vanquish the reluctance of Philip to accede to the Quadruple Alliance*. In reply to the first application of the states general, he brought forward demands scarcely less exorbitant than those dictated by Alberoni; and he persisted in these demands, though they renewed their instances, and pressed him to accede before

* Even St. Philippe, though prejudiced against Alberoni, cannot resist the proof drawn from the reluctance of Philip, but candidly observes: "The reluctance testified by the king in accepting the peace, showed that Alberoni had not acted alone, and by his own will, in the great troubles; and that his master had taken his share with some degree of warmth." T. 4. p. 32.

CHAPTER XXXI.

1720—1723.

Philip reluctantly accedes to the Quadruple Alliance—Successful expedition against the Moors in Africa—Difficulties with regard to the fulfilment of the Quadruple Alliance—Alliance of Spain with England and France—Negotiations relative to the restoration of Gibraltar—Correspondence on that subject—Double marriages between the families of France and Spain—Increasing difficulties in the negotiation.

CH. XXXI.

1720

1723.

Jan. 4,
1720.

IN general, authors imagine that as Alberoni was the sole mover of the war, so he was the only obstacle to the peace, which followed after his dismissal. It was, however, on the contrary, a matter of no small difficulty to vanquish the reluctance of Philip to accede to the Quadruple Alliance.* In reply to the first application of the states general, he brought forward demands scarcely less exorbitant than those dictated by Alberoni; and he persisted in these demands, though they renewed their instances, and pressed him to accede before

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the expiration of the second term of three months, declaring that any further delay would compel them to join the allies in commencing hostilities.

CH. XXXI.

1720

1723.

The application of the republic proving thus ineffectual, the british and french governments again resumed their negotiations. Sir Luke Schaub, the confidential secretary of earl Stanhope, was sent to Madrid, to co-operate with Scotti, while the regent employed the interference of d'Aubenton. Finally, the fear of losing the reversion of the Italian duchies induced the queen to take a share in these solicitations; and by her powerful influence, the reluctance of her husband was with difficulty vanquished. He accordingly announced his accession to the Quadruple Alliance by a royal decree, declaring that he gave peace to Europe at the expence of his own interests as well as of his own possessions and rights.* This act he transmitted to the duke of Orleans, in order to throw the negotiation into his hands, and demanded his assistance for the recovery of Gibraltar, if not Minorca, as a recompense doubly due, from the offer of the king of England, and from the opprobrium which he had incurred among his subjects by the sacrifice of his pretensions and dignity.

Jan. 26,
1720.

In acceding to the Quadruple Alliance, Philip renewed his renunciation of the french crown, and relinquished all claims to the dominions which had been dismembered from the spanish monarchy. He acquiesced also in the transfer of Sicily to the emperor, and of Sardinia to the duke of Savoy, with the title of king, and promised to evacuate those islands within the term of six months. In return he was acknowledged king of Spain and the Indies. The eventual succession of Tuscany and Parma was entailed on the issue of the queen, on the condition that those duchies should never be united with

* Ortiz, t. 7, p. 354.

CH. XXXI.

1720

1723.

the crown of Spain; and to secure the possession in failure of issue male to the reigning sovereigns, the fortresses were to be occupied by 6,000 swiss in the pay of the mediating powers. Lastly, the emperor and Philip were bound to a mutual guaranty of their respective possessions.

Delivered by this arrangement from his more immediate embarrassments in Europe, Philip, to make amends for his breach of promise to the pope, as well as to flatter his people, directed his attention to Barbary, that darling theatre of spanish enterprise. Ceuta, the Gibraltar of Africa, and one of the keys of the Mediterranean, had withstood desultory, but continual attacks from the Moors during a blockade of twenty-six years. For the greater part of that period, 100,000 lives had been sacrificed in vain; but the infidels having recently obtained the assistance of European engineers, their approaches were made with skill and regularity, and in a few weeks produced more effect than all the preceding attacks. To save so valuable a possession, and extend the spanish empire in Africa, Philip augmented the army raised for the prosecution of the italian war, and gave such activity to his preparations as revived the alarm of the European powers, who had just witnessed the energy which Spain derived from the vigorous hand of Alberoni. Remonstrances were made in vain from all quarters, till the preparations were perfectly matured, when Philip quieted the public apprehensions by announcing his design to vindicate the honour of his arms in Africa.

Towards the close of 1720, a powerful armament, prepared under the direction of Don Joseph Patiño, the active intendant of the marine, sailed from Cadiz, consisting of 16,000 veterans, under the command of the marquis of Lede. He landed in the beginning of November, and on the 15th in the

morning, marching against the infidels, forced their intrenched camp, took 33 pieces of artillery, and drove them towards Tetuan and Algiers. He repulsed them in two desperate attacks on the 9th and 21st of December, and advanced against Tetuan, with the intention of extending the spanish dominion along the coast as far as Tuniz.

CH. XXXI.

1720

1723.

The news of these victories equally gratified the nation and the monarch. Philip presented three standards taken from the infidels, to our lady of Atocha; and sent another to the pope as the grateful homage of the catholic king to the head of the church, and as an earnest of further success. He also for the first time attended the celebration of an *auto de fe*, at which in the commencement of his reign he had refused with horror to appear, and witnessed the barbarous ceremony of committing twelve Jews and Mahometans to the flames.

But either from the difficulty of the enterprise against Tetuan, or, what is still more probable, from the opposition of the british government, which was jealous lest the progress of the spaniards in Africa should straiten the transport of supplies to the garrison of Gibraltar, Philip recalled his victorious troops, and the marquis of Lede closed his operations with repairing the works, and reinforcing the garrison of Ceuta. In retaliation for this attack, the Moors prepared to pour their predatory hordes on the coast of Andalusia; but the armament being dispersed by a storm, Spain was happily delivered from the scourge of a new moorish invasion.*

March 21.

After this short but successful display of spanish enterprise against the natural enemies of the nation, the views of Philip were again directed to the negotiation which he had already commenced with the European powers.

* St. Philippe, t. 4, p. 44—53.—Ortiz, t. 7, lib. 23, c. 8.

CH. XXXI.

1720

1723.

July.

According to appearances the accession of Spain to the Quadruple Alliance completed the arrangements left imperfect at the peace of Utrecht. But the two sovereigns, for whose reconciliation it had been principally framed, were too much irritated against each other to relinquish their contrary claims without a further struggle; and it would be difficult to decide whether the emperor or Philip was most dissatisfied with the treaty which had been forced upon them.

Philip, however, performed his part of the agreement, though unwillingly, with good faith and punctuality. For within the stipulated term, he recalled his troops from Sicily, surrendered Sardinia to Victor Amadeus, and nominated the count of San Estevan and the marquis of Beretti Landi his plenipotentiaries at the intended congress of Cambray. The emperor, on the contrary, had no sooner secured Sicily, which was the price of his accession, than he endeavoured to prevent the transfer of Tuscany and Parma to a prince of the rival House of Bourbon. Without formally refusing his acquiescence, he encouraged other powers to start various claims and raise numerous obstacles to the intended cession. The duke of Parma disguised his reluctance to the nomination of a successor during his own life, under the pretence of an unwillingness to admit the imperial jurisdiction in his territories; the pope claimed Parma as a fief of the holy see; the great duke of Tuscany resented the transfer of his duchy to a spanish prince, as a violation of the rights of his sister the electress Palatine. Of all these objections the emperor availed himself with consummate address.

While the emperor was starting endless objections, and while his ministers were catching at every pretext for prevarication and delay, a new change took place in the disposition of

the other powers united by the Quadruple Alliance. Disputes arose between the emperor, England, and Holland, relative to the commerce of the Netherlands; while his reluctance to complete the peace, and his disputes with the king of England as elector of Hanover, extinguished that zeal with which the British cabinet had hitherto espoused his interests. The Bourbon courts united to turn this schism to their common advantage. Favoured by the interest of the regent, Philip gained the support of the maritime powers; and with a secrecy and celerity which confounded the court of Vienna, concluded an alliance with France and England, calculated to give effect to his pretensions.

CH. XXXI.

1720

1723.

The prelude to this arrangement was a separate convention with England. All former treaties were renewed, particularly the two recent conventions, for the revocation of the explanatory articles in the treaty of Utrecht, and the establishment of the Asiento. The effects of individuals seized or confiscated in the late contest were to be mutually restored; and the king of England made a tacit concession to the punctilious spirit of the spanish court by engaging to give back the ships captured by Byng, and to pay the value of those which had been broken up or sold.

June 13,
1721.

This treaty was the preliminary to the defensive alliance with France and England, signed on the same day. The contracting parties guarantied their respective dominions according to the treaties of Utrecht, Baden, and London, confirmed the Quadruple Alliance, and bound themselves to give effect to the arrangements which should be made at Cambray for terminating the dispute between the emperor and the king of Spain. An article was also introduced for the protection of the duke of Parma in his rights and possessions; and the

CH. XXXI.

1720

1723.

maintenance of his dignity. To this treaty the states general were invited to accede.

But it was easier to arrange this complicated scheme on paper, than to carry it into execution. The emperor, unwilling totally to relinquish the title of king of Spain, insisted that the renunciation of the dismembered provinces made by Philip, should be ratified by the cortes, an assembly which he was well aware no king of Spain would willingly convoke. On the other hand, Philip as strenuously insisted that the renunciation of the emperor should be confirmed by the germanic diet, whose interference was scarcely less offensive to the head of the empire. England and France interposed to vanquish these objections, and at length the mutual exchange of the ratifications took place at London.

Sept. 27,
1721.

Dec. 1722.

This difficulty was scarcely obviated, before another arose from the formation of a commercial company at Ostend, to trade to the Indies, which had been recently established by the emperor, in resentment for the shackles imposed on him by the barrier treaty. Such a design being equally hostile to the interests and views of Philip, and to those of the maritime powers, all joined in opposing it as a direct infraction of the conditions on which the emperor had received the Netherlands.

An additional obstacle to the conclusion of this long pending dispute was derived from the difficulty of satisfying the king of Spain, with regard to the means of securing the eventual succession of Tuscany and Parma; because he insisted on spanish, instead of swiss garrisons, and required a form of investiture which amounted to a virtual emancipation from all feudal dependance on the empire.*

* St. Philippe, t. 4, p. 84, 94.—History of the House of Austria, v. 2, ch. 8.—State Papers, and other documents, in Rousset and other collections.—Koch's *Traité de Paix*, t. 2, p. 12, 16.

But the principal source of difficulty was the interminable discussion relative to Gibraltar and Minorca. Philip was too jealous of his honour to submit with patience to the establishment of a foreign dominion on his own shores, and displayed his anxiety to recover these possessions by calling them the *thorns in his feet*. During the negotiations between Spain and the emperor, under the administration of earl Stanhope, George the first had authorised the regent to offer the restoration of Gibraltar, provided Spain would accept the terms of accommodation then proposed. This offer was verbally renewed by earl Stanhope himself, in his mission to Madrid,* but in vain; and the hostilities which ensued naturally annulled the engagement. However, in the subsequent negotiations, the regent, without express authority from the british court, again tendered this tempting bait, to facilitate an accommodation, and with more effect than before. The Quadruple Alliance was concluded without any public reference to this subject; but, in announcing his accession, Philip demanded the expected recompense, as well in virtue of the promise made by the regent, as of his own private declaration, that he had accepted the treaty solely on that condition.

Accordingly the regent warmly seconded the demand of Philip at the court of England. From a desire to gratify him, or at least from an apprehension of impeding the negotiation at so critical a period, the king of England sounded the disposition of his ministry, who had recently received an accession of strength by the junction of Townshend, Walpole, and many of the seceding whigs. The proposal was supported by Stanhope; but the consent of his new colleagues to submit

* Letter from Mr. Stanhope to Mr. Walpole, Oct. 11, 1725. Walpole Papers.

CHAP. XXXI.

1720


1723.

1718.

CHAP. XXXI.

1720

1723.



the question to the parliament, could not be obtained except on the condition of an equivalent. The attempt was made; and the bare insinuation created such general indignation and alarm, that representations were sent to convince the regent of its total impracticability.

Earl Stanhope, in a letter to sir Luke Schaub, gives an account of these transactions, which shews the embarrassment of the government.

March 28.
1720.

“ We have made a motion in parliament relative to the restitution of Gibraltar, to pass a bill, for the purpose of leaving to the king the power of disposing of that fortress for the advantage of his subjects. You cannot imagine the ferment which the proposal produced. The public was roused with indignation, on the simple suspicion that, at the close of a successful war, so unjustly begun by cardinal Alberoni, we should cede that fortress. One circumstance greatly contributed to excite the general indignation, namely, a report insinuated by the opposition, that the king had entered into a formal engagement to restore Gibraltar, which was deemed a sufficient ground to attack the minister. Many libels have been published to alarm the nation, and to excite them rather to continue the war, than cede a fortress of such importance. We were accordingly compelled to yield to the torrent, and to adopt the wise resolution of withdrawing the motion; because, if it had been pressed, it would have produced a contrary effect to what is designed, and would perhaps have ended in a bill which might for ever have tied up the king's hands. Such being the real state of this business, you will endeavour to explain to the court of Madrid, that if the king of Spain should ever wish, at some future day, to treat concerning the cession of Gibraltar, the only method of succeeding would be to drop the subject at present. We are much concerned that France should have in-

terfered on this occasion ; the extreme eagerness which she testified was of great detriment. Some letters and memorials on that subject seemed even to threaten a rupture. The alarm was indeed so strong, that people began to suspect France was meditating a change of system, and made Gibraltar a pretext to adopt other measures. The little alacrity she discovered in hastening the evacuations,* her profound silence in regard to her negotiation with Spain, and the extraordinary language held by some persons in high estimation here, seemed to confirm those opinions, and was the cause of my coming to Paris."†

CHAP. XXXI.

1720

1723.

Notwithstanding this unequivocal expression of the public sentiment, the importunities of the regent prevented the king of England from giving a decisive refusal. The subject was referred to the congress of Cambray, and in the mean time, new efforts were employed to gain the nation and parliament, by holding forth the prospect of acquiring Florida, or the spanish part of St. Domingo, as an equivalent, with the grant of additional commercial advantages. This proposal was even approved by the cabinet council, and a letter written by the king to Philip, announcing his willingness to cede Gibraltar on the condition of such an equivalent.

Philip, who had been buoyed up with the prospect of an unconditional restoration ; who hoped to flatter the pride of the nation by this darling acquisition ; and who was as unwilling to give the English a footing in America, as to tolerate them in Spain, contemptuously rejected the proposal, and insisted that the promise was absolute and positive. The necessity of conciliating him, and the dread of a closer union between

* Of Fuenterrabia and the other Spanish posts occupied by the French in the late contest.

† Earl Stanhope to Sir Luke Schaub. Paris, March 28, 1720. Hardwicke Papers.

CHAP. XXXI.

1720

|

1723.



Spain and France, extorted from the king a letter calculated to flatter his hopes, without implying an additional obligation. "Since," he observes, "by the confidence your majesty expresses towards me, I may now look upon the treaties depending between us as re-established, and that, conformably thereunto, the acts necessary for the commerce of my subjects will have been delivered, I no longer hesitate to assure your majesty of my readiness to satisfy you with regard to your demand relating to the restitution of Gibraltar, promising you to make use of the first favourable opportunity to regulate this matter with the consent of my parliament.*"

Philip, mistaking, or affecting to mistake this offer as unconditional, accepted it, and acceded to the peace.†

This arrangement gave rise to a long and active correspondence. Among the numerous letters which passed on the occasion, we select one from Mr. Stanhope, british envoy at Madrid, to sir Luke Schaub, as exhibiting the nature of the question in the most distinct point of view, and as throwing considerable light on the character of Philip, the state of his ministry, and the principles of his government.

Jan. 18.

"I believe you will not be surprised if the accounts I shall give you from hence of public affairs, should not be more pleasing than those you sent me from England, knowing so perfectly well as you do, the natural obstinacy of the king of Spain's temper, and the arguments he has always persisted in alleging

* Translation of a Letter from George I. to Philip V. St. James's, June 1, 1721. Walpole Papers.

† This part of the narrative is principally drawn from the diplomatic correspondence of Earl Stanhope, Mr. Stanhope, Sir Luke Schaub, Mr. Walpole, and Mr. Sutton, British ministers or agents at Madrid, Paris, and London. Also from the Correspondence between the King of England, the Regent, and Du Bois. See also the Narrative of this negotiation, in the Memoirs of Sir Robert Walpole, ch. 34.

for the restitution of Gibraltar, which, though certainly of no force in themselves, nevertheless continue to have their weight with him. To this may be added, that, as he thinks himself obliged in honour not to desist, having often publicly assured the Spaniards that it should be given up, so his conscience also tells him, he ought to neglect nothing in his power to remove from his dominions such an heretical settlement.

CHAP. XXXI.

1720

1723.

“ Not to take up too much of your time, I will, in as short a manner as I can, acquaint you with the steps I took upon the receipt of your letter of the 18th of November, which came to my hand but the 6th instant, with every thing that has passed here since that time.

“ In the first place, I delivered your two letters to the marquis Scotti. He gave me the strongest assurances of doing his utmost, with the greatest sincerity, to bring the king of Spain to comply with what the king our master desired, which he, Scotti, acknowledged to be so just in itself, and advantageous, and even so necessary for Spain, that, notwithstanding the invincible obstinacy of the king hitherto, he had still very great hopes of success. In short, he said so much to encourage me, that, had I known him or the king less, I should not have been in any pain for the event.

“ Upon leaving M. Scotti, I went to the marquis de Grimaldo, to whom, in a very long conference, I represented in the best manner I was able, the justice of what I was charged with. At last, he told me that it was not necessary to use many arguments to convince him of the reasonableness of what the king our master demands in relation to Gibraltar. He assured me, in the greatest confidence, that he was of the same opinion with me upon that head; and that the difficulties encountered here, were not owing to him, or any other of the ministers, but proceeded solely from the king himself, whom he had never

CH. XXXI.

1720

|

1723.



seen, since he had the honour to serve him, so immoveable upon any point, or have any thing so much at heart as he has the restitution of Gibraltar. He therefore could do nothing more than state what I had said to him, without taking upon him to persuade the king to alter his resolution, but desired I would ask an audience, wherein I might represent the reasons I had to offer with a greater liberty and force than it was fitting for him to do. Some hours after he sent me word the king would see me the next morning at the Palace.

“Accordingly I went thither, and had the honour of an audience of the king alone, for three quarters of an hour. I shall not trouble you with the account of what I represented, which would be only to repeat the substance of your own letter, and my former instructions. The king in answer began by expressing how sensible he was of the proofs the king our master had given him of his regard and friendship, by the orders sent to commodore Stewart, and the offer of still more ships to serve against the Moors, which he said he would gladly accept, if he found he had occasion for them. On his part he would take every opportunity of shewing his gratitude; and desired me to assure his majesty, that he wished for nothing more earnestly than to live always in the most intimate friendship with him. For that purpose he was willing and desirous to enter into the strictest alliances, which he looked upon as not only advantageous to both their dominions, but even necessary for the safety of Europe; otherwise he was persuaded the emperor would make himself master of all Italy this year. He afterwards demanded upon what terms the king our master would enter upon a treaty with him? I answered, nothing more was demanded from his majesty at present, but the confirmation of all the treaties subsisting at the time of the rupture, and which were actually confirmed by the Quadruple Alliance,

and by the treaty of armistice, and that for what related to Gibraltar and the equivalent, they should be reserved till a more favourable opportunity.

CHAP. XXXI.

1720

1723.

"As to the first part, the king made no objection, but as to the last, he repeated all the arguments you have heard him make use of for the immediate restitution, and particularly his acceding to the Quadruple Alliance upon that account, as a condition *sine qua non*, which he at the same time declared to the regent, and had his positive assurances, that it would be complied with. And as to the parliament, he said, if it was reasonable to believe, that they would have consented to part with that place two years ago, to prevent a war, he did not understand why the same arguments should not still prevail upon them. That if they would not now hear of parting with Gibraltar for the sake of peace, and the restoring of their commerce, he could not imagine they would be ever prevailed upon to do it when those reasons should subsist no longer. I endeavoured to shew the impossibility of complying with what he demanded, from the present situation of affairs in England, and temper of the parliament, and to show that to press it now, was to lose it for ever. At last the king said he would consider upon what I had represented to him, and order Grimaldo to give me his determination upon it in writing, in two or three days.

"Whilst the answer was depending, I saw both Scotti and Grimaldo every day, and was always flattered by the first, and not altogether discouraged by the latter. At length, I received the inclosed paper from Grimaldo. Before you read it, I desire to premise to you that the expressions in it are different from what they ought to be, in relation to the former pretended promise of Gibraltar, and also to his majesty's present dispositions to restore it for an equivalent, whenever it shall

CHAP. XXXI.

1720

1723.

be practicable, of which equivalent no mention is therein made. This matter I have explained to the ministers here, who readily agreed with me, that it ought to have been otherwise expressed. I must also tell you that the several demands at the latter end are not supposed to be insisted on by way of treaty; but only to explain what the king of Spain would wish his majesty to comply with. You will readily believe, that I could not look upon this answer otherwise than as a fresh declaration of the king of Spain's persisting obstinately in his former resolution, though Scotti and Grimaldo endeavoured to represent it to me as a very great condescension. But it was easy to prove to them that the very same difficulties which tied up the king's hands from giving Gibraltar at present, equally subsisted to his engaging absolutely to the doing of it a year hence; that the alternative of annulling the asiento was nothing, it being even more impossible to be contracted for, as being already disposed of by parliament to the South Sea Company.

“As to the several things requested in the same paper, I would not enter so much upon them till the first point should be settled, and contented myself with saying in general, that the king, our master, was desirous to give his catholic majesty all imaginable proofs of his friendship, in whatever was not contrary to the treaties already entered into, but it could not be expected he would act in violation of them. I assure you, Sir, that since this answer, I have neglected nothing in my power to obtain a more agreeable one, by applying to all the ministers here, Scotti, Grimaldo, the confessor, and Don Andres de Pez,* who all assure me they desire the same thing, and say that they find two obstacles, which render the king so positive upon this point: the having so often publicly declared

* President of the council of Indies.

to the spaniards, that Gibraltar should be restored, and the fixed opinion he holds that the parliament of England will be brought to consent for the sake of their commerce, provided they think him immovable in his resolution. They all assure me they will do their utmost to accommodate this affair, and particularly the confessor, who the other day promised me to speak to the king upon it. But having lately received a letter from Grimaldo, wherein he tells me that the king is still unalterable, I thought it proper to send back the courier with the state of the matter as it now stands, and in case of any alteration, design immediately to dispatch another. It is very unfortunate that our hands are tied as to Gibraltar, so as not to take advantage of this immoderate desire the king of Spain has to obtain it; for were it otherwise, notwithstanding the pretended promise of it, I am fully persuaded we might yet sell it for double its worth in advantages to our commerce.

“I now come to that part of your letter wherein you say it was to be wished that the court of Spain could be induced to give up to us la Florida, or that part of Hispaniola they still are in possession of, as an equivalent for Gibraltar. In answer to which I shall plainly confess to you, that from the best lights it has been possible for me to get of the dispositions of the people in general here, and particularly of those in power, such a proposition will meet with infinite, if not insurmountable difficulties. The confidence and intimacy with which I have always lived with Don Andres de Pez, occasion my foreseeing those difficulties plainer than I otherwise should have done. For during all the time that I have known him, he has seemed to have nothing more zealously at heart, than to drive the french from their settlements on the Mississippi, upon this general principle that the suffering of any foreigners to establish themselves in any part of the spanish West Indies would

CHAP. XXXI.

1720

1723.

CHAP. XXXI.

1720

1723.

sooner or later occasion the loss of the whole to Spain. And as you will have seen by my former letters that by this late change in the ministry, the affairs of the Indies are wholly in his hands, (he being president and secretary of state for the Indies and the Marine,) nothing can be hoped for in opposition to his sentiments. Though he most certainly is extremely well disposed to favour his majesty's subjects in their commerce, and to cultivate a good correspondence between the two nations; yet in a point of this consequence, and so contrary to all his maxims, I doubt we cannot flatter ourselves much from his good intentions. I have already talked to him two or three times upon this subject, not as to a minister, but upon that familiar footing, which we have used to converse together, and always found him as immoveable upon that head as the king of Spain is upon Gibraltar. He is not only convinced that it is impossible ever to persuade the spaniards to approve of such a proposal, but would endeavour to prove to me, that we do not know what we ask in demanding either of those places. He assures me upon his own knowledge, that they would be a charge and no ways profitable, being barren and scarce productive, even to subsist the inhabitants, and that we should soon be as tired of them as we were of Tangier; and for the same reasons, as entailing a continual war upon the nation, with the indians and spaniards settled there. That therefore we could propose no other advantages by them, but the hopes of penetrating by their means toward the mines, or carrying on a clandestine trade, either of which is a reason strong enough to hinder the spaniards from ever coming into such a project.

“It is certainly very necessary to proceed with the caution you intimate to me in addressing Scotti, so as not to give any jealousy to Grimaldo, and I can assure you that Scotti

himself is as careful and fearful upon that head as we can possibly be. However, after keeping your public letter two or three days by him, in order to let Grimaldo be the first to open the matter to the king, he ventured to produce it to both their majesties, who extremely approved the manner of your writing, though not the matter you write about. Scotti's present situation is something different from what it was when you left us. Although he sees the king and queen as much and as often as ever he did, and with the same privilege of entering at all hours, without being sent for, I am however fully persuaded that he seldom takes upon him the office of a minister, so as to propose matters from himself, directly, by way of advice; but that as occasions offer in conversation, he is still able to do great service. The intimacy I have with him will not let me judge otherwise; for though there hardly ever passes a day that we are not together some hours, we never once parted without his requesting me with great earnestness not to intimate to any person that we ever talk of public affairs, but more especially to Grimaldo and the confessor, whereas the first never mentions Scotti's name to me."*

We spare the reader any further documents, however interesting, on this important subject; and particularly as we shall afterwards frequently recur to it, as one of the principal causes of our perpetual disputes with Spain.

* William Stanhope to sir Luke Schaub, Madrid, Jan. 18, 1721. Hardwicke Papers

CHAP. XXXI.

1720

1723.

CHAPTER XXXII.

1721—1723.

Reconciliation of Philip with the Regent Duke of Orleans—Double Marriages between the two Branches of the House of Bourbon—New Difficulties in arranging the accommodation with the Emperor—Opening of the Congress of Cambray—Habits and monotonous Life of Philip and his Queen—State of the Court and Administration after the removal of Alberoni—Temporary Favour of Scotti, d'Aubenton, Tolosa, and Mirabal—Rise and Character of Grimaldo.

CH. XXXII.

1721

1723.

IN the midst of these transactions, a more intimate connection took place between France and Spain, by an arrangement between Philip and the regent, which favoured the views of both, and suspended their political rivalry. The regent appreciating the strength of the party attached to the antient maxims of state, adopted the only expedient proper to weaken their opposition, by entering into a family alliance with Philip. On the other hand, the king of Spain concurred in the design as the means of re-establishing the union between the two bourbon crowns, without awakening the jealousy of England.

It is equally uncertain and immaterial, where or how the proposal originated; but, about the time of Philip's accession to the Quadruple Alliance, negotiations were commenced for

a marriage between Louis, prince of Asturias, the eldest son of Philip by his first wife, and Louisa Isabella, a daughter of the regent; and between Louis the fifteenth, and the infanta, Mary Anne, a daughter of Elizabeth Farnese. The arrangement was concluded by the agency of the duke of St. Simon, the confidential friend of the regent, who was deputed for the purpose to Madrid. As the infanta was only in her fifth year, the consummation of her marriage was so distant and uncertain an event, as to flatter the views both of Philip and the regent on the crown; and if the match should really take place, the ambition of the catholic sovereigns would still be gratified by the elevation of their daughter to the throne of France.*

CH. XXXII.

1721

1723.

The marriage of Don Louis with Louisa Isabella of Orleans, allayed the personal animosity which had aggravated the disputes between the two nations. But it is a singular instance of the spiritual bondage to which Philip was reduced, to observe that the regent was compelled to purchase the approbation and support of d'Aubenton, by gratifying him with the reappointment of a jesuit confessor to the king, in the room of the venerable abbot Fleury, and with the reception of the Bull *Unigenitus* in France, which gave his order the victory over their rivals the jansenists.†

* Villars, who divined the views of the Regent, paid him this ironical compliment. "Permit me to hail you, Sire, as the most adroit Prince on earth. Richelieu and Mazarin, those great politicians, never conceived so grand a design. The Prince of Asturias being fourteen, and mademoiselle de Montpensier, ten on the 10th of Dec. 1721, promise a far more numerous issue, than we may expect from the infanta." Mem. de Villars, t. 2, p. 544.

† Memoires de Noailles, t. 5, p. 126.

St. Simon and Duclos affect to deny the interference of the Confessor, by asserting that the King of Spain never made the proposal, because it did not

CH. XXXII.

1721

1723.

The king and queen themselves conducted the infanta to Burgos, where they waited to receive the future princess of Asturias. Bull-feasts, and every species of public rejoicing, announced the satisfaction of the sovereigns; but the match was far from being equally grateful to a nation, who, priding themselves on the purity of their blood, were averse to see a natural descendent of Louis the fourteenth selected to share their throne.*

Encouraged, if not urged, by the counsels of the regent, Philip endeavoured to lure the cupidity of the maritime powers, while he continually raised his demands on the emperor. Not satisfied with the renunciation of the title of king of Spain, he now required the cession of all the dependent titles and honours, and particularly the grand mastership of the golden fleece, with the treasure and archives of the order. He also insisted that an immediate arrangement should be concluded for placing spanish, instead of swiss garrisons, in the fortresses of Tuscany and Parma, and that the pretensions of the duke of Parma should not be judged at a diet of the empire, but at a congress of all the european powers. As if in actual possession, he demanded an arrangement of the boundaries between the Milanese and the Parmesan, and the transfer of certain towns, which facilitated the trade of Tuscany, from the adherents of the House of Austria to his own dependents. To counterbalance the imperial authority, he also insisted that the states of Mantua, Mirandola, Montferrat, and Sabionetta, with other imperial fiefs, should be restored to their original proprietors, and Italy replaced in the same situation as before the war of the succession.

pass through the hands of St. Simon, then French ambassador at Madrid; but the fact was, that d'Aubenton, finding St. Simon unwilling to charge himself with the proposition, obtained the acquiescence of the Regent, by the agency of his favourite du Bois. St. Simon, t. 8, c. 4.—Duclos, t. 2, p. 186, 192.

* St. Philippe, t. 4, p. 92.

These extravagant demands, however, were not relished by the maritime powers, and therefore were peremptorily rejected by the emperor. On his part, he likewise embarrassed the negotiation by requiring the guaranty of the pragmatic sanction for the entail of his hereditary dominions on his own daughters, in preference to those of his deceased brother Joseph, or any other pretenders, to his succession, as a recompence for fulfilling the conditions of the Quadruple Alliance.

When so many jarring pretensions existed, and when the slightest movement on one hand was sufficient to awaken alarms on the other, the progress towards a reconciliation was frequently suspended, and the difficulty was also increased by the discordant interests of the mediating powers themselves. The accommodation between France and Spain, however imperfect, had produced an immediate return towards the former system of policy. The regent, as anxious to gratify Philip as to humble the House of Austria, supported many of his demands, though contrary to the stipulations of the Quadruple Alliance, and strenuously opposed the guaranty of the pragmatic sanction. On the other hand, the king of England overlooked many causes of personal dissatisfaction with the emperor, favoured his designs for the establishment of his succession, and was chiefly solicitous to obtain from him the investiture of Bremen and Verden, and the abolition of the Ostend company.

Such discordant views naturally produced endless chicanes and delays. Although the plenipotentiaries of the different powers had all appeared at Cambray in the middle of the year 1722, the congress was not formally opened till 1724, and the interval was spent in questions of ceremonial, and in obtaining from the emperor letters of investiture, for the Italian duchies, according to the form required by Spain. At this

CH. XXXII.

1721

|

1723.

CH. XXXII.

1721

1723.

juncture, however, all negotiations were again suspended by the sudden abdication of Philip.*

St. Simon, whose post of family ambassador entitled him to the privilege of a frequent intercourse with the sovereigns, and whose fondness for anecdote renders his pages peculiarly rich in those minute, but often important, circumstances, which escape the cursory observer, has recorded the invariable detail of the daily occurrences in the life of Philip and his queen, at this particular period. As the personal habits and dispositions of sovereigns so essentially influence the fate of nations more particularly in governments approximating to a despotic form, we present the description of St. Simon to the reader, as a picture unique in its kind, and as furnishing one clue to the many singular changes, and extraordinary events, which mark the reign of Philip.

“ At nine in the morning the *assa feta*, or first woman of the bed chamber, drew aside the curtains, followed by a french valet, who carried a restorative cordial, composed of broth, milk, wine, two yolks of eggs, sugar, cinnamon, and cloves. While the king was drinking this cordial, the *assa feta* brought the queen some tapestry, or other work; and, having placed upon the bed some of the papers which lay on the chairs, retired with the valet. Their majesties then said their morning prayers. The prime minister, when there was one, or the secretary of state, then made his appearance, and transacted the necessary business; while the queen’s employment did not prevent her from giving her opinion. The minister retiring, the *assa feta* brought the king his night gown and slippers, and his majesty passed into his dressing room, where he was assisted by three french valets, and two spanish noblemen of his

* St. Philippe, t. 4, passim.—Rousset, t. 2, passim.—History of the House of Austria, v. 2, ch. 8.

household. Being quickly dressed, he passed a quarter of an hour alone with his confessor, and then repaired to the queen's toilette.

“ On the king's retiring to his dressing room, the queen rose from bed, attended only by the *assa feta*, and these were almost the only few minutes in the four and twenty hours which she could call her own, and converse on confidential business unknown to the king. Hence the consequence and power of the *assa feta*, who was always a person in the highest confidence; and the importance of these precious moments when the queen could receive or return any message or letter. But as this time seldom exceeded half a quarter of an hour, without giving umbrage to the king, it is easy to imagine with what apprehensions letters or messages were received and returned, or with what precipitation the political conference was closed. The queen then repaired to her toilette, which was attended by the king, accompanied by two or three principal officers of his household, the infants, and their governors.


“ At the conclusion of the toilette, their majesties repaired to the drawing room, to receive foreign ministers, and those grantees, who requested a private audience. When any one was introduced, the queen affected to retire to the other end of the apartment; but the persons who came to be presented, well aware that the king related to her every thing which passed, and that she would be offended if a secret was attempted to be kept from her, always intreated her majesty to approach, or spoke sufficiently loud to be heard, if she persisted in keeping aloof. In all cases, however, Philip never gave an answer to any business of importance without having first consulted the queen in private, or without asking her opinion at the time of audience.

“ After the audience, the king and queen heard mass, and

CH. XXXII.

1721

1723.



Handwritten notes in the right margin:
 In the original text, the
 description of the toilette
 is very interesting,
 & gives a
 very good idea of the
 manner of life of the
 court.

CH. XXXII.

1721

1723.

sat down to dinner at twelve, where no one was admitted but those who had been present at her majesty's toilette. The king and queen had each their particular dishes. The queen, who loved eating, a great many; the king few, and these always the same; such as soup, fowls, boiled pigeons, and a roast loin of veal; neither fruit, sallad, nor cheese, and rarely any pastry. He never confined himself to maigre, but was particularly fond of eggs, as well raw as dressed in different ways. They both drank champagne. After dinner they said their prayers, saw the minister, if he had any particular business to transact, mounted in a carriage together to take the diversion of shooting, which, though the only amusement of the king, was no less dull and melancholy than the rest of his life. A number of peasants, forming a large circle, forced the game into a particular spot, while the king and queen, stationed in an avenue, shot promiscuously at stags, wild boars, hares, and foxes, as they were driven along before them. In returning from shooting, they took a collation; the king, biscuits or bread, with wine and water; the queen, pastry, fruits, and cheese. Then they received the infants, and infantas, for about a quarter of an hour, and afterwards transacted business with the minister or secretary of state.

"This was the time in which the queen confessed once a week. She retired with the confessor into a cabinet adjoining, and if the king thought the confession too long, he would open the door and call her. The minister entering, they again said their prayers, or read some book of devotion till supper, which was exactly the same as the dinner. After supper, conversation or prayers *tête à tête* till they retired to rest.

"Once a week, when a public audience was given, and at Madrid always when the council of Castile was assembled, the queen was able to receive any person of confidence unknown

to the king; and it was in these conferences, and by means of the *assa feta*, that she deliberated on the dismissal and appointment of prime ministers, and on the best means of obtaining the king's compliance with any political business to which he appeared averse.*

CH. XXXII.

1721

1723.

Such being the invariable habits and disposition of the sovereign, it is easy to conceive the confusion and imbecility derived from the rupture of the master spring which had given energy to every department of government, and of the sudden relapse from a state of the utmost activity, to an almost total stagnation of business.

The king, in imitation of Louis the fourteenth, affected to be his own minister, and to conduct the business of state according to the antient forms of the national administration. But after a temporary struggle with a load to which his strength was unequal, he gradually sunk into his habitual melancholy, and, without delivering the reins to a more able hand, evaded the avocations of the kingly office, by secluding himself within the apartments of the palace.

The queen, whose agency was now doubly necessary to sway the indecisive mind of her husband, was alarmed by the odium which was attached to the italian government, and declining, or affecting to decline business openly, interfered only in matters which regarded her own personal interests, or those of her family.

This species of interregnum, however, opened a field to various competitors for political power.

The marquis Scotti succeeded for a short period to the favour of the minister, in whose disgrace he was the principal agent. But though enjoying all the advantages of his countryman, in the privilege of an intimate and familiar intercourse

* St. Simon, t. 4, p. 183—201.

CH. XXXII.

1721

1723.

with the sovereigns, he wanted talents and spirit to seize the helm of state; and, after figuring a few months in the sunshine of royal favour, sunk into his native insignificance, owing the remnant of his remaining credit to the support of his obscure protectress, Laura Piscatori.*

Father d'Aubenton, whose spirit of intrigue was not damped by age, and who was neither deficient in talents or address, soon overbalanced the weight of Scotti. Being hourly necessary to administer spiritual consolation to the desponding mind of Philip, he at one period attained so great a portion of influence, that he is not without reason designated as the real prime minister. But his career was terminated by that hand which arrests all human ambition. He died (for the death of such a man forms an epoch in the History of Spain) on the 7th of August 1724, in the house of the jesuits at Madrid, whither he had been transported in his last moments. His place, though not his loss, was supplied by father Bermudez, a spanish jesuit, who was far his inferior both in talents and experience, and who wanted that authority which long habit no less than his ghostly office had given him over the mind of the monarch.†

Don Michael Fernandez Duran, marquis of Tolosa, who was introduced into office by Alberoni, had acquired considerable credit during his administration, and had the good fortune or dexterity to avoid being involved in his disgrace. The privileges of his office as secretary of war and the marine, gave him frequent access to the royal presence; but his rising influence drew on him the common attacks of all the pretenders to court favour. The jealousy which Philip fostered against all the dependents of Alberoni was called into action, and

* Mr. Stanhope's Dispatch in the preceding chapter.

† St. Philippe, t. 4, p. 127.

Tolosa, under the accusation of being implicated in a fraudulent contract for supplying the African army with provisions, was deprived of his offices. He soon fell a victim to the chagrin occasioned by his disgrace.*

CH. XXXII.

1721

1723.

Another person who to an ostensible place in the administration united a share of the royal confidence, was Don Andres de Pez, president of the council of Indies. He was distinguished for his probity; but having grown grey in the routine of business, he was deeply imbued with the prejudices of his country and his station.† On the disgrace of Tolosa, he received the secretaryship of the marine; but did not long survive to enjoy this accession of power.

The marquis of Castellar, who succeeded Tolosa in the secretaryship of war, and his brother Don Joseph Patiño, the able intendant of the marine, were both men of distinguished talents and secretly favoured by the queen. At this juncture however, their credit was of too recent a date, to enable them to emerge from a subordinate station.

The other members of administration were little more than cyphers, and the antient forms of the government, which had been first superseded by the policy of Orri and Alberoni, had been gradually suffered to moulder away by the indolence or jealousy of the monarch himself. Of the council of state, which once united the persons most distinguished for rank, merits, or services, in the whole compass of the monarchy, only three members remained; the presidency of the council of orders was left vacant by the recent death of the marquis of Bedmar; and after the death of Don Andres de Pez, no nomination was made to the ministries of war and the marine, or the presidency of the Indies. The marquis of Campo Florido,

* St. Philippe, t. 4, p. 60.

† Mr. Dodington and Mr. Stanhope's Dispatches.

CH. XXXII.

1721

1723.

head of the finances, was reduced to a mere cypher by his declining health, and the marquis of Mirabel, president of Castile possessed more personal than official authority.*

The person for whom accident rather than design had thus opened the way to the highest place in the administration, was the marquis of Grimaldo, a native of Biscay, who from his early years had been trained to the business of state. Originally a clerk under Orri, he gained the favour of his employer as well as that of the princess Orsini, and in 1704, he first emerged to notice as secretary of the Indies and war. Pleasing in his manners, diligent in the transaction of business, and uniting a dexterous flexibility of character with the exterior of candour and sincerity, he speedily acquired the esteem of Philip, who was flattered by the appearance of deference to his opinion, and affection to his person. Grimaldo, however, employed his favour so discreetly, that after the return of the princess to power, he did not incur her jealousy; and amidst all the subsequent revolutions still continued attached to the court. By the arrangements of Orri, he was confined to the department of foreign affairs; but his gratitude and devotion still preserved the esteem of his early patron. As he continued to gain additional favour with the king, the disgrace of Orri opened the way for his further advancement; and after the second marriage, he added to his original office, the important post of private secretary to the new queen. He gained great merit by the prudence with which he settled the contest with the inquisition; and though he suffered a temporary eclipse under Alberoni, yet he was never excluded from office, nor lost the royal favour. On the disgrace of Alberoni, he found rivals in Scotti and d'Aubenton; but his own prudence and diligence, joined to the death of his most dangerous competitor,

* St. Philippe, t. 4, passim.

soon left him the entire ascendancy. He was, however, far better adapted for a subordinate than a superior station, and ill calculated to receive the reins of government from the vigorous hand of Alberoni. He was greatly deficient in information, firmness of character, and vigour of intellect, and in addition to these radical defects, was already labouring under the disadvantages and infirmities of advanced age.

At this juncture, he was appointed a counsellor of state, and as secretary for foreign affairs, being almost the sole organ of the royal will, he was regarded as the prime minister in functions, though not in name. His honours were not, however, without some alloy. Though hitherto favoured by the queen, he soon incurred that jealousy which she invariably conceived against all who appeared to acquire an ascendancy over the mind of the king. His manifest devotion to England exposed him to all the hostilities of the french partisans, and in particular he found a formidable rival in his brother secretary, the marquis of Castelar. Conscious of his own deficiency, sinking under the weight of business, which daily accumulated, unable to draw assistance from the dilapidated remnant of the national administration, or to rouse the attention of the monarch, he endeavoured to lessen the heavy responsibility of his situation by recommending the admission of the prince of Asturias into the cabinet council. His suggestion was too popular to be rejected, and the prince justified the recommendation by displaying an intelligence and capacity above his age. But, after a short period, the expedient was rendered abortive, by the arts of the queen, and the restlessness of the king himself, who, by hurrying from residence to residence, while the prince remained at the Escorial, virtually excluded him from any real share in the current affairs.

CH. XXXII.

1721

1723.

CH. XXXII.

1721

1723.

Such was the state of the king and government, when a new and singular revolution took place in the ever changeable court of Madrid.*

* St. Philippe, t. 1, 2 and 3, passim.—t. 4, p. 60—112.—Dodington's and Stanhope's Dispatches.—Ortiz, t. 7, p. 368.

CHAPTER XXXIII.

1724.

Construction of the royal residence of St. Ildefonso—Abdication of Philip—Acts and formalities on the occasion—Conjectures relative to the causes of this extraordinary event.

FROM different causes, Philip seems to have long meditated the abdication of his crown; and like a second Dioclesian selected a splendid retreat,* in which he might enjoy the power and advantages, without the trammels of royalty. This retreat was his favourite village of Balsain, where he had expended no less than six millions in the construction of the palace of St. Ildefonso, which in memory of the magnificent pile raised by Louis the fourteenth, he called his little Versailles.

CH. XXXIII.
1724.

* The abdication and retreat of Philip have been absurdly compared to those of his predecessor Charles the fifth; but without the least degree of resemblance except in the mere fact of abdication. Charles did not relinquish the reins of government till after a long, active, and glorious reign; and when he retired he adopted the life of an anchorite, banishing public affairs even from his thoughts. But Philip descended from the throne in the prime of life, maintained the state of a monarch even in his retreat; took an active share in political affairs, and besides looking forward to a more splendid crown than he had quitted, never abandoned the reins of government.

CH. XXXIII.

1724.

It lies on the north of the ridge of mountains which crosses the center of Spain, and on the opposite side of which stands the more proud but gloomy pile of the Escorial, built by Philip the second, in the midst of barren heights, and exposed in summer to all the ardour of the most sultry climate in Europe. To this residence, St. Ildefonso, the favourite retreat of Philip, forms a grateful and striking contrast. Situated in the deepest recess of a narrow valley, accessible only to the north wind; it affords in the midst of the autumnal heats, a cool and delicious retreat, surrounded by all the freshness and fragrance of spring; while the southern declivity of the mountains is scorched with intense heat, and presents nothing but a cheerless, brown, and arid surface.

The time was now arrived when Philip deemed it proper to carry this long meditated design into execution. His purpose was however kept a profound secret to all except the queen, the prince, Grimaldo, the marquis of Valoure, chief of his french household, and the confessor. As if even to baffle suspicion, an audience granted to the british envoy, in consequence of the death of the duke regent, was marked with an affectation of cheerfulness. "In this audience," says Mr. Stanhope, "which the princess of Rubec told me was one of the longest she ever remembered their catholic majesties to have given, the queen appeared with her usual gaiety. She asked me several questions, and after repeating that as women were naturally curious, I must not be surprised, in a matter which so much concerned her, at her being desirous to know what I thought would be the event of the investitures so long promised;* and whether the emperor would be brought without force to execute his engagements relating to her son; it being what she could hardly persuade herself to believe.

* The investiture of the Italian duchies to her son Don Carlos.

During this conversation the king was silent, but upon her talking of the gardens of St. Ildefonso, he asked if I had seen those at Versailles and Marli, comparing some of the water works there with those at St. Ildefonso. This I mention as being a thing unusual with the king to enter voluntarily into any kind of conversation, and I confess that I could not discover any thing else new in him.*

CH. XXXIII.
1724.

After imparting the design to the prince in an audience, Philip announced it by a message to the council of Castile.

"Having," he observed, "these four years reflected with due and mature consideration on the miseries of this life; and on the infirmities, wars, and troubles with which God has visited me during the twenty-three years of my reign; seeing also that my son the infant Don Louis is of competent age, married, and endowed with discretion, judgment, and talents, sufficient for governing this monarchy justly and wisely, I have determined to retire wholly from the government, renouncing all my states, kingdoms, and lordships in favour of the said Don Louis, in order to lead at St. Ildefonso a private life with the queen, who has offered to accompany me with pleasure, that, freed from all other cares, I may serve God, meditate on a future life, and devote myself to the important work of my salvation. I impart this to the council, that it may take the requisite measures on the occasion, and that all may be apprised of my intentions."

Jan. 10.

This communication was accompanied with a list of the new ministry, and the chiefs of the royal household; and the names of twelve persons who were to be honoured with the golden fleece.

On the same day the act of abdication was formally passed before the council in a long and laboured decree. As if

* Mr. Stanhope to Lord Carteret, Jan. 16, 1724, NS.

CH. XXXIII.
1724.

desirous to give his parting wishes the force as well as the formality of law, Philip, after a preamble, announcing his abdication nearly in the terms of the message already quoted, apostrophises his son, and under the shape of advice, details the maxims of his government, and traces the arrangements which he was expected to sanction.

Should Louis die without issue, he intailed the crown on his other sons in succession, and appointed a council of regency, in case the future sovereign should be called to the throne a minor. He inculcated respect towards the church, and the inquisition as the bulwark of the faith, and urged him to consult the welfare and remedy the grievances of his subjects. He coupled these admonitions with a pressing recommendation of the queen and her children, adverted to the establishments reserved for himself and the minor branches of his family, and concluded with an injunction to fulfil the testament which the queen and himself had recently executed.

Jan. 14. This act being recorded in the council, was conveyed by Grimaldo to the Escorial, and read by the new sovereign in the presence of his whole court.

Jan. 15. The following day Louis announced his acceptance of the crown in an answer which is a mere echo of the decree of abdication, and evidently dictated by a dependent of the court of St. Ildefonso. After expressing his veneration and astonishment, at the piety and self denial which had prompted the retirement of his father, he pledges himself to sanction his arrangements and to follow his advice, and does not omit a solemn promise to respect the queen as his mother, and regard her children as his brothers. He concludes with expressing a wish to imitate the example of his father in retirement. "God grant," he says, "that after treading awhile in your steps, I may have the same opinion of the vain greatness of this world;

and that being sensibly affected with its nothingness, I may likewise imitate you in your retreat, and prefer great and solid happiness to transitory and perishing honours."

CH. XXXIII.

1724.

Although Louis accepted the crown, and the council of Castile had recorded the abdication, yet many formalities were requisite to render it valid. The council of Castile proposed to assemble the cortes, and obtain their consent. But many objections occurred to this measure. Philip justly apprehended that an assembly once so powerful might profit by the occasion to resume its lost authority; he was not without his fears that the cortes might even refuse their assent; and at all events, he considered that a ratification so public and solemn would for ever preclude him from resuming his dignity; a resumption which he was evidently unwilling to render impracticable. After much deliberation he adopted the usual expedient employed to obviate the necessity of appealing to the representatives of the nation collectively. Circular letters were written to obtain the consent of the towns possessing the right of choosing deputies; and the approbation of the other branches of the state was considered as virtually given by the acquiescence of the prelates and nobles residing at the court.

After these formalities the new sovereign was proclaimed in the capital with the accustomed ceremony; and Philip having pronounced a solemn vow never to resume the crown, established himself in his chosen retreat.

Feb. 9.

The household and ministry were transferred in a body to the new monarch, except Grimaldo and M. de Valoure, who still continued to fill the offices of secretary and high-chamberlain to Philip; Donna Laura, and five other female attendants attached to the queen; and an establishment of menial servants amounting to about sixty persons. And as Philip relinquished his favourite diversion of the chace,

CH. XXXIII.
1724.

the stables and equipages were proportionably curtailed. He refused a guard, and was with difficulty persuaded to suffer a small detachment to be stationed at Balsain, in case of accidents. For his own privy purse, he reserved a yearly pension amounting to £. 120,000 to be continued to the queen after his decease; 20,000 to each of the three infants, and 10,000 to each of the infantas, with a certain sum for the completion of the buildings at St. Ildefonso.*

Numerous conjectures have been formed relative to the causes of this extraordinary event, but doubtless the principal motives were derived from that singular mixture of superstition and self interest, of indolence and ambition, which composed the character of Philip. He had adopted the notion that the bequest of Charles the second, which placed him on the spanish throne, was illegal, and he was equally convinced that his own renunciation of the french crown was no less invalid: to this was added a rooted predilection for his native country, which gained strength by time. From one or all of these motives, he had more than once formed the design of quitting the spanish throne. In his melancholy moods, during the war of the succession, he had even taken the resolution to resign in favour of his competitor the archduke, but had been overruled by his beloved queen, and the confessor Robinet. The complicated arrangements, after the peace of Utrecht, and the tumult of business during the brilliant administration of Alberoni, had left him neither time nor inclination to meditate on retirement; but in the sudden stagnation of affairs, which succeeded, his hypochondriac malady returned, and with it the darling idea of abdication. Of this disposition, the duke of Orleans endeavoured to take advantage, as the means of hastening the accession of his son in law, and reducing the influ-

* Act of Abdication in St. Philippe, t. 4, p. 272.

ence of Philip in France, but the attempt was frustrated by the representations of the queen and d'Aubenton.

CH. XXXIII.
1724.

Still, however, this latent inclination returned whenever a prospect was opened of succeeding to the throne of France, and at this moment it acquired new strength from the death of the duke of Orleans, the only guarantee of the future marriage between the infanta and Louis the fifteenth, and the only dangerous rival to his views on the crown. At this particular juncture, also, the repeated maladies,* and apparently declining health of the young king, gave ample scope for the operation of these combined motives of religion and interest, inclination and ambition; and their effect was augmented by the pressing representations of the duke of Bourbon, who, in the favour of Philip, hoped to secure a counterpoise to the rival House of Orleans.

Philip, therefore, looked forward with hope and confidence to the prospect of ascending the throne of his ancestors. He endeavoured at once to satisfy the scruples of his conscience, and obviate the opposition of other powers, by transferring Spain beforehand to one of his sons by the former marriage, and, at the proper time, by renewing the engagements for preventing the union of the two crowns on one head.

Whatever might have been the disposition of the queen at former periods, it is probable that she did not now contemplate with indifference the near prospect of succeeding to the crown of France, of entailing so splendid a succession on her own family, and of quitting a country, for which she fostered a rooted dislike, and where she was equally detested. She, therefore, at least tacitly approved, if she did not strengthen the resolution of her husband, to quit for a short period the duties

* In February, Louis the XVth was in a state of imminent danger, and saved by bleeding in the foot.

CH. XXXIII.

1724.

of royalty, as the prelude to the resumption of them on a more splendid theatre.

The conduct of the two sovereigns corroborates these arguments. So anxiously did they turn their views towards this new establishment, that secret and incessant communications were maintained with the duke of Bourbon, and the spanish party. Couriers were stationed on the road between the two capitals; the necessary preparations for a journey to France were already made at St. Ildefonso; even the jewels and money of the queen were packed up; and every precaution was taken to profit by the news of the young king's death, which their sanguine hopes led them hourly to expect.*

Indeed, Philip had scarcely resigned the crown, before he meditated a visit to France, under the pretence of restoring his health, though with the evident purpose to mature his plans on the spot, and encourage his adherents by his presence. The design was probably favoured by the duke of Bourbon; but the bare report sufficed to awaken the alarms of the british government, which was tremblingly alive to every incident affecting the renunciations of the two crowns. An earnest remonstrance was accordingly made to the french cabinet, and the cautious Fleury quieted their apprehensions, not only by a solemn promise to maintain the existing engagements, but by obtaining from the young king himself a declaration that he would not permit the journey of the abdicated monarch.†

Were any additional proof necessary, it might suffice to remark, that religious motives, and love of retirement alone, did not influence the mind of Philip; for, had that been the case, he would not have clung with such pertinacity to the authority

* Memoires de St. Simon, t. 7, p. 205.—Memoires de Richelieu, t. 3, p. 356.

† Memoirs of Lord Walpole, ch. 8.

which he affected to relinquish; he would not have abridged the resources of the new sovereign by lavishing his parting favours on the dependents of the court; he would not have established an administration, calculated to throw the whole power of the government into his own hands; nor in the existing necessities of the state would he have deposited a large sum of money at Segovia, except for the purpose of being employed on some momentous emergency.

CH. XXXIII.

1724.

There is little doubt also that the design was concerted with the duke of Bourbon and the chiefs of his party in France; for marshal Tessé, one of the most zealous advocates for the regular order of succession, was nominated minister to Spain after the death of the duke of Orleans; and notwithstanding his advanced age, proceeded on his mission and appeared at St. Ildefonso immediately after the abdication.* His journey in such circumstances could have no other object than to preserve a direct communication with Philip, to instigate him to maintain his authority over the government of his son, and to mature the requisite preparations in conjunction with the duke of Bourbon, for facilitating his eventual succession to the crown of France.

* Stanhope's Dispatches.

CHAPTER XXXIV.

1724—1725.

Accession and Character of Louis—Account of his Queen—Their matrimonial Infelicity—Her Caprice and Indiscretion—Temporary Disgrace—Project for obtaining a Divorce—Embarrassments of the new Government—Characters and Situation of his Ministers—Predominant Influence of the Court of St. Ildefonso—Plans of the Queen Dowager for the establishment of her Son, Don Carlos—Incipient Schism between the two Courts—Attacks against the Authority of Philip—Illness and Death of Louis—Philip resumes the Crown, in contradiction to his Vow, and in opposition to a part of the Ministry—Situation of the widowed Queen.

CH. XXXIV.

1724

1725.

THE new reign was so short, and the new monarch possessed so scanty a share of authority, that the name of Louis scarcely appears in the annals of authentic history, beyond the boundaries of Spain.

Louis, eldest son of Philip by Maria Louisa of Savoy, was in the seventeenth year of his age, when he was raised to the throne, by the abdication of his father, with as little experience as power. By birth, habit, and inclination, attached to the customs and manners of Spain, he was welcomed by his subjects with universal applause. His entry into the capital bore the air of a triumph; and when, according to antient custom, his accession was announced by the acclamation, "Castile,

Castile, for king Louis," the united voice of exulting crowds spontaneously hailed him with the epithet of the *well beloved*. Not deficient in abilities, if they had been properly called forth and directed, he was not averse to science; and possessed a taste for the polite and liberal arts. He was elegant in person; in address and manner strikingly contrasted with the cold, stiff, and reserved deportment of his father; he excelled in personal accomplishments, and tempered the spanish gravity with the captivating affability of the bourbon family.

CH. XXXIV.

1724

1725.

So sudden an elevation, at so early an age, gave scope to the thoughtlessness of youthful levity. He was at first inattentive to business, and so careless of public respect, that he often sallied forth at midnight in disguise, to scour the streets of the capital, or to strip the royal gardens of their fruit, that he might, the following morning, be gratified with the frivolous pleasure of witnessing the vexation of the gardeners.* But the first ebullitions of youth rapidly subsided. He respected the remonstrances of his father, who urged that such irregularities would dishonour his crown, and diminish the respect and affection of his people. This docility afforded a presage, that when he had attained the age of reflection, and his understanding was matured by experience, he would not disappoint the predilection with which he was regarded by the nation.

Louis was married to Elizabeth, third daughter of the regent duke of Orleans, before she had attained the age of twelve, no less contrary to his own inclinations, than to those of the spanish nation. She united, indeed, elegance of manners and vivacity of temper, with great personal accomplishments, and was endowed with qualities which might have rendered her the delight of her husband, and the ornament of

1722.

* Mr. Stanhope's Dispatch to Lord Carteret, April 15, 1724. Harrington Papers.

CH. XXXIV.

1724

1725.

his throne; had not an unprincipled education, and the scenes of a vicious court, corrupted her morals, and depraved her heart. Although so young when she quitted France, she had been brought up in the profligate school of her father. Misled by the dissolute conduct of her two elder sisters the duchess of Berry and Mademoiselle de Valois, she was insensible to the comforts, and indifferent to the duties of domestic life; regardless of the dignity of her character and station; and wanting only opportunities to imitate the licentiousness which she had witnessed at Paris.

Even at the moment of her arrival at Madrid, she gave proofs of an unaccommodating and capricious temper by secluding herself in her apartment, under pretence of indisposition, and not only declining to testify any respect towards the queen, but repulsing her attentions with disdain. She refused to appear at a ball given in honour of her marriage, and behaved to her husband with studied indifference.* Time, the representations of her attendants, and the commands of Philip, so far overruled her wayward fancies, that she preserved decorum in public, and treated her husband with attention and respect. But the abdication of Philip had no sooner released her from restraint than her caprices returned with redoubled force. She again gave way to her contempt for her consort, ridiculed that etiquette which had been sanctioned by ages, and scandalised a grave court and punctilious nation, by her indiscreet if not licentious behaviour.

With the hope of subduing or restraining her spirit, king Louis at the instigation of his father was induced to mortify her by some public mark of disgrace. He conveyed the order in a letter to her camerara-mayor, the countess of Altamira:

* See St. Simon's curious account of her capricious behaviour, and the kind but unavailing attentions of the queen. T. 8, lib. 5, c. 5.

"The disorderly conduct of the queen being highly prejudicial to her health, and no less degrading to her royal dignity, I have endeavoured to prevent it by remonstrances; and in my anxiety for her amendment, I even prevailed on my pious father, to admonish her with great severity. But perceiving no change, I am resolved she shall not sleep this night at the palace in the city; and I hereby require you, and the persons whom I have selected for the purpose, to employ every requisite care for her accommodation and precious health."*

CH. XXXIV.

1724

1725.

July 2.

Accordingly, as she returned to the Buen Retiro, from an evening excursion in the Prado, her coach was stopped at the gate, and ordered to proceed to the Alcazar, or old palace, in the city. Demanding the reason, she was told "such is the king's pleasure." She burst into a transport of rage, repeatedly exclaiming "to Buen Retiro!" but the mayor domo who was charged with the order interfered, she was conveyed by force, and confined to her apartment with a few select attendants, under a strong guard. Her arrest was then announced in a circular letter to the foreign ministers.

After a strict confinement of six days she was visited by marshal Tessé the french ambassador, whose age and character, it was hoped, would make some impression on her volatile mind, when depressed by disgrace and confinement. In this interview, she frankly acknowledged that half the imputations against her were true, but as strenuously maintained that the other half were false. Without attempting to deny her follies and irregularities, she made the most solemn asseverations that nothing criminal could be imputed to her. She expressed contrition for her past misconduct, promised future amendment, and entreated the forgiveness of her husband.

* Stanhope's Dispatch.

CH. XXXIV.

1724

1725.

The young king was satisfied with this reparation, and after dismissing seventeen female attendants who had abetted her imprudence, permitted her to return to the Buen Retiro. He went out to meet her in the terrace near the Puente verde; and as she alighted and attempted to kiss his hand, prevented her by the salutation of peace. He received her into his own carriage, and seemed anxious to make amends for the publicity of her disgrace by marks equally public of his returning affection.

Notwithstanding this apparent reconciliation, the mutual dislike of the royal couple was undiminished. The king's aversion to his consort was so deeply rooted that he never consummated his marriage; and Philip, himself so scrupulous in his moral conduct, felt for the domestic afflictions of his son. After requesting with tears his forgiveness for promoting so ill assorted an union, and for bestowing on him a wife, whom he so justly disliked, he declared that his conscience perpetually reproached him for the temptations to which he had thus given cause.

Philip and the queen affected to believe that their daughter in law was insane, and secretly determined to obtain a divorce. As Tessé did not oppose the design, and as the duke of Bourbon was desirous at once to mortify the rival House of Orleans, and to raise his own sister to the throne of Spain, arrangements were made for sounding the sentiments of the pope. In the interim, Louis was directed to preserve the exterior of complacency towards his consort, as well from a regard to decorum, as to prevent suspicions.*

* The account of the misunderstanding between Louis and his queen, of her arrest and imprisonment, and the subsequent design to obtain a divorce, is taken from Mr. Stanhope's dispatches to lord Carteret, April 15, and to the duke of Newcastle; July 26, and August 10, 1724. As he received his intel-

While the young monarch was thus afflicted with domestic troubles, his public situation was scarcely more enviable ; for he supported all the weight, without the authority, of the crown which had been prematurely placed on his head. Having been generally excluded from a share in the administration of affairs, and little versed either in the details of internal government, or the management of foreign transactions, his youth and inexperience rendered him utterly incapable of directing the state machine. Indeed the administration appointed, and the forms prescribed by the abdicated king, proved that he still held the real authority ; and that the orders which were to convulse or pacify Europe, emanated not from the cabinet of the ostensible sovereign, but from that of St. Ildefonso.

CH. XXXIV.

1724

1725.

After the formalities of the abdication, Philip and his queen retired to St. Ildefonso, with their minister and favourite, Grimaldo. The new administration was nominally vested in a junta or cabinet council, composed of seven members ; but no precaution was omitted to select such as were either devoted to Philip, the adherents of the queen and Grimaldo, or persons of too little talents and weight to act without a superior direction.

The marquis of Mirabal, after representing his sovereign in Holland, though with little diplomatic ability, had filled for a considerable period the high office of president of Castile, of which he had formerly been auditor. He was a man of good

ligence from Tessé himself, as well as from members of the royal household, there can be no doubt of its authenticity. St. Philippe has given a circumstantial narrative of this event ; but he has intermixed many anecdotes and rumours, not sufficiently proved, which are corrected by Stanhope's relation. T. 4, p. 187, 192.—See also Memoires de St. Simon, t. 8, ch. 5,—de Richelieu, t. 3, ch. 30,—de Tessé, t. 2, ch. 14.—Ortiz, lib. 23, c. 9.

CH. XXXIV.

1724

1725.

sense, experience and application ; and since the dismissal of Alberoni had acquired a considerable share in the government, through his friendship with d'Aubenton and Grimaldo. From the countenance and support which he received from the abdicated monarch, as well as from the consideration annexed to his employment, he was considered as the leading member of the administration ; and at the commencement of the new reign assumed a degree of superiority which excited the discontent of his colleagues. In other respects he fostered the aversion of a true spaniard towards France, and regarded England as the natural ally of his country.

The archbishop of Toledo, the son of a blacksmith at Gibraltar, was scarcely less mean in political talents than in extraction, though of irreproachable morals. His zeal for the bourbon cause, and his services in Catalonia during the war of the succession, raised him from a canonry to a bishopric. Finally, for his elevation to the primacy, he was indebted to the intrigues of the jesuits, who were anxious to place at the head of the spanish church, a prelate subservient to the views and interest of their order.

The bishop of Pampeluna, who held the post of grand inquisitor, was distinguished only for his knowledge of the canon law ; ignorant of the world, and a novice in the management of public affairs.

Don Michael de Guerra had profited by the advantages of foreign travel and employment. He had successively filled the offices of chancellor of Milan, minister in France, and for a short time that of president of Castile and the finances. He was, however, according to the observation of Mr. Stanhope, rather a cunning than an able man, though possessing considerable knowledge of the laws of Spain. Being attacked with a fit of the palsy which rendered his speech scarcely intelligible,

he had for a time retired from business. The effects of this attack, joined to the infirmities of advanced age, precluded him from a constant attendance in the cabinet council; but being the brother of the queen's confessor, he was naturally considered as under her peculiar controul.

CH. XXXIV.

1724

|

1725.

The marquis of Valero, president of the Indies, was a man of ordinary capacity. He had recently filled the viceroyalty of Mexico, and returning to Spain loaded with the riches of the Indies, obtained patronage at court by his splendid presents to the royal family; and by announcing a resolution to nominate the reigning monarch, then prince of Asturias, as his heir.

The count of San Estevan del Puerto, lord high-chamberlain, was the same nobleman who has been frequently distinguished in the preceding pages among the partisans of the House of Bourbon. His nomination was a mere form, because he was now absent at the congress of Cambray as one of the plenipotentiaries of Spain.

The most remarkable, and indeed the most efficient member of this motley cabinet, next to Mirabal, was the marquis of Lede, president of the council of war, a native of Flanders, and distinguished for his military talents. He was diligent, active, and perspicuous in business, patient of contradiction, yet firm to his purpose; and, unlike his spanish associates, devoting himself with zeal and alacrity to the duties of his employment. He was a man of great probity and prudence, and from gratitude for past favours was considered as devoted to the old court. Professedly adverse to the House of Austria, he was favourably inclined towards France without being an enemy to England.*

The most remarkable members of the administration who did not hold a place in the cabinet, were the two brothers, the

* Mr. Stanhope to lord Carteret, March 23, 1724.

CH. XXXIV.

1724

1725.

marquis of Castellar, and Don Joseph Patino, both devoted to France, and secretly hostile to Grimaldo; and Don Ferdinand Verdes de Montenegro, head of the finances, who owed his appointment to the influence of Mirabal.

The acting chiefs of the different departments were the same persons as under the former government, and either attached to Philip or his ministers; but the connecting link between the old and new cabinets, was Don Baptista Orendayn, who was appointed both secretary for foreign affairs, and secretary of the junta. This minister, afterwards better known under the title of the marquis de la Paz, had risen from the menial office of page to Grimaldo, to that of his under secretary, and from thence was suddenly transferred to the post which he now held, occupying in reality the same situation under another name. Deficient in talents and dignity for his new employment, his principal merit was the plodding drudgery of a mere clerk, and the absolute devotion which he had hitherto shewn to his benefactor.

The secretary for the marine and Indies, was Don Antonio Sopena, of whom we can trace nothing but the name and appointment.

From the inefficient characters of some members of the new administration, and the dependence of others on the old court, together with the youth, docility, and inexperience of Louis, it is evident that the government was still directed by the same hands, and that the management of affairs was vested in Grimaldo, who, from long exercise in office, and from the confidence reposed in him by the abdicated sovereign, was alone capable of continuing the negotiations of the congress at Cambray, and arranging the complicated disputes between Spain, Austria, and the other powers of Europe. He in reality was as much prime minister, as before the change of government,

and, by his daily instructions and communications, directed all the operations of Orendayn. Nor did he affect to conceal his power; for, in the first visit of Tessé to St. Ildefonso, he triumphantly observed, "king Philip is not dead, nor am I."*

CH. XXXIV.

1724

1725.

If, indeed, any proof were wanting of the real principles and prime mover of the government, it might be found in the measures pursued with regard to the establishment of Don Carlos. Too impatient to wait for the tardy proceedings of a congress, and the chances of an eventual succession, the queen formed the resolution of sending her son into Italy, as presumptive heir to Parma and Tuscany. This proposal was combated by every member of the new cabinet; but their opposition was disregarded, and measures adopted to carry it into execution, with the connivance of France and the maritime powers.


This new scheme, like almost every plan of this restless and aspiring woman, introduced a new actor on the political theatre, the marquis of Monteleon. He had long distinguished himself in the diplomatic line, and was greatly trusted in the secret policy of his court. Deputed as envoy to England, during the negotiations for the peace of Utrecht, he appears to have been gained by the tory ministry of queen Anne, and, on the accession of George the first, still adhering to their party, he became so obnoxious to the whigs, that, as we have already observed, Mr. Stanhope extorted from Alberoni the promise of his recal. Being, however, too useful an agent to be lightly sacrificed, he continued in his post till dismissed by the government, in consequence of the rupture. After a short retreat to the Hague, he returned to London, with the title of ambassador, on the accession of Spain to the quadruple alliance, and dexterously conforming himself to circumstances,

* *Memoires de Tessé*, t. 2, p. 352.

CH. XXXIV.

1724

1725.



gained the favour of the ministry, to whom he was before so obnoxious.

Monteleon appeared at Madrid at the moment of the abdication. With that quick and accurate discernment, which is the fruit of long experience in political intrigues, he discovered that the new government was a mere shadow, and that the real power was still vested in the cabinet of St. Ildefonso. Sanguine, adroit, and aspiring, he devoted himself to the court which afforded the fairest prospect of advancement. He acquired the powerful interest of Donna Laura, by submitting to an unequal match between his eldest son and her daughter. He flattered the views of Philip on the throne of France; he applied with equal success to the ruling passion of the queen, and by dint of officious interference, and a parade of his influence in England, wrought himself into a commission, at this time of the most important kind, that of agent for negotiating the measures to promote the accession of Don Carlos to the Italian duchies. His conversations with Mr. Stanhope on this and other subjects throw a new light on the situation of the two courts, which were now beginning their course of political rivalry.

April 15,
1724:

“In his conduct here,” writes the minister, “Monteleon not only publicly professes, but in all his actions shews an entire attachment to the court of St. Ildefonso, and industriously avoids even the appearance of having any dependence on the court or ministers of Madrid, of both which he gave a convincing proof a few days after his arrival. The young queen gave a dinner to the ladies of her court at the Retiro, to which the two daughters of Donna Laura, sole favourite of king Philip’s queen, were invited, (one of whom was lately married to Monteleon’s son) and going to sit down at her table with the rest of the ladies in the same employment, namely, Señoras

de Honor, were ordered to remove to another, by the queen herself, aloud, on pretence of their having been *cameristas*, or women of the bed chamber, to the former queen. On being told of this circumstance, he answered publicly, he was glad of it, and wanted only two or three more such affronts to his family, to make his fortune. For his devoted attachment to the court of St. Ildefonso, he has several reasons. He is persuaded that the whole authority of the government is still lodged there; he looks upon his interests as secure, by the great credit of Donna Laura with the queen; he considers the young king and cabinet as mere cyphers; and every one of the latter as so exceedingly jealous of him, that if they had any authority, they would employ it against him. He has few personal friends; but his superior capacity and experience makes him universally esteemed; and, though he industriously preserves his resolution of accepting no employment whatever in Spain, no one, in any of the higher posts, thinks himself secure, while the destination of Monteleon remains undetermined.

“ He has informed me, that, during his abode at St. Ildefonso, where he remained three weeks, and was received in the most gracious manner, he had daily audiences of their catholic majesties. In all these, his chief view was to convince them how advantageous and even necessary it was, for the good of their affairs, and those of the rest of Europe, that the strictest union should be maintained between the crowns of Great Britain and Spain; as being that upon which the assurance of Don Carlos's succession to Tuscany chiefly, if not entirely, depended. He even insinuated that the friendship of England, for which he pledged himself, might be of the greatest use to them, in case an opportunity should present itself of executing, in favour of one of the infants, their pretensions to the crown of France.

CH. XXXIV.

1724

|

1725.

* * * * *

CH. XXXIV.

1724

1725.

“ These reasonings, he assured me, his catholic majesty heard with great seeming satisfaction and approbation, particularly those relating to the succession of France. King Philip, whenever that matter was touched upon, constantly replied, he saw clearly, and was convinced of the great advantage which our master’s friendship might be to him, as well as to the passage of the infant Don Carlos into Italy, and the security of his person and succession there. He says, he presented a plan at St. Ildefonso, which was drawn up there by king Philip’s order, setting forth the steps necessary to be taken for these purposes.”

The substance of this plan, after some partial changes suggested by the queen, was, that Don Carlos should be sent to Italy, with the approbation of France and England, and declared and acknowledged successor to Tuscany and Parma, on conditions calculated to gratify the reigning sovereign, and his sister, the electress palatine. The design was approved by Grimaldo; and, though opposed by Mirabal, to whom it was communicated, in order to obtain the sanction of the new government, his objections were disregarded.

* * * * *

“ I have nothing,” continues Mr. Stanhope, “ to add in relation to Monteleon, but that he is in daily expectation of seeing his project approved, and, in consequence, of receiving orders to set out for Italy, taking London and Paris in his way. In all events, he seems determined not to accept of any employment here for the present; and, as a proof of this, he assures me, that it depended on himself only to have been already declared first minister, king Philip having several times proposed and even pressed it to him. His reason for not accepting that employment, is the almost impossibility he foresees of continuing in it long, in the present situation of affairs here,

without drawing upon himself the displeasure of one of the two kings; that of the father, in case he governs not himself expressly in every thing by the orders he shall receive from St. Ildefonso: as in so doing, he must in a little time expect that of the son, whom, he is persuaded, will by degrees withdraw himself from the dependence and submission he at present acquiesces under. Marshal Tessé has confirmed to me what Monteleon says as to his having been offered the place of first minister, and both of them seem persuaded, that in a very short time that place will be filled, it being impossible for matters to continue long in the confusion they are at present in, from the want of a visible authority. The persons most likely to be appointed for that employment, are the president of Castile, and the marquis of Grimaldo, but more especially the latter, in case king Philip consents to part with him."

CH. XXXIV.

1724

1725.

The suggestions of Monteleon being adopted, the title of Grand Prince was given to the infant. The insinuating statesman was selected to carry his own project into execution, with a salary of 5,000 pistoles, and the credentials of ambassador extraordinary to the princes of Italy, and the courts of France and England, for arranging the affairs of Don Carlos.

July 28.

While, however, the queen dowager was ardently pursuing her own designs with indifference and even contempt towards the government of the young king, a schism was already commencing between the two courts.

Notwithstanding all the sagacity which had been employed in forming the new administration, it was not in the power of art to change the constitution of human nature. The junta had scarcely tasted the sweets of ostensible authority, before they aspired to substantial power, and were eager to shake off the yoke imposed by their patrons of St. Ildefonso. Two parties were speedily formed in this heterogeneous council, one for

CH. XXXIV.

1724

1725.

Louis, the other for Philip. But the distinction was little more than a name; for, though some affected to wear the appearance of attachment to the former sovereign, all naturally turned their eyes from the setting to the rising sun. In general, the courtiers were gradually relaxing in their attentions to the abdicated monarch; and the nation was as favourably disposed towards a spanish king and spanish cabinet, as disgusted with the italian government of their parmesan queen. Finally, the whole court anxiously watched for the moment when Louis should display the slightest inclination to throw off his dependence, and omitted neither intrigue or artifice to encourage him to assume a degree of authority becoming his station.

Fortunately for Philip, Louis himself did not shew the least regard or application to business, and placed his sole confidence in the count of Altamira, his camerero mayor, who himself without spirit or ambition, was not calculated to give umbrage to the jealous cabinet of St. Ildefonso.

The government was thus without any visible chief; and in many instances foreign ministers found it necessary to make similar applications to both courts, to avoid giving umbrage to either. No person of consideration or abilities was yet, however, found to assume a part, which might ultimately draw down the displeasure of both monarchs; and the members of the junta, at once to exculpate themselves, and to acquire popularity, publicly declared that they were mere cyphers. "It is better," they said, "that the world should see we are without power, than blame us for misconduct and negligence." The whole system of government naturally became the object of universal contempt, and even Tessé himself asserted, that this farce, *of king and no king*, could not long subsist.*

In spite of the docile character of Louis, means were at

* Memoires de Tessé, t. 2, ch. 14.

length found to turn his agency against the court of St. Ildefonso. With a view to supersede the authority of the abdicated monarch, the junta, by a new arrangement of business, attempted to limit the controul exercised over their deliberations by Orendayn and Grimaldo. Reviving the custom which prevailed under the later sovereigns of the austrian dynasty, they divided among themselves the transactions with foreign powers, each taking a peculiar and distinct department, and making his report to the whole body. They thus excluded the secretary of state from all public share in foreign affairs, and reduced him to the situation of a mere reporter of their deliberations.* This measure appeared a death blow to the authority of Philip; when the news was communicated at Versailles, marshal Villars could not refrain from exclaiming, "Adieu, court of St. Ildefonso; you will be lucky to be assured of a regular supply of your daily meals!"†

All the address of Grimaldo, and all the art of the queen, were called forth to parry the effects of this dangerous blow. An order was obtained from Louis, empowering Orendayn to receive from each member separately the report of his particular department, and lay it before the king for the regular dispatch of business. The collective force of the junta was thus broken, and the secretary of state, by becoming the direct channel of communication with the sovereign, was enabled to turn the reports according to his own views, and to regulate his conduct by the mandates which emanated from the oracle of St. Ildefonso.

Though foiled, the governing party in the junta were not dis-

* Mr. Stanhope to Lord Carteret, Madrid, March 23, 1724.

† "Adieu, la cour de St. Ildefonse. Elle sera heureuse si son diner et son souper sont bien assurés." Mem. de Villars, t. 3, p. 123.—Mr. Walpole to Lord Townshend, Paris, April 1, 1724. Walpole Papers.

CH. XXXIV.

1724

1725.

couraged. Clothing their opposition with the plausible pretext of the public weal, they expatiated on the dilapidated state of the revenue, and the inadequacy of the receipt to the current expences. They, therefore, proposed to curtail the establishments of the two infants, and obtained a royal order reducing them to such an allowance as was barely sufficient for their maintenance. A warm remonstrance, however, from St. Ildefonso, inducing the docile monarch to retract, he not only continued the salaries assigned to his brothers, but even took on himself the additional charge of their equipages and tables.

A new and more decisive attack was then planned against the abdicated sovereign himself. Recurring as before to the dilapidated state of the finances, the leading members of the junta exaggerated the sums which Philip had appropriated before his retreat, and the existing expences of his establishment; and recommended a reduction of his pension. Although this proposal was adroitly clothed with the same plausible pretence, it shocked the feelings of the young monarch. He not only refused to authorise such an insult, but even communicated the attempt to his father.

In matters less directly clashing with his filial feelings, Louis was more easily swayed. He granted several pensions, and filled various places in the council, with persons not agreeable to the old court. Accordingly Mirabal was instructed to watch over his conduct, and hints were given him to moderate his bounty, and revoke his appointments.*

Thus urged on one hand by the intrigues of those who were aiming at power, and restrained on the other by respect which time and habit must gradually diminish, the period could not have been far distant, when Louis would be tempted to unite the real to the nominal authority; when either the son

* St. Philippe, t. 4, p. 266.

must have descended from the throne, or the father have changed his nominal for a real renunciation of power, if not his retreat for imprisonment. Fortunately, however, for the tranquillity of Spain and the safety of Philip, such a dangerous crisis was prevented by the death of Louis.

CH. XXXIV.

1724

|

1725.

He was seized on the 19th of August with a malignant small pox, which being unskillfully treated, hurried him to the grave in twelve days, in the eighteenth year of his age, and the eighth month of his nominal reign. During his illness the court of St. Ildefonso remained in a mixed state of agitation, anxiety, and alarm. But he was no sooner pronounced in danger, than Philip determined to resume the crown. With this view he caused an instrument to be prepared for the young king's signature, constituting him his heir, and empowering him to make his will. This document was presented to Louis, the evening before his death, and signed by him though then in a state of delirium; and, however informal, became the authority on which Philip founded the first measures adopted after the decease of his son.

Aug. 31.

On that event, the marquis of Mirabal, president of the council of Castile and chief of the regency, announced the intelligence to Philip, and requested his instant presence in the capital. He accordingly quitted his retreat, gave audience to Mirabal, who met him at Campillo, entered Madrid with all the ensigns of royalty, transacted business with the secretary of state, and issued the necessary orders.


Philip was induced to believe, from the representations of Tessé and his attendants, that the nation unanimously looked forward to his resumption of the crown as the greatest blessing, and that his right was indisputable. But so solemn a renunciation, sanctified by a deliberate vow, registered by the council of Castile, and ratified by the highest civil authorities, could

CH. XXXIV.

1724

|

1725.



not be set aside with as little formality as the mere transfer of a crown from one prince to another; and therefore Philip thought proper to demand the advice of the council of Castile.

It is difficult to ascertain the nature of the opposition raised in that body to his wishes; but it is clear that there was a strong party even in his own household and court, and in the nation, adverse to his resumption of the crown in his own right. Indeed the leading members did not scruple to acknowledge to Mr. Stanhope, that they were *individually* against the resumption, from a conviction of Philip's incapacity, and the queen's ambition. Of this party, one of the most zealous was the marquis of Mirabal himself, who under the pretext of attachment to Philip exerted all the influence of his high office to prevent the resumption; and under the guise of advice, presented the objections to the measure, both political and religious, in the strongest light. His views were furthered by the confessor Bermudez, who, either from conviction, or interest, dwelt on these objections as insuperable, and represented the resumption as a sin of the deepest dye. From the same motives, Mirabal deferred convening the council till the fourth day after the death of Louis; and though he could not prevent his colleagues from concurring in a request to Philip to re-ascend the vacant throne; yet in their *consulta* or report, all the objections are again studiously detailed, and presented in the most forcible language.

This artful report, strengthened by the reflections of the confessor, made the deepest impression on a superstitious mind: Philip instantly dismissed his guards, saying, "I am not worthy of such marks of sovereign power till my conscience is perfectly satisfied." He therefore submitted the report of the council of Castile to a junta of divines, who as-

sembled in the convent of the jesuits. This body, probably swayed by the confessor, declared against the resumption, and suggested as an alternative, that Philip should assume the government as regent for his son Ferdinand, the next in order of succession. Philip, who had anticipated a more favourable answer, was mortified with the decision. In the first emotions of anger and disappointment he declared that he would accept neither the crown nor the regency, and gave orders for his immediate return to St. Ildefonso.

CH. XXXIV.

1724

1725.


The queen was still more enraged than Philip, because she was incited by every motive of self-interest, inclination, and ambition, to replace him on the throne. She had felt from recent experience, that the mere expected reversion was but an imperfect compensation for the actual possession of a crown. She had learnt to dread the mischiefs attending a divided government; she foresaw that a cabinet council at Madrid would not long submit to be directed by a mandate from St. Ildefonso; she perceived that the elevation of another stepson, and the continuance of a ministry purely spanish, would prove fatal to her plans for the aggrandisement of her own children.

She therefore omitted no endeavour to vanquish the real or affected reluctance of Philip, and to counteract the machinations of those who, under the semblance of zeal and affection for his conscience and honour, were labouring to obstruct his return to authority. She reproached Bermudez, to whom she principally attributed the scruples of Philip, accused him of perfidy, called him, in the presence of the king a traitor, another Judas; and declared, that if at the point of death, she would rather depart without the blessing of the sacraments, than receive them at the hands of such a wretch. She encouraged the petulance of her favourite Donna Laura, to whom age,

CH. XXXIV.

1724

1725.



situation, and long habit, had given the privilege of speaking with freedom and familiarity. This woman, no less violent than her mistress, apostrophised Philip: "Are you not ashamed to submit to the controul of this wicked wretch, to abandon your country to the dangers of a minority, to intrust the government to a junta who will annihilate the royal authority!" The queen, affecting to interfere, with the remark "You will kill the king!" the indignant beldame rejoined, "Let him die! It is only the loss of one man; but if he abandons the government, his people, his children, and his monarchy, are all lost!"*

Perceiving that all her remonstrances, supported by the representations of Grimaldo, were not sufficient to outweigh the arguments of the confessor and the decision of the divines; the queen had recourse to Tessé, whose long attachment and advanced age gave him great influence over the mind of Philip. The marshal not only employed the trite argument against the validity of renunciations and oaths, when placed in competition with the public weal; but declared that the french government would no longer treat with Philip except as king of Spain; and that if his fatal resolution was maintained, he would himself withdraw from a court where he could render no further service.

The queen found other resources to counteract the machinations of her opponents, and even turned against them that authority which they had employed with such mortifying success. She induced Philip to refer the decision of the divines to the council of Castile, and drew from the council a strong censure against it, accompanied with a new request to resume the crown. She gave additional weight to this advice by procuring another decision from divines of different prin-

* *Memoires de Villars*, t. 3, p. 143, 4.—de Tessé, t. 2, p. 366.

ciples. She did not hesitate to call to her assistance the highest authority in the church. Having summoned the papal nuntio from his sick apartment, where he had been long confined, she excited him, by every motive which her fertile genius could suggest, to join in removing the scruples of the king. The nuntio was more flexible than a spanish confessor, backed by spanish divines. He obtained an audience of Philip, and detailed all the arguments which could be drawn from a concern for the welfare of his family and the glory of the catholic religion. These producing some effect, he added, "The pope* had made a vow never to accept the papacy; but he thought himself bound in conscience to break a hasty engagement for the sake of the public good. His holiness, I am convinced, would approve a similar conduct in your majesty, did time permit me to appeal to his opinion. I am satisfied he would even enjoin your majesty to acquiesce in the general wish. Convinced, as I am, of the necessity and justice of the case, I make myself answerable before God for the breach of your majesty's renunciation and vows."†

So impressive a discourse, delivered by so high an authority, swayed a monarch who was desirous of being convinced. Philip industriously published the arguments of the nuntio, and, on the 6th of September, issued a decree to the council of Castile; declaring that, as natural lord and proprietor of the crown, he again took into his hands the reins of government, and sacrificed his own happiness for the advantage of his subjects. To save appearances, he reserved to himself the

* Benedict XIII, recently chosen on the death of Innocent XIII, March 13, 1724.

† Dispatch of Mr. Stanhope to the duke of Newcastle, Madrid, Sept. 9, 1724.

The reader will find the two Consultas of the Council of Castile, and the Report of the Junta of Divines, in St. Philippe, t. 4, appendix.

CH. XXXIV.

1724

1725.

power of resigning in favour of his son Don Ferdinand, when he came of age, provided it should not be productive of too great inconveniences. He concluded by promising to summon the cortes to acknowledge Don Ferdinand prince of Asturias, and tender him the accustomed homage as successor to the crown.*

The queen expressed the most immoderate joy at her success. She was not only gratified with recovering a crown, the value of which was enhanced to a mind like hers by a temporary deprivation, but she thus gained a considerable advantage in favour of her own views, as well as those of her husband on the throne of France. She gave a new instance of the nullity of the most solemn engagements when put in competition with personal inclination or political interest; and accustomed the powers of Europe to regard with indifference the breach of vows and renunciations.

The death of Louis saved his queen from the humiliation of a divorce. She regained the favour of the king and nation by her affectionate attentions to her husband; though she had never had the disorder which hurried him to the grave. She caught the infection; but the strength of her constitution, and more skilful treatment, saved her life. For a short time, she continued in Spain with the accustomed appointments of a widowed queen; and Tessé even proposed a marriage between her and Don Ferdinand. But she was disgusted with the restraints of spanish etiquette; and by the agency of her mother, the duchess of Orleans, obtained from Philip and Louis the fifteenth permission to return to France. Her departure was hastened by the subsequent disputes between the two courts.

* Ortiz, lib. 33, c. 9, 10.—Memoires de St. Philippe, t. 4.—de Tessé.
—Villars.

For a time she resided in the palace of Luxemburg, and maintained a splendid establishment by means of the annual pension which was remitted to her from Spain. But her gallantries occasioned public scandal, and she was obliged to dismiss a part of her household. As she filled the vacant places without regard to the privileges and remonstrances of the prince of Rubec, who retained the title of her mayor domo, he complained to the court of Madrid, and obtained an order enjoining her to accept the persons whom he should nominate. The high spirited princess resenting this attempt to controul her in the choice of her own household, dismissed the mayor domo. The court of Madrid accordingly withheld the payment of her pension, and she retired into the nunnery of the Carmelites, where she occupied the same apartments to which her sister, the duchess of Berri, repaired, in her temporary transitions from licentious amours to acts of penance and contrition. Here she continued, depending on the occasional bounties of the spanish court, and compensating for her former irregularities by a life of retirement and devotion, and died in 1742, of a dropsy.

* Memoires de Richelieu, t. 3, p. 259.—Tessé, t. 2, p. 370.—Ortiz, t. 7, p. 379.

CH. XXXIV.

1724

1725.

CHAPTER XXXV.

1725.

Acknowledgment of Don Ferdinand as Prince of Asturias—Cabals on the expected changes in the government—Removal of the Junta—Disgrace of Mirabal and Lede—Diminution of the credit of Grimaldo and rise of Oren-dayn—Change of policy in Spain—Overtures to the Emperor—Account of Ripperda—His plans of political æconomy—Negotiations at Vienna—Dismission of the infanta from France, and marriage of Louis the Fifteenth with Maria Letzinski—Indignation of the King and Queen—Their ineffectual overtures to England—Conclusion of an alliance with the court of Vienna.

CH. XXXV.

1725.

PHILIP having resumed the crown as if no renunciation had been made, with the tacit consent of the nation, convened the third branch of the cortes, in the church of St. Geronimo del Prado, and in the same manner and form as on the nomination of Don Louis procured their acknowledgement of Don Ferdinand as his successor.*

Nov. 25.

Immediately after the public resumption of the crown, Philip, with his queen and minister, retired to St. Ildefonso, and remained in perfect seclusion for forty days, to avoid the in-

* Desormeaux, t. 5, p. 391, 393.—St. Philippe, t. 4, p. 201.—Ortiz, t. 7, p. 281.

fection of the small pox, of which the young queen had sickened. In this interval of suspense, an active struggle took place among the different candidates for power, as well as between the contending partisans of France and England.

CH. XXXV.
1725.

Grimaldo, as nearest to the royal person, first felt the effects of this political rivalry. He was again attacked by Tessé and the french party, who accused him of receiving bribes from England, and of partiality to the maritime powers. Even the queen seems to have transferred her confidence to Orendayn, who, according to the usual custom of court dependants, betrayed the confidence of his benefactor, and endeavoured to supplant him. Long habit, together with the sense which Philip entertained of his merit, diligence, and usefulness, prevented the disgrace of Grimaldo; but these representations did not fail to produce a considerable diminution of his influence.

After the expiration of the forty days, Philip returned to the Escorial to receive the homage of his court, and regulate the arrangements in the administration which the late intrigues and changes had rendered necessary. His displeasure was first shewn against all who had evinced too zealous an attachment to the late sovereign, or too much anxiety to prevent his own resumption. Among these the most distinguished was Mirabal.

Mr. Keene, at this time resident at Madrid as agent of the South Sea Company, describes this revolution with the exactness of an eye witness. "Two days before the king came to Madrid, he ordered Montenegro to be removed from his place of secretary and intendant of the finances;* and sent to Ciudad

Jan. 26,
1725.

* St. Philippe has disclosed the real cause of his disgrace, which was his obeying the orders of Louis, in preference to the arrangements of Philip, prior to his abdication. T. 4, p. 206.

CH. XXXV.
1725.

Rodrigo, to be kept in a convent belonging to the knights of Alcantara, under pretext of mal-administration. His disgrace foreboded that of the president of Castile, who had raised him, and placed him in that profitable post. Orendayn was appointed by Grimaldo to dispatch the treasury in his place, to keep him employed, and as content as he was able."

"Two days after, the president of Castile, who had so long enjoyed the king's good graces, and had as much influence over him as any of his ministers, was notified to resign his office; but was made a counsellor of state, and a pension of a thousand ducats assigned to him, to comfort a fallen minister. He had of late observed some decay in his interest, and intended only to offer to lay down his employ, and at the same time to have made a recapitulation of his services, the better to move his majesty, and refix himself. But his enemies had notice of his design, and persuaded the king to send his quietus, before he could have an opportunity of an audience, which as president of Castile he has a right to every Friday.

"A courier was immediately dispatched to the bishop of Siguenza to succeed him. He was formerly chancellor of Milan; then auditor of the Rota; has lived the greater part of his time in Italy, and in his own see since he came to Spain; so that he is free from the brigues or dependencies of this court, and has not as yet listed himself into any party, nor been employed in any other negotiation than what directly regards the execution of his office.

"I have been the more particular on the president's fall, because it shews the present reigning interest in Spain, which is the queen's. She seems resolved to revenge herself on all those who were tepid, or appeared to be so, in persuading the king to re-accept the crown; and to take the wise precaution

to remove them, lest he should relapse into the same reveries. CH. XXXV.
 Marshal Tessé is made use of to lessen their esteem with the 1725.
 king, and to employ his emissaries to throw dirt on them in public before they design to give the stroke. This is the game he is now playing with Grimaldo, and has filled the town with stories of pensions from England, &c. So that I am apprehensive we shall shortly see they will have some effect on the king's suspicious temper, or else cost the marquis so much pains and trouble to support himself, that as he is pretty well advanced in years, he will sooner chuse to yield to them and retire.

"I have observed Orendayn's circle at court to be full as numerous as Grimaldo's. He, it seems, has made a merit of having refused some offers from the English in king Louis's reign, and is at present the favourite of the french, and the hope of the jacobites. The marshal would, as I am credibly informed, have lately presented him with a ring, which he refused to accept till he had the queen's commands for so doing, and wore it at their ceremonies."*

The next sacrifice was the marquis of Lede. When he presented himself to kiss the hand of his sovereign, Philip reproached him with his ingratitude, by sternly observing, "From you, Sir, I never expected such behaviour." The humbled courtier retired in confusion, and soon fell a victim to chagrin and disappointed ambition.†

Jan. 11.

Philip continued the other ministers, reinstated Grimaldo in the offices of secretary for foreign affairs and the Indies, and honoured him with the golden fleece. But Orendayn was appointed secretary of the finances, with the superintendance of

* Mr. Keene to Mr. Horace Walpole, Madrid, Jan. 26, 1725. Walpole Papers.

† St. Philippe, t. 4, p. 167.

CH. XXXV.
1725.

the general affairs of state, whenever Grimaldo was prevented from fulfilling his duty by his age and frequent infirmities. This was in effect preparing Orendayn for the reversion of the most important office in the administration.

Philip had no sooner restored order in his domestic government, than he turned his attention to foreign affairs; and resumed the complicated negotiation which was scarcely commenced at the moment of his abdication. The congress of Cambray had indeed continued its sittings during the short reign of Louis; but the business was principally confined to matters of etiquette and to entertainments, without unravelling a single thread of the gordian knot. However, the discussions soon degenerated into the former cavils and disputes; and the attention of the congress was less occupied with the subjects referred to its decision by the articles of the quadruple alliance, than with the abolition of the Ostend company, and the guaranty of the pragmatic sanction promulgated by Charles the sixth.

Meanwhile, the darling negotiation of the queen had been indirectly carried on by the agency of Monteleon. But his sanguine imagination had built too confidently on the support of the mediating powers. France, England, and Holland positively refused to co-operate in the forcible admission of the spanish prince in Italy; and at the moment when the revolution in the government opened the fairest career to his active and enterprising genius, he was detained at Paris on an irksome and unprofitable mission.

At length the impatience of Elizabeth Farnese terminated this farce of negotiation. Vexed with the jealousies of the mediating powers, indignant at the lukewarmness of France, from whom she had anticipated a cordial support; above all, mortified and chagrined to find the offer of Gibraltar a mere

illusion, and foiled in her plans for the immediate establishment of her son, she turned to the emperor himself, not merely to escape from the labyrinth in which she was entangled, but with the hope of drawing from him more essential advantages for the establishment of her children, than she could expect from the lukewarm mediation of France and England.

CH. XXXV.
1725.

The emperor was speedily apprised of this change of sentiment, and was impelled by similar motives to free himself from the irksome mediation of France and the maritime powers, from the latter of whom he was alienated by the endless disputes relative to the commerce and government of the Netherlands. He first employed the intervention of the pope to sound the disposition of the spanish court; and, when assured that his overtures would be favourably received, he made a direct application to the queen, and flattered her ruling passion for the aggrandisement of her family.*

The agent of this new and singular operation in policy was a counter-part of Alberoni, without his superior talents as a statesman, whose sudden rise and rapid disgrace form a memorable epoch in the reign of Philip.

John William, baron, and afterwards duke, of Ripperda, was descended from a noble family, originally Spanish, which had settled in the Netherlands while dependent on the spanish crown. He was born in the lordship of Groningen, about 1665,† and is said to have received his education in the jesuits' college at Cologne. After distinguishing himself as a classical scholar, he embraced the military profession, and at the close of the war of the succession had attained the rank of colonel. In the intervals of military duty, he acquired an

* House of Austria, v. 2, ch. 8.

† In the short period of his ministry, Montgon says, he was about sixty.

CH. XXXV.

1725.

extensive knowledge of modern languages; and deeming the theory of trade and manufactures the most effectual instrument of promotion in a commercial country, he successfully applied himself to the study of those branches of political œconomy.

At this period, he increased his fortune by espousing a rich heiress of Holland, and became one of the representatives of his province in the states general. He brought himself into notice during the congress of Utrecht, and in consequence of his commercial knowledge, was deputed as envoy to Madrid, to terminate the complicated disputes between Spain and the dutch republic. In this capacity he rendered essential service to the english ministers, and was rewarded with valuable presents. He at the same time devoted himself to the service of the emperor, to whom he became known by an acquaintance with prince Eugene, and was recompensed with an annual pension. His insinuating address, his knowledge of manufactures and commerce, his fertile genius, and acquaintance with languages, particularly the spanish, had early attracted the notice of Alberoni, then labouring for his own rise. Ripperda acquired the favour and confidence of so discerning a statesman, by supplying him with projects of political œconomy, and was consequently employed in affairs of the most delicate nature, particularly in those branches which had been the object of his study and meditation.

With these qualifications and advantages, Ripperda was at once the spy and agent of the imperial and british courts, and a servant of Spain, while he remained the ostensible representative of the dutch republic. Extravagant in his style of living, he was little scrupulous in acquiring money, and was bold and artful enough to obtain 14,000 pistoles from the british court, by employing the name of Alberoni himself, as reward for the

signature of the commercial treaty.* His deceptions were not, however, immediately detected, or were overlooked in consideration of his talents and services; for he continued to rise in the esteem and confidence of Alberoni, and assisted in accelerating his nomination as minister.†

CH. XXXV.
1725.

The elevation of his patron, and the splendid hopes inspired by the fortune of foreigners in Spain, induced Ripperda to lay down his ministry, and naturalise himself in a country which may be called the Paradise of adventurers. His distinguished talents and aspiring character began to awaken the jealousy of Alberoni, who urged his religion as an insuperable obstacle to his being employed in the service of the catholic king. But such objections were too trifling to baffle an enterprising and little scrupulous politician; and he compassed his design with the art of a consummate courtier. He found means to represent to the king, that the great virtues of his majesty had made an edifying impression on his heart, and that he was irresistibly moved to embrace a religion which would at once secure his own salvation, and enable him to devote himself to the service of so great, so pious, and so beneficent a monarch. The duty of nature, he said, obliged him to secure a competence for the support of himself and his family; but he trusted in the generosity of the king to make him some compensation for the sacrifice of his friends and country. He hinted that his studies had qualified him to superintend the manufactory at Guadalaxara, which had been established at his own suggestion.

* Mr. Dodington mentions the payment of this sum to Ripperda, on the behalf of Alberoni, and Mr. Stanhope afterwards discovered that it was converted to his own use.

† Account of Ripperda by the Sicilian Abbots, from whom we learn that he suggested to Alberoni the proper moment for assuming the administration, by the influence of the queen.

CH. XXXV.
1725.

His representations were attended with effect. His solemn abjuration was received; and he was immediately appointed superintendant, with a grant of lands, and a house which formerly belonged to the admiral of Castile.

Well acquainted with the proper sources of court favour, Ripperda, by the emperor's influence, obtained recommendations from the duke of Parma to the queen, and carefully copied the successful example of Alberoni. The rapid improvement of the manufactory under his auspices, and the skilful use which he made of his familiar intercourse with the king and queen, redoubled the jealousy of the minister, who was alarmed to see this adroit and enterprising foreigner tread so closely in his own footsteps, and he was removed from his superintendancy. He, however, dissembled his resentment, affected ignorance of the quarter from whence the blow was struck, and redoubled his attentions to Alberoni. But at the same time, he entered into connections with Grimaldo and d'Aubenton, and by those secret channels of communication which he well knew how to command, continued to present to the king plans and memorials adverse to the system, and exposing the errors of the minister.

These representations, and the verification of many of his predictions, made a due impression, and gained him the reputation of a man of singular foresight and intelligence. Accordingly, on the disgrace of Alberoni, he was not only restored to his former station with additional honour, but made superintendent general of all the manufactures in Spain, and took up his residence at Segovia, where he lived in a style of great magnificence. Being now a widower, he increased his connections in Spain, by espousing a castilian lady of noble family.

1721.

He continued to support his credit by new plans and suggestions for the improvement of trade, and the increase of

the revenue, and ingratiated himself with the queen, by recommending an intimate connection with the emperor as the most effectual expedient for aggrandising her family, and for marrying her son Don Carlos to one of the archduchesses. He now aspired to a share in the administration, and was on the point of succeeding, when he was foiled by the united influence of d'Aubenton and Grimaldo, who, after employing him to overthrow Alberoni, became jealous of his superiority, and represented the danger of confiding the reins of government to a new convert. Ripperda therefore turned his attacks against Grimaldo, and in a series of memorials exaggerated his errors, and detailed the mischiefs flowing from his impolitic devotion to the english court, at a time when England was peculiarly obnoxious. The death of d'Aubenton removing his most powerful enemy, he was on the point of triumphing over the opposition of Grimaldo, when the retreat of Philip suddenly overclouded his brilliant prospects.

CH. XXXV.
1725.

During the temporary seclusion of Philip, he improved the good opinion of the queen, and became her secret and confidential adviser. With the return of the king to the government, he emerged suddenly into new favour; and from his connections with the imperial court, was selected to negotiate that union with the House of Austria, which he had himself originally suggested and uniformly recommended.

Ripperda was furnished with authority and instructions to conclude a peace with the emperor, to negotiate a marriage between Don Ferdinand and the youngest archduchess, if he could secure the Netherlands and italian territories as her dowry, and to obtain the reversion of Tuscany and Parma for Don Carlos. These were the conditions which were probably settled with Philip, while he was charged with private orders from the queen to arrange a marriage between

CH. XXXV.
1725.

the eldest archduchess and Don Carlos, whose intended union with mademoiselle de Beaujolois, fourth daughter of the duke of Orleans, was in consequence to be annulled.

Before his departure, our political adventurer made a bold and adroit attempt to secure the post of prime minister on his return. He presented an extensive and splendid plan for the renovation of the spanish monarchy. He developed the means of improving the american trade, creating a powerful marine, and augmenting the public revenue; and interspersed his suggestions with invectives against the peculation of preceding ministers, and the incroachments of foreign nations on the spanish trade and territory.

It may not, perhaps, be unpleasing to the reader, to present the outline of a project which was intended to form the ground work of his own administration, and evidently suggested many beneficial improvements of succeeding ministers.

To eradicate the contraband trade to the West Indies, he proposed to establish a number of small light squadrons, amounting in the whole to eight ships of the line, ten frigates, and twelve gallies, so stationed as to range the whole coast of Southern America. To these were to be added a land force of 5,000 foot, and 1,000 horse, the object of which was to expel the english from their possessions and encroachments. To defray the expence, the militia duty, which was become useless, was to be commuted for a particular tax on each province, and an additional contribution of 5 per cent. was to be levied on all employments and pensions in those countries. The deficiency was to be supplied by appropriating the revenues of vacant sees and benefices.

This was to serve as the foundation to a new and efficient system of commerce, which was divided under three heads, the asiento of negroes, contraband, and the trade from Spain, by Cadiz, to the Indies.

CH. XXXV.
1725.

If the asiento could not be wrested from the English without a war, they were to be harassed till they should voluntarily relinquish it as vexatious and unprofitable. For this purpose, their passports were to be delayed, that they might not reach the West Indies till after the arrival of the flota and galleons, and after the periodical fairs. Private orders were to be given to all principal officers not to consume foreign, particularly english, manufactures, to lessen their estimation among the people, and, under the pretence of search, to exercise every species of vexation. The south sea company was also to be deprived of every indulgence not specifically included in the peace of Utrecht; to have no warehouses on the north sea; to be prohibited from selling, except at the fairs, where they would incur a certain loss; and all natives who should lend their names to the English, were to be punished with death. The acquiescence of England was anticipated; because, on the slightest complaint, Spain would be provided with a naval and military force to subjugate her colonies.

With regard to the second branch, or contraband, the king was to revive his antient and exclusive right of trading to the american colonies, that, under the pretext of smuggling, a constant cause might be adduced for seizing all foreign ships in the indian seas, even on their passage. But, while the utmost rigour was to be used towards the English, as the nation most benefited by this lucrative traffic, the dutch were to be adroitly lured with indulgences, to prevent the two maritime and trading nations from uniting in defence of their common interest. Thus, it was urged, the colonies of other countries, in this part of the western world, no longer enriched by the stream of treasure which continually flows from the adjacent continent, would speedily be abandoned as an useless charge, or yield to the first attack of the spanish arms.

CH. XXXV.
1725.

The regulations for the trade from Spain, tended to annihilate the commerce of the English and all other nations considered as not friendly. Returns were to be made of the goods sent to America; and measures adopted that such articles as could not be furnished by the mother country, should be drawn from friendly nations, though without a public prohibition of english commodities. To supply the deficiency, foreign manufacturers were to be invited to settle in Spain. By a perseverance in these and similar measures, the downfall of the english commerce was predicted in less than two years.

Ripperda proposed to send with each flota twelve royal ships loaded, and twelve galleons; and to keep two galleons constantly at Cadiz, and two at Buenos Ayres to serve in subsequent voyages. The expence of this armament would, it was calculated, be defrayed by the freight; because the merchants would naturally give the preference to king's ships well manned. This regulation would furnish a considerable force, with skilful mariners and able officers accustomed to the Indian seas. In case of a war, these flotas and galleons united, would immediately form a fleet of twenty four ships of war, and might speedily be joined by an additional force of fifty sail of the line.

He laboured also to shew the high importance of the Philippine Isles in a commercial view; and urged that an advantageous trade might be opened through this channel between Spain and the East. In support of his arguments, he added, that when he was permitted to examine the books of the dutch East India Company, he found accounts of great presents to the spanish ministers, for permission to trade with these islands, and export the silver brought from Mexico. He therefore proposed the formation of a spanish company trading to the Philippines. The ships of this company were to sail

from Cadiz to the South Sea, to distribute a part of their lading in Chili in exchange for silver and other native productions, and from thence proceed to the Philippines. This merchandise being disposed of in the ports of China, Siam, and the adjacent regions, to purchase spices and other eastern commodities, they were again to direct their course to Chili, and exchange their cargoes for silver, to be brought back to Spain. Thus he calculated that Spain would speedily appropriate the commerce both of their own territories and their own Indies, to the exclusion of interlopers, and even obtain a considerable share in the rich trade of the east.

CH. XXXV.
1725.

As the means for securing this extensive maritime commerce, a well fortified dock yard and arsenal were to be formed at Ferrol, as the station for the squadrons destined to cruise in the summer, to protect the american fleets, and watch the English. This project, besides ensuring the execution of the preceding plans, would keep the british nation in constant alarm, inflame the popular discontents; and, by the augmentation it must necessarily occasion in the public burdens, would contribute, with the decrease of trade, to the downfall of a power on the ruins of which alone Spain could hope to restore the edifice of her antient grandeur.

In addition to the plans for the improvement of the indian commerce, a factory was to be established at Ferrol, to trade to the northern countries, and establish fisheries. This, it was calculated, would maintain 20,000 families of mariners, and deprive the english of above a million of crowns, which they annually drew from Spain.

He also proposed to issue orders excluding foreign articles of wool, silk, &c. in proportion as such manufactures should be naturalised; and the king and court were to set the example in the consumption of home fabrics.

CH. XXXV.

1725.

As the means of giving energy and movement to this extensive system, he suggested the plan of a bank at Madrid, which was to allow five per cent. interest on all deposits of money. To form its fund, he proposed to transfer to it the treasure called St. Justus, for the relief of widows and orphans; and all the property of ecclesiastical establishments, intended for the purchase of additional revenues.

By the combined operation of all these causes, he confidently predicted such an augmentation of the national industry, population, and revenue, as would enable the king to maintain an army of 130,000 men, with a fleet of an hundred ships and frigates, and would furnish an annual surplus amounting to 2,000,000 crowns.*

Such plausible and magnificent plans, proposed by a man whose predictions had been so often verified, joined to a keen sense of resentment against England and France, captivated the romantic imagination of Philip. He promised the sanguine projector, that on his return from his mission he should be raised to the supreme direction of affairs; and empowered to effect that regeneration which he had so skilfully planned for his adopted country.

With this assurance, Ripperda departed from Madrid, and after a rapid and secret journey, arrived at Vienna *incognito* in November. To evade the prying eyes of the foreign ministers, and of those who were interested to thwart his design, he took up his residence in the suburbs under the name of baron

* These notices relative to the early life and plans of Ripperda, are principally taken from interesting documents communicated to the british court by the Sicilian abbots.

Account of the Rise and Plans of Ripperda, and the means of preventing their ill effects. Account of the means by which Ripperda ingratiated himself with their catholic majesties. MSS. in the Walpole Papers, translated from the original spanish, and communicated to Mr. Walpole at Paris, Oct. 1, 1727.

Pfaffenburg, and held his conferences nightly with count Sinzendorff, the imperial chancellor. He continued this secret agency, unnoticed by all the vigilance of political jealousy, above three months, and, before any certain knowledge could be gained of his person or object, had nearly fulfilled his mission. He seems even to have been lured by the imperial court, with the hope of a marriage between the eldest archduchess Maria Theresa and Don Carlos.

CH. XXXV.
1725.

When thus far matured, the design encountered the strongest opposition from the empress, from the archduchess herself, who was attached to the duke of Lorraine, and the ministers, who were devoted to the antient system of austrian policy. But the agent of Spain, supplied with immense sums, did not spare his largesses. Even the emperor himself did not blush to encourage this venal traffic by his own example. Of all the austrian ministers, Eugene alone maintained his integrity, and every obstacle seemed to be gradually diminishing under the powerful influence of money.*

At this juncture an unexpected incident swept away the remaining objections of the spanish court, and precipitated the conclusion of this singular and mysterious negotiation.

The duke of Bourbon, as prime minister of France, was actuated by different principles, both political and personal, from those which had induced the regent duke of Orleans to re-unite the spanish and french branches of the bourbon family. Personally obnoxious to the House of Orleans, he was anxious to prevent its eventual succession, in case of the death of the

* According to Mr. Stanhope's Dispatches, the sums distributed by Ripperda in the interval from July to Sept. 1725, amounted to no less than 570,000 pistoles. Mr. Stanhope to Lord Townshend, Nov. 2, 1725. Also St. Saphorin's Notices sur la Cour de Vienne ; and Dispatches to the british court, while their agent at Vienna. Walpole Papers.

CH. XXXV.
1725.

young king. Hence he formed the design of dissolving the compact of marriage which had been concluded for Louis the fifteenth; because the youth of the intended bride delayed for several years the hope of a direct successor. He long deliberated in what manner to take so delicate a step; and under various pretences, deferred the ceremony of betrothing, which was to have been performed when the infanta had attained her seventh year.

In the midst of his hesitation a dangerous illness of the young king alarmed the nation with the prospect of a disputed succession.* Of this sentiment the duke of Bourbon promptly availed himself. After various attempts to discover a princess of proper rank and mature age, he selected Maria, the daughter of Stanislaus Letzinski, titular king of Poland. This point being settled, he obtained the consent of the young king; and to prevent any opposition from the court of Madrid, it was decided to send back the infanta without previous notice, but with an apology urging the necessity of the case.

However secret this design was kept, either political jealousy, or private intimations awakened the suspicions of the spanish court; the importunities of the queen not only extorted repeated and solemn disavowals, but a promise that the ceremony of betrothing should speedily take place. The plan being matured, Tessé was recalled, and the communication of the unwelcome intelligence was intrusted to an humbler agent, the abbot de Livry, who was detached from his embassy of Portugal, as a minister well qualified by sedateness of temper and acquaintance with the court of Madrid for so delicate a commission. He reached Madrid, ignorant of the real motive of his appointment, and was overwhelmed with concern and terror at the communication of the orders.

* St. Simon, t. 8, p. 198.—Richelieu, t. 4, ch. 6.

with which he was charged. He was directed to demand an audience, and deliver the letters of excuse from the king and the duke of Bourbon, without any previous hint of their contents, that a pretext might not be found to refuse receiving them. But his mind was too deeply agitated to fulfil the injunction. When presented, he fell on his knees, burst into tears, and betrayed his errand by a confused apology.* The effect was such as might have been expected from sovereigns so ardent in their temper, and so affectionately attached to their children. The letters were indignantly rejected, and the queen, tearing a picture of Louis the fifteenth from her bracelet, trampled it under foot, exclaiming, "All the Bourbons are a race of devils!" But recollecting the relationship of her husband, she turned to him, and added, "except your majesty."† The minister, confounded and dispirited, was dismissed from the royal presence with ignominy and contempt.

In the first struggle of contending passions, the secret was not divulged, though the unusual agitation of the sovereigns, and the despondency of Livry himself, created suspicion. At length, when the intelligence arrived from Paris, and could no longer be concealed, their smothered resentment burst forth with redoubled fury. The minister and every french consul were ordered to depart without delay. Philip declared that all the blood of Spain could not sufficiently avenge the insult, and announced his resolution never to be reconciled to France till the duke of Bourbon had repaired to Madrid, and solicited for pardon on his knees. The indignation of the monarch spread rapidly among a nation peculiarly delicate on points of personal honour; for it required all the vigilance of the govern-

* *Memoires de Montgon*, t. 1, p. 16.—*Stanhope's and Keene's Dispatches*.

† *Account of Ripperda*, by the Sicilian Abbots.

CH. XXXV.
1725.

ment to prevent a general massacre of the french in the capital. All public connection was broken off betwen the two courts; and before the arrival of the infanta, the widow of Louis and mademoiselle de Beaujolois were sent back to France.*

In the first burst of resentment, the violence of the queen extorted from Philip a decree for the departure of every frenchman, without exception. On reflection, however, he became sensible of the injustice and even impracticability of this order, and adopted a whimsical expedient to pacify his imperious consort. Calling his valets, he made them open his wardrobes, and prepare his trunks as if for a journey. The queen entering amidst the bustle, demanded the cause of such preparations. "Is it not decreed," asked Philip, "that all the French should leave Spain? I am a Frenchman, and therefore am preparing for my journey." This ludicrous expedient was more effectual than serious remonstrances; the queen smiled, and the order was countermanded.†

Philip and the queen immediately sent for the english ambassador, Mr. Stanhope. They recapitulated all the irritating circumstances of the indignity they had suffered, and inveighed against the duke of Bourbon, for aggravating the outrage by his duplicity. Though in the presence of a public minister, the queen could not restrain her natural impetuosity. "This one-eyed scoundrel,"‡ she exclaimed, "has sent back my daughter because the king would not create the husband of his harlot a grandee of Spain!" Philip, with more decorum, added, "I am resolved to separate myself for ever from France, which,

* Account of Ripperda, by the two Sicilian abbots.—St. Philippe, t. 4, p. 216—223.—Ortiz, t. 7, lib. 23, c. 10.

† From Burgoing, to whom the anecdote was communicated by one of the valets de chambre. T. 2, p. 116—Note.

‡ Alluding to the duke of Bourbon, who was blind of an eye.

instead of weakening, will, I trust, strengthen the bands of amity between Spain and England. I will place my whole friendship and confidence in your sovereign, and will command my plenipotentiaries at Cambray to reject the interposition of France, and submit the arrangement of my disputes with the emperor to the sole mediation of Great Britain."

CH. XXXV.
1725.

Too impatient, however, to wait for a reply to the overture, Philip ordered Ripperda to abandon all the contested points which had retarded his negotiation. He entered also into a treaty for a double marriage with the family of Portugal, to unite Don Ferdinand with the infanta Barbara, and the intended queen of France with the prince of Brazil; while the queen dispatched a pressing injunction to Ripperda to conclude the match between Don Carlos and the eldest archduchess.

George the first declining the overture, and not only refusing to dissolve his connection with France, but urging the necessity of her support to defend Spain against the emperor, Philip turned his resentment against England. He reiterated his commands to Ripperda to hasten an accommodation; and broke up the congress of Cambray by recalling his plenipotentiaries.

The emperor was equally hostile to France and equally dissatisfied with England. The disputes therefore between two rival sovereigns, who for so many years had agitated Europe with their wars and intrigues, were terminated in a few conferences; and an alliance suddenly took place between these two inveterate and personal enemies, for the advancement of their mutual interest, and the gratification of their common resentment."*

April,
1725.

* Letters from St. Saphorin, minister at Vienna to the british court; from Mr. Stanhope to the duke of Newcastle, March 10 and 20, 1725. Mr. Keene, March 18, 1725.—Memoires de Montgon, t. 1, passim.—History of the House of Austria.—Memoirs of sir Robert Walpole.

CHAPTER XXXVI.

1726.

Substance of the three Treaties concluded by Ripperda at Vienna—His departure and arrival in Spain—His indiscreet and violent Conversations—Honourable reception at Madrid—Entrusted with the sole Administration of Affairs.

CH. XXXVI.

1726.

THE impatience of the spanish court was soon gratified; for within six weeks after the dismissal of the infanta, all Europe was alarmed with the disclosure of a treaty between Spain and the emperor, which had been concluded at Vienna on the 30th of April.

This engagement confirmed in general all the articles of the Quadruple Alliance. Both sovereigns renewed their former renunciations, but agreed to bear the titles which they had respectively assumed during their lives. The emperor confirmed the eventual investiture of the italian duchies; while Philip abandoned all ulterior pretensions to the territories dismembered from Spain, at the peace of Utrecht, as well as his protection of the italian states, and relinquished his title to the reversion of Sicily for that of Sardinia. But the most important article was the guaranty of the succession established in Spain, by the emperor, and the counter guaranty of the pragmatic sanction by Philip. On the 1st of May, the emperor, in the name of

the germanic body, signed a new treaty, approving the arrangements for the succession of Parma and Tuscany; and on the 20th of July it received the confirmation of the diet.

CH. XXXVI.
1726.

Another treaty was signed on the 1st of May, relative to commercial arrangements. The king of Spain sanctioned the company of Ostend, agreed to protect the subjects of the emperor in their trade to the East Indies, granted them free ingress and egress in all his ports, allowed them the same commercial privileges as were enjoyed by the most favoured nations, and, to gratify the states of the empire, extended to the Hans Towns the same advantages. To give additional effect to this arrangement, and enable the manufacturers and merchants of the Netherlands and the hereditary countries to maintain a successful competition with those of England and Holland, a design was formed to establish a new list of duties in their favour, by which their contributions were diminished one half.*

A secret treaty was signed at the same time, which, though according to the diplomatic phrase, called a treaty of defence, was in reality an offensive alliance. It contained a new guaranty of their respective dominions, a specification of the contingent to be furnished by each, in case of an attack, and an engagement to support each other if necessary with their whole force. The emperor pledged his good offices to obtain the recovery of Gibraltar and Minorca, and private and ulterior engagements were evidently arranged, if not actually signed, against the possessions and tranquillity of Great Britain.†

* Account of Ripperda, by the Sicilian abbots.

† From the mystery attending this transaction, much discussion has arisen on the subject of these secret articles. We have already dilated too amply on this subject in another work, to bring it again before the reader in the present. It is,

CH. XXXVI.
1726.

In announcing these treaties to the court of Madrid, Ripperda conveyed the most solemn assurances on the part of the emperor, that he would bestow his eldest daughter in marriage on Don Carlos, assist in the recovery of Gibraltar and Minorca

therefore, sufficient to observe, that, according to all the proofs which the case admits, and which we think sufficient to satisfy any unprejudiced mind, these secret engagements comprised the forcible recovery of Gibraltar, and the restoration of the exiled family, should England refuse to comply with the demands of the Vienna allies. We barely recapitulate a part of these engagements, as communicated by the Sicilian abbots, of whose accurate information, and favour with Philip, we have adduced many proofs in this work; and, if more were necessary, more may be found in the testimony of Montgon, at this time himself high in the royal confidence. Montgon, t. 3, p. 64, t. 5, p. 108. 137.

“ Art. 5. Their cesarean and catholic majesties, foreseeing that the king of England will oppose the execution of such designs, as well in regard to his particular interests, as not to lose his umpireship in Europe, for which reason he will undoubtedly engage the English nation, and unite the Dutch and other princes in his league, they oblige themselves to seek all methods to restore the Pretender to the throne of Great Britain, to which end, the catholic king was to make use of the pretence of the restitution of Gibraltar, which he was to demand immediately, as soon as the peace of Vienna was published.” *Memoirs of Lord Walpole*, c. 14.

We cannot, however, omit to introduce a curious anecdote, communicated by Count Rottembourg to Mr. Walpole, which carries with it all the evidence that the tacit avowal of Philip and his queen themselves can afford.

“ Count Rottembourg mentioned a very remarkable thing. In speaking of me to their catholic majesties, he told them, I had wrote Mr. Keene word in one of my private letters, that I had such an opinion of their veracity, that if it was possible to ask them the question, and they would declare there was no other treaty between the emperor and Spain, than that which was public, I would freely own that all the measures taken by England were wrong and unjustifiable. Having said this to their catholic majesties, they made him no manner of answer; and, observing their countenances, the queen looked upon the ground, and the king coloured extremely. But her catholic majesty having recovered herself, said to the king, Sir, you never did make any treaty against England. The king, however, continued silent, and said nothing.” *Mr. Walpole to the duke of Newcastle*, Paris, May 4, N. S. 1728.

by force, and concur in the hostile designs of Philip against England and France. The glad tidings were received at Madrid with transports of joy; the sanguine imagination of Philip was inflamed, and he fondly hoped that the time was arrived to retaliate for past mortifications, and gratify his disappointed ambition. The treaty of peace was first published, that of commerce next divulged; the other engagements were, for a time, veiled in mysterious secrecy, and known only from the vaunts of Ripperda, and the exultation and imperious demands of the court of Madrid. The services of Orendayn, who had conducted the correspondence, were rewarded with the title of marquis de la Paz, and proofs of increasing favour; and Ripperda, immediately raised to the rank of a duke, was made a grandee on his return to Madrid.*

CH. XXXVI.
1726.

The circumstances of this negotiation drew the attention of the powers more immediately interested. In consequence of the public boasts of Ripperda, that England should be compelled to restore Gibraltar and Minorca, Mr. Stanhope demanded an explicit avowal, whether this declaration was made by authority from the king of Spain. Philip and the secretary Grimaldo did not at first hesitate to disavow the minister; but at the moment when Mr. Stanhope was preparing to transmit the intelligence to his court, he received a note from Grimaldo, requiring the *immediate restitution of Gibraltar*, as the only expedient to avert a rupture. Astonished at such prevarication, he demanded an audience, respectfully remonstrated against the precipitancy of the demand, and represented that it was previously necessary to obtain the consent of parliament, which could not be assembled till the return of the king, then in Hanover. He was interrupted by the queen: "No!" she exclaimed, with her usual vivacity, "Then let

Aug. 6,
1725.

* Ortiz, t. 7, p. 386.

CH. XXXVI.
1726.

the king your master return instantly to England, and summon a parliament, a measure we have a right to expect, from his repeated offers of friendship. I am fully convinced that the proposal would not meet with a single negative in either house. To give more weight to the demand, let this short argument be used; either relinquish Gibraltar, or your trade to the Indies; the question will not admit of a moment's dispute or delay.*

Aug. 16.

In consequence of the information which the british court had already received, concerning the secret engagements between those of Madrid and Vienna, this imperious and insulting demand was repelled with proper dignity. An immediate declaration was also obtained from France, announcing a resolution to concur in proper measures for maintaining the british nation in the possession of Gibraltar, and the enjoyment of its commercial privileges.†

Both Austria and Spain immediately made active preparations for war, and Philip flattered himself that this union would enable him to give the law to Europe. He encouraged his partisans in France, caballed against the duke of Bourbon, and joined with the emperor to form a party in favour of the Pretender, both in England and on the continent. They acquired a preponderance in the North, by gaining Russia; they hoped, by the treasures of Spain and the imperial influence, to obtain a majority in the empire; and the marquis of St. Philip was dispatched to secure the acquiescence of the Dutch.

The alliance of Vienna, joined to the active cabals, myste-

* Memoirs of sir Robert Walpole, ch. 34.—Mr. Stanhope to lord Townshend, Aug. 6, 1725.

† State of the Negotiations with Spain, from the Treaty of Vienna to December, 1727.

rious threats, and hostile preparations of the two powers, excited all the alarm which they expected to create, but did not, as they hoped, deter England and France from opposing force to force. Common danger produced an intimate union, and they were soon joined by many of the minor powers who were equally threatened or alarmed. The result of their concurring efforts and negotiations was the celebrated alliance of Hanover between England, France, and Prussia, which formed a counterpoise to the alliance of Vienna. The bond of this union was a defensive treaty for the mutual protection of each other's dominions and possessions; with a common engagement against the Ostend company, and the other commercial projects of Spain and the emperor, by a general renewal and confirmation of all prior treaties of commerce.*

Europe was now divided into two great parties by the efforts of the rival powers to increase the force of their respective alliances; and every court within the sphere of their influence was agitated by their intrigues and bribes, and other artifices of diplomatic warfare.

While the commotion was rapidly spreading around, the principal agent of this great political revolution emerged from his retreat, and assumed the state and honours of an ambassador of the highest rank. Naturally vain and loquacious, his indiscretion was increased by the pride of success: even on the most public occasions, he expatiated on the mighty effects which would result from the formidable alliance of the two most powerful courts in Christendom.

His arrangements being completed, he left his son Louis, then only nineteen years of age, as chargé d'affaires; and quitted Vienna without deigning to take the customary leave of any of the public ministers. Accompanied by only a single

* Rousset, t. 2, p. 189.—Koch, t. 2, p. 20, 23.

CH. XXXVI.

1726.

attendant, he hastened back to receive the honours and rewards which awaited him in his adopted country. Even on his journey, he could not refrain from indulging a vanity equally puerile and imprudent. At Genoa, he was received with unusual honours; and in the extravagance of his exultation, indulged himself in the same boasts as at Vienna.

On landing at Barcelona, he detailed to the officers of the garrison, who crowded to pay their respects, an ample account of his mission, and of its successful result. The emperor, he said, had an army of 150,000 men, ready to march without delay. At the moment of his departure from Vienna, prince Eugene bade him assure the king, his master, that in case of a war, as many more would be ready to obey the orders of Spain in six months; and the emperor himself in the strongest terms announced his resolution to support the king of Spain with his whole force, should he be reduced to declare war, in order to obtain the restitution of Gibraltar.* He spoke with the utmost contempt of the duke of Bourbon and the french government. "Should the Hanover allies," he exclaimed, "dare to oppose the designs of the emperor and Spain, that great grenadier the king of Prussia shall be driven from his throne; George the second stripped of his territories in the empire in a single campaign, and his english throne filled by the rightful heir, James the third. Never shall a reconciliation take place while I have any influence; and could I only live till that event, I should have no doubt of attaining an advanced age."†

Anxious to convey himself the grateful intelligence of his success, he rode like an ordinary courier, and arrived at

* Memoirs of sir Robert Walpole, 4to, v. 2, p. 580.

† Mr. Stanhope to lord Townshend, Dec. 27, 1725.—Memoirs of sir Robert Walpole, 4to, v. 2, p. 275.

Madrid in the afternoon of the 11th of December. Conscious that he was authorised to overstep all the punctilios of spanish etiquette, after a momentary interview with his wife, he hurried directly to the palace in his traveller's apparel. On reaching the anti-chamber he was informed that the king and queen were engaged with Grimaldo. He expressed his impatience at this trifling delay; and when the secretary quitted the cabinet, he did not condescend to notice a man whom he had already doomed to disgrace. His arrival being announced to the king and queen, he was welcomed with unusual kindness; and in a long audience detailed his recent transactions, and developed his future designs.*

CH. XXXVI.

1726.

Honours and rewards now showered on our political adventurer. On the following morning he was declared secretary of state in the room of Grimaldo; and an order issued to the other ministers and foreign ambassadors, to make their communications to him alone, announced that, like Alberoni, he was raised to the place of prime minister. It is needless to particularise the successive promotions which marked his rapid career. In the short space of two months he concentrated in himself not only the departments of war, marine, and the Indies, but even the revision and superintendence of the courts of justice.†

If the conduct and language of Ripperda were before equally unbecoming and indecorous, it will be easily imagined that he became still more insolent when basking in the full sunshine of royal favour. It was his favourite and almost continual topic of discourse to extol the strength of the emperor

* Montgon, t. 1, p. 205.

† Memoirs de Montgon, t. 1, p. 207.—Memoirs of sir Robert Walpole, ch. 35.—Ortiz, t. 7, lib. 23, c. 10. Account of Ripperda, &c. by the Sicilian abbots.

CH. XXXVI.
1726.

and Spain, which, if united, he said, would not only counter-balance all the other powers of Europe, but would suffice to chastise those who should presume to resist them. The Pretender, he repeated, should be established on the throne of England; weakness and divisions in the government would reduce France to neutrality; the parliament of England would never be induced to sanction a war with Spain, nor the Dutch to accede to the Hanover alliance; while his own superior credit and fertile resources would draw from Spain whatever sums he should want or desire.

The court easily caught the confidence and presumption of the minister, and announced the conclusion of an offensive alliance with the emperor, in terms which shewed its expectation of intimidating Europe.*

* Stanhope's Dispatches.—Montgon, t. 1, passim.

CHAPTER XXXVII.

1726.

Administration of Ripperda—His ineffectual attempts to intimidate and afterwards to divide the maritime Powers and France—Difficulties of his situation—Failure of his promises to the imperial court—Disputes with Konigseg the imperial Ambassador—Attacks of his enemies—Loses the favour of the King and Queen—Disgrace—Takes refuge in the Hotel of the english Ambassador—Discloses the secrets of the spanish Cabinet—Arrest and imprisonment in the Castle of Segovia—Subsequent adventures—Change of administration.

SUPPORTED by royal favour, and swollen with his native presumption, Ripperda prepared to carry into execution the splendid projects for which he had been chosen to guide the helm of state. The sanguine hope, which naturally attends a change of government, prevailed to a high degree both in the court and nation: the favourite of the day was hailed in the glowing language of spanish romance, as a new planet rising in the political horizon, as the harbinger of peace and prosperity to a troubled world. He himself flattered the general prepossession by his own confidence; by displaying the presumption of one who felt the vast extent of his own abilities and resources, who was fully assured of fulfilling all the promises which he had lavished on the sovereign

CH. XXXVII.

1726.

CH. XXXVII.
1726.

and the nation. He represented himself as appointed to change the antiquated and defective system of spanish polity ; to purge the courts of justice ; to reform every department of state ; to break the commercial fetters imposed on the country by the maritime powers ; to revive the splendour of that people who had once given law to Europe, and whose energies had been depressed by the vices, ignorance, and misconduct of preceding administrations.

Elevated expectations are however inseparably united with disappointment and contempt ; and never was an unfortunate projector more completely deluded by his own sanguine imagination than Ripperda. Amidst the illusions of extraordinary success and airy favour, he had not calculated the strength of interested opposition, even to the most beneficial designs ; he had widely over-rated his own abilities ; he had ill appreciated the obstacles arising from the character of the people, the circumstances of the country, and his own personal situation ; he had fondly hoped to realise in an hour that which could only be attained by a long course of successful years. Above all, he little suspected, that even before his return from Vienna, effectual means had been employed to arm against him the prejudices of the king. The suspicious diffidence of Philip, who never gave his full confidence to any minister, induced him to submit the projects of Ripperda to the Sicilian abbots, and to others from whom he was accustomed to receive secret advice. This communication was fatal to their author. Besides exposing and exaggerating the defects and errors in his plans, these private advisers excited the jealousy which Philip entertained of his prerogative ; and deterred him from confiding to the new minister that extensive power which was necessary for carrying them into execution.*

* Account of Ripperda by the Sicilian abbots.

Ripperda had as widely mistaken the temper and principles of the queen. He was ill calculated and ill prepared to sway a princess, haughty and impetuous, who pursued her designs with inflexible perseverance ; who spurned at delay or restraint, and would not suffer the most important considerations to interfere with her prejudices or personal interests.

CH. XXXVII.
1726.

Thus circumstanced, Ripperda, in assuming the government, was loaded with honours, titles, and all the external appearances of authority ; but without the solid power possessed by Alberoni. He was suspected by the king, harrassed by the impatience of the queen, detested by the grandees, thwarted and exposed by those whom he had displaced, and surrounded by a host of enemies, without the means to baffle their vigilance or repel their hostilities.

In the very outset of his career he encountered an insurmountable obstacle to the discharge of the subsidies which he had promised to the emperor. By the constant drains of incessant wars, the great extent of the current expences, and the enormous sums already transmitted to Vienna, the royal treasury was completely exhausted. The salaries of the household and civil officers were in arrears ; even the army, which had been augmented to 80,000 men, was ill paid, and in want of every necessary article of equipment. The people were oppressed with taxes which were difficult to be raised ; while the trade and industry of the nation suffered under a general stagnation of credit, in consequence of the disputes with France and the maritime powers.

In the midst of these embarrassments, count Konigseg arrived at Madrid, as ambassador from the emperor, and was welcomed with extravagant marks of favour and exultation. It was naturally supposed that the presence of an ambassador from Vienna would consolidate the influence of the minister

CH. XXXVII.
1726.

who had originally formed the connection between the two courts. But such was the situation of Spain and the emperor, and such the circumstances of Ripperda himself, that this very incident increased his difficulties; and, amidst the general joy which welcomed the arrival of Konigseg, the countenance of the minister was clouded with doubt and apprehension.*

In spite of the lavish promises of Ripperda and the artifices of the austrian court, it now appeared that far from being anxious to hasten the promised marriage, the emperor was deterred by the opposition of the german princes, and only sought to gain plausible pretexts for delay. It was likewise evident that his military preparations were far from being so extensive or mature as Ripperda had inconsiderately represented; and that instead of dictating to the Hanover allies in the empire and the north, he had the mortification to see their influence triumphant in every quarter.

Ripperda was irritated and harrassed by the incessant importunities of the imperial ambassador for pecuniary assistance, to subsidise the catholic princes of the empire, and give energy to the preparations of the emperor. To elude these importunities, he was forced to allege excuses on excuses; to urge the impoverished state of the treasury; and with difficulty obtained a respite, till the arrival of the periodical supplies which were expected from America.

With these endless causes of discontent and irritation, the intercourse of the two ministers became daily less cordial, and finally terminated in a state of covert hostility. Still, however, the interest of both to deceive the queen protracted an open rupture. Konigseg amused her with professions and apologies on the part of his sovereign; while Rip-

* Memoires de Montgon, t. 1, p 290.

perda adopted the most vigorous measures to allay the cupidity of the imperial court. To obtain a temporary supply, he made a sweeping reform in every branch of administration, discharged hosts of clerks and officers, and levied contributions on the farmers of the revenue, the viceroys, and others who had filled lucrative offices, under the pretence of peculation. He raised the value of the gold coin, and recurred to a measure equivalent to that of closing the exchequer in England, the suspension of all pensions and payments. Such rigorous measures were sufficient to rouse the popular indignation at any period, and at the present they were more keenly resented, because they were introduced by an upstart foreigner, and appeared as the first fruits of that alliance from which such benefits had been expected, but which had proved the fertile source of innumerable mischiefs.

CH. XXXVII.

1726.

Conscious of his difficulties, yet anxious to satisfy the expectations he had raised, Ripperda endeavoured to supply his want of strength by vaunts, threats, and ostentation. With this view, he induced Philip to address a letter to the states general, apprising them that he was obliged to assist the emperor in case of a war, and to avenge the wrongs he might receive from his enemies. That he would make a common cause with his imperial majesty in all things, and by all things, and declare war against all who should engage in hostilities against him, holding the enemies of the emperor for his own, and being fully assured of a return equally zealous on his part.*

Jan. 23.

With a similar hope, Ripperda employed a different expedient to alarm England. With affected confidence, he communicated to the british minister a part of the secret articles of the treaty of Vienna, relating to the engagement of Spain to support the company of Ostend, and the reciprocal promise of

* Historical Register, 1726, p. 40.

CH. XXXVII.
1726.

the emperor to assist in recovering Gibraltar by good offices, or by force, if necessary. He detailed the means devised for carrying these designs into execution; he said the emperor was to send 30,000 men into Spain; and added, with an implied threat against England, that he would employ as many more, at the charge of the king, *wherever such a force was deemed necessary to promote the objects of the alliance.**

Not content with mere threats, he planned an expedition against the british isles, in favour of the exiled family. Affecting to apprehend an attack on the northern coasts of Spain, he collected 12,000 men in Gallicia, under the command of Don Louis de Cordova, equipped six men of war at Cadiz, under the pretext of a voyage to the West Indies, and ordered some russian ships, which had reached the coasts of Spain, to the northern ports, to concur in the enterprise.†

To supply the expences of the armament, he proposed to appropriate the charitable fund of St. Justus, amounting to 9,000,000 dollars, under the promise of future reimbursement. But even the sovereign of Spain could not venture to touch this sacred deposit, without the consent of the council of Castile; and accordingly the queen, by the agency of her confessor, endeavoured to gain the president, the bishop of Sigüenza. The queen and minister were, however, too little beloved to obtain the support of a spanish minister, in such an open violation of the national feelings and principles. The president referred the proposal to his friends, the two sicilian abbots, and, in consequence of their dissuasions, not only re-

* Stanhope's Dispatch to the duke of Newcastle, Feb. 4, 1726.—Memoirs of sir Robert Walpole, 4to. v. 2, p. 584.

† Stanhope's Dispatches.—Sir Robert Walpole to lord Townshend, London, Oct. 12—21, 1725.—Lord Townshend to the duke of Newcastle, Nov. 4—15, 1725.—Memoirs of sir Robert Walpole, v. 2, p. 486—490.

fused his assent, but solemnly protested against a measure pregnant with such mischief and injustice.*

CH. XXXVII.
1726.

The queen and minister were equally confounded and indignant at this unexpected obstacle, and the queen in particular testified her resentment so warmly against the president, that he fell ill from chagrin and apprehension. The king, however, being deeply affected by the representations of the president, the expedient was necessarily abandoned. To save appearances, the minister employed the royal name in demanding from England and France a disavowal of any hostile design against the spanish coasts; and this disavowal being freely given, the troops were remanded to their former quarters.†

At the same moment, he turned his views to France, expecting to raise that jealousy or apprehension which he had failed to excite in England and Holland, and flattering himself that the court of Versailles might be lured with the hope of a reconciliation, or dazzled with the prospect of establishing a bourbon prince on the throne of the empire. With his characteristic presumption, he boasted that he was able at any moment to effect this reconciliation. He accordingly opened a secret correspondence, by means of the queen's confessor, Montgon, and other french agents, with Fleury, and endeavoured to gain him by offering to favour his design of supplanting the duke of Bourbon.

In all quarters, the sanguine minister was equally unsuccessful. His threatening mandate to Holland, and his attacks against their commerce in supporting the rival company of Ostend, weighed with many towns which were before adverse to the Hanover alliance, and weakened that influence from which Spain had hitherto drawn such advantage.

* Account of Ripperda by the two Sicilian abbots.

† Mr. Stanhope to the duke of Newcastle, April 23, 1726, N. S.

CH. XXXVII.

1726.

The british nation and parliament, as on every dangerous occasion, rallied round the throne. Contrary to the hopes of Ripperda, they not only supplied the means of fulfilling the hanover alliance, but testified their resolution to defend the german dominions of the king, if attacked, in consequence of the measures pursued by the british government.

These repeated disappointments induced him to change his tone, and he became as humble as he was before vain and insolent. Instead of the peremptory demand of Gibraltar, he now mildly assured Mr. Stanhope, that it should not be made the subject of a war; that, although the king would not relinquish his pretensions, he was ready to wait a twelve-month, or even a much longer time. He concluded with pressing for an amicable negotiation on this disputed point, pledging his head, that such an equivalent should be offered on the part of Spain as would be perfectly satisfactory to the british nation.*

Even the faint hopes which remained of detaching France from the Hanover alliance totally vanished. Fleury was too cautious, as well as too secure of his own personal influence with the young king, to employ the assistance of Spain against the duke of Bourbon. The duke himself, also, felt that the only chance of his continuance in power depended on the maintenance of the connection with England. Both courts accordingly presented a strong declaration, expressive of their cordial union, by the agency of Mr. Stanhope, who, from the absence of a french ambassador, was charged with their public business at Madrid. On this occasion, the king and minister shewed their disappointment, in a manner conformable to their respective characters. When Mr. Stanhope presented the letter written on the occasion, by Morville, french secretary of

* Mr. Stanhope to the duke of Newcastle, Feb. 28, 1726.

state, the king cautiously read it over, and then sullenly observed, "By this it appears that the king your master, and the french court, are closely united: so am I with the emperor." Ripperda, on the contrary, whose feelings and character were more impetuous, displayed every symptom of extreme chagrin and agitation, and, to adopt the expression of the british minister, "appeared more discontented than he had power to describe."*

CH. XXXVII.
1726.

Such sinister omens announced the approaching fall of this political meteor. He was overwhelmed with the multifarious business which flowed into his different departments, where his rigorous reforms had left him almost without assistance. He was perplexed and baffled even in the most beneficial designs, by the interested opposition of the councils and ministers; he was intimidated by the general clamour against the Vienna alliance.

Philip, who, amidst his hypochondriac melancholy, was not deficient in judgment nor in love of his people, at length truly estimated the extravagance of his visionary schemes, and encouraged the attacks of his enemies. He even repeatedly represented to the queen, that it was necessary to remove such a madman from power. For a time, however, Ripperda still maintained himself by the protection of this imperious woman, who reluctantly abandoned the hope that he would ultimately realise the promises with which he had flattered her ambition.

Confiding in her support, Ripperda endeavoured by confidence and presumption to overawe his enemies, and save his tottering authority. He even ventured to overstep the respect due to the princes of the royal blood. The game-keepers of the prince of Asturias having shot a dog belonging to his wife, were instantly arrested. When the prince appeared before the

* Mr. Stanhope to the duke of Newcastle, April 23, 1726.

CH. XXXVII.
1726.

king to demand redress, the minister attempted to interrupt him. The prince, with castilian spirit and brevity, silenced him with the remark, "I am speaking to the king:" Philip nodded approbation, and the humbled pride of the minister was reduced to an apology.

In a public levée, he enjoined the confessor to confine himself to the spiritual concerns of the sovereign, and not to meddle in other matters. On another occasion, he no less publicly declared, "I know that the spanish nation hate me; but I despise their attempts while I am protected by the queen, to whom I have rendered the most important service." He once made use of the absurd and childish exclamation, "I have six good friends, God, the Virgin Mary, the emperor and empress, and the king and queen of Spain."

His vacillations, indiscretion, and absurdities, were, however, rapidly dissipating the favourable opinion which the queen herself had formed of his abilities and resources. Her pride, vanity, and ambition, for a time struggled against the general sentiment, and even against her own conviction: she passed whole days in alternate fits of tears and passion, when urged by the arguments of her consort.* At length means were adopted to overcome her infatuation, by persuading her that other ministers could be found no less capable of realising her darling projects than Ripperda, without his vanity and indiscretion.

The two brothers, the marquis of Castellar and Don Joseph Patiño, who had been removed from their offices, to make way for Ripperda, were the chiefs of the cabal which struck the death blow to his authority. They were assisted by Sopena,

* "The king is extremely agitated and uneasy, and has daily disputes with the queen, who does nothing but cry from morning till night." Mr. Stanhope to the duke of Newcastle, March 29, 1726.—Memoirs of sir Robert Walpole, v. 2, p. 584. Correspondence.

Ariaza, and other discarded ministers, and still more by their relative Monteleon, who, since his return from France, had regained his former favour. But their chief support was the confessor of the queen.*

CH. XXXVII.
1726.

This priest had been recommended to his post by Alberoni and d'Aubenton, from an opinion of his want of capacity and unambitious spirit. During the life of d'Aubenton and the ministry of Alberoni, he remained in the back ground; but he afterwards ceased to act a subordinate part; employed all the arts of petty cunning and an insinuating disposition, to acquire influence with his royal mistress, and succeeded by flattering her ambition, and affecting an entire devotion to her will. His ignorance of political affairs, joined to his anxiety to consolidate his favour, led him to form an intimate connection with the sicilian abbots, and particularly with the two Patiños,† who were capable of supplying him with that information which his confined understanding and professional occupations had not permitted him to acquire. By his channel, therefore, the Patiños found means to transmit such representations as were at once calculated to weaken the power of the minister, and bring themselves into notice. They applied with equal success to count Konigseg, by engaging to realise the promises of Ripperda, and, through his interposition, acquired the powerful assistance of the imperial court.

While this cabal was imperceptibly sapping the credit of the falling minister, he received a new shock from the members of the Hanover alliance. Without declaring war, France and England employed prompt and effectual measures to palsy the efforts of Spain. France menaced an attack by land, while England detached three squadrons, one to the Baltic, a second

* He had recently been raised to the rank of titular archbishop of Amida.

† Montgon, t. 1, p. 513.

to the coasts of Spain, and a third to block up the galleons in the ports of America. By the former, the powers of the North were awed, and the attention of Spain called to her own shores; by the latter, the regular supplies were suspended, public credit destroyed, and the last resource on which Ripperda had calculated, snatched from his grasp.

At this crisis, the smothered enmity between the minister and count Konigseg burst into open hostility. Konigseg assailed him with incessant accusations, and charged him with deceiving the court of Vienna, by pretending that the king of Spain was richer than all the other princes of Europe, while, in reality, he was scarcely less distressed than the emperor himself. On the other hand, Ripperda complained to the english and dutch ministers, that the Germans were insatiable, and would not be contented till they had drained the king of his last pistole. These bickerings were followed by a formal complaint from the emperor himself, inveighing against the folly and imprudence of Ripperda, in revealing to the british minister the secret articles of the treaty of Vienna, and exaggerating the fatal consequences of the disclosure. Such an attack was decisive. The queen herself joined with Konigseg in inflaming the displeasure of the king, employed all her influence to overthrow her own creature, and urgently recommended the Patiños, who had pledged themselves to discharge the subsidies, and fulfil the promises with which Ripperda had lured the imperial court.

Still, however, the fall of Ripperda was not sudden like that of Alberoni. He was first removed from the superintendence of the finances, and this partial disgrace was palliated with the pretence of relieving him from a part of the burthens of administration. Too well acquainted with court favour to mistake this prognostic of approaching ruin, he requested

permission to retire. But the arrangements of his enemies were not yet matured, or the effects of his despair and indiscretion were dreaded. His demand was refused; he was never permitted to make an apology for his conduct, and continued a few days in the regular transaction of business. On the 14th of May, as he was quitting the royal cabinet, he received a decree from the marquis de la Paz, announcing the acceptance of his resignation by the king; and the grant of an annual pension of 3,000 pistoles, for his past services.

CH. XXXVII.
1726.

This spoiled child of fortune might probably have been permitted to retire from visionary power to substantial affluence; but the very apprehensions which had apparently delayed and softened his fall, were now realised. From resentment or fear he had for some time courted the british and dutch governments; and in the first emotions occasioned by his dismissal, he hurried to the hotel of the dutch minister, Mr. Vander Meer, under the pretext of escaping from the indignation of the populace, who tumultuously assembled about his house.

May 15.

Receiving however no encouragement from his own countryman, he took refuge in the hotel of Mr. Stanhope, who was then absent with the court at Aranjuez. On his return Ripperda betrayed the most abject humiliation, and purchased a temporary protection by disclosing all the secrets of the spanish cabinet, with the exaggerations natural to his disordered feelings and dangerous situation. Besides the secret articles which he had before communicated, he now mentioned the intended marriages of the two archduchesses with the two infants, developed the plans formed for the restoration of the pretender, and the schemes for dismembering from France, Alsace, Franche Comté, Burgundy, Navarre, Rousillon, and all the possessions which she had wrested from Austria and Spain; and concluded with adverting to the

CH. XXXVII.
1726.

various projects for the eventual succession of Philip to the french throne. He accompanied the detail with signs of the utmost agony and contrition, and frequently interrupted his recital with groans and tears.

With the inconsistency of a weak mind, at the very moment when he had thus forfeited all claims to the royal indulgence, this singular and imprudent man made a final attempt to regain the partiality of his injured sovereigns. He wrote a letter expatiating on his past services, adding this expostulation, "Was it not I, who procured for your majesty the treaty of Vienna; was it not I, who concluded the marriages of Don Carlos and Don Philip with the two arch-duchesses?" He had even the folly to recommend the king to abandon the emperor and unite with England and France, from whom he might draw greater advantages for his children, namely, Italy for Don Carlos and the Netherlands for Don Philip. He concluded his rhapsody with requesting permission to retire into a convent.*

It was not to be expected that the sovereigns of Spain would tamely suffer their disgraced favourite to insult them under the protection of a foreign minister. They therefore demanded the surrender of his person, and this being declined, they sent a military force, and caused him to be seized and transported under a strong guard to the castle of Segovia. But these precautions were too late to prevent the effects of his treason. Mr. Stanhope found means to commit the detail of his discoveries to writing, and place it in the hands of a friend; and dispatched the english consul to Keene, with a

* Mr. Stanhope to the duke of Newcastle, March 18, and July 2, 1726. Memoirs of sir Robert Walpole, and Walpole Papers. And other details from a curious Dispatch written by Mr. Keene, June 15, 1726, who was selected to convey this important intelligence to London. Memoirs of sir Robert Walpole, Correspondence, v. 2, p. 606.

verbal account to his court. He made a protest against the violation of the privileges attached to his residence; but as the conduct of Ripperda was in itself unjustifiable, the british court profited by his disclosures without descending to any efficient measure of resentment.

CH. XXXVII.
1726.

The caprices and favours of fortune, towards this singular man, were not yet exhausted. After a confinement of fifteen months, though crippled with the gout, he found means to escape by the assistance of a maid servant, Josepha Romero, whom he had seduced; reached Portugal in safety, and landed in England, where he was received in secret, but with respect. His presumption induced him to make an attempt to play the same part in England as in Spain;* but failing in the design he withdrew to his native country, where he again embraced the protestant faith. Being demanded by the court of Spain as a state criminal, and his resentment against Spain still rankling in his bosom, he entered into the service of the Moors, through the agency of Perez, a spanish renegado, then moorish resident at the Hague. He was honourably received by the emperor Muley Abdalla, filled the administration for several years, and commanded an army against the spaniards.† On the dethronement of Muley Abdalla, he obtained the protection of the basha of Tetuan, and closed his chequered life in November, 1737, whether as a christian or a mussulman is uncertain and unimportant.

In reviewing the transitory administration of Ripperda, we naturally draw a comparison between him and his predecessor

* Memoirs of sir Robert Walpole.—Art. Ripperda.

† In consequence of this connection with the infidels, he was deprived of his rank of duke and grandee of Spain, July 16, 1732. Ortiz has, however, preserved a letter from Ripperda to his friend Mr. Troye, May 22, 1734, justifying himself against the accusation of apostacy. T. 7, p. 388.

CH. XXXVII.

1726.

Alberoni. Both were men of abilities and extensive knowledge, and both the architects of their own fortune; Alberoni rising to power by the native energy of his character, Ripperda by dexterously availing himself of times and circumstances. One, however, seemed born to command, the other to figure in a secondary sphere. One always appeared superior to his situation, struck before he threatened, veiled his means and designs with a mysterious secrecy which redoubled their effect, rose with new vigour from defeat, and for a time balanced the combined efforts of the great powers of Europe by the vast resources of his mighty genius. The other was no less rash in his promises than defective in their performance, rendered his real power contemptible by vain menaces and empty vaunts, and degraded his person and office by needless falsehoods, pitiful evasions,* or alternate insolence and meanness. Both were equally impetuous and irritable, yet the hopes or apprehensions of Alberoni were never betrayed, even amidst the most violent ebullitions of his temper; while Ripperda discovered all the workings of his mind, by his looks and gestures, embarrassment and agitation. Finally, one was re-

* In proof of this remark it will be sufficient to quote a single passage from the correspondence of the british minister.

“ Though I flatter myself with the hopes of being able to form a tolerably sure judgment of the disposition of this court, I have almost as little certainty from them of what they will be a fortnight hence, as I have of knowing what the wind will then be from seeing how it is at present. This uncertainty proceeds from having a minister at the head of affairs, upon whose veracity no sort of dependence can be had; and what is still worse, who acts upon no fixed scheme; but entangled in his rash engagements, which he finds himself unable to fulfil, from the disappointment of his vain hopes at home, and in most of the countries in Europe, *a perdu la tramontane, et vit au jour la journée.*”

Mr. Stanhope to the duke of Newcastle, Madrid, April 11, 1726. *Memoirs of sir Robert Walpole.*

spected and dreaded in his retreat, the other despised even in the height of his authority.

CH. XXXVII.
1726.

But while we place Alberoni in a rank far superior, it would be unjust to withhold from Ripperda the merit of having suggested many useful schemes which were executed by other ministers. He evidently projected most of the commercial regulations adopted by Alberoni; and the bare outline of the plans sketched in a preceding chapter, will suffice to prove how greatly his successor Patiño profited by his ideas and designs. Indeed Ripperda may justly be regarded as one of the principal authors of the new commercial system established in Spain, since the commencement of the last century.

The fall of Ripperda was followed by the re-appointment of most of the ministers whom he had displaced, though political power was transferred to other hands. Grimaldo was again named secretary for foreign affairs; but the conduct of the important communications with the court of Vienna was still confined to the marquis de la Paz. Don Francisco Ariaza was re-placed in the department of finance; and Castelar in that of war. Don Joseph Patiño, assuming the administration of the marine and Indies, and possessing the full confidence of the queen and Königseg, now commenced the career of his ministry.*

* *Memoires de Montgon*, t. 1, passim.—*St. Philippe*, t. 4, passim.—*Ortiz*, t. 7, lib. 23, c. 10, 11.—*Dispatches of Mr. Stanhope and Mr. Keene*.—*Account of Ripperda by the Sicilian abbots*.—*Memoirs of sir Robert Walpole*, ch. 35, and of lord Walpole, ch. 14, 15.—Campbel has written a life of this singular man, which contains some truths, but overwhelmed with fictions proper only for the pages of romance.—Also a spirited sketch of his character and administration by G. Moore, esq. though in some instances he has been misled by the fables of Campbel.

CHAPTER XXXVIII.

1726.

Preponderance of the german Influence at Madrid—Disgrace of Grimaldo and change of Ministry—Rise of Patiño—Ineffectual attempts of the French Court to effect a Reconciliation—The Queen obtains the Disgrace of the Confessor and the Sicilian Abbots—Philip resumes his Designs on the French Succession—Instructions and Mission of the Abbot Montgon to Paris—Commencement of an Intercourse between the two Bourbon Courts—Montgon returns to Madrid—Temporary Hostilities with England—Siege of Gibraltar—Signature of the Preliminaries by the Emperor—Delays of Spain—Effects of the Death of George the First—Restoration of the Correspondence between France and Spain.

CH. XXXVIII.

1726.

THE fall of Ripperda gave additional strength to the german influence, and inflamed the hostile disposition towards England and France. With redoubled confidence, the court turned towards the emperor, as to a cordial friend and powerful ally, who was occupied in promoting the interest and glory of the spanish crown, by preparing the way for transferring to the family of Philip the vast dominions of the House of Austria. Such was the darling object which engrossed all the thoughts and hopes of the queen. The illusion of this agreeable perspective did not permit her to discern the slightest shade of difficulty, or anticipate the most trifling obstacle; it became an article of political faith at Madrid, that sincerity was no

where to be found but at Vienna, and insinuations contrary to this darling idea were not merely received with contempt, but drew down infallible disgrace on their authors.

CH. XXXVIII.
1726.

Ripperda had suffered too severely for his want of complaisance towards the court of Vienna, to be imitated by the new ministry. At the very moment of his disgrace, 300,000 dollars were sent to the emperor, a loan of 2,000,000 more negotiated in the most pressing manner, and the principal part immediately transmitted to the same destination. The troops withdrawn by order of Ripperda, were again countermarched to the french frontier and the coasts of Gallicia, and ships equipped in the different ports. New marks of distinction were lavished on the dukes of Ormond and Wharton, and the rest of the exiled jacobites, both by the court and the imperial minister, and every proof displayed of an intention to prosecute the hostile designs so solemnly and repeatedly disavowed.*

An entire change took place in all the departments of state, and every minister was removed who was even suspected of partiality towards England and France. To use the expression of a writer engaged in the intrigues of the cabinet, every thing which did not bear the stamp of entire devotion to the court of Vienna, was stigmatised with a mark of reprobation.†

One of the first victims was the marquis of Grimaldo, so long the personal favourite of the king, who had shared his retreat, and had been the depositary of his most secret counsels. His influence had resisted numerous attacks, and gained new strength by every victory. On the disgrace of Ripperda, he was indeed restored to office; but by the interference of the all-powerful Konigseg, he was excluded from any share in the communications with the court of Vienna, which were

* Mr. Stanhope to the duke of Newcastle, June 27, 1726.

† Montgon

CH. XXXVIII.
1726.

confided to the marquis de la Paz. The jealousy excited by this exclusion in the breast of the minister, raised frequent disputes between him and his former dependant; and his enemies, profiting by his moments of spleen, and his avowed attachment to England, at length succeeded in obtaining his dismissal. Ariaza, minister of the finances, shared the same fate, in consequence of his opposition to the enormous subsidies lavished on the court of Vienna.

Sept. 30.
1726.

In announcing these incidents to Mr. Walpole, then minister at Paris, Mr. Stanhope observes, "Your excellency will doubtless be much surprised by the late changes at this court, as indeed every body here was, and still is, and none more than the persons themselves who have suffered by them. As to the marquis of Grimaldo, it is certain he expected no such thing yesterday morning. He was actually putting his papers into the bag to carry them to the king, (as it was dispatch day) when the order was delivered to him to resign his employment, and retire immediately to Madrid, with a pension of two thousand pistoles a year.* * * * *

"Don Joseph Patiño seems to be the only gainer by these changes. He has the employments of president, intendant, and secretary of the *hacienda*, or finances, joined to those he held before, namely, superintendant of the marine, and secretary of the marine and Indies. As to the marquis de la Paz, he rather loses than gains by what has happened, being obliged to part with the secretaryship of the finances, for the addition of the few foreign affairs, which had been left in Grimaldo's hands, the greatest and most considerable part having been long since in his own.

"Patiño grows every day into the confidence of their

* Grimaldo lived for a few years at Madrid, in a state of dignified retirement, always respected, and frequently consulted by the king.

catholic majesties: if he once gains it, he is likely to preserve it long; because he is a person of great capacity and experience in affairs, and of wonderful application and dispatch."

CH. XXXVIII.

1726.

But the most important of these changes was the removal of father Bermudez, the king's confessor, an avowed enemy to the German alliance, and a partisan equally zealous for a reconciliation with France. He was esteemed a man of strict integrity, and superior to the petty intrigues too common among those of his order; and he was endeared to Philip by his strict attention to his duty, and the confidence derived from his function. In vain the queen had hitherto laboured to procure his dismissal, though she had so far prejudiced the mind of her suspicious husband, as to draw on him reproaches for treachery. When he offered to attest his innocence on the crucifix, the king snatched it from his hands, exclaiming, "I have too much respect for the image of Christ, to suffer you to perjure yourself." The confessor, however, found means to parry this blow, and even to regain his influence.*

Having entered into a secret correspondence with cardinal Fleury, he was employed to make a direct overture to the king for a reconciliation, without the knowledge of the queen. Bermudez availed himself of the opportunity of confession, to present a letter from Fleury, inclosing another from the king of France himself. Philip had scarcely cast his eye over these letters, before the queen, who never left him long alone with the confessor, entered the apartment. Perceiving the papers in his hand, and the confusion of the confessor, she affected to retire, expressing her concern for having interrupted business. This artifice produced its usual effect. "You may enter," said the king, "for we have no business. Father Bermudez is

* Memoires de Tessé.

CH. XXXVIII.
1726.

speaking to me of a letter which he has received from cardinal Fleury, and has delivered me one from the cardinal himself." He then placed these important papers in her hands.

Sept. 29. It is easy to conceive the indignation of this imperious woman on discovering such an attempt to subvert her favourite system. The humbled confessor was instantly commanded to retire; and before the evening received an order to return to his college, without a pension, or the slightest mark of royal favour. His place was filled by father Clarke, a jesuit of irish extraction, and rector of the scottish college at Madrid, personally unknown to the king, and imperfectly acquainted with the french language; but principally recommended as a partisan of the Stuart family, and as confessor to the count and countess of Konigseg.*

Subsequent attempts only drew down similar disgrace on their authors. The Sicilian abbots, Platania and Caraccioli, had been long accustomed to furnish memorials to the king, and to give him advice in private audiences, conducted by means of his favourite valet, Valois. As they were men of great political sagacity, Philip at all times received their opinions with attention, though contrary to the predominant system patronised by the queen; and they had essentially contributed to the fall of Ripperda. They entered into a private correspondence with Fleury and the english ministers, and profited by their audiences and communications to expose the mischiefs resulting from the german connection, and the policy of a reconciliation with France. To these representations, we may attribute a part of that lukewarmness, and even

* These particulars are chiefly drawn from the Memoirs of Montgon, who received his intelligence from the archbishop of Toledo, and Bermudez himself. T. 2, p. 311, 317, and Stanhope's Dispatch to the duke of Newcastle, Madrid, Oct. 7, 1726.

repugnance, which Philip occasionally expressed with regard to the Vienna alliance. For some time this intercourse was kept so secret as to escape the prying eyes of the queen, till in one of Philip's frequent indispositions, a letter found in his pocket led to a discovery of his advisers. So highly, however, were they respected by the king, that the queen did not make a direct attempt to procure their removal; but employing the agency of the inquisition, caused them to be seized on a religious accusation, without the knowledge of Philip, and ordered them to be transported to Italy.*

CH. XXXVIII.
1726.

This therefore, like the preceding attempts, served only to fortify the authority of the queen, and to intangle Spain still deeper in the german connection. Count Konigseg, whose exaggerated promises had charmed her imagination, became the great channel of court favour, and the prime mover of the spanish counsels, and was permitted or authorised to receive from the chiefs of the different departments, the same communications as were made to the prime minister. Every thing bent to his powerful interference; even Monteleon, though related to the Patiños, and favoured with the royal confidence, was baffled in his attempts to obtain the embassy of Vienna, in consequence of his former connections with England.†

* From a curious letter of Mr. Walpole, Sept. 30, NS. 1727. These abbots afterwards repaired to Paris; and furnished much useful information to the british and french governments. In a visit to England they were received with great attention by the ministry, were gratified with pensions, and appear to have passed the remainder of their lives in France. So warmly were they persecuted by the queen, that, according to the information of Montgon, to whom they were recommended by Monteleon; one of the prettexts employed by Fleury to ruin his credit with the court of Madrid, was an accidental visit paid him by these priests on their arrival at Paris. Montgon, t. 3, p. 64. t. 5, p. 108, 134. In the Memoirs of lord Walpole, I have erred in attributing their banishment to the displeasure of the king. Ch. 14.

† Mr. Stanhope to Mr. Walpole, Madrid, July 2, and Segovia, Sept. 30, 1726.

CH. XXXVIII.
1726.

The queen, so agreeably flattered with the hope of realising her ambitious dreams through the Vienna alliance, persuaded herself, that little difficulty would arise in detaching France from England, or at least in palsying the efforts of the french government, by exciting civil troubles under the pretence of urging the claims of Philip to the eventual succession. These hopes, which were easily infused into the mind of her husband, were strengthened by the events in France since the fall of Ripperda.

We have already mentioned the contemptuous manner in which the catholic king rejected the letters of apology for the dismissal of the infanta. Frequent overtures of the duke of Bourbon were repulsed with similar contempt, and even a declaration was made that no apology would be accepted, till the duke himself should repair to Madrid to solicit pardon on his knees. On a refusal to comply with such a degrading condition, both the king and queen forbade the very name of the duke to be mentioned in their presence.

Resentment and the desire of vengeance again induced Philip and his queen to employ the intrigues of their partisans in France, and to profit by the errors and abuses which disgraced the administration. The duke of Bourbon himself imitated the profligacy, without possessing the talents of his predecessor, the regent. He was governed by a rapacious mistress, madame de Prie; and she in her turn was directed by those low and greedy adventurers, the four brothers known by the name of Paris, who, deriving their humble origin from a petty inn-keeper at the foot of the Alps, had risen by chance, aided by their own talents and address, to the height of political power and affluence. Such a government, combining every species of immorality and speculation with weakness and imbecility, was condemned by every honest and discerning man, and found a powerful opposition in the

party of the duke of Maine, and the numerous adherents of the bourbon system of policy.*

CH. XXXVIII.
1726.

In this disposition of the public mind the intrigues of the spanish court produced a considerable effect; but the fall of the unpopular minister was hastened by the ascendancy of bishop Frejus, preceptor to the king, afterwards well known under the title of cardinal Fleury. Disputes had continually arisen between the duke and the preceptor, each of which had only tended to strengthen the interest of the latter, till at length their rivalry terminated in the dismissal of the duke. He was exiled to his residence of Chantilly; and Fleury, at the advanced age of seventy-three, ventured to assume the administration of affairs.

This change was hailed in Spain with scarcely less exultation than the conclusion of the alliance with the emperor. Besides the gratification of personal resentment, it was considered by the court of Madrid as a new æra in the policy of France: Philip and his queen confidently believed, that the new minister, an ecclesiastic, and a personal enemy of the duke, would signalise his accession to power, by breaking the alliance with heretics, and renewing the connection between the two branches of the House of Bourbon. It cannot, indeed, be asserted, that these hopes were totally unfounded; but France was still too much embarrassed by internal disorders, and too jealous of Austria, to take so abrupt and decisive a step.

The first measure, however, of the new minister, was an overture through the papal nuntio, to accommodate the family disputes, accompanied with the declaration, that he himself had no share in the dismissal of the infanta. An imperious reply from Philip, for a time, cut off all hope of that

* Memoirs of lord Walpole, ch. 12.

CH. XXXVIII.
1726.

November,
1726.

gradual reconciliation which it was the policy of the cautious minister to effect. Still dazzled with the splendid prospects of the Vienna alliance, he insisted that the emperor should mediate the arrangement; and reproached Fleury for his union with the enemies of God and of the catholic religion. Such a preposterous mediation was therefore naturally rejected, as insidious, and contrary to the faith of the treaties with England.

All attempts to dissolve the connection between France and England proving fruitless, Philip endeavoured to accomplish by force what he was unable to effect by intrigue and negotiation. He matured his military preparations for the siege of Gibraltar, trusting that the emperor would adopt a part equally decisive, and give full employment to the Hanover allies in Germany. Indeed this expectation was partially realised, for the emperor induced Russia to accede to the alliance of Vienna; he detached the king of Prussia, whose interest preponderated in the north of Germany; and by the promise of liberal subsidies he obtained the support of the catholic states. To engross the whole attention of the british government, he intrigued with the jacobites both in England and on the continent, and caballed with the chiefs of opposition, who became the apologists and advocates of Spain and Austria.

At the moment when the two courts were thus deeply occupied in forwarding their common design, a report of the french king's declining health diverted the attention of Philip, and revived his darling hope of ascending the throne of his ancestors. He accordingly sent a confidential agent into France, who, under the hackneyed pretext of negotiation, was to consolidate an union of all parties in his favour; and either gain Fleury, or prevent his opposition by exciting internal troubles.

This agent was the abbot de Montgon, a native of France, who under the appearance of religious enthusiasm had won the confidence of the devout monarch and his queen. He was of noble descent, and brought up in the family of Condé, with the duke of Bourbon; but renounced his property in favour of his brother, and exchanged the military for the ecclesiastical profession. By the interest of d'Aubenton, he endeavoured to obtain an establishment in Spain; and appears even to have aspired to the office of preceptor to the prince of Asturias. Although the death of his protector frustrated his appointment, he was not discouraged; for, on the abdication of Philip, he requested, through the medium of the new confessor, to share his retreat, with no other view, as he said, than to become a near spectator of his virtues, and strengthen his own good disposition by so edifying an example. The resumption of the crown by Philip prevented the fulfilment of his request; but after a short delay, he was permitted to repair to Spain, with the promise of a post near the royal person. He was employed by his patron the duke of Bourbon to mediate a reconciliation; and though his endeavours proved unsuccessful, he continued to rise in favour, and was selected for the task of uniting and consolidating all parties in favour of Philip's pretensions to the eventual succession of France.

In the audience in which he received his orders, after some previous conversation on the delicacy of his commission, the queen said to him as he stooped to kiss her hand: "You are going into a country where I am little beloved; but you shall judge whether with reason. We were informed by a special messenger from the court of France, that as soon as my daughter had completed her seventh year, the betrothment should take place. Yet the very next post brought us word that she was sent back. Is it wonderful that the king and

CH. XXXVIII.

1726.

CH. XXXVIII.

1726.

myself should resent an insult which would provoke the meanest individual?" "This insult," replied the abbot, "cannot be imputed to the french nation, which fosters for your majesties equal attachment and respect; for the departure of the infanta spread as much concern as her arrival had given joy. This last sentiment will readily be revived when your affection for the french nation returns. If you will permit me to be the bearer of this happy news, you will soon be apprised of the universal joy it will inspire in France." "It is not yet time to speak of that," interrupted the queen; "you know our sentiments on that article, and the king and I trust you will exactly follow our instructions. Confine yourself solely to the object of your mission; and you will receive my further orders from my confessor the archbishop of Amida."

Dec. 24,
1726.

Montgon afterwards received his instructions, written in the king's own hand. To use the words employed by the monarch himself; "If it please God that the king my nephew should die without male heirs, *I, the nearest relative, or my descendants, ought and will succeed to the crown of my ancestors.** For this purpose you will endeavour to discover and discriminate those who are attached to me, those who are attached to the House of Orleans, and those who are indifferent to both parties, and you will employ every discreet and secure means to augment the number of my adherents. You will not communicate this either to cardinal Fleury or to the count de Morville. Not to the former, because his devotion to the House of Orleans is known, and because, for some time, I have no reason to be satisfied with his conduct. You may,

* After the remarks we have made in regard to the views of Philip on the French crown, it is perhaps scarcely necessary to call the attention of the reader to this forcible expression.

however, visit him as a private man, and endeavour by his means to discover the true state of the court, and of affairs; but enter into no negotiation without my special permission. Morville is totally devoted to the English, and therefore you must distrust him; though you may likewise draw from him all the information you can.

CH. XXXVIII.

1726.

“ Give no umbrage to the ministers of the emperor, but by no means impart to them the slightest hint of your commission. Act in every thing as a private individual, avoiding the airs of a minister, and make no allusion to a reconciliation in the present state of affairs:

“ Attempt particularly to gain the duke of Bourbon, by assuring him that if he will engage to favour my just cause, I will forget the past, and that he may expect from me every return of attention and friendship. This point requires your utmost secrecy, discretion, and address.”

After pointing out the persons whom he was to consult, he observes, “ I give you a letter of credence written with my own hand, which you are to present to the parliament, at the moment of the death of the king my nephew. *It contains orders to proclaim me king.* You will please to inform yourself what other letters are necessary to the different bodies of the state, and whether it will be proper to name a cabinet or regent, till my arrival, with the names of those you recommend for that appointment. Also, should the queen survive the king, whether means should be taken to ascertain her pregnancy.

“ The moment the king is attacked with a dangerous malady, you will send me a courier, and in case of his death, you will take the same precaution to announce the event, and the measures you have adopted.”*

* Montgon, t. 3, p. 70.

CH. XXXVIII.
1726.

But to avoid exciting the jealousy of the emperor, or to furnish a plausible pretext for the mission, Montgon, before his departure, received a memorial in the hand of the queen, from her confessor, without any specific address. It contained a positive denial that Spain was averse to a reconciliation with France, and a proposal of re-union, provided the king would accede to the Vienna alliance. This memorial was to be communicated to Fleury; but every precaution was adopted to evade any serious engagement, and many petty artifices were employed to give to Montgon's departure the air of a disgrace, at the instance of the imperial minister. Soon afterwards, a new hint was conveyed to Montgon by the confessor, to contrive that if Louis the fifteenth should die, Don Carlos should be appointed to succeed in France, and Don Ferdinand in Spain.* With these instructions Montgon departed on the 8th of January, 1727.

But the plan, matured with such art and caution, could scarcely have been confided to an agent less discreet. The abbot, vain of his address, and equally presumptuous, credulous, and loquacious, contravened every article of his instructions. He disclosed the proposal for a reconciliation to Morville, who was devoted to the alliance with England, and in the very first conference with Fleury, he suffered the insinuating minister to draw from him the whole design of his mission, and even to peruse the orders with which he was charged. By the connivance of the cardinal, he also obtained personal interviews with the duke of Bourbon, as well as with many nobles of the spanish party, and imparted the intelligence which he received from them, with the same indiscretion as his own commission and instructions. He was thus adroitly cajoled and made the channel of communication with all parties, until

* Montgon, t. 2, p. 366.

an intercourse of letters was established between the two sovereigns. CH. XXXVIII.
1726.

This point was no sooner gained, than Fleury endeavoured to free himself from the presence of an agent, who, besides his loquacious and meddling disposition, was a zealous adherent of the duke of Bourbon. He, therefore, treated him with studied reserve, and contrived to hasten his departure. Accordingly, Montgon returned to Spain, bearing letters of apology from the duke of Bourbon, and proofs of attachment from the adherents of Philip; but, at the same time, leaving in the hands of the french minister a clue to the machinations of his party, and the means of tracing and baffling their designs. The reports he was suffered to convey, flattered the hopes of the spanish court, and he was welcomed both by the king and queen with all the favours due to the most adroit and successful negotiator. May 15-27.

Aug. 13.

In his first audience, Montgon delivered the letters which he had brought from France, and rendered an account of his mission. The queen alone maintained the discourse; for the king, absorbed in a profound melancholy, gave no other sign of attention, than an occasional nod or smile. After obtaining a promise to accept the apology of the duke of Bourbon, and promote his return to court, the abbot entered into a bitter invective against Fleury, and to use his own whimsical expression, *made an exact anatomy* of his designs and injustice. The queen, listening complacently, enquired with a smile, "How did you take leave of each other?" To his reply, "With indifference on his part, and without chagrin on mine;" the queen rejoined, "I believe what you say; do not trust that man." She then reverted to the situation of France; and, after expatiating on the advantages to be expected from the reconciliation, concluded with an earnest wish to reward

CH. XXXVIII.
1726.

Feb. 11,
1727.

his meritorious services, and with assuring him of the protection of the king against the resentment of the cardinal.*

In the midst of these transactions, the king of Spain commenced hostilities against England. By his order, the Prince Frederic, a trading ship belonging to the south-sea company, with a rich cargo of merchandize, was seized at Vera Cruz. He threatened an invasion of the british isles, and collected an army of 25,000 men in Andalusia, for the siege of Gibraltar. In vain the most experienced of his generals remonstrated; in vain the marquis of Villadarias, who had conducted the attack in the war of the succession, represented the impracticability of the attempt while the english remained masters of the sea, and preferred the resignation of all his employments to the conduct of so hopeless an enterprise. Philip found a general inspired with his own sanguine hopes, in the marquis de las Torres, who presumptuously boasted, that in six weeks he would deliver Spain from this noxious settlement of foreigners and heretics. The siege was vigorously commenced; and it was hoped that such promptitude in undertaking hostilities, and the speedy reduction of Gibraltar, would at once remove every pretext for the interference of France, and stimulate the emperor to measures equally decisive in Germany. To alarm the court of Versailles, the king of Spain threatened to confiscate the property of the french merchants on board the flota, which soon after arrived from America.

These sanguine hopes were dissipated by the spirit and resources of the british nation. The parliament, roused by the machinations and hostilities of Spain and the emperor, sup-

* Montgon, t. 4 & 5, passim.—Mr. Walpole's Dispatches from Paris, during, and after the mission of Montgon.—Memoirs of lord Walpole, ch. 14.

ported the government with unusual grants of men and money. Gibraltar was supplied with continual succours, the jacobites were awed by vigorous measures, and the imperial minister, count Palm, was disgracefully dismissed, for appealing to the nation against the conduct of the king. Holland, Sweden, and Denmark, acceded to the Hanover alliance. A french army was collected on the frontiers of Germany, and a subsidiary force of Danes, Swedes, and Hessians, taken into pay. The death of Catherine the first deprived the emperor and Spain of a powerful ally in the north, the king of Prussia began to waver, and the failure of the subsidies from Spain threatened to rob the emperor of that support in Germany, in which he had vainly confided. Instead of becoming the assailant, he was menaced in his turn. After a short negotiation, commenced by the pope, and continued under the mediation of France, he sacrificed Spain to his own safety; and his ambassador signed the preliminaries of peace at Paris, on the 31st of May, 1727. These preliminaries were formally ratified; and, after considerable reluctance, accepted by the duke of Bournonville, the spanish minister at Vienna, in the name, though without the express authority of his sovereign.*

CH. XXXVIII.
1726.

By the first article, the Ostend company was suspended for seven years. By the second, the rights and pretensions of the contracting powers were to remain on the same footing as before the year 1725, or if infringed, the question was to be referred to the decision of a future congress. The third contained the stipulation, that the commercial privileges enjoyed by the maritime powers and France, should be restored, as before the same period. According to the fifth, the king of Spain was to cease

* House of Austria, v. 2, c. 8.—Preliminaries of Vienna in the collections of public Papers, and particularly in Rousset, t. 3, p. 382.—404.

CH. XXXVIII.

1726.

hostilities within eight days after receiving the preliminaries; the ships of the Ostend company, included in a particular list, were to complete their voyages, or if taken, to be restored, and any which might have been seized, were to be faithfully delivered, with their cargoes. The galleons * were also to be permitted to return, in the full trust that the king of Spain would distribute the american effects, both in them and the flota, as in time of peace. In consequence, the british squadrons were to quit the blockade of the american ports, and withdraw from the coasts of the dominions belonging to Spain and the emperor, and the british commerce was to be exercised according to former treaties. By the eighth article, the ratifications were to be exchanged within two months, and a congress assembled within four, at Aix la Chapelle.

In virtue of this engagement, the king of England issued orders to the governor of Gibraltar, and the admirals in the West Indies, to cease hostilities, to restore the prizes taken during the war, to permit the return of the galleons, and to raise the blockade of the spanish ports and coasts. These orders were transmitted to Mr. Vandermeer, the dutch minister at Madrid, who, in the absence of the regular ambassadors, was charged with the affairs of France and England. He was directed to communicate them to the court, and obtain the ratification of the preliminaries, with reciprocal orders, for raising the siege of Gibraltar, and restoring the ships detained or captured, particularly the Prince Frederic.

* The galleons were the vessels charged with the riches and merchandise of the western districts of South America, which rendezvoused at Carthagena, or Portobello; the flota, those which were charged with the productions of the eastern, and which rendezvoused at the Havannah; the flotilla was a light division detached to announce their arrival, and carry a statement of their respective cargoes.

But the allies of Hanover had ill calculated on the captious and vindictive spirit which animated the spanish cabinet. Philip, still hoping for a favourable change of affairs, delayed the ratification of the preliminaries, and continued to temporise until the death of George the first.

CH. XXXVIII.
1726.

June 22.

This event again awakened his hopes. He renewed his intrigues with the jacobites, ordered his ambassadors and agents in foreign courts to encourage them with promises of support, and instigated the pretender to proceed to a port in the Netherlands, that he might be ready to pass over to England on the first signal. Philip was even persuaded that France would seize so favourable an opportunity of deserting England, and returning to that system, to which she was bound by the ties of blood, religion and policy.

He was encouraged by the emperor, who fostered a similar resentment against the british government, and resumed his design of carrying his arms into the electorate of Hanover and the United Provinces. The expectation of a new revolution in England produced an equal change in the interested sentiments of the german princes. The king of Prussia renewed his alliance with Austria, Saxony became neuter, Bavaria, with the electors on the Rhine, concurred in favouring the emperor. The possession of Mentz and Erfurth furnished the means of an attack against France; and a negotiation was commenced with the duke of Brunswick Wolfembuttel, for the occupation of Brunswick, which would open a similar road into the dominions of Hanover and the United Provinces.*

But the sanguine hopes which both powers had founded on this change of government, were as rapidly dissipated, as they were suddenly conceived. The french government not only resisted all the lures and threats of Spain, but Fleury himself wrote

* Memoirs of sir Robert Walpole, ch. 33.

CH. XXXVIII.
1726.

to the new king, deprecating a change of administration.* George the second took quiet possession of his throne, retained the ministry, and adopted the system of policy pursued by his father. The temporary ascendancy of the emperor in Germany again yielded to the prevailing influence of british subsidies, and the attacks which he meditated against France, the United Provinces, and Hanover, were frustrated by the defection of his most valuable allies. His inaction, therefore, now became a motive with the court of Madrid to imitate his example, and purchase the most favourable terms by a separate accommodation.

As the prelude to this arrangement, Philip and the queen endeavoured to accelerate the reconciliation between the two bourbon crowns. We have already noticed their refusal to accept any apology, however humble, from the duke of Bourbon, and the extreme joy which they manifested at his disgrace. So great an obstacle being thus removed, they employed the agency of Montgon, who was then at Madrid, to testify their satisfaction, and their wish for a renewal of the former correspondence, provided the king of France, for the interests of their common religion, would embrace the catholic cause, and accede to the alliance of Vienna. This overture produced an amicable reply from the minister of foreign affairs, representing the dismissal of the duke as a measure calculated to facilitate a reconciliation; but expressing the regret of his sovereign that any proposal should be made to him, derogating from the fidelity due to his allies. When Fleury announced his elevation to the purple, the ministerial communication was made in the same style.

Still, however, the king of Spain hoped at once to reap the advantages of a connection with France and Austria: he

* Memoirs of lord Walpole, ch. 15.

declined a reconciliation except by the mediation of the emperor, and on the condition that the british squadrons should be withdrawn from their coasts. This determination therefore suspended the attempts to effect a more cordial union.

CH. XXXVIII.
1726.

But an accommodation was so popular in France and so advantageous in itself, that Fleury renewed his efforts to promote so desirable an object; and the situation of Spain, as well as the changeable temper of the sovereigns, at length were propitious to his design. After the first emotions of resentment had subsided, Philip gave way to his inherent affection towards his family and native country; and had his will been uncontrolled, the remaining obstacles would have been speedily removed. But the resentment of the queen, naturally more vindictive, and personally averse to France, derived additional strength from her anxiety to aggrandise her children; and the flattering prospects derived from the Vienna alliance, joined to the continual lures of the emperor, for a long time contributed to keep this passion alive.

Fleury, having in vain endeavoured to conciliate the queen through the agency of Donna Laura and the duchess of St. Pierre,* attempted to work on the mind of Philip without her knowledge. For this effect he employed the intervention of the confessor, father Bermudez, to which we have already alluded as the cause of his disgrace.

One of these letters, communicated to Mr. Walpole, may serve to give an idea of the style and arguments adopted by the sagacious minister.†

* Sister of Torci, and one of the ladies of the bed-chamber to the queen of Spain.

† Mr. Walpole to Mr. Stanhope, Fontainebleau, Sept. 15, 1726.—Mem. de Montgon.

CH. XXXVIII.

1726.

“It is not long since,” Fleury observed, “I acquainted father Bermudez, that I was tempted to inform your majesty of some particular matters of great secrecy and importance, which I now do, in order to discharge my conscience, as well as to satisfy my duty and attachment. I rely on your known piety, and the inviolable secrecy of confession, which I exact from you, not to disclose what I reveal.

“Upon the report of your majesty’s design to abdicate the crown, and of some free expressions used by the prince of Asturias against the excessive power of the germans at your court, a project has been contrived at Vienna equally diabolical and ridiculous, as if England and France had framed a conspiracy, by means of Mr. Stanhope, to shut up your majesty and the queen in a convent, and proclaim the prince of Asturias. This project was sent to count Palm at London, to communicate it to Pozzobueno. But Palm, who had not well learnt or understood his lesson, or with the absurdity inseparable from falsehood and calumny, has thought fit to embellish this scheme with circumstances so extravagant as to deprive it of all appearance of probability. Should this account therefore reach your majesty, I have too good an opinion of your understanding and integrity to doubt that you will in a moment detect the imposture.

“God forbid that I should lay so wicked a thing to the emperor’s charge. I know his religion and integrity too well to suspect him; but his ministers are less scrupulous. We have too recent proofs of their machinations to suppose them incapable of such calumny, however unworthy of ministers and christians. I will not take upon me to name any of them, although they are not difficult to guess; but I dare assert, that prince Eugene is not one of them. Their chief aim is to embroil your majesty and France, and to render the misunder-

standing so great as to leave no hopes for a reconciliation. The most shameful artifices are employed to compass this design.

CH. XXXVIII.

1726.

“ I should do the french injustice, should I for a moment attempt to vindicate them from so black an aspersion. Your majesty knows the genius of the nation too well to entertain such a suspicion. They are indeed deeply touched at your late indifference to them, and at your repugnance to be reconciled to the king your nephew ; but they are incapable of conceiving so diabolical a plot, and their concern arises from no other motive than their respect for your majesty.

“ I can as little believe that the English would be guilty of engaging in so chimerical a scheme ; for had they any such intention, they would have communicated it to us ; and I know so well the virtue and uprightness of the king and his ministers, that I can answer for them. Difference of religion does by no means authorise views contrary to all probity and honour.

“ The motive which has induced the imperial ministers to invent this fable is probably the general discontent among the people of Spain at the great remittances of money to Vienna ; and the apprehension that this may induce your majesty to relent towards France.

“ I think myself obliged to inform your majesty of another particular of great importance. I do not presume to inquire into the secret engagements between your majesty and the emperor ; but one of them is become too public to be doubted, namely, that the emperor has agreed to give the two arch-duchesses his daughters in marriage to your sons, Don Carlos and Don Philip. I say, I do not presume to enter into this mystery ; but I think myself obliged to acquaint your majesty, that the emperor has given a written declaration in his own

CH. XXXVIII.
1726.

hand to the elector of Bavaria, denying that he has made any such agreement; at your command I will produce a written proof of it, though I impart this under the inviolable secrecy of confession, not to expose the elector of Bavaria to the resentment of the emperor. He has also given the duke of Lorraine the most solemn assurances, that the two arch-duchesses shall never espouse any other princes but his two sons; and though I can give no written proof of this, it shall be testified on oath. I thought it my duty to communicate these circumstances, because probably the promise of these marriages made by the emperor to the queen of Spain, has induced her majesty to enter into all the views of the imperial court.

“ I shall only add another remark, the truth of which your minister at Florence is best able to inform you. The imperial ministers are making the strictest search to procure registers and documents for many ages of all the fiefs in Tuscany, which ever depended on the empire, to appropriate or sell them; that if Don Carlos should succeed to those dominions, it will be as to a carcass mangled and torn.

“ Your majesty may perhaps imagine that I am actuated by an earnest desire of a reconciliation between Spain and France; but I can assure you I have no other motive than my duty and attachment to you, and my concern for your interest, honour, and dignity.

“ We are just informed that count Palm has spoken of the pretended conspiracy against you, and that you intend to demand the recal of Mr. Stanhope. You may easily see in this the views of the imperialists to remove from you the minister whose vigilance they dread; that they may become masters of your court.”*

* Contained in Mr. Walpole's letter to Mr. Stanhope, Fontainebleau, Sept. 15, NS. 1726.

The preceding failures, and the disgrace which this attempt drew on the confessor, convinced the cardinal that all further efforts would be fruitless without the co-operation of the queen. He therefore changed his battery; employed the agency of Montgon to open a direct correspondence with her confessor, whom he lured with a cardinal's hat; and at length induced her to enter into an intercourse of letters with the king of France. The dismissal of Morville, and appointment of Chauvelin, which was the necessary prelude to a change of policy, was represented as a mark of deference to the court of Spain; and after the agency of Montgon was superseded, the intercourse was continued by means of the papal nuntios at Madrid, Paris, and Vienna.

CH. XXXVIII.
1726.

The effect of Fleury's representations was strengthened by the compulsory desertion of the emperor, and the embarrassments of Spain. The queen now looked with a favourable eye towards France, and nothing but form, and a remnant of political jealousy, prevented an open and permanent accommodation. Such an opportunity was adroitly improved; and at length an acknowledgment drawn from the court of Madrid, that the reconciliation should be publicly announced, provided the king of France would prepare the way by a letter of compliment and excuse. This arrangement produced an affectionate letter from Louis, both to the king and queen.

"I have learnt by a letter from the nuntio Aldobrandini, that you no longer object to our reconciliation; and are willing to forget the circumstance which has occasioned an interruption of the good intelligence natural between princes of the same blood, and so nearly related. No news can ever give me greater pleasure than I feel from this information. I am unable to express my joy, and shall never forget this mark of your affection. You know with what eagerness I

Aug. 2.

CH. XXXVIII.
1726.

have ever sought a reconciliation; not only because it is necessary for the common interest of our families and kingdoms, but from my tender friendship for you. I desire you to give me yours, which I have so earnestly solicited, such as it should always subsist between an uncle and nephew, and you may rely on my readiness to oblige you in all things. I send this by a common courier, with which it appears from the nuntio's letter, your majesty will be satisfied for the present, and shall defer nominating an ambassador, till I know your intentions, to which I shall willingly conform myself."

In his letter to the queen, he observes:

"After expressing to the king, my uncle, my acknowledgments for the consent he has given to our reconciliation, I could not forbear returning my thanks to your majesty, being persuaded that you have much contributed to it. There is such a tender union between you, that he can have no sentiment but what is yours. I beg you to entertain for me, such as a nephew may expect from an aunt, and you may be assured of a perfect friendship on my part. I pray earnestly to God, that you may be soon and happily delivered, and I wish you in particular every thing which may promote your felicity."

A letter from Fleury himself was less satisfactory. After some general expressions of his joy at the restoration of harmony, and his zeal for the union of the two crowns, he suggested that only one thing was wanting to complete his satisfaction, a reconciliation with the king of England, which was the principal means of promoting a general pacification.*

* Walpole Papers, Aug. 1, 1727.

This account of the reconciliation is principally drawn from Montgon, and from a Narrative of the Transactions between France and Spain, MS. in the Walpole and Orford Papers.—Memoires de Villars, t. 3, passim.—Mem. of lord Walpole, ch. 16.

But, notwithstanding the damp which this unwelcome hint threw on the ardent hopes of the two sovereigns, the overture was received with complacency: the queen, deceived by the apparent facility of Fleury, flattered herself, that she might yet be avenged on England, and render Spain the bond of union between France and Austria.

CH. XXXVIII.
1726.

CHAPTER XXIX.
1727-1728.
THE sovereigns of Spain accepted the preliminaries, merely to avoid immediate hostilities from the squadrons which hovered on their coasts, and interrupted the communication with America. But no form of words could be devised sufficiently explicit to curb that spirit of chicanery which marked all their proceedings; and therefore they employed endless pables to elude the execution. They made the cessation of the attack on Gibraltar depend on the actual departure of the British squadrons from their coasts; they retained the Prince of Biscaye, not as a prize taken in actual war, but as a

CH. XXXIX.
1727
1728.

CHAPTER XXXIX.

1727—1728.

Cavils and delays of the Court of Madrid in regard to the execution of the Preliminaries—Hostile preparations of England—Mission of Mr. Kene and count Rottembourg, as English and French Plenipotentiaries to Madrid—Audiences of Rottembourg—Spirit and resentment of the Queen—She induces Rottembourg to accept a modification of the Preliminaries in favour of the Spanish demands—Acquiescence of the English and Dutch Ministers—Effects of this supposed accommodation—England persists in rejecting the proposed modification of Spain—Extorts the concurrence of France—Remonstrances and threats of the Hanover Allies—Chicanery and obstinacy of the Queen—Motives which induced her to recede—Illness of the King—Act of the Pardo.

CH. XXXIX.

1727

1728.

THE sovereigns of Spain accepted the preliminaries, merely to avoid immediate hostilities from the squadrons which hovered on their coasts, and interrupted the communication with America. But no form of words could be devised sufficiently explicit to curb that spirit of chicanery which marked all their proceedings; and therefore they employed endless quibbles to elude the execution. They made the cessation of the attack on Gibraltar depend on the actual departure of the british squadrons from their coasts; they retained the Prince Frederic, not as a prize taken in actual war, but as a

reprisal for damages, or as condemned for an illegal commerce; they refused to distribute the effects of the flota, under the pretence that the preliminaries had not been executed on the part of England.

CH. XXXIX.

1727

1728.

The emperor, whose subsidies were to cease on the opening of the congress, omitted no art or machination to prolong the dispute; while the quibbling spirit of the court of Madrid was encouraged by the secret intimations of Chauvelin, and the general disposition of the whole french cabinet. Even Fleury himself was not disinclined to gratify Spain, if means could be found to soothe the jealousy of England.

Various circumstances contributed to favour this temporising system. The only channel of public intercourse with the court of Madrid, was Mr. Vandermeer, the dutch ambassador, who besides wanting personal weight and influence, was perplexed by the want of concert, and even by the contradictory orders from France and England.


To complete this series of difficulties, the king, afflicted with his hypochondriac malady, was incapable of serious application. The queen was also confined by her recent delivery, and would permit no business to be transacted till she was sufficiently recovered to resume her usual controul. Konigseg usurped the controul over every operation of government. La Paz was his creature; and the changeable Monteleon, who without being a minister possessed considerable influence, was too dexterous a politician not to bow before the idol of the day. Though Patiño, as minister of the finances, was disgusted with the insatiable avidity of the court of Vienna, he also was too sensible of the frail tenure by which he held his office, to oppose the ruling passion of the queen, and the power of the german party.

Much time was passed in this uncertainty. As Vander-

CH. XXXIX.

1727

1728.



meer was referred from minister to minister without obtaining a decisive answer, and prevented from appealing directly to the sovereign under various pretences; as an actual war was scarcely more burthensome than such a delusive truce, the british government assumed that decisive tone which in former instances had overborne the lukewarmness of their friends, and the opposition of their enemies. The british squadrons were reinforced; the harbour of Cadiz blockaded; vigorous measures were adopted for striking that blow which had been suspended by the hope of peace. To give an authentic expression to their sentiments, a national representative was sent to Madrid.

From punctilio or policy the example was imitated by France. The recent birth of the infant Don Philip was taken as the motive for announcing the public reconciliation of the two bourbon courts, and deputing a regular ambassador, to convey the order of the Holy Ghost to the new born infant, and to compliment the queen on her delivery.

The representative of England was Mr. Keene, who had long resided in Spain as agent to the South Sea Company, and had acquired the confidence of the government by his intelligence, capacity, and perfect acquaintance with the language and country. The mission from France was filled by the count of Rottembourg, a nobleman of great talents, and suavity of manners; but a partisan of the old court, and selected for the office at the suggestion of the king and queen of Spain. To preserve the requisite cordiality and union, the general instructions of the two ministers were reciprocally communicated, and they were enjoined to act in perfect concert and confidence. They were ordered to require that the court of Spain should raise the blockade of Gibraltar, restore all captures without reserve, and distribute the property brought by the flota.

The instructions of Rottembourg, in addition to the general orders, which he received in common with Mr. Keene, contained particular directions regarding the relative situation of the two bourbon courts. Besides the usual information concerning the characters and views of the different ministers, particular stress was laid on the language and conduct which he was to hold towards the queen, as the main spring of all political transactions.

CH. XXXIX.
1727
|
1728.
~~~~~

“ You shall not enter, of your own accord, into any detail at the first audience; but shall ask the king and queen when you may discourse with them upon some points, which relate to the interests of the two monarchies, hinting, that notwithstanding your earnest desire to treat directly with so intelligent a prince and princess, who have so much friendship for the king their nephew, yet you will willingly open yourself to any minister whom their majesties shall please to appoint. At the same time, without evincing any distrust of any of the ministers, you will intimate that there are some things not to be confided but to the king, and to another-self. For those, the king of France will be gratified if his majesty has no other minister but the queen his consort. This manner of flattering the queen is necessary, because she is not ignorant that her designs have been much suspected; and she has often affected to treat those well, who, by birth or any other tie, are thought to have an affection for this country. It must not likewise be omitted, that, though the queen has great influence over her husband, yet she is occasionally obliged to yield, in things which are repugnant to his sentiments in favour of France. Hence, great caution must be employed not to induce her to suspect that endeavours are used to lessen her influence, or the confidence which the king reposes in her.”\*

\* Instructions of the king of France to count Rottembourg, Sept. 16, 1727, NS. Official Translation—Orford Papers.



CH. XXXIX.

1727

1728.

The two plenipotentiaries arrived at Madrid nearly at the same time, but experienced a different reception. From the inveterate resentment of the queen against England, as well as to mark a decided preference for France, Mr. Keene was not permitted to deliver his credentials for several weeks, and consequently the whole negotiation was thrown into the hands of Rottembourg, who was honoured with all the privileges of a family ambassador. The views of the court of Spain were likewise facilitated by this expedient. Rottembourg, zealously attached to the old bourbon principles, and looking forward to the blue ribbon which was to reward the successful result of his embassy, gradually became a lukewarm advocate for what, in his confidential correspondence, he called "the petty interests of England."\* The french court, however, as well as its ambassador, professed the most perfect cordiality towards England, and in the early period of the negotiation, not only a mutual confidence was maintained on both sides, but the official dispatches of the two ministers were reciprocally communicated. From these we are enabled to trace the progress of this singular negotiation, and to exhibit the haughty, acute, and impetuous temper of the queen, who usurped the whole management of the transaction.

In the first audience, Rottembourg experienced a proof of that pertinacious resentment which marked her character. When introduced into the royal apartment, after the usual compliment, he intreated their catholic majesties to forget the injuries they had sustained from the former government in France. The queen, purposely employed in a work of embroidery, did not deign to honour him with an answer, nor even with a look. Philip was moved with affection towards his nephew, and his native country. He welcomed the ambassador with the

\* Mem. de Villars, t. 3, p. 362.



kindest expressions; and, presenting him to the queen, entreated her to entertain no other sentiment towards France, than regard for the king his nephew, and solicitude for the union which ought to subsist between the two crowns.

CH. XXXIX.

1727

|

1728.

After some hesitation, the queen began to assume an air of cordiality. But, unable to restrain her resentment against England, she reprobated the alliance of France and England, as equally unfeeling and impolitic. Twenty times, in the course of this short audience, she repeated with emphasis, "You have sold yourselves to the english, who lord it over you as your masters!" Rottembourg had scarcely quitted the apartment, before a warm altercation took place between the two sovereigns; and the queen was heard repeating in a loud and angry tone, "Will your majesty again trust your family, who have so often deceived you?"\*

The first audience being a mere form, the transaction of business was reserved till the second. As the principal points in dispute were on this occasion brought into discussion, and as the description of the ambassador is a correct and curious picture of the manner and character of the queen, we present it to the reader, as nearly in his own words as a translation will permit.

"I had reason to believe from my first audience, that the only way to move the king of Spain was to employ arguments founded on his tenderness and regard towards his

\* Keene's Dispatches.

Duclos, the only author who has given a specific account of this first audience, asserts, that the ambassador threw himself on his knees, and solicited forgiveness for the affront which their catholic majesties had received from the former government. We entertained too much doubt of this fact to insert it in the text, though from so respectable an authority, because it is not in the slightest degree alluded to in the Dispatches of count Rottembourg and Keene, or the Memoirs of Montgon. Duclos, t. 2, p. 384.



CH. XXXIX.

1727

1728.

nephew and native country, rather than on political considerations; since I could not speak of these without adverting to the engagements between France and England, and the queen always testified her anger at the bare name of the english. Before I went to the audience, I endeavoured to engage in my interest several persons who I believe have credit with their catholic majesties, namely, the two confessors, the marquis de la Paz, and Castelar, the last of whom not only promised his own good offices, but those of his brother Patiño. All concurred in assuring me that every thing would be done for France, and nothing for England. \* \* \* \*

“ I began my audience by expressing to their catholic majesties my great concern at the report which had been spread, that I was come to hold the knife to their throats, and to declare war against them, if they would not blindly submit to the orders of the english. In France, I said, neither harshness nor ill humour was shewn, when a negotiation with their catholic majesties was the object: ‘ Sometimes, sometimes!’ interrupted the queen, smiling on the king. ‘ Nothing,’ I continued, ‘ was further from it than my present mission, and the orders with which I was charged. First, to express the king my master’s regard for their catholic majesties, and his great joy at the reconciliation; secondly, to intreat them to execute the preliminaries; and thirdly, to assure them of his readiness to concur in the establishment of their family.’

“ The queen again hastily interrupted me, ‘ It is not now the time to speak of this. I have no other interests than those of my husband.’ As I replied with an apology, ‘ Well,’ she added, ‘ what is required from us? Are we still accused of delaying the congress? Has not the king sent his ratifications to Vienna above a month ago? Has he not ordered his plenipotentiaries to repair instantly to France?’



“ I replied with a smile, ‘ The congress would sooner have opened, had the preliminaries been executed. The arrival of the plenipotentiaries would have been more patiently expected.’ ‘ What,’ she asked, ‘ do you mean by the preliminary points?’ ‘ The restitution of the Prince Frederic,’ I answered, ‘ and the distribution of the effects of the flota.’ ‘ Well,’ was the answer, ‘ did I not say so? See these english, these masters of the world, how they explain all things as they will.’ ‘ This explanation,’ I said, ‘ is signed by his majesty. It is the letter of the preliminaries, and the king, my master, desires nothing more.’ ‘ If the ship was his own,’ she rejoined, ‘ it should be instantly given him ; but the english shall not have it.’ ‘ Well, madam, the king, my master, will be more obliged to you, than if you gave it to him. The merit will be the same. He desires nothing more than to see a reconciliation established, which is dear to him, and cannot take place but by procuring satisfaction for his allies according to his engagements.’ ‘ Well,’ she said, ‘ who is to judge of this satisfaction? The king claims the vessel as his, for a thousand contraventions of the Asiento ; the English pretend that it belongs to them ; let the congress decide!’ I replied by an explanation of the article in question.

“ The king then repeated twice or thrice, ‘ there is contraband.’ I answered, ‘ the ministers have never alleged this reason among those which the preliminaries have obviated, nor is it adduced in the letters of the marquis de la Paz.’ ‘ You know,’ said the queen, ‘ that if this reason was forgotten, it is not the less cogent.’ As I combated the argument of contraband, the queen again interrupted me. ‘ We will give you,’ she said, ‘ a memorial.’ This I accepted, with the hope of embarrassing them.

“ ‘ But if nothing more was necessary,’ she continued, ‘ than to ask, give us Gibraltar, and we will give the vessel.’



CH. XXXIX.

1727

1728.

Smiling, I said, 'if Gibraltar was in the hands of the king, my master, I am persuaded he would sacrifice it; but it is not the time to stipulate new reciprocities, after the signature of the preliminaries, which restored all things to the same situation as before 1725.'

" 'Sir,' she asked, "do you know why we acquiesced in this date of 1725?' To the remark, 'for no other reason than to facilitate the peace, by suspending the difficulties which had troubled it till the congress of Cambray could effect an amicable arrangement, 'I shall give you,' she rejoined, 'other reasons.' She asked the king for the key of his casket; he gave it her, and she went towards the head of the bed to open it.

"I took this opportunity to press the king, from a tender regard to his nephew and country, to shew such condescension as would pacify matters; and urged that a prince so generous and disinterested, the depositary of all the riches in the world, should not incur the reproach of provoking a war for the sake of a single vessel. The queen, instantly turning, interrupted me, 'Is it not just that the english, who are so affluent, should give a few millions to the king? If we were foolish enough to be thrown off our guard, we should be laughed at. True, the riches of the world pass through the king's hands, but the smallest part, nevertheless, remains in Spain; and this you would wrest from us, to give to your good friends the english.'

As I attempted to advert to the fidelity due from the king to his allies, she resumed her discourse, still searching in the casket. 'You in France are nothing but english. You were not enemies to the emperor, till since his alliance with my husband. Before, he was your great friend. Do you remember that, during the congress of Cambray, we pressed you to procure satisfaction to Spain from the emperor? Yet you



never would. There was, however, nothing to fear. But we no sooner had made peace, than you joined against us, from caprice, and without knowing why.'

CH. XXXIX.

1727

1728.

"At length she found a letter from the king of England, promising the restoration of Gibraltar, and dated the first of June, 1721.\* While I was reading it, she observed, 'perhaps it is forged.' Answering that I believed it original, 'I was glad,' she rejoined laughing, 'to furnish you with such an excuse. See, sir, the principal reason for admitting the term of 1725. Let your allies fulfil their part, we will fulfil ours. Let them restore to us what they have. With what right do they come to blockade our ports!' Thinking she had silenced me, she turned towards the king.

"As, however, I adduced proofs, that their engagements were intended to trouble Europe, 'If we had wished to trouble it,' she observed, 'we had a fine game. We had a powerful army in Catalonia; and all your places on that side were unprovided.' I urged this circumstance as a proof of our confidence in their catholic majesties. 'You ought not, however,' she continued, 'to have so much, after the example you have given. You, who supplied the imperialists with money, to rob us of Sicily! You who took Fuenterrabia and St. Sebastian! You, who joined the english to destroy our marine, to burn our ships in our very docks! You, lastly, from whom we can expect no other treatment, while the king, your master, places no dependance on the counsels of his uncle, and listens to people sold to the english! Mr. Walpole is your master in France. I wish I had Mr. Walpole and the cardinal here. We would dispute of religion and policy; we would see whether my arguments would not preponderate.'

"To end a conversation growing too warm, I lamented

\* See ch. 31. And Memoirs of sir Robert Walpole, ch. 34.



CH. XXXIX.

1727

1728.

my ill success ; and after touching on the affection of the king towards my master, affected to retire. The queen, resuming the discourse, asked if I had no expedient to propose. As I replied in the negative, and continued to retreat, she stopped me with the question, ‘ Suppose we put the vessel in sequestration till the congress shall decide?’ I coolly asked, with whom? She added, ‘ with the king your master.’

“ I endeavoured to shew the inconveniences and inadequacy of this expedient ; but the queen persisting, I turned towards the king, and observing that equivocations were dangerous, asked, if he commissioned me to make the proposition? I was interrupted by the queen, who added, ‘ Yes, and let the king your master agree not to restore it without the consent of the king my husband.’ On which the king said ‘ Yes.’

“ I then proceeded to ask the king if he would cause the effects of the flota to be distributed. The queen again resumed the discourse. ‘ Yes,’ she said, ‘ when the english have quitted the coasts of America and Spain.’ ‘ It should be done,’ I observed, ‘ at the same time, for it is not just that every thing should be fulfilled on one side and nothing on the other.’

“ ‘ Well,’ she continued, ‘ if the king, your master, will himself become a guarantee for the retreat of the english squadrons, we will consent to give up the effects of the flota ; and when the english ships have retired, we will withdraw the troops which from a point of honour are kept before Gibraltar.’

“ I distinctly recapitulated these three propositions, stating that there was no reason to expect they would be relished ; and even hinted at the impolicy of shewing so little consideration towards the english, who were joint guarantees of the succession to the italian states in favour of Don Carlos.



‘ You are come again,’ exclaimed the queen, ‘ to your successions ! I voluntarily abandon them, if Gibraltar is restored to the king. You see by what I say in his presence, that it is his glory and his interests only which affect me.’

CH. XXXIX.

1727

1728.

“ As the conversation had lasted above an hour and a quarter, I made my bow to retire, and the queen dismissed me with a compliment, saying ‘ Come and see us when you will without ceremony. We shall be glad to chat with you.\*’”

This account will suffice to shew the general tone which prevailed in the audiences of the french minister ; for the same propositions were repeatedly brought forward with different modifications, and supported with all the arguments which the pertinacity, acuteness, and resentment of the queen could suggest. On one hand she spared no effort to weary the patience or work on the feelings of the french ministry ; on the other she caught at every pretence to gain time, that she might regulate her conduct by the suggestions of the austrian cabinet. Count Konigseg was permitted to guide or influence every step of the negotiation ; while the spanish ministers who were not blindly subservient to him, were reduced to mere cyphers, and scarcely intrusted with a knowledge of the transaction.

The proposal to sequestrate the Prince Frederic being transmitted to Versailles, drew from the king a letter containing a positive refusal to admit this expedient. This was accompanied with a gentle complaint against the antipathy and suspicion manifested by the queen towards the english, and concluded with an affectionate appeal to the king of Spain, for the prompt and absolute execution of the preliminaries, as the

\* Lettre du Comte de Rottembourg à Monsieur Chauvelin, Oct. 16, 1727. Orford Papers.



CH. XXXIX.

1727

1728.

Nov. 15.

surest means to preserve tranquillity and maintain the union of the two crowns.\*

“I read this letter,” says the ambassador, “to their catholic majesties. The queen made some grimaces when I came to the part which spoke of her resentment; but at last she smiled. The king seemed much touched by the affectionate passages which it contained. He listened to it with extreme attention. When I had finished, the queen said, ‘well, we have done all they wished; they will be satisfied.’ I hinted that this new guaranty was useless, and would, in some degree, invalidate the first, which was comprised in the other articles. ‘Why,’ asked the queen, ‘do you refuse us a satisfaction which will cost only a sheet of paper? If you gave ten synonymous guaranties, you would execute them all in fulfilling one?’ I replied, smiling, that it required much trouble to root out her suspicion of the english, who in reality were not such people as they had been described to their catholic majesties. ‘Perhaps,’ I added, ‘what I said might not please at the present moment; but having bound myself to their majesties to speak the truth, I should on a future day have the satisfaction to know that they approved my freedom. An alliance with the english has this advantage, peculiar to that nation; they subject their allies to no inconvenience by attempting to extend themselves abroad, and *their continent* is easily guarantied.’ Turning to the king, I continued, ‘Your majesty will acknowledge that, if at the death of Charles the second, we had had the english on our side, the monarchy of Spain would not have been dismembered. The time might come when the english would not be useless to repair these

\* Translation of the French king’s letter to count Rottembourg, Fontainebleau, Nov. 3, NS. 1727.



losses. Besides, we were about to form a congress for a pacification which it would be advantageous to hasten.'

"Seeing that their majesties listened with satisfaction, I assured the queen, that if Mr. Walpole were known to her, he would deserve her esteem by the moderation and respect with which he always spoke of their catholic majesties. I did not even despair of seeing the time when her majesty would approve and profit by the union which she suspects between the cardinal and Mr. Walpole. The queen laughed and said, 'You are too charitable.' Finding her in so good a humour, I recalled to her recollection her warmth in my first audiences, adding, 'Madam, employ your endeavours, that the king may place himself at the head of my master's allies; you will then see the cardinal at least as intimately connected with the spanish ambassador as with Mr. Walpole.'"

CH. XXXIX.

1727

1728.

From the apparent complacency which prevailed on this occasion, and the precise orders given to the french minister, it might have been imagined that this complicated negotiation was drawing to a conclusion. On the day preceding this audience, a discussion had taken place between the ambassador and the secretary la Paz, though with the invariable intervention of count Konigseg. The result of this conference was a memorial in the form of a letter, addressed by la Paz to Rottembourg, stating the question of sequestration under another shape; and changing the whole article relative to the Prince Frederic in such a manner as to justify the claims of Spain for an indemnification of the damages to their commerce by the blockade of their ports and coasts. With an inconsistency which we can only attribute to the private intimations of Chauvelin, Rottembourg received and trans-

\* Lettre du Comte de Rottembourg à M. Chauvelin, l'Escorial, Nov. 15, 1727.



CH. XXXIX.

1727

1728.

mitted this memorial to his court; though he at the same time solicited an ostensible letter of recal, in case the king of Spain should refuse the unconditional acceptance of the preliminaries.

Meanwhile new offers were transmitted by the king of England, in a letter from count Broglio the french ambassador at London, to Chauvelin. The substance of this proposition was the execution of the preliminaries in general, and the restitution of the Prince Frederic; but the question of contraband was to be referred to the congress; and with full confidence in the honour of the king of Spain, that he would distribute the effects of the flota, the british squadrons were recalled. The contraventions of treaties and agreements public or private, before the year 1725, were to be remedied in a similar manner at the congress; and finally, the guaranty of the king of France was admitted for the execution of these articles.

This proposition was communicated by Rottembourg, with an eulogium on the sincerity and good faith of the king of England, and the confidence he had shewn towards their catholic majesties at the very moment when they evinced their diffidence of him by demanding new guaranties from France and the emperor. The king was struck with surprise at this instance of generosity, and even the queen herself appeared highly pleased. "I shall," she said, "no longer doubt the truth of any thing you may say. Hitherto I have considered your discourses in favour of the english, as proceeding from your desire to forward a reconciliation. But I am now fully satisfied."

Rottembourg replied, "As the chief articles are now settled, there is no need to wait the return of the courier, with an answer to the proposition of your majesties. I hope I may



be permitted to dispatch a courier with the welcome news to my court." The queen gave signs of embarrassment at this request, and, after some hesitation, replied, "Before we adopt a final resolution, you must consult the marquis de la Paz, and count Konigseg." He was graciously dismissed, and as he quitted the apartment, the queen in a tone of complacency said, "I wish every one was like you, for you always bring good news."\*

CH. XXXIX.

1727

1728.

A conference was accordingly held with la Paz and Konigseg; at which Mr. Keene was present in his private capacity. To the surprise of the french minister, the dispute was revived on the very same points as before. It was, however, finally decided, that Rottembourg should state the last proposition in an official note, which was to be accepted and approved by la Paz in the name of his sovereign. Instead, however, of this simple approbation, la Paz drew up a new recapitulation, repeating the propositions of the king of England in general, but changing the article relative to the Prince Frederic to the same terms as had been already rejected. It was to be restored, but the congress was to decide whether it ought not to be pledged as an indemnification for the damages done to the spanish commerce by the presence of the british squadrons in the american seas.

Without a moment's hesitation, the french ambassador accepted the document thus modified, although he already received the orders which he had solicited for his recal. His asseverations that no other terms would satisfy the queen, and the confidence inspired by his plausible manners and apparent candour, joined to the authority which he assumed as the only channel of direct communication with the spanish sovereigns, extorted the reluctant acquiescence of his colleagues,

\* Mr. Keene to the duke of Newcastle, Dec. 3, 1727.



CH. XXXIX.

1727

1728.

Keene and Vandermeer. It was transmitted to the different courts as an advantageous and satisfactory arrangement. To give it the stamp of authority, Mr. Keene was relieved from the political interdict to which he had been subjected, and apprised that he should shortly be admitted to the privileges of his public character.

The spanish court had not widely miscalculated on the effect which this apparent accommodation would produce in France. Although these terms had been already rejected, it is a remarkable circumstance, that the order of recal to Rotterdambourg was accompanied with a counter-order to protract the negotiation, and doubtless with private intimations to seize a favourable opportunity of satisfying Spain at the expence of England. It was therefore welcomed by the partisans of the old court as the harbinger of returning tranquillity, and the prelude to a more intimate connection with Spain; while the trading and mercantile classes, whose interests had suffered by the suspension of commerce, were elated with the hope that the returns of the flota would at length be faithfully distributed. "We must," was the general expression, "speak clearly to England. We must declare that we are satisfied with the offers of Spain; that those who are not content can only wish to involve Europe in a general war."\*

In London, however, the sensation was far different. Large sums had been already expended in hostile preparations; the fleets had mouldered away from inactivity and disease; the lucrative trade with the spanish dominions in Europe and America was suspended, without the slightest of those advantages which would have flowed from open war. Such a mortifying uncertainty could not fail to rouse the public indignation. The national outcry was, "give us either war or peace;

\* Memoires de Villars, t. 3, p. 360.



but let us not spend our blood and treasure in mere preparations and temporary expedients, which damp the public spirit, and disgrace the honour of the crown." Parliament was daily expected to meet; and the ministry, instead of declaring the re-establishment of tranquillity, could not venture to announce this doubtful truce to an impatient and indignant people.

CH. XXXIX.

1727

1728.

However anxious for peace, the government could no longer venture to temporize. The most vigorous measures were instantly adopted. The meeting of parliament was deferred. An appeal was made to the french court to fulfil its engagements, in enforcing the execution of the preliminaries, except those concessions which the king of England had made from mere complaisance. Either, it was observed, France must disavow count Rottembourg, or the alliance of Hanover is broken, and the ties dissolved which united the two countries to their mutual advantage.

The french court and cabinet were thunderstruck with this decisive demand: there was scarcely a nobleman or minister who did not urge that it was more becoming the national honour to adhere to Spain, than to submit to the dictates of the british cabinet. Even Fleury wavered, in the hope of inducing England to relax in her demands. But, finding the british cabinet inflexible, he prudently decided to preserve peace and the connection with England, rather than sacrifice the welfare and tranquillity of the nation to the punctilios of romantic honour, and the imperious cupidity of the queen of Spain.\*

\* In Mr. Walpole's Papers are several curious dispatches on this subject, shewing the energy and effect with which he supported the demands of his court, and extorted the consent of Fleury to a cordial co-operation with England, particularly the Dispatches to the duke of Newcastle, Paris, Dec. 17, 24, and 27, 1727.



CH. XXXIX.

1727

1728.

Accordingly, a letter was sent to count Rottembourg, in the name of the king, insisting, in the strongest terms, on the prompt and literal execution of the preliminaries. "I am," he observes, "concerned and astonished at these new conditions, which can produce no other effect, than to embarrass the execution of what should precede the opening of the congress, and which tend to annul the preliminary articles, or at least to gain time for new interpretations. It would be dishonourable and shameful to my allies, and consequently to myself, should I accept them, and I should justly incur the reproaches of all Europe." This letter was accompanied with an ostensible order of recal, and a memorial to the same effect from the secretary of state.

Great as was the sensation occasioned by these propositions in France and England, the rejection of them excited a still greater at Madrid.

"I found M. la Paz," says Rottembourg, "who is usually very phlegmatic, in a ferment of rage, in consequence of the letter which he had received from Paris. As he spoke without an interpreter, I comprehended little of what he said, except that he was going to revoke the orders which he had expedited in conformity with his letter, and to prevent the introduction of Mr. Keene, who was to have his first audience at four in the afternoon. Finding my arguments fruitless, I only told him that his impetuosity would spoil more in a quarter of an hour, than he would ever be able to remedy.

"To prevent the ill effects of his passion, I called on the archbishop of Amida, and persuaded him to charge himself with the office of procuring the promised audience for Mr. Keene, which took place at the appointed hour, and in the most gracious manner.

"Yesterday I was admitted to the presence of the king and queen, on their return from shooting. I delivered to them the



letter of the king, and told them that, without entering into the reasons which had induced his majesty to disapprove the conditions proposed by M. de la Paz, I should only observe, that I had faithfully communicated to them his majesty's orders of the 3rd and 10th of November, and the letter from M. Broglio, which must form the foundation of our proceedings. The extension of the conditions in the letter of M. de la Paz, I said, was laid upon me, in consequence of the declaration that, without this extension, their catholic majesties would never comply with the demands.

"I added, 'I now find from the remarks of M. Chauvelin, that the extension of the second article will never be admitted.' I then produced the memorial, and read that clause, and the other relating to impartial powers.

"The queen asked me if the satisfaction required for the king of Spain was not stipulated in the second article. I answered, 'equally to all the contracting parties.' 'We are then,' she rejoined, 'included. If your intentions are upright, you ought not to reject this explanation; if not, we have nothing to do with the congress, because it is only to judge of reciprocal infractions. We do not demand an uncertain compensation; we only require it to be taken into consideration, whether we ought to have a compensation or not.' To my remark, 'that one party had no right to explain preliminaries settled by several, and that the additions to the letter of count Broglio were not made with the consent of France and England,' she interrupted me, 'True, but Bournonville, you will recollect, signed the preliminaries without our knowledge.' I replied, 'M. Bournonville signed for his master, I for a foreign king.' 'Mr. Keene was present,' said the queen. I answered 'yes, but accidentally. He had only appeared as a visitor to

CH. XXXIX.

1727

1728.



CH. XXXIX.

1727

1728.

M. de la Paz, and had done nothing but interpret and translate, without speaking a single word from himself. Besides, he had not delivered his credentials, and had not affixed his signature.' The king remarked, 'You are right.' I then took the whole blame on myself for exceeding my instructions, on an occasion when it was signified to me, on the part of her majesty, that nothing less would terminate the negotiation. I did not hesitate to say, 'I had wofully deceived myself, because this unfortunate addition might occasion a war.'

"The queen said, 'There will be no war. The allies of Hanover will never incur such a disproportionate expence, while five or six millions will suffice to defend the spanish frontier. If we should lose a few places, they will be restored at the peace, and we have effects enough in our hands to render the allies accountable for that sum.' 'Well,' I rejoined, 'the emperor will not be quit on such easy terms; and we have sufficient proofs that the court of Vienna raises all these difficulties?' 'No,' she replied, with emphasis, 'It is I who ordered the explanatory article to be inserted. If France and England acquiesce, well; we shall deem them sincere in their professions to satisfy Spain. If they reject it, they design to deceive us. Besides, we demand no preference, we only require others to submit to the same laws as ourselves.' "

After some further conversation in the same tone, the ambassador was dismissed without satisfaction.

His representations were accordingly supported in the strongest manner by M. Vandermeer, who had not waited for orders to retract, and by Mr. Keene, who now assumed the functions of a public minister. They all concurred in announcing, that further delays would give rise to immediate hostilities.

\* Lettre du Comte de Rottembourg à M. Chauvelin, Madrid, Dec. 20, 1726.



Indignant and disappointed, the queen appeared inclined to risk the fortune of war, and demanded of Patiño whether the country was in a state to maintain a contest. The minister did not venture to give a direct negative, but hinted that the effects of the flota would only be sufficient to supply the expences of a defensive war, without furnishing subsidies to foreign princes. She then ordered a heavy indulto to be laid on these effects; and to the remonstrances of Rottembourg, she replied, "The king is master in his own dominions, and may lay what tax he pleases on his own subjects. Besides, what have foreigners to do with our flota."

CH. XXXIX.

1727

1728.

While she yet hesitated, the first parliament of George the second assembled in England. The speech from the throne expressed a hope of a final and satisfactory accommodation; but recommended proper measures of precaution. The appeal produced an unanimous and liberal grant of men and money; and immediate reinforcements were accordingly dispatched to the squadrons stationed off the coasts of Spain.

The allies, however, did not solely rely on the effect of public menaces, but omitted no endeavour to work on the temper of the queen, and influence those about her person. Bribes were lavished on her attendants, and menaces were not spared to her confessor, that her refusal would be imputed to his instigation, and that his family, to whom he was affectionately attached, would suffer for his indiscretion. The impending danger did not fail to alarm even the ministers who had been promoted by the german interest. All joined in representing the fatal consequences of delay, and deprecating a war, for an object so comparatively trifling as the Prince Frederic.

Even the emperor himself was at length intimidated by the strength and aspect of the Hanover allies, and the lukewarm-



CH. XXXIX.

1727

1728.

ness of his own adherents. Conscious that the principal burthen of a conflict would fall on Austria, he ordered Konigseg no longer to foment the resentment of the queen, but to join in recommending the prompt acceptance of the proffered terms. This sudden change of conduct only served to inflame her resentment. She turned her indignation against the emperor, and publicly stigmatised Konigseg as the advocate of England.

The real cause which vanquished her pertinacity, was the uncertain health of the king, who, at this particular moment, was reduced to the most alarming state. She removed him from public observation to the royal residence of the Pardo; but his incapacity for business daily increasing, she first admitted the prince of Asturias into the council, and finally procured the signature of a royal decree, constituting her governess of the kingdom. She now became seriously apprehensive, lest the death of her husband should frustrate her favourite project of an establishment in Italy, and reduce her to the melancholy fate which awaits the queen dowagers of Spain. She, therefore, employed the powers with which she was vested to accelerate an accommodation. At length Philip, by the act of the Pardo, announced his absolute and unequivocal acceptance of the preliminaries, modified according to the concessions of Great Britain, and under the guaranty of the king of France. This act was accepted by the plenipotentiaries of France, England, and Holland, at Madrid, and by count Konigseg, on the part of the emperor. The intended meeting of the congress was transferred from Aix la Chapelle to Soissons, for the convenience of cardinal Fleury, on whom, in quality of french plenipotentiary, the principal conduct of the negotiation devolved.\*

March,  
1728.

\* Act of the Pardo, in the collections of public papers.



The commission of Rottembourg being thus fulfilled, he returned for a short time to France, and in the interval was replaced by the marquis of Brancas.

CH. XXXIX.

1727

1728.

The king having soon experienced a favourable turn in his disorder, the queen induced him to announce his recovery by returning with regal pomp to Madrid, re-establishing his residence at the Buen Retiro, and ostensibly resuming the reins of government. By persuading him frequently to appear in public, she likewise endeavoured to remove the impression made by his recent malady, as well as to allay the general suspicions of a relapse. To give, however, additional effect to these exhibitions, which were intended to satisfy the public mind the queen herself, in gratitude for his recovery, made a nine days pilgrimage to the chapel of our lady of Atocha, the peculiar object of royal devotion as the patroness of Spain; and wore the franciscan habit for a twelvemonth, in compliance with a vow made to St. Anthony of Padua.\*

\* Mr. Keene's dispatches, April 19, 1728.



## CHAPTER XL.

1728—1731.

*Tardy and inefficient Proceedings of the Congress of Soissons—Obstructions to the execution of the Preliminaries by Spain—Hypochondriac Malady of Philip, and power of the Queen—His ineffectual attempt to abdicate—Illness of Louis the Fifteenth, and new hopes of Philip to succeed to the French Crown—Secret Plans of the Courts of Madrid and Vienna—Double Marriage between the Families of Spain and Portugal—Establishment of the royal Residence at Seville—Increasing Malady of the King—Separation of the Courts of Spain and Austria—Treaties of Seville and Vienna—Disgrace of Montgon—Death of St. Philip.*

CHAP. XL.

1728

|

1731.

THE congress of Soissons was opened on the 14th of June, 1728, for the termination of all the disputes which had so long agitated Europe; and as the alliance of Vienna had apparently left no point of contention between Spain and the emperor, it was hoped that a speedy arrangement might be effected. But the same jealousies and bickerings which, in the preceding meeting at Cambray, had frustrated all efforts to mediate an accommodation, were now renewed, and produced a similar effect. The interminable disputes between the emperor and the maritime powers, relative to the barrier treaty \* and the

\* House of Austria, v. 2, ch. 3.



Ostend company, were again revived with redoubled acrimony. Spain also brought forward the demand of Gibraltar, and mutual accusations were respectively produced by England and Spain, relative to the english settlements, and contraband trade carried on with the coasts of South America.

CHAP. XL.

1728

1731.

England and France, though apparently united in the same design of separating Spain from the emperor, and hastening a general pacification, were actuated by different interests. France secretly wished to effect a cordial union with Spain, and to oppose the guaranty of the pragmatic sanction. England was anxious to secure the renewal of her lucrative commerce with Spain, and to revive her antient and popular connection with the House of Austria. The only obstacles to such a reconciliation, were derived from the refusal of the emperor to suppress the Ostend company, and to comply with the demands of George the second, as elector of Hanover.

The personal friendship and confidence which long habit had produced between Mr. Walpole and cardinal Fleury; and the pacific principles which reigned in the french cabinet, suspended the actual dissolution of an alliance founded on mutual, but temporary interest, till long after the operation of that interest had ceased. But it could not be expected that personal regard would continue to outweigh political principle and national sentiment. Consequently, those jealousies, and that contrariety of opinion, which afterwards occasioned its dissolution, began to manifest themselves during the congress of Soissons.\*

These discordant interests, and the pertinacity of the contending parties, particularly of Spain, rendered the proceedings of the congress a mere routine of forms, and a repetition of memorials and counter-memorials without leading to the deci-

\* Memoirs of lord Walpole, ch. 16.



CHAP. XL.

1728

1731.

sion of a single contested point. At length the Hanover allies, to terminate such fruitless, irritating, and inconclusive discussions, proposed to draw up a provisional treaty, comprehending the principal points relative to the re-establishment of peace on the same foundation as before the year 1725, and referring all inferior questions to the examination of commissioners, who might proceed in the arrangement without interruption to peace and commerce in general.

This proposal was accepted by the imperial, and after some delay even by the spanish plenipotentiary. But the project itself experienced the most pertinacious opposition from both the courts of Madrid and Vienna. The king of Spain endeavoured to renew the former discussions under another shape, by insisting that many points should be introduced into the provisional treaty, which in the project had been referred to commissioners. The interests of the queen now began to predominate: the demand of Gibraltar, with the commercial disputes, were superseded by instances for the introduction of spanish, instead of neutral garrisons into the fortresses of Tuscany and Parma. To prevent, however, the further progress of this negotiation, Philip recalled his plenipotentiary, the duke of Bournonville, under the pretence of rendering an account of his proceedings, and refused to give a definitive answer relative to the provisional treaty, before his arrival at Madrid. Bournonville accordingly departed in October, and after being detained at Paris by real or affected illness appeared at Madrid in December. From the period of his departure, the court of Vienna also suspended all intercourse with the congress.

During these transactions, new agitations filled the court of Madrid; and new interests and projects engrossed the attention of Philip and his queen.



The first event was the temporary illness of Don Ferdinand, Prince of Asturias, who was seized with the small pox; and whose death, by opening the succession of Spain to Don Carlos, would have changed the views of the queen with regard to an establishment in Italy.

CHAP. XL.  
1728  
|  
1731.  
~~~~~  
May, 1728.

The hypochondriac malady of the king continued to increase, and occasionally gained an empire over his reason. Sometimes he passed whole days in bed, inverting the ordinary habits of life, and changing night into day and day into night. He gave midnight audiences to foreign ambassadors, detained his own ministers in the transaction of business till the dawn, and at other times did not admit them into his presence for several weeks. In these paroxysms he reverted to his former scruples. He not only expressed his resolution to abdicate, but made various attempts to escape from the palace, and carry it into effect. Every precaution was taken to seclude the doting monarch; no person was admitted to his presence without a special order; the queen herself watched all his motions; the locks of the apartments were frequently changed; the guards were strictly enjoined to prevent him from quitting the palace. But all these precautions were not sufficient. He profited by the moment when the queen, fatigued with watching, had retired into another apartment, wrote a decree with his own hand, and sent it by his favourite valet to the council of Castile, with the injunction to notify his abdication, and proclaim his son Ferdinand.*

June

The queen, soon discovering what had passed, sent the marquis de la Roche, secretary of the cabinet, to prevent the proclamation, and if possible to recover this dangerous document.

* Mr. Keene's dispatches, June 1728. *Memoires de Montgon*, t. 6, p. 273. —Villars, t. 3, p. 394.—Duclos, t. 2, p. 57, erroneously places this incident in 1729.

CHAP. XL.

1728

1731

Fortunately the president, the archbishop of Valencia, to whom it was carried, was her creature, and had delayed the execution under the pretence of form. Her messenger therefore arrived at the moment when the council was on the point of fulfilling the order. The dangerous paper was destroyed; redoubled precautions taken to prevent the repetition of a similar scene; and, to vanquish one scruple with another, an oath extorted from the king, that he would not again renew his clandestine attempts to abdicate.*

As his bodily health was not impaired by his mental disorder, the queen did not, as before, publicly assume the government, but with the assistance of the ministers, directed all operations in his name, and sanctioned the public acts with the stamp which was employed to spare the royal hand the labour of signing the numerous acts which occur in the ordinary course of business.

The power which this seclusion of the king threw into her hands, enabled her to pursue her designs with less obstruction than when he retained his faculties unimpaired; for, with frequent incapacity, and general aversion to business, Philip was peculiarly jealous of his authority, and on the slightest suspicion of a design to deceive or biass his judgment, sunk into a state of sullen obstinacy. With this temper, notwithstanding the means which the queen possessed to influence his conduct, it required consummate art and self command to disguise her wishes, and make her suggestions appear as his own reflections. She constantly assisted at the audiences of foreign ministers, and generally engrossed the discourse; yet she always affected a perfect submission to the king, and indignantly repelled the slightest allusion to her own advantage,

* Mr. Keene's dispatches.—Memoires de Villars, t. 3, p. 397.—Montgon, t. 6, p. 273.

declaring that she had no interest but that of her husband ; no glory but that of Spain. But with this exterior of docility and disinterestedness, she was indefatigably vigilant to prevent any other person from influencing the mind of the king ; she frequently conquered his obstinacy by superior address and perseverance ; and gave private audiences, or received private communications through the channel of the marquis de la Paz, and her confessor.

CHAP. XL.

1728

1731.

The malady of the king liberated her from these restraints. She now gave public audiences, became the principal or only channel of communication with the king, and acted as the minister in obtaining his approbation or signature to the acts of government. To her predominant influence, we may justly attribute the conduct of the spanish court, since the opening of the congress of Soissons, and the increase of the austrian influence, which daily acquired strength at Madrid.

Before the return of the spanish plenipotentiary from Soissons, Philip was roused from his morbid melancholy by the illness of the king of France, who was attacked with symptoms of the small pox, on the 26th of October. Though the disorder was slight, yet, from those accidents which frequently attend such moments of anxiety, a temporary suspension took place in the regular communication between Paris and Madrid. This incident was sufficient to cause the strongest agitation in the minds of Philip and his queen, who anticipated the death of Louis, and considered themselves as already in possession of the french throne.

Mr. Keene has preserved an account of their behaviour on this trying occasion, communicated by one of their familiar attendants.

“ They expressed great uneasiness at not having news from France, and concluded from thence that the king was dead,

Nov. 9,
1728

CHAP. XL.

1728

1731.

and the communication between the two kingdoms was stopped. The queen asked him what he designed to do upon this important accident? he replied, he would go into France with her and the rest of the royal family, leaving Don Carlos in Spain. That if he was invited by France, there would then be no difficulty. If he was not, he would set out without delay for the capital, and, presenting himself where he knew he should be well received, would proceed to the first parliament to have himself acknowledged king, and they who refused it would deserve chastisement. The queen proposed to have the *officiers de la Bouche* advertised to keep themselves in readiness. But he refused, and told her that some of them had already rode post with him, and that when they should arrive in France, they would not want servants to attend them.

“There were several other circumstances passed between them, as that if he was once in France he should be easy; that business was dispatched in a different manner in that country to what it is in this; that there was much more magnificence; but there was one party of which he was apprehensive, which was the jansenists. And they had reason to be against him, for if ever he came to be in possession of the crown of France, he would drive them out of the kingdom.”*

In this crisis the queen sent for Montgon, and gave him a private audience at midnight, to consult him on the momentous question which was now in agitation. But instead of the information which was expected from him as an agent of the duke of Bourbon, he detailed his past grievances and representations, and concluded with an ill timed demand of the post of counsellor of state or foreign ambassador. He was accordingly dismissed with vague offers and promises of protection. He, however, informs us that the journey to France engrossed the

* Mr. Keene to the duke of Newcastle.

public conversation, describes the exultation of the french partisans at Madrid, and observes, that a suspense of twenty four hours longer would have hurried Philip and his queen into some desperate measure.*

CHAP. XL.

1728

1731.

The arrival of a courier speedily dissipated their hopes and fears, by bringing intelligence of the french king's recovery. This incident, and the struggle of contending passions which it occasioned, were sufficient to rouse Philip from a long fit of apathy and dejection. He quitted his bed; permitted his beard of eight months growth to be shaved; returned thanks at the chapel of our lady of Atocha, and resumed his ordinary mode of life, and the exercise of the chase.†

Meanwhile some new scheme appears to have been planned between the restless courts of Vienna and Madrid. On the part of the emperor, hopes were held forth to the queen of a prompt and satisfactory arrangement of the Italian successions; and she was again tempted with the lures which had first induced her to form the Vienna alliance. On that of Spain, the most active preparations, both military and naval, were made; a fleet of twenty four ships of war was already stationed in the american seas; and twenty four sail of the line were ready for sea, or in a forward state of equipment. The most studied indifference and contempt were shewn towards France and England, every overture was evaded under the pretence of waiting the return of Bournonville; and the arrival of the galleons, which were on their way from America, was expected with an impatience which marked the anxiety of the queen to secure funds for the execution of the projects now in agitation.

October to
December.

To this scheme we may also attribute the resumption of a design at first formed with warmth and precipitation, and

* Montgon, t. 7, p. 68, 75.

† Mr. Keene's dispatches.

CHAP. XL.

1728

1731.

since suspended. This was the conclusion of the double marriages between the prince of Asturias and the infanta of Portugal, and the prince of Brazil with the infanta of Spain; the object of which was evidently to withdraw so important an ally as Portugal from the scale of the maritime powers.

In the depth of winter, and shortly after the recovery of the king, to the astonishment of all, he acceded to the instances of the portuguese court; and fixed the 7th of January for his departure to the frontier, to make the formal exchange of the future brides. Every expedient was adopted to render the cavalcade worthy the magnificence of the respective sovereigns. They were attended by a numerous train, as well as by all the foreign ministers; considerable bodies of troops were drawn to the frontiers, and no expence spared to decorate the theatre of the intended ceremony. The two courts arrived at Badajos and Elvas; and the place of meeting was a temporary pavilion on the bridge over the Caya, which divides the two kingdoms.

After some ludicrous altercations for precedence, which diminished the harmony and grandeur of the scene, the two monarchs, accompanied by their respective families, at length met on the 20th of January. The contracts of marriage were formally executed, the princesses mutually exchanged; and after a short and formal interview, they separated with great marks of friendship and cordiality; but with tears of affection and regret on taking leave of their children. Mr. Keene, who witnessed the ceremony, thus describes the bride of the prince of Asturias, and future queen of Spain.

“ I had placed myself very conveniently yesterday to see the first meeting of the two families; and I could not but observe, that the princess's figure, notwithstanding a profusion of gold and diamonds, really shocked the prince. He looked

as if he thought he had been imposed upon. Her large mouth, thick lips, high cheek bones and small eyes, afforded him no agreeable prospect; but she is well shaped and has a good mien.*

CHAP. XL.

1728

1731.

After a second and third interview, less marked by the restraints of etiquette, the two courts separated, with proofs of affection and regret. The king and queen of Spain made a progress through Estremadura; and directing their route by Seville to witness the arrival of the galleons at Cadiz, they spent some months in examining the state and improvements of that great commercial and naval station. As the queen dreaded another clandestine attempt to abdicate, and consequently was anxious to cut off all immediate communication with the council of Castile,† she induced her husband to establish the royal residence at Seville. Feb. 1729.

In consequence of the preceding causes and pretences for

* Mr. Keene to Mr. De la Faye, Badajos, January 20, 1729.

† “No one ever doubted,” observes Mr. Keene, “that the queen of Spain’s design in carrying the king her husband into Andalusia, was both to divert him from the thoughts of a second abdication, which he had unsuccessfully attempted in the year 1728, or at least to render the execution of such a design extremely difficult, by the distance he was then removed to from the council of Castile. Whilst he remained in Seville, nothing could be transacted upon that point with such secrecy and expedition but that she must come at the knowledge of it, and have time enough to prevent it; but the case was quite different at Madrid. That council was always at hand, and in virtue of their employments had a right to an audience of the king every Friday in a body, after which, by the laws and customs of Spain, the president retired into a dark room with the king alone; and made such representations, and received such directions as his duty obliged him to, or the king thought fit to give him. It is true that she made a proper choice of persons to be intrusted with these privileges; but as the matter was of the greatest importance to her, it was prudent to put it out of the power of any one to hurt her, which was effectually done by fixing her residence at Seville.”

Mr. Keene to the duke of Newcastle, Segovia, Aug. 1, 1733.

CHAP. XL.

1728

1731.

March.

delay, the Hanover allies were still left in the same uncertain and irksome situation as before the act of the Pardo. The season had passed without effect; the different plenipotentiaries had gradually withdrawn from the ridiculous farce of negotiation at Soissons; the court of Madrid maintained an obstinate silence in spite of repeated representations. Not only were the same depredations continued on the subjects and commerce of the Hanover allies, but new vexations daily added, and new artifices employed to revive the discussion relative to a compensation for the blockade of the spanish ports and harbours.

The Hanover allies were thus once more compelled to resort to acts of vigour, in order to put a period to those prevarications with which the court of Spain sought again to wear away the season for action. The decided devotion of the queen to Austria rendered France less scrupulous than on preceding occasions. As the prelude to decisive measures, the three ministers of France, England, and Holland, joined in a common remonstrance to the spanish government, demanding the immediate execution of the preliminaries, and announcing that delay or refusal would be considered as a motive for hostility.

It is impossible to divine to what new schemes and troubles these singular and contradictory proceedings might have given rise, had not a sudden change of policy taken place in the court of Madrid. The queen had indeed accepted the preliminaries, but with a determined resolution to evade their execution. Her conduct had shewed that she still fostered her implacable resentment against France and England, and her devotion to the austrian alliance, to which she yet clung with infatuation. The subsidies to the emperor were continued; the influence of Konigseg predominated in the councils, notwithstanding the murmurs of the nation, the opposition of the mi-

nisters, and the multiplied embarrassments in which the country was involved. Nothing indeed could dissipate the illusion but the conduct of the emperor himself, and, fortunately for the public tranquillity, an event occurred to put his sincerity to the test.

CHAP. XL.

1728

1731.

In consequence of the death of Francis, duke of Parma, the emperor instigated his successor Anthony to espouse a princess of Modena, in the hope that the birth of an heir would annul the investiture which he had reluctantly granted to an infant of Spain. Notwithstanding his repeated professions, he made endless objections to the introduction of spanish garrisons into the italian fortresses. He sent his agents into the petty courts of Italy, to counteract the spanish interest; and spared no research to trace out and revive obsolete pretensions of the empire to fiefs in Parma and Tuscany, in order to diminish as far as possible the value of that inheritance. He alternately made overtures to France and England, and insinuated that his desertion of Spain might be purchased by the guaranty of the pragmatic sanction. These intrigues were discovered, and communicated to the queen by Monteleon, who, at this period, was again sent into Italy, on the mission to which we have before adverted.

April,
1729.

Patiño also found, from fatal experience, that the finances were unequal to answer the continual demands of the emperor; and that this drain, if not checked, would frustrate his great design of restoring commerce, and reviving the marine, which had so long been the darling object of the nation. He, therefore, began openly to express his disapprobation of the Vienna alliance, and found little difficulty in adducing proofs of insincerity on the part of the emperor. This opposition excited a bitter enmity between him and Konigseg, and led to frequent altercations, which hastened the decline of the austrian

CHAP. XL.

1728

1731.

interest. He publicly attributed all the obstacles which had delayed an accommodation to the insatiable cupidity of the imperial court, and in answer to a formal accusation presented against him by Konigseg, replied, "The king, if he pleases, may send me to Italy; but while I remain in his service, I will never submit to concessions unworthy a minister of Spain."* Even the very courtiers discovered the change which was taking place, and raised a clamour against the mischiefs of the German alliance, which, as Mr. Keene justly observes, a few weeks before, would have been considered a species of political blasphemy.†

The multiplied proofs of the emperor's insincerity, which appeared from every quarter, and the representations of a minister who possessed her full confidence, made a gradual impression on the queen. Of this disposition the Hanover allies did not neglect to profit. By their ministers, Keene and Brancas, they expressed the utmost readiness to gratify their catholic majesties in all things which might contribute to the establishment of Don Carlos in Italy, and testified their willingness to concur in the admission of spanish garrisons, provided Spain would execute the preliminary articles.

These considerations fixed the decision of the queen. On one side, suspecting the emperor, on the other, dreading to lose by delay the advantages tendered by the allies, she made a direct application to the court of Vienna, either to bring its sincerity to the test, or obtain a pretext for a rupture. She demanded a prompt and explicit declaration, in writing, of the emperor's intentions with regard to the marriage of his daughter to a spanish prince, and to the introduction of spanish garrisons into Parma and Tuscany. An evasive answer con-

* Mr. Keene's dispatches.

† Mr. Keene to the duke of Newcastle, Dec. 20, 1727.

vinced her that she had nothing to expect but equivocation and delay, and she instantly turned to the Hanover allies. She did not, however, act with weakness or precipitation, but, with all her impatience, displayed the consummate address of her nation. She played off the emperor against the allies, and the allies against the emperor; she even made an effort to separate France from England; by the means of Chauvelin, she brought forward a scheme for an accommodation, conceived in vague terms with regard to the interests of England, and leaving the privileges of trade, and the right to Gibraltar and Minorca, to the decision of neutral powers. Even the cardinal accepted the proposal; but on this, as preceding occasions, he was over-ruled by the energetic remonstrances of Mr. Walpole.* Lastly, after a long delay, she made an appeal to the gratitude and generosity of the french and english nations, by distributing the effects of the flota and galleons.

CHAP. XL.
1728
|
1731.

Aug.

While she was yet cavilling and caballing, and employing all the resources of a consummate statesman, to extort more advantageous terms, the birth of a dauphin, by diminishing the chances of an eventual succession in France, raised the value of a more certain, though less splendid establishment in Italy. Accordingly, these long pending negotiations were closed by a treaty signed at Seville, November 9, 1729, which instantly broke the connection between Spain and Austria.

Sept. 4,
1729.

The treaty of Seville was a defensive alliance between Spain, England, and France, to which Holland afterwards acceded. After the usual guaranties and stipulations of reciprocal assistance, and the confirmation of preceding treaties, Spain revoked all the privileges granted to the subjects of the emperor by the treaties of Vienna, re-established the english commerce

* Memoirs of lord Walpole, ch. 16.

CHAP. XL.

1728

1731.

in America on the former footing, restored all captures with reparation for damages, and promised to prevent future depredations. Commissaries were also to be appointed to settle the disputes between England and Spain, concerning the american trade, and decide on the claims of Spain for the restitution of the ships taken off the coast of Sicily in 1721. The pretensions to Gibraltar were again passed over in silence.*

Regulations were made to secure the succession of Parma and Tuscany, and the attention and minuteness with which they were framed, prove the solicitude of the queen, and the anxiety of the allies to meet her wishes. The allies took on themselves the introduction of spanish garrisons, and formally engaged to defend Don Carlos against any power who might attempt to disturb him in the succession. Separate articles were also added, to render more prompt and effectual the intended abolition of the Ostend company, together with the restoration of commerce, and the confirmation of the asiento with England.

The court of Madrid vainly imagined that the emperor would be awed by this alliance, and that the italian successions would be secured without further difficulty or delay. But the sovereigns of Spain had ill calculated on his firmness and perseverance. Personally offended by their desertion, disap-

* Philip now evidently relinquished all hope of recovering Gibraltar; for, to cut off its communication with the interior, he constructed the strong lines of San Roque, across the isthmus, and invited inhabitants to settle in the neighbouring town of Algeziras, by extraordinary privileges. Mr. Keene, who was charged to remonstrate against the construction of these lines, observes, "As to the demolition of the works before Gibraltar, I was assured, if the whole universe should fall upon the king to make him desist, he would let himself rather be cut to pieces, than consent, since he had maturely considered his right to the ground; and we might as well pretend to Cadiz, in virtue of our treaties, as to the spot where the line was. It was far out of point-blank cannon shot, which was all we could justly ask." Seville, May 20, 1731.

pointed in the hopes of obtaining the guaranty of his pragmatic sanction, indignant at the forcible abolition of the Ostend company, and the loss of the spanish subsidies, he surpassed even the queen herself, in his artifices and intrigues to prevent, or at least to suspend, the execution of this obnoxious treaty. He inveighed by turns against the court of Spain and the allies, recalled his ambassador from Madrid, and poured troops into the Milanese to give law in Italy. He endeavoured to rouse the states of Germany, and the powers of the north, and displayed an invincible resolution, rather to risk a war with all Europe, than accept the conditions imposed upon him. For a time, the want of concert between the allies, arising from their own discordant interests, encouraged and enabled him to persevere. On the death of Anthony, duke of Parma, he therefore pushed his troops into that duchy, and retained it in his possession under pretence that the widow was pregnant.

The delays and inactivity of France and England, and the obstinacy of the emperor, roused the irritable court of Madrid. The queen gave way to her indignation against the cardinal minister, and did not hesitate to tell the french ambassador in a public audience, "I am the wife of a king of the House of France, yet deserted by France. We must adhere to our friends, not to our relations."* At her instigation, Philip, by his ambassador, declared himself free from all the engagements contracted by the treaty of Seville.

This prompt and decisive measure produced an instantaneous effect; for the british nation was alarmed by the prospect of again losing their commercial advantages. The king applied to the emperor, and at length purchased his accession to the treaty of Seville, by guarantying the pragmatic sanction, on the condition that the Ostend company should be

CHAP. XL.

1728

1731.

March 16,
1731.


* Memoirs de Villars, t. 4, p. 205.

CHAP. XL.

1728

|

1731.



abolished, and that his heiress should not be given to a prince of the House of Bourbon, or any sovereign so powerful as to endanger the balance of Europe. The spanish declaration was accordingly revoked, and a second treaty, concluded at Vienna on the 22nd of July, once more terminated the disputes between Philip and the emperor.

Soon after these treaties Don Carlos took possession of Parma and Placentia, with the approbation of the emperor and empire. He was also acknowledged successor to the grand duke of Tuscany. Spanish troops were conveyed by an english fleet to occupy the fortresses of that duchy, with no other opposition than a protest issued by the pope, for the sake of form, to preserve the obsolete rights of the church.

Thus these tedious negotiations, which had kept Europe in a state of alarm and commotion for twelve years, and had broken all the antient bonds of policy, terminated in arrangements which left the balance of power nearly in the same situation as before their commencement. The maritime powers and Austria were again united against the two branches of the House of Bourbon.*

The reconciliation of Spain with France was followed by the disgrace of the abbot Montgon, who had so essentially contributed to the renewal of the union. After his return from France, his plausible manners and devout exterior preserved the favour of Philip, and for some time the good will of the

* Dispatches of Mr. Keene from Madrid; Mr. Walpole from Paris, and the duke of Newcastle from London. Account of the negotiations from the opening of the congress of Soissons to the conclusion of the treaty of Seville by Mr. Robinson. MS.—Considerations on the Introduction of spanish garrisons.—Grantham Papers, MS.—Memoires de Montgon, passim.—Villars, t. 3 and 4, passim.—Memoirs of sir Robert Walpole, ch. 33, 35.—Lord Walpole, ch. 16.—House of Austria, v. 2, c. 9.—Treaties of Seville and Vienna in Rousset, Dumont, and other Collections of public Documents.

queen. But his mysterious connection with the court, and the general homage which he consequently received, both from natives and foreigners, filled his sanguine mind with the most aspiring designs, and dazzled him with the hope of becoming another Alberoni. While he deluded himself with these fantastic expectations, he was assailed by all the influence of Fleury, who could not, without alarm, see the elevation of an irreconcilable enemy and a zealous partisan of the duke of Bourbon. The vain, officious, and meddling character of the abbot, gave full scope to the machinations of his adroit antagonist, and drew on him the displeasure of the queen. He at length discovered her secret opposition to his advancement, and, persuading himself that his influence with Philip was too firmly established to be shaken, attempted to brave the effects of her dislike.

With this view he presented several memorials to the king, expatiating on his sufferings and services; and inveighing against the queen's confessor, the Patiños, cardinal Fleury and the french ambassador, whom he considered as the advisers of the queen, and his own personal enemies. A favourable attention from Philip, who never forgot his services in promoting the reconciliation with France, and a gratification of 2,000 pistoles, filled him with the highest exultation. Proud of this distinction he considered his victory as complete, and anticipated the ruin of his opponents. "The confessor," he says, "has already taken a house at Madrid, Rottembourg* is preparing to quit Spain, under pretence of indisposition, and Patiño hourly expects the news of his dismissal."†

Finding, however, that his hopes were still deferred; and pressed by mortified vanity and pecuniary distress, he made a

* He had recently resumed his embassy in Spain.

† Montgon, t. 8, p. 437.

CHAP. XL.

1728

1731.

more direct attack, and prepared a new memorial in the stile of the preceding. After sedulously watching an opportunity to present it, he intruded himself into the inner apartment where the king was about to hear mass. As he advanced with his memorial, the queen entered, and confounded him with a look of indignation and contempt. "Retire, retire!" she exclaimed: "No one must enter here but the grandees and gentlemen of the houshold." Montgon retired; but after the ceremony, he again penetrated into the apartment, with the duke of Ossuna and the other attendants; and, having presented his memorial to the king, withdrew. The queen, who had observed his return, exclaimed, "this is too impudent!" and on the following morning, he received an order to quit the court in a week, and the kingdom in twenty days.*

This mandate was rigorously enforced. The abbot, after finding a temporary asylum in Portugal, returned to close his days in his native country and in his original obscurity; leaving in his Memoirs a monument of disappointed ambition, hypocritical piety, and overweening confidence, accompanied, however, with curious and valuable anecdotes of the two courts in which he had once acted so important a part.†

In closing our narrative of this period, it would be a species of ingratitude, to pass unnoticed the death of that spanish writer, from whom we have drawn such valuable materials for the preceding pages. Don Vincente de Bacallar y Sanna,

* Mr. Keene's dispatch, March 21, 1732.

† The overweening vanity and loquaciousness of the good abbot rendered him the object of ridicule to the whole *corps diplomatique* long before his disgrace. Many anecdotes occur in the letters of our ministers at Paris and Madrid of the derision in which he was held; and the intelligence which they drew from him relative to the personal sentiments and conduct of the sovereigns who honoured him with their temporary confidence.

marquis of St. Philip, was a native of Sardinia, and descended from an antient spanish family settled in that island. He received an excellent education, distinguished himself in various branches of learning, filled some important offices in his native island; and on its capture by the partisans of the archduke, persisted in his attachment to Philip. Repairing to Madrid, he was created marquis of St. Philip, much employed by his sovereign, and distinguished his diplomatic talents in the embassies of Genoa and the Hague. He died at the Hague, on the 11th of June, 1729, leaving in manuscript a *History of the Hebrew Monarchy*, and *Commentaries on the War of the Succession under Philip the Generous*: a work which has entitled him to a place among modern historians. It was composed from original documents and actual observation, and written with such freedom, that it was not permitted to be printed during the life of Philip the fifth. This very circumstance enhances its merit. We have however to regret the complaisance of the editor, who changed and softened many parts where he considered the character of Louis the Fourteenth as treated with too much severity. According to the spanish critics, the style of the original is harsh, and vitiated with the author's native idiom; but, though it is written with castilian prejudices, its authenticity and exactness are uncontested, and its tone of candour and freedom cannot fail to interest the reader. From the close of this narrative in 1725, there is a sad chasm in the History of Spain, which no succeeding author has yet supplied.*

* Ortiz, t. 7, p. 399.—Memoires de St. Philippe, t. 1, Discours Preliminaire. The title of the work was likewise changed to Memoires pour servir à l'Histoire d'Espagne sous le Regne de Philippe 5.

CHAP. XL.

1728

1731.

CHAPTER XLI.

1732—1736.

Continuance of Philip's Malady—Successful Expedition against Oran—Return of the Spanish Court to the Capital—Machinations of Spain against the Emperor—Negotiations with France—War of the Polish Succession—Campaigns in Italy and Germany—Conquest of Naples and Sicily—Don Carlos proclaimed King—Division in the Bourbon Alliance—Preliminaries of Vienna concluded between France and Austria—Indignation of the Spanish Court—Their reluctant accession to the Preliminaries—Dispute with the Pope—Temporary rupture with Portugal, and acquisition of the colony of Sacramento.

CHAP. XLI.

1732

1736.

AFTER Philip had established his residence at Seville, his mind again sunk into a state of apathy for want of interesting objects to rouse his attention. He soon relapsed into a still more deplorable state than before his departure from Madrid; and though without the ability to hold the reins of government, he was not sufficiently docile to commit them as before to the queen. Frequently he would neither transact business himself, nor suffer it to be transacted by others; and at one period the queen, notwithstanding her jealousy of the prince of Asturias, was obliged to employ his intervention to recal her husband to the ordinary habits of life.

The regular avocations of business proving ineffectual, another expedient was employed to stimulate his apathy. Advantage was taken of a vow which he had made to recover Oran from the Moors, and an appeal was made to his conscience to fulfil the sacred obligation. The bustle of war was now, as before, successful after other means had failed.

Having obtained from the pope the usual grants on ecclesiastical property for a war against the infidels, Philip issued orders that the troops collected to assert the rights of his son in Italy, should be employed to vindicate the honour of the christian name against the Moors in Africa. Twenty-five thousand men, convoyed by forty-five ships of war, commanded by the duke of Montemar, landed near Oran, routed a tumultuary army of 40,000 Moors, and laid siege to the place. The attacks were pushed with such vigour, that the fortress, though defended by a garrison of 10,000 men, surrendered, and the general, leaving 8,000 men to secure his conquest, returned to Spain.

CHAP. XLI.

1732

|

1736.

On the departure of the army, the Moors recovered from their panic, and attempted to dislodge the christians from both Ceuta and Oran. At Ceuta, a body of spaniards made a vigorous sally, under the command of the duke of St. Blas; but falling into an ambuscade were cut to pieces. The garrison, not disheartened by this reverse, repeated the attempt under the count of Cecil, and drove the Moors from their lines. A similar reverse was followed by similar good fortune at Oran. A sally was made under the command of the marquis of Santa Cruz, the celebrated tactician; but the chief falling in the moment of victory, the troops were panic struck, and driven back to the walls. While, however, the enemy were tumultuously celebrating their success, they were again attacked by the spaniards, and driven from their entrenchments. They several times renewed the conflict, and were as often repulsed, till at length they were totally routed, their camp taken, and their works levelled. The marquis of Miromenil, who directed this attack, received a mortal wound; but the vigorous defence of the garrison and the success of their sally threw the enemy into consternation: they abandoned their inauspicious

1732.

CHAP. XLI.

1732

1736.

enterprise, leaving the spaniards in tranquil possession of the two fortresses which they had so bravely won, and so gallantly defended.*

After the expedition to Africa, Philip found sufficient occupation in Europe during the remainder of his reign. At the instigation of his consort, he was involved in a war for the ostensible purpose of assisting France in restoring Stanislaus to the throne of Poland, but with the real design of obtaining new establishments for her sons in Italy.

It was not to be expected, that the accession of Spain to the treaty of Vienna should at once terminate the long pending disputes with the emperor; for many causes of irritation still subsisted which it was impossible to remove by treaties. The ambition of the queen was rather inflamed than gratified, and the breach of the recent connection had excited the highest personal resentment on both sides. The emperor accumulated obstacles on obstacles to delay the establishment of a bourbon prince in Italy. Even when it had actually taken place, he produced new complaints against the form in which Don Carlos had taken possession of his dominions, and received the homage of the Tuscans, as an infraction of the feudal rights possessed by the head of the empire.† The consequences of these contentions were mutual appeals to England as the principal mediating power; but no decision would satisfy both parties.

The sovereigns of Spain caught the alarm at the military preparations of the emperor to extort the consent of the german states to his pragmatic sanction; and at his design to

* Ortiz, t. 7, p. 429.—Desormeaux, t. 5, p. 418, 422.—Pol. State for April 1733.

† Disputes and negotiations relative to the possession of Parma and Tuscany in 1732.—Rousset, t. 6.

give his eldest daughter to the duke of Loraine, and unite, in the person of his destined son-in-law, the crown of the empire with the austrian territories. They were jealous also of his returning confidence in England; and of the alliances which he was now negotiating with the northern powers.

With England likewise, innumerable causes of irritation still remained. The spanish government, which had incessantly struggled since the peace of Utrecht to evade the performance of their commercial engagements, were not better disposed to fulfil them than before. They employed every artifice to obstruct the british trade in America, deferred the nomination of commissioners to arrange the disputes; and not only encouraged the depredations of their officers on those who carried on an illicit traffic with the colonies under the protection of the asiento; but even on those who frequented the west indian seas, for other traffic.

With a navy which under the skilful management of Patiño had risen from its losses, with the finances improving under his administration, and an army of 80,000 men, flushed with the recent victories in Africa, it scarcely admits a doubt that the queen was eager to renew the war, in order to obtain more honourable and advantageous terms than those of the recent treaty. But she had felt also, that the strength of Spain was not sufficient to resist alone the combined powers of Europe; and her continual efforts, though assisted by the co-operation of the partisans of Philip in France, had failed in the attempt to draw Fleury from his pacific system. The Memoirs of Villars, and the dispatches of our ministers, furnish innumerable proofs of the incessant endeavours of Spain to renew hostilities; and the no less incessant artifices of Fleury to maintain the connection of the two Bourbon courts,

CHAP. XLI.

1732

1736.

CHAP. XLI.

1732

1736.

Sept. 3,
1730.Feb. 1,
1733.

at the same time that he endeavoured to moderate the counsels of the restless and irritable sovereigns.

Indefatigable in her efforts to extend the power of her family, the queen attempted to extort from France a promise to enter into a war against Austria, on the side of Germany, while Italy was overrun by the spanish forces. She pressed the cardinal also to thwart the establishment of the pragmatic sanction by subsidizing the elector Palatine and the elector of Bavaria, who had pretensions to the austrian succession. She even opened a negotiation with Charles Emanuel, who had succeeded his abdicated father on the throne of Sardinia; and endeavoured to gain a prince who, with the abilities, possessed all the cupidity and ambition of his predecessors.*

While Philip and his queen were fluctuating between an eagerness to declare war against the emperor, and an unwillingness to engage without the co-operation of France; while they were temporising with the maritime powers, and even listening to overtures from the emperor himself to renew the former connection, an event happened in the distant regions of the north, which occasioned an union of views and interests between France and Spain. This event was the death of Augustus the third, elector of Saxony, and king of Poland.

During the attempts of the emperor to obtain the guaranty of his pragmatic sanction by the princes of Germany, the polish monarch, in virtue of his family pretensions,† stood forward as his principal opponent, entered into a compact with the elector of Bavaria, and was secretly encouraged by France. As his health was rapidly declining, it was easy to foresee that the

* For an account of the abdication of Victor Amadeus, and the accession of Charles Emanuel, see House of Austria, v. 2, p. 111.

† For the various pretenders to the austrian succession, and their respective claims, see House of Austria, v. 2.

approaching vacancy of the polish throne would give rise to commotions in Europe, from the natural solicitude of Louis the fifteenth, to revive the pretensions of his father in law, Stanislaus, and the equally natural interest of the emperor and Russia to prevent the accession of a prince dependent on France. These clashing views and mutual jealousies, occasioned active preparations for war among all the powers interested in the result.

CHAP. XLI.

1732

|
1736.

The great object of Augustus was to secure the reversion of the polish crown to his son. Hence he entered into secret connections with such of the european powers, as were able to forward his design, and hastened in the depth of winter to Warsaw, to obtain the consent of his subjects. But, in consequence of his opposition to the guaranty of the pragmatic sanction, he was opposed by the emperor, who, drawing his troops from Italy and the Netherlands, collected a considerable army in Silesia, and negotiated a treaty with Russia and Prussia, to give a king to Poland, in the person of Emanuel, prince of Portugal. Before, however, Augustus could convene a diet, he fell a sacrifice to his solicitude for the advancement of his family, and died of a gangrene in his foot, occasioned by an accident in his recent journey.

Feb. 1,
1733.

His decease at once changed the plan of the emperor. The new elector of Saxony, hopeless of support from France, and conscious that he could not succeed to the vacant throne without the assistance of Austria and Russia, entered into the views of the emperor, and gained his patronage by guarantying the pragmatic sanction. Russia readily concurred in a measure which was calculated to exclude an adherent of France, and joined with Austria in supporting his pretensions.

Numerous candidates started for the vacant throne, and, as usual in this elective government, two were chosen by op-

CHAP. XLI.

1732

1736.

Sept. 12.

posite parties. Stanislaus, by a singular series of adventures, traversed Germany, appeared suddenly at Warsaw, and was elected by acclamation in a diet of his adherents held in the plain of Vola. But a few days afterwards, he was expelled by the austrian and russian armies; and a new diet, assembled under their auspices, chose Augustus king.

The intelligence of the king of Poland's decease excited a deep sensation at Seville; because it was justly considered as an event which would fix the wavering inclinations of France, and prove the signal of hostilities against the emperor. It was therefore no sooner communicated to Philip, than he started from his bed, in which he had long continued, under the influence of his hypochondriac malady, without attention to business, or regard to his personal comforts. He resumed the duties of government, gave general audience to persons of all ranks and descriptions, entered minutely into the transaction of affairs, and ordered immediate preparations for an approaching war.

The queen did not suffer this temporary ebullition of spirit to subside. As the residence of Seville exposed him to the machinations of the king of Portugal, who was naturally anxious to hasten the elevation of his son in law, the prince of Asturias; as the grandees were incessantly caballing for a change of government; and as the different courts of Europe unequivocally hinted the necessity of a new abdication, she now deemed the residence of Madrid preferable to that of Seville, and was anxious to give a public proof of his returning health. She adroitly hinted that, like his grandfather, he was become the terror of Europe, and that it was necessary to disappoint the expectations of his enemies, who were anxious for his return to a private station. By similar arguments, she induced him to break off the familiar intercourse of the prince

of Asturias, with the grandees and foreign ministers, under the pretence of reviving the national etiquette; and she persuaded him to remove his residence to the neighbourhood of the capital, because the moist air of Seville was unfavourable to his constitution.*

CHAP. XLI.

1732

1736.

Philip started at once from sluggish indolence to extreme activity. Though he suffered a temporary indisposition from the exertions of his journey, he soon recovered, and repaired to his favourite residence at St. Ildefonso. "The moment," says Mr. Keene, "he arrived, he called for the directors of the works, and gave them his orders. At the same time, he declared his intention to have a regular despacho the next morning, when he disposed of several military employments. He has continued to apply to business ever since, so that the government is now upon a regular footing, and as to his health, I never saw him look more cheerful and more free of speech."† Thus, after an absence of five years, Philip again cheered the capital with his presence.

Anxious for occupation, Philip, in announcing to the court of France the capture of Oran, had made proposals to form a closer connection, and turn their united force against the emperor. Fleury was too sincerely devoted to peace, to excite the alarms of England, by shewing hostile designs against Austria; but the overture gave rise to a negotiation, which continued during the whole of 1732, and great part of the succeeding year. The conclusion of a treaty was for a time obstructed, by the refusal of Fleury to join in the designs of the queen against the austrian possessions in Italy; but the death of Augustus gave a new direction to the views of both powers. The queen, as an argument for immediate aggression, urged

* Mr. Keene's dispatches.

† Mr. Keene to the duke of Newcastle, Segovia, July 20, 1733.

CHAP. XLI.

1732

1736.

that the spanish navy was sufficiently powerful to transport an armament into Italy, expatiated on the strength and discipline of the army, and in reply to the cautious suggestions of the cardinal, exclaimed, "The king and I are not children of fear, great enterprises do not embarrass us.*"

Even the moderation and timidity of Fleury were tempted by the favourable juncture which now presented itself. The british ministry, on the eve of a general election, and embarrassed with the popular discontents occasioned by the attempt to establish the excise, were only anxious to prevent the subjugation of the Netherlands, and contented themselves with a vain offer of mediation.† Holland also, unwilling to encounter the strength of France without support, adopted a neutrality.

Secure on the side where France had learnt to dread an attack, Fleury in his turn solicited the co-operation of Spain. At the moment when both courts continued to amuse England with vague professions of their pacific views, and denials of any specific engagement, a triple alliance was already arranged between France, Spain, and Sardinia.‡ This was the last political act of the marquis of Castellar, brother of Patiño, who had exchanged the department of war for the embassy at Paris. The change of system was instantly announced by Montijo, spanish ambassador in London, who in an audience of the king declared that his catholic majesty was under an obligation of taking new measures, and joining his arms with France against the emperor.§ This communication was the prelude to a declaration of war, in which the three courts recapitulated all their grievances and complaints against Austria since the peace of Utrecht.

* Villars, t. 4, p. 341.

† Memoirs of sir Robert Walpole, ch. 43.

‡ Ortiz, t. 7, p. 436.

§ Conduct of England in the Polish affairs.—Walpole Papers, MS.

At the same moment a french army under Berwick passed the Rhine, and a second, under Villars, the favourite general of the court of Madrid, traversing the Alps, united with the Sardinians. Sixteen thousand spanish infantry, convoyed by twenty men of war, were transported from Barcelona and Alicante to the coast of Genoa, while five thousand horse, crossing the Pyrenees, embarked at Antibes for the same destination. The disembarkation being completed, these forces, under the command of Montemar, directed their march into Tuscany, and established their head quarters in the vicinity of Sienna. During these movements, Don Carlos, declaring himself of age, assumed the government of Parma, and fixed the majority of the future dukes at fourteen. He soon afterwards quitted Parma, and, as if secure of a higher distinction, stripped the ducal palace of the most valuable moveables and curiosities. Repairing to Sienna, he assumed the title of generalissimo of the spanish army in Italy.

CHAP. XLI.

1732

1736.

Nov. 1733.

Dec. 19.

Feb. 24,
1734.

The French and Sardinians hoped that this army was destined to co-operate in reducing the Milanese; but Philip, unwilling to share his anticipated booty with his allies, meditated an acquisition of far higher importance, long the object of his desire.

Among a people so changeable as the Neapolitans, and so averse to a regular government, however constituted, it was as easy to conquer, as it was difficult to retain the throne.

From the difference of language, manners, and national character, the german government became highly obnoxious: the new modes of taxation, and the military regulations, if not oppressive, were at least odious from their novelty, and offensive to the irritable temper and peculiar habits of the people. Under these impressions, the remnant of the spanish party gained continual accessions of strength, and made earnest representations to the court of Madrid to deliver them from

CHAP. XLI.

1732

1736.

March 15.

the german yoke. An object so tempting, and apparently so easy in the attainment, outweighed the general interests of the alliance of which Spain formed a part; and the remonstrances of marshal Villars, who himself repaired to Sienna to procure the co-operation of the Spaniards, produced no effect. Don Carlos left the French and Sardinians to pursue their own plans in Lombardy, drew the spanish troops from the Modenese, and, traversing the states of the church by permission of the pope, was received by the papal ministers with real or feigned respect, though without the honours of a crowned head. While he directed his march towards the neapolitan frontier, a powerful squadron, under the count of Clavijo, having a detachment of 8,000 troops on board, skirted the coast, and opened the way for the attack of the capital by the occupation of Ischia and Procida. The infant himself, passing by Capua, crossed the Valdarna, and united all his forces at St. Angelo di Rocca Canina. He published a manifesto to the Neapolitans, in the name of the king his father, declaring in the usual language his satisfaction with their past fidelity, and announcing his intention to deliver them from the german oppression; and, what was more likely to captivate this capricious people, promising to enlarge their privileges, and deliver them from all kinds of taxation, particularly those imposts which owed their invention and establishment to the cupidity of the german government. This paper was accompanied by a declaration in the name of the infant himself, confirming the promises of his father in general, and asserting his resolution to permit the introduction of no new tribunal, either civil or ecclesiastical, a promise deemed necessary to relieve the dread which the Neapolitans entertained, lest the establishment of the inquisition should be the consequence of a spanish government.

These tempting offers, with the national love of novelty, produced a great sensation. Fortunately also for the success of this enterprise, the viceroy, Visconti, as if anticipating the fatal event of the contest, had retired to Rome, and the austrian generals, Caraffa and Traun, disagreed in their plan of operations. After a violent dispute, they resolved to remain on the defensive, diminished their disposable force to garrison the principal fortresses, and divided the remainder into two bodies, one to guard Apuglia, while the other took post opposite St. Angelo della Canina, to cover the northern frontier.

CHAP. XLI.

1732

1736.

The spanish army forced the position of the imperialists at Angelo della Canina, drove them into Capua and Gaeta, and, leaving a detachment to blockade them, advanced towards Naples. At Aversa, the infant received a deputation from the capital; on the 10th of April 300 of his troops were admitted without opposition; and in a short time all the forts commanding the city and port of Baia, were occupied by the Spaniards. In consequence of this success, the infant made his triumphal entry, and published a decree in the name of his father, declaring him king of the two Sicilies, and renewing the promises made in the former proclamation.

May 10.

While the infant was conciliating his subjects, and establishing the government of his newly acquired dominions, Montemar followed the remnant of the german troops, who, to the amount of 9,000 men, retreated through Bari, and took up an advantageous position under the walls of Bitonto. But the strength of their post did not compensate for inferiority in number. The veterans of Spain, directed by the skill and enterprise of Montemar, forced their intrenchments with a dreadful carnage, and compelled those who escaped into Bitonto to surrender prisoners of war. Nearly 2,000

May 25.

CHAP. XLI.

1732

1736.

November.

men were left in the field, 6,000 taken, with their tents, provisions, and stores, and of the whole body only 400 hussars escaped into the mountains of Calabria. This victory decided the fate of the kingdom. Before the close of the year, the conquest was completed by the reduction of Gaeta, which Traun defended for several months with extraordinary resolution.

Don Carlos received the crown at Naples, amidst the acclamations of the people, who rejoiced to exchange a viceroy for a sovereign. The first act of his reign was to reward the services of Montemar with the title of duke of Bitonto, an annual pension of 14,000 ducats, and the perpetual custody of Castello Nuovo. To these rewards, the king of Spain added the honours of a grandee of the first class.*

As the imperialists were totally dissipated, even before Gaeta Pescara and Capua surrendered, measures were taken for the reduction of Sicily. Strengthened with considerable succours from Spain, Montemar landed at the head of a considerable force, in the neighbourhood of Palermo, was immediately welcomed as viceroy to the new sovereign, and before the middle of the ensuing summer reduced the whole island. Trapani, the last fortress held by the austrians, surrendered on the 21st of June.

The king himself passed over, and was crowned at Palermo, with great magnificence, on the 3rd of July. Nothing, indeed, was wanting to establish the sovereignty of Don Carlos, but the approbation of the pope, as liege lord of the two Sicilies; and, though he could not obtain the actual investiture, yet the spanish court so far intimidated the pope, as to induce him to maintain a neutrality, and refuse the customary tribute of a hackney, and purse of money, when offered by the emperor.†

* Muratori Ann. 1734.—Beccatini Storia di Carlo Terzo, *ibid.*

† Political State for July, 1735.

During this rapid conquest, the allied arms were crowned with no less splendid success in the north of Italy. Count Mercy, the most enterprising of the austrian generals, was defeated and killed in a desperate attempt to penetrate into the country south of the Po, at the bloody battle of Parma. Reinforcements were poured in to the imperial army to replace its losses; the veteran Staremberg, who had succeeded in the command, made repeated efforts to pass the Po; but he experienced the same ill success as his predecessor, and before the close of the campaign was circumscribed to the possession of Orbitello, Mirandola, and Mantua with its territory.

CHAP. XLI.

1732

1736.

June 29.

On the return of the season for action, powerful reinforcements arrived from France and Spain. The reduction of the two Sicilies being completed, a body of spaniards, under the conqueror of Bitonto, landed on the coast of Tuscany, and occupying the fortresses, joined the allies to gather new laurels in Lombardy. With this accession of strength, Orbitello was reduced by the spaniards, the imperialists were driven into the Trentin; and Mantua, the key of Lombardy, was closely blockaded by the united armies.*

Meanwhile the operations in Germany, though less brilliant, were scarcely less favourable. The duchy of Lorraine was occupied without opposition, and an army of 100,000 french troops, after reducing Kehl, advanced beyond the Rhine. In the ensuing year the country watered by the Moselle was secured by the capture of Treves and Traerbach, and a way was opened into Germany by the reduction of the strong fortress of Philipsburgh, the siege of which was rendered memorable by the death of the veteran marshal Berwick, who fell before its walls. The imperial army, though commanded by Eugene, was too inferior in force, too deficient in discipline

1733.

1734.

* Muratori.

CHAP. XLI.

1732

1736.

and appointments, and too much divided by the intrigues of its chiefs, to act on the offensive, and passed the whole campaign of 1735 in merely witnessing, without attempting to obstruct the triumphs of the enemy.*

In the midst of these events, Philip was engaged in a dispute with the pope; and notwithstanding his attachment to the church, and his title of catholic king, he resented the insults of the roman see, with a spirit and dignity becoming a successor of Charles the fifth. Some of his officers, endeavouring to enlist recruits at Rome, were massacred in a temporary commotion by the populace. A similar tumult arose at Velletri, in consequence of the exactions of the spaniards; and a body of their troops were obliged to quit the city, and fall back towards Rome. The satisfaction required not being given by Clement the twelfth, the spanish and neapolitan ministers withdrew from Rome, commanded the subjects of their respective sovereigns to quit the city; and the papal nuntio was dismissed from Naples. At the same time the spaniards returned with an accession of force to Velletri, erected gibbets in the market places, imprisoned many who were engaged in the recent commotion, and after committing various outrages levied a contribution of 8,000 crowns as a compensation for exemption from military execution. Another detachment committed similar exactions in Ostia; and a third, under a trifling pretence, extorted 5,000 crowns from the inhabitants of Palestrina. The court of Madrid also displayed no less resentment against the pope. The nuntio was dismissed, his tribunal closed, and all payments and contributions to the roman see were suspended. These vigorous measures reduced the pope to submission. He not only gave

Dec. 19. the required satisfaction, but purchased a perfect reconcilia-

* History of the House of Austria, v. 2, ch. 11.

tion by conferring the cardinal's hat on the infant Don Philip, then only eight years of age, and appointing him administrator to the archbishopric of Toledo.*

CHAP. XLI.

1732

1736.

In this favourable situation of affairs, Elizabeth Farnese already anticipated the expulsion of the austrians from Italy, and the establishment of a new sovereignty for her second son Don Philip. But her sanguine hopes were frustrated by those divisions among the members of an extensive combination which are the natural consequences of success. France having secured Loraine, the possession of which she had coveted for more than two centuries, was unwilling to confer new power in Italy either on the king of Sardinia or on the spaniards. The cautious Fleury was also alarmed by the threats and preparations of England and Holland; both now fully sensible of their impolicy in permitting the degradation of the House of Austria. But the king of Sardinia in particular, who had greatly contributed to the success of the late campaigns, was alarmed at the progress made by his own allies; and determined not to suffer the establishment of another spanish prince in Lombardy on the ruins of the austrian dominion. These jealousies and jarring interests led to mutual opposition and separate negotiations: France and Sardinia, in secret understanding with England, obstructed the blockade of Mantua, and prevented its reduction particularly by refusing to supply the battering artillery for a siege.†

All the efforts of the different parties were now turned to

* Muratori Annali d'Italia, anno 1736.—Beccatini Storia di Carlo Terzo. —Ortiz, t. 7, p. 448.


† The correspondence of lord Waldegrave, british minister at Paris, presents numerous proofs that France employed every expedient to obstruct the reduction of Mantua; and that having secured her own objects in the cession of Loraine and Bar, she was anxious to reduce Spain to favourable terms of peace.

CHAP. XLI.

1732

|

1736.



Oct. 3.

negotiation ; while the maritime powers, pressing their mediation on all, prepared to support their instances by an appeal to arms. But France with her usual address artfully profited by the displeasure which the emperor felt at the lukewarm support, or rather the desertion of the maritime powers, to open a secret negotiation. La Beaume, a confidential agent of the cardinal minister, repaired to Vienna ; and with the same mystery and the same success as Ripperda, concluded the preliminaries of a general pacification without the participation of any other power.*

The substance of these preliminaries, after they were finally arranged and modified, was : Stanislaus to renounce the crown of Poland, retaining the title of king ; and to possess during his life the duchy of Lorraine, which after his decease, was to revert to France. In return, Tuscany was entailed on the duke of Lorraine, as a compensation for the loss of his paternal dominions. France guarantied the pragmatic sanction ; acknowledged Augustus king of Poland, and acquiesced in the intended marriage of the eldest archduchess with the duke of Lorraine. The emperor ratified the cession of Lorraine and Bar, renounced Naples and Sicily in favour of Don Carlos, and in return was to receive Parma and Tuscany, with the territories conquered during the war in the north of Italy.†

These preliminaries were followed by a suspension of arms for the conclusion of a definitive peace.

This accommodation, effected without that participation with Spain which was due by the bonds of alliance, roused the indignation of Philip, and still more that of his consort.

* History of the House of Austria, v. 2, ch. 11, 12.—Conduct of England in the Polish affairs.

† Preliminaries of Vienna in Rousset and other Collections of public papers.

He felt the want of confidence manifested towards him by his nephew; but she was deeply mortified at the compulsory cession of her paternal inheritance, the utter failure of her long cherished hopes of an austrian alliance, and the loss of that establishment in Lombardy which she considered as already secured to her second son. The manner in which they received the first intelligence sufficiently marks their wounded pride and indignation.

CHAP. XLI.

1732

1736.

“I never,” said Mr. Keene, “saw the king more gay nor so talkative as he has been since he first knew of this transaction. They have found means to make him over act his part. The queen’s behaviour requires a stronger term than affectation. Patiño keeps the best countenance he can. But it is not to be doubted that the king suffers extremely from the treatment he has met with from his nation; the queen from being disappointed in her ambition; and Patiño from finding himself a dupe, he who thought himself capable of duping the rest of mankind by his superiority of genius. I have yet heard nothing of what has fallen from the queen, but what she told a friend of mine yesterday, that as long as she breathed she would have nothing to do with France.

Nov. 21.

“The french ambassador goes to court as usual, but the cool reception he meets with does not encourage him to repeat his visits. Their catholic majesties in his presence redouble their civilities to the other *ministre de famille*, the duke of Sora.*

“When the ambassador received his first orders to speak of this affair to the court, Patiño told him his excuses were so light and trivial, that he advised him not to open his lips upon it to the king, to avoid the disagreeable incidents which might happen in such conversation, where the queen might be less

* The neapolitan ambassador.

CHAP. XLI.

1732

1736.

mistress of her temper than when she was by herself. This advice has been observed.

* * * * *

“In his conversations with me, Patiño said, ‘the queen foretold to Rottembourg all which has happened when he pressed them to enter into the war.’ They have paid, he says, two millions and a half of piastres on account of subsidies to the french, who have likewise demanded half of what was to have been given to Sweden by the late treaty. They have constantly sent 600,000 piastres a month into Italy; and they were yet in a condition to carry on the war two years longer; and would have done it, had they not been abandoned.”*

Both sovereigns made the most vehement complaints to the french court. “Tell the cardinal,” said the indignant queen to Patiño, “that nothing but his decrepitude is capable of committing such follies, and receive the french ambassador no more in your house.”†

Philip likewise expressed his chagrin in the strongest terms which courtly decorum would permit, in the letter written to the king of France, acknowledging the reception of these unwelcome preliminaries. “The ambassador of your majesty has delivered to me your letter of the 29th of November. By its contents, I learn that your majesty is persuaded you have had powerful motives for concluding without my knowledge, and in the midst of signal victories, a particular treaty with the emperor. My love towards the person of your majesty, and my attachment to the honour of the french nation, do not permit me to investigate these motives. I can only believe, they must have been of the most weighty nature, to

Jan. 7,
1736.

* Mr. Keene to the duke of Newcastle, Nov. 21, 1735.

† Mem. de Richelieu, t. 5, p. 386.

CHAP. XLI.

1732

1736.

be preferred to those which arise at all times from our intimate connection by blood, my own desire of an union, and my blind submission to the wishes and instances which your majesty has repeatedly expressed in your letters. However, I flatter myself that the engagements contracted by your majesty will never lead so far as to the abandonment of my son, the king of the two Sicilies, to the ambition of the enemy, nor of my troops to their good fortune. This I expect from the invariable affection I bear your majesty.*"

Thus mortified and disappointed, they employed the intervention of England to make an overture to the emperor, and resolving to prosecute the war alone, declined ratifying the preliminaries. But this imprudent delay placed their troops in an alarming and critical situation. Montemar, who proved himself worthy of his past successes, and was eager to add new splendour to his reputation, had of his own accord refused to accept the armistice without the express orders of his court. But his troops were dispersed over a great extent of country, and intermixed with the french and sardinians, from whom it was in vain to expect support. Far from being in a condition to act offensively, they were in hourly danger of being cut off by the austrians, and not without apprehensions of an attack from their own allies. In this situation, Montemar had no other alternative than to extricate himself from the immediate danger to which he was exposed, and fall back behind the Po. From hence he retreated to Bologna, hoping that the respect due to the church would secure him in the papal territories. While, however, he was giving a public entertainment to the principal nobles of the place, he was surprised by an incursion of the german hussars; and deeming them the advanced guard of the imperial army, he suddenly directed

* Pardo, Jan. 7, 1736.—Private communications in the Keene Papers.

CHAP. XLI.

1732

1736.

his march to Tuscany, harrassed in his retreat by different parties of these irregulars, who plundered his baggage, made the stragglers prisoners, and took possession of his hospital at Bologna with 1,500 sick. During this perilous march, the duke of Noailles with difficulty persuaded him to accept the armistice for two months, as the only expedient to save his troops, and prevent the loss of his recent conquests.*

In this extremity, Philip, deserted by his allies, threatened by the hostile preparations of the maritime powers, and alarmed by the appearance of a british squadron on his coasts, reluctantly acceded to the preliminaries of Vienna on the 18th of May 1736. His acceptance was preceded by that of Don Carlos, as king of the two Sicilies, on the 1st of May.†

Before, however, this accommodation was concluded, a new and distinct dispute arose between Spain and Portugal, the real motive, or at least the final result, of which was a hostile design against the colony of Sacramento, on the Rio de la Plata, so long coveted by Spain.

John the fifth, king of Portugal, united by the bonds of marriage with the austrian family, and with the maritime powers by interest, fostered an inveterate jealousy of the House of Bourbon, which was too deeply rooted to be eradicated by the double marriage lately concluded. A jealousy no less inveterate was fostered against Portugal, by the rival court of Madrid. In this temper, a diplomatic dispute of the most trifling kind threatened the renewal of hostilities, and led almost to an open rupture between two princes equally punctilious and irritable.

* Noailles, t. 5, p. 258, 278.—Muratori.

† Memoirs of sir Robert Walpole, ch. 44, 45.—House of Austria, v. 2, ch. 12, 13.—Tindal, v. 20, ann. 1735—6.—Hist. Register and Political State from 1733 to 1739.—Rousset.—Koch. Hist. des Traités.—Conduct of England, &c. MS.

The servants of Don Cabral de Belmonte, the portuguese minister at Madrid, having rescued a malefactor from the officers of justice, were all arrested and imprisoned by order of the court. The spanish minister at Lisbon also demanded satisfaction for this outrage to public justice; but had the mortification to see nineteen of his own domestics seized in his house and conveyed to prison. Mutual complaints were made, and as neither party shewed the slightest disposition to retract, the two ministers retired from their respective embassies, and both nations made preparations for hostilities.

The king of Portugal appealed to the maritime powers and the emperor, complained of the ill treatment which his daughter received from her mother in law, and represented that the slightest hope of foreign support would induce the disaffected party in Spain to shake off the tyranny of the queen, and place the government in the hands of the prince of Asturias. This appeal drew liberal promises of assistance from the emperor, who hoped to renew hostilities, on the same principle as in the war of the succession. But the maritime powers were too zealously inclined for peace, to give ear to these extravagant plans, and the british government only sent a squadron of twenty-five sail, under sir John Norris, to secure the return of the merchant fleet from the Brazils, and repress any enterprise on the part of Spain. At the same time, they disclaimed all hostile views, and offered their mediation to terminate the dispute.

This measure, though qualified with every mark of consideration, produced the customary remonstrances and extravagances from the court of Madrid. Philip rejected any other mediation except that of France; but while a negotiation was pending in Europe, he made an attack in America, against the

CHAP. XLI.

1732

1736.

CHAP. XLI.

1732

1736.

July,
1736.

obnoxious colony of Sacramento, and succeeded in driving the Portuguese from their incroachments on the spanish territory. Having attained this object, and dreading the injury which the american trade would sustain from the hostility of England, in resentment for this aggression, he shewed more disposition towards an accommodation, and was induced to refer the dispute to the maritime powers and France. The mediating powers not being averse to the partial exclusion of the portuguese from the Rio de la Plata, the consent of Portugal was extorted. After a quibbling negotiation, a convention dictated by the mediators was accepted by both courts, and a treaty signed at Paris terminated this dispute, which, however apparently frivolous, might have again involved Europe in a general war.*

During the negotiation, the queen did not manifest her resentment with more decorum than on preceding occasions. To the french ambassador, she observed, "if we do not handle that fellow the king of Portugal pretty roughly, nothing can be got out of him." The king then asking if it was not an easy matter to treat Portugal in the manner the queen had mentioned, the ambassador replied, "it is but too easy, but these affairs are in the hands of the mediators, and what has happened is to be laid to their account." "That is true," interrupted the queen, "yet in the mean time nothing is decided." Changing her voice, she continued, "You all spoil that court by your complaisance; and I assure you if it was not for the little one, (alluding to her daughter), the king of Portugal should already have had a box on the ear."†

* Memoirs of sir Robert Walpole, ch. 5 — Mr. Keene's Correspondence from Madrid, and lord Tyrawley's from Lisbon.

† Mr. Keene to the duke of Newcastle, Segovia, Sept. 24, 1736.

CHAPTER XLII.

1736—1739.

Reluctance of Spain to accede to the definitive Treaty, and attempts to renew the War—Death, Character, and Administration of Patiño—Account of his Successor, La Quadra, and the new Administration—Signature of the definitive Treaty.

UNWILLING to relinquish Parma and Placentia, and to resign Tuscany in favour of the House of Loraine, the spanish cabinet started innumerable objections in the course of the negotiation, and repeatedly appealed to France and the maritime powers, as guaranties of those successions. But as France would not interfere, and as the maritime powers insisted on the evacuation of Tuscany, Philip and his queen next brought forward claims to the rich allodials of the deceased duke. They temporised till the imperial troops were withdrawn from Italy, in consequence of the war between Russia and Turkey, and then, suddenly resuming their preparations, appeared determined to renew hostilities, under the pretext of these allodials, though with the hope of a favourable opportunity to appropriate the whole inheritance.

But at this moment, their plans were disconcerted by the death of Don Joseph Patiño, who has been termed the Colbert of Spain, and was perhaps the most able minister, who, since the accession of Philip, had directed the helm of state.

Patiño was of noble birth, and, if we may credit the information of Montgon,* commenced his youthful career in the

* T. 1, p. 507.

CHAP. XLII.

1736

1739.

CHAP. XLII.

1736.

1739.

order of the jesuits. He became the sole confidant and principal coadjutor of Alberoni, contributed to the fall of Ripperda, and afterwards shared with La Paz the royal favour. His superior talents however soon gained the ascendancy, and the death of his colleague in 1733, left him without a competitor in power. He possessed all the qualities which were requisite to manage a suspicious and hypochondriac monarch like Philip, and an artful impetuous and interested woman like the queen. He was equally master of every branch of policy, clear and prompt in the transaction of business, and combined uncommon address, subtilty, and suavity of manners, with the firm and persevering spirit of a spaniard. Like his able predecessor, he threw off the trammels of office imposed by the councils, suppressed the endless discussions by memorials and reports, which had rendered the tardiness of the spanish government proverbial, and united in his own person the principal management of every department in the administration.

In the midst of perpetual avocations and interminable disputes, the ministry of Patiño was marked by continual, though silent efforts to increase the strength and promote the welfare of Spain. Duly appreciating the high importance of the american colonies, he directed his earliest attention to the exclusion of foreigners from the lucrative traffic of those regions. He completed a plan which appears to have been almost the last act of Alberoni, for concentrating the whole american trade, exclusively at Cadiz, and rendering the intercourse with the colonies direct, systematic, and safe.

In promotion of this design, he laboured to raise the spanish marine, and silently to station an efficient force in the seas of America. As early as 1728, his exertions awakened the jealous vigilance of England. "Ever since," says Mr. Keene, "I returned to this country, I observed, with the greatest con-

cern, the progress Patiño was making towards a powerful marine, and I have repeated it in most of the dispatches I have had the honour to write. That idea is so strong in him, that neither the subsidies paid to the emperor, nor the misery of the spanish troops, nor the poverty of the household and tribunals can divert him from it. He has the finances at his command, and the money which is not sent into Italy for the queen's use, is all applied to the building of ships. He supports himself with the king by giving him hopes of being great at sea, and independent of all other nations; and with the queen, by taking care of her private interest.

CHAP. XLII.

1736

1739.

Aug. 23,
1728.

“ In carrying on this scheme, I have likewise observed, that he has endeavoured to do it with as little noise as possible, not to awaken the jealousy of the maritime powers. For this reason, his ships are built and kept in different ports, that they may depart two or three at a time, and escape inquiry and observation. The three ships which were last dispatched to the Indies, were an instance of this way of proceeding. It was given out that they were to cruize in the Mediterranean, and provisions accordingly collected for such an expedition. But as soon as they arrived in a certain latitude, and opened their instructions, they were ordered to the Indies, and were to touch at the Canaries, and take in a fresh supply of necessaries. So that I have not yet found that this design was to send a number of vessels at once to the Indies, but by degrees; and I only mention with certainty those that were at Cadiz, because I was assured by one of the contractors for victualling them, that provisions were ordered for no more than the eight ships at that port. By the list of the ships inclosed in my letter of the 26th past, it will appear that nine were to be built in the Indies. But as they will want several materials which must be procured from Europe, I imagine such materials and stores

CHAP. XLII.

1736

1739.

are to be sent by the first ships to those parts. Some have been already transported, as I gather from Patiño's frequent assurances, that the South Sea company's factors will not fail to find all sorts of materials at Vera Cruz."*

Without adverting to inferior regulations, which it would be tedious were it practicable to detail, it will sufficiently shew the spirit of Patiño's ministry, to call the attention of the reader to those plans and establishments which he formed in imitation of the great trading companies in other countries. During the reign of the german influence, when it was proposed to transfer the Ostend company to Triest, he projected a plan to unite the trade of the austrian and spanish monarchies, by means of this company, and render Cadiz the center of commerce with the North, the Netherlands, Germany, the Levant, and the East Indies, as well as the West.† When this design was frustrated by the abolition of the company, he formed another establishment, to draw to Spain the cocoa trade, and diminish the contraband, carried on by the subjects of England, Holland, and France, with the countries and islands of the bay of Mexico. This was the company of Guiposcoa, the object of which was partly commercial, partly to increase the marine. It was yearly to furnish two ships of 40 or 50 guns each, which were to be laden at Port Passage, and San Sebastian, with native productions and commodities, and to dispose of their cargoes, in exchange for cocoa, and other productions of the Caraccas, Venezuela, Cumana, Margarita, and Trinidad. Both in their departure and return they were peculiarly favoured with regard to duties and privileges, and in the intervals of their voyages, were to cruize as guarda costas, keeping à constant watch on the shore between the river

1728.

* Mr. Keene to the duke of Newcastle, Madrid, Aug. 23, NS. 1728.

† Account of Ripperda by the Sicilian abbots.

Oronoco and the Rio de la Hacha, and capturing all vessels engaged in illegal traffic.*

CHAP. XLII,

1736

1739.

The success which attended this first essay, soon afterwards encouraged the minister to realise the plan of a company trading through the Philippines with the East Indies, an idea originally suggested by Ripperda. This company was no less favoured in its privileges than that of Guiposcoa. In opposition to that jealousy which the spanish monarchs had always manifested of their sovereign rights, it was empowered to form military establishments, and acquire territories in such parts of the east as were calculated to improve its commerce, and consolidate its strength. It naturally awakened umbrage in the trading nations, and appears to have silently sunk under the weight of their superior capital, power, and influence.†

1733.

Philip respected and listened to Patiño, though without bestowing on him his affection or confidence. The address of the queen, and the abilities of the minister, were often called forth to parry the effects of his morbid irritability and constitutional distrust. One instance in particular is recorded in the correspondence of Mr. Keene. Some of those secret counsellors to whom Philip constantly recurred for advice, suggested accusations against the minister, which made a deep impression on the mind of the melancholy and suspicious monarch. The queen, perceiving the effect of these insinuations, instead of irritating her husband by a direct opposition, affected to acquiesce in the charge, and hinted the

* Octroy de la compagnie de Guiposcoa, Rousset, t. 5, p. 239.—Keene's dispatches.

This company long continued to the advantage of the colonies, as well as of the mother country; but incurring heavy losses in the american war, and abuses creeping into its administration, it was suppressed. The trade was afterwards carried on by individuals.

† Historical Register for 1733.—Rousset, t. 8, p. 369.—Ulloa, t. 2.

CHAP. XLII.

1736

1739.

propriety of calling on the minister for a defence of his conduct. This pretext enabled Patiño to present an able and eloquent memorial, in which he did not fail to expatiate on the deplorable state of affairs when he entered on his office, and to draw a flattering picture of the benefits derived from his administration. With affected modesty he appealed to the king to shew the faults of his system, and solicited his majesty in his superior wisdom to point out alterations and improvements. Such a detail was suited to the taste and principles of Philip, who was equally gratified by the prospect of the national improvement, and by an appeal to his judgment. The queen, never neglecting to seize the favourable turn of her husband's disposition, affected to be influenced by his conviction, and concluded with lamenting the unjust prejudices which she had permitted herself to foster against Patiño.*

Notwithstanding the triumphant result of this trial, Patiño had other difficulties to contend with, besides the suspicions and prejudices of his sovereign. It required all his abilities to find resources for maintaining those hostilities which the queen meditated in Italy and Portugal; for, though he proudly boasted that he had means in reserve to protract the contest for two years, the pay of the troops was considerably in arrears, and no less than four years' salary was due to the royal household. Even the mechanical operations of his various offices were become a burthen far superior to his strength. Mr. Keene gives a picture of his embarrassments in the early period of his ministry, before they were increased by the difficulties arising from the Italian war. "It is scarcely possible for me to lay before the ministry the extreme disorder into which the king's way of life throws business, and those who are to transact it. * * * For several

* Mr. Keene's dispatches to the duke of Newcastle, April 30, 1736.

months, nothing has been thought of but equipping the spanish fleet, and sending away the infant to Italy. Patiño, who is charged with the whole, loses four hours every day in mere attendance at the palace, and I lose as many in looking after him. His nights from two till six pass in conversation with their catholic majesties, and when he has time, it is employed how he can bring them to agree in sentiments with each other, and how he can preserve his authority with both. He has scarcely time to eat or sleep. But I would not be understood by this to make his apology ; for no one can be more certain than I am, that he is an enemy to all foreign commerce, and as he has more knowledge of trade and of the abuses in the customs than any minister had before him, he will make us more uneasy than any has yet done. We had formerly to complain of delays and *la lenteur Espagnole* ; now there is a share of malice in his resolution to reform and new model what he thinks prejudicial to Spain.”*

Patiño doubtless fell a sacrifice to his violent and continued exertions both of body and mind. He was seized with a mortal disorder, and, after lingering a month, died on the 6th of November, 1736, in his 70th year. Devoted to his sovereigns to the latest moment of his life, he transmitted his secret papers to the king, and sent his dying advice on the critical state of affairs with the same judgment and perspicuity which he had displayed while in perfect health. Philip received the news of his decease with his characteristic phlegm ; but the queen felt the deepest concern for the loss of one, who, as Mr. Keene observes, was a minister after her own heart. From respect, however, for the king, she suppressed her concern in public, under an affectation of indifference, and flattered him by repre-

CHAP. XLII.

1736

1739.

* Mr. Keene to Mr. Walpole, Nov. 25, 1731.

CHAP. XLII.

1736

1739.

senting the deceased statesman as his scholar. "The king and I," she said to Mr. Keene, "formed him to foreign affairs; we can transact our business ourselves, and form other ministers."

Notwithstanding this affectation of dignified pride, no testimony of regret and regard was omitted either during his illness or after his death. Philip soothed his dying hours by creating him a grandee with reversion to his heirs, and granting a considerable pension to his niece, the countess of Fuenclara. The charges of his funeral were defrayed by the treasury; the ceremony was attended by the royal officers and the corregidor of Madrid; and he was interred with scarcely fewer honours than a prince of the blood.*

After the preceding detail, little remains to be added to our account of this able minister. Exposed to the shock of clashing interests, surrounded by multiplied embarrassments, obliged at the same time to consult the prejudices of the king, and bend to the passions of the queen, his character and conduct have been unfavourably represented by foreigners. He was said by Fleury, "to speak as well as write in cypher;" he has been accused of prevarication, duplicity, want of faith, of personal and national prejudice. Possibly these charges are not totally unfounded. But, in judging him as a minister, some allowance should be made for the difficulties of his situation; and the concurring testimony of friends and enemies, proclaims his superior merit and talents. It was the confession even of a political rival, that his loss was irreparable to Spain.†

By the death of Patiño, the administration again reverted

* Mr. Keene to Mr. Walpole, Nov. 6, 1736, and dispatches about the same period to the duke of Newcastle.

† Mr. Walpole's Narrative of the conduct of England in the Polish transactions, MS.

into the hands of the king, and the consequent changes called forth a new set of actors on the political theatre.

The chief of the new ministry was Don Sebastian de la Quadra, originally page to Grimaldo, with the marquis de la Paz, and like him gradually advanced in office. At his death, he was the first clerk in the department of foreign affairs; and, after a service of thirty years, was appointed secretary of state. He was a man of limited capacity, conscious of his want of talents, and so far inferior to his predecessor, that it was maliciously said, Patiño had recommended him to render his own loss more sensible and more regretted. Unlike Patiño, who ruled his sovereigns even while affecting to bend to their wishes, and flattering their ambition, La Quadra possessed all the timidity and irresolution of a weak and contracted mind, and aspired no higher than to become the mere agent of the king and queen.

Mr. Keene wrote at the moment of his nomination, "La Quadra will place his utmost merit entirely on his resignation to their orders, without prompting them to any party, or making himself responsible for the least imaginable accident. His fear of speaking more than he should will keep him from talking as much as he ought, and he would as soon discover to a foreign minister the most important secrets of his court, as tell the place from whence he received his last courier. As for the rest, he passes for a very honest man, has no sort of bias for one country more than another, nor any private views to engage him to give any other turn to the instances that pass through his hands, than the natural one in which they are made to him. He will be slow in his operations, and will demand informations and reports upon any trivial matter of commerce, in the same manner as the marquis de la Paz,

CHAP. XLII.

1736

1739.

CHAP. XLII.

1736

|
1739.

and as was constantly practised here till Patiño broke through those tedious formalities.”*

Another of the ministers recommended by Patiño, was the marquis of Terranueva, who had been brought up under him in the management of the finances, and succeeded as secretary for that department. The marine and Indies were confided to Don Francisco Varas, who had long filled the place of one of his agents at Cadiz.

The only person of note in this new ministry was the duke of Montemar, who, after his return from Italy, was intrusted with the war department, a post for which he was well qualified by his experience and military skill.

Thus, almost for the first time since the accession of Philip, the direction of affairs was wholly confided to the hands of Spaniards. But the loss of the late active and able minister, and the inability of his successors to supply his place, joined with the increasing deficiency in the finances, and the lukewarmness of France, induced Philip to relinquish his plans of aggression, and listen to the instances made him for the conclusion of a general peace.†

England and France, both equally interested in the restoration of tranquillity, continued to press the arrangement of a definitive treaty on the basis of the Vienna preliminaries. At length, after all those contests, quibbles, and evasions, and those discordant interests which never failed to arise whenever the courts of Madrid, Vienna, and Turin, were jointly concerned, the definitive treaty was signed between France and Austria on the 8th of November, 1739. The king of Sardinia acceded on the 3rd of the ensuing February, and the kings of

* Mr. Keene to the duke of Newcastle.

† Mr. Keene's dispatch, Nov. 6, 1736.—Mr. Walpole's deduction of the negotiations from 1733 to 1736. Walpole Papers, MS.

Spain and Naples, on the 21st of April. The king of Spain withdrew his troops from Parma, Placentia, and the places which they still held in Lombardy. Don Carlos was formally acknowledged king of the two Sicilies, and received the investiture from the Pope. As the great duke of Tuscany had died in July 1737, the whole arrangement was carried into complete execution by the absolute cession of Loraine to France, and the occupation of Tuscany by Francis, duke of Loraine, who had recently espoused Maria Theresa, the eldest daughter of the emperor.*

CHAP. XLII.

1736

1739.

* Desormeaux, t. 5.—Ortiz, lib. 24, c. 4.—Rousset.—Treaties of Peace from 1736 to 1739.—Tindal, 1736—1739 ;—And the dispatches of Mr. Keene for the same period, besides those already quoted.

END OF VOL. II.

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* In consequence of the death of the emperor, the
Peace from 1735 to 1737. — The Peace of 1735 — The Peace of 1737 —
Treaty of the Alliance, 1735 — The Peace of 1737 — The Peace of 1737 —

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